"
<
http://www.shabait.com/articles/q-a-a/12829-the-emergence-of-the-eplf-as-a-
power-promoted-the-geo-political-interest-of-the-eritrean-people-mr-alamin-m
ohammed-seid> The emergence of the EPLF as a power promoted the
geo-political interest of the Eritrean people": PFDJ Secretary Mr. Alamin
Mohammed Seid
29 March 2013 11:34 |
Exactly 25 years before the EPLF staged a lightening offensive against the
largest and greatest army of the Derg, the Nadew command. Many historians
compare this offensive so worlds' greatest victory- like what Basil
Davidson, reffered the offensive as the African Dien Bien Phu. Commemorating
this special event, Mr. Alamin Mohammed Seid, Secretary of the PFDJ,
conducted an extensive interview with the local Medias. Excerpts of the
whole interview follow:
Q: Mr. Alamin Mohammed Seid, we would like to begin our question with the
first stage of our struggle 1977-1987. This stage has significant place in
our struggle with regards political and military developments. It was also a
period in which there was Soviet interference and the EPLF was compelled to
shifting from an offensive into a defensive position and conduct strategic
withdrawal. Could you please tell us what was the situation during this
stage?
First I would like to thank you for having me. It is also very important for
we are going 25 years back and talk about past events and draw important
experiences. If we are to talk about the demise of Nadew Command (What we
call Nakfa Front) and the liberation of Afabet town we have first to look at
the situation prior to that. It is very important to look at the general
picture between 77 and 87. How was the Command demolished? What victory was
gained? How did the situation emerge? It is very important to look at these
questions separately. One important aspect during this stage was the
strategic withdrawal and the change of military balance. Until 1977 the
balance of power was in favor of the EPLF but after that the situation
changed. An important political development emerged in the field that went
on for ten years, from 1977-1987. That was the Second and Unity Congress was
conducted and with that the unity within the Eritrean revolution was
realized. The struggle continued within the framework and credence of the
EPLF. Hence, the Second and Unity Congress was an important political
milestone.
The second scenario that emerged during this time was the interference of
the Soviet Union. This external intervention had two strategies: the enemy
and the external forces that took side with the enemy with a motive to deny
the fundamental rights of the Eritrean people (the Soviet Union and its
allies-South Yemen, some Palestine organizations) on one hand and the EPLF
and other revolutionary fighters on the other. The antagonism was between
these two forces. This stage was very complicated and intertwined. How did
the EPLF pass through that? The liberation struggle sustained because all
Eritreans nationalists from all factions stood together against the external
invasion and against the sub-nationalist elements within the revolution.
That was a very historic stage in which the unity of the true nationalists
was realized.
The other scenario observed within these 10 years was the drought. There was
severe drought. The situation was very challenging for both the Eritrean
people, the EPLF as well as for the Horn of Africa. However, the EPLF
shouldered the task of alleviating and controlling these challenges; it set
up camps and run programs to provide shelter and care for dislocated
families and orphaned children and it eased the problem.
The other aspect worth mentioning during this stage was the political
activity. From 1977 to 1987 rigorous political activities were conducted
targeted at the population and the combatants. Conducting strategic
withdrawal was by itself historical. The second aspect of the EPLF's
political work pertained to mass organizations. The fundamental policy was
to organize the Eritrean masses on the basis of their social status into
associations of workers, peasants, students, women as well as professionals.
Empowering the people was a big task of the time. The strategy of the EPLF
was to free the land and people stage by stage. In other words after
liberating the land the task was enabling the population participate in
political activities through forming resistance committees. The challenge
was on how to materialize the then slogan of the EPLF: politicizing,
organizing and arming the people. In the 1977-1987 periods the efforts made
to promote the role of women were also of special interest. The EPLF gave
special attention to women to ensure their participation in the struggle for
independence. Hence, it was made possible that the Eritrean women become
exemplary by heroically demonstrating their importance in the struggle.
The other aspect I would like to mention was the different attempts waged by
the enemy quarters to foil the Eritrean revolution through means of arms,
media and diplomatic maneuvers. However, the EPLF was able to conduct
significant media and diplomatic activities reorganizing itself inside the
country and abroad.
With the strategic withdrawal there were many who doubted the continuity of
the revolution. There were also some which thought that was the end of the
Eritrean revolution. The EPLF, however, continued the struggle employing
sophisticated strategies and tactics and possessing superior consciousness
and morale.
Hence, the period could be described as a period in which the EPLF came
triumphant by foiling different offensives by the Derge regime. The EPLF is
huge organization and it was a huge success for it to organize a formidable
army we call EPLA.
Q: We understand that the interference of the Soviet Union in 1977-78 was
very trying time for the Eritrean revolution. But still the EPLF came out
stronger; what was the secret behind it?
The secret is being Eritrean; the perseverance of the Eritrean people. In
1977 almost 95% of the land was liberated. 90% of it under direct
administration of the EPLF and due to the massive Soviet interference the
balance of power shifted in favor of the Derge regime and we were compelled
to conduct strategic withdrawal.
Expectation for an external help had been always the culture of the
successive Ethiopian regimes. The Haileselasie regime stayed in power during
the Second World War because of direct assistance from the west. Eritrea was
condemned to stay under Ethiopian rule because of unjust decision on the
part of the west, especially of that of the US. Likewise, the Derge regime
in 1977 realizing its defeat at the hands of the EPLF sought help from the
Soviet Union. And it received massive military hardware and the military
hardware was transported to Eritrea by cargo planes and ships.
With the circumstances on the ground the EPLF was compelled to withdraw from
the 90% land which was under its administration. The strategic withdrawal
did not mean taking a leap back to the base area. The basic elements of the
strategic withdrawal were preserving human resources, conserving weapons,
boasting morale of the combatants, inflicting human, material and morale
loses on the enemy. That demonstrated the strong quality and far sight of
its leadership. That was the secret of the EPLF and is documented in the
annals of history. There was strong belief on the EPLF's leadership,
perseverance and firm stance.
Q: The Eritrean revolution at the time did not have recognition from the two
camps. It has been also said that "The Eritrean revolution is committing
suicide". What was that the two camps failed to see? What is the secret for
the EPLF to emerge triumphant passing through such trying time?
Eritrea, in geo-political perspective, is located along the Red Sea and in
the Horn of Africa. The area has geo-political importance. If you have the
desire to control the Red Sea, the Horn of African and above all the Indian
Ocean you have to occupy Eritrea. This is the core problem on the part of
the world powers. It is a matter of interest. And the only power, in their
eyes, that could guarantee their interest in the region is not the EPLF but
the regime in Ethiopia. They first said that was the Haileselasie regime
that could ensure their interest. The Haileselasie regime was overthrown by
the military junta. Then they associated to with the junta believing that
could safeguard their interest. On the other side the EPLF is the owner of
the land and has strong and committed people ready to fight for their right.
Frankly speaking thanks to the EPLF the Eritrean people reached to this
stage.
The emergence of the EPLF as a power promoted geo-political interest of the
Eritrean people. And I still believe that the geo-political interest of the
Eritrean people will be further realized by the EPLF.
Q: During that stage the Derge regime had one of the strongest armies in the
region. And because the regime was conducting successive military invasions
there was no breathing space. The EPLF was engaged in repulsing the enemy
invasion on the front line as well as conducting different activities behind
the front line including establishing peoples' assemblies, empowering women,
providing academic education to combatants, sports activities as well as
political education. How do you explain this stage as political victory?
Military campaign is part of political process. To consolidate the political
process we had to build a strong army. There was no other means and that was
the core understanding of the occupation forces. Political works have also
to be done within the combatants and people in the liberated areas. Regular
political education was introduced to raise political consciousness of the
combatants and the people and establishment of popular assemblies and mass
organizations. That had to be conducted parallel with the military
developments. The end result of all the political activities is to reinforce
the combat capacity of the revolution.
The strategy pursued by the EPLF was to liberate the land and people stage
by stage. To this end the EPLF set out and formulated clear military and
political strategy. It was not an easy task. The period from 1977 to the
liberation of Afabet was challenging. And the demise of Nadew Command and
the liberation of Afabet was the sum total of all the undertakings I tried
to explain.
Q: During that stage the Derge possessed a massive and seemingly
inexhaustible military capacity, which enabled it to wage repeated
offensives. Amid such situations there were defenses and counterof-fensives
on one side and building up your own resources on the other. The EPLF was
able to establish popular assemblies behind enemy lines; elevate the rights
of Eritrean women to the highest standards; sensitize and raise the
fighters' awareness in academy, sport and politics. Mr. Alamin, how would
you describe this stage in terms of a political victory?
Military is an aspect of politics. If we were to carry out political
activities the only choice we had was to ensure our military strength.
Peaceful demonstrations, telegrams, meetings etc. did not coincide with the
views of those seeking control of this region.
Therefore, in line with the military campaigns, political awareness had also
to be raised in Eritrea, which was the aim of the changes in the liberated
areas that I have been mentioning: making sure that the general public
participated in the political process by way of popular assemblies and other
social forces, at home and abroad. It was a political phenomenon and the
military activities served as its boosters. In such a way the geo-political
interest of this region were able to be preserved. This was the cumulative
political work. And in the end it evolved into a military dimension with the
aim of gradually liberating Eritrean territory and reaching a definite
political level.
This was referred to by some as a "worn strategy" as the concept of
liberation of territory didn't really work out in their minds. But the EPLF
leadership had clear visions, objective calculations, and a distinct
know-how of its military strategies and political maneuvers. It knew how to
sensitize, organize and arm its people. But the struggle was not easy and
that made this stage a difficult one. In terms of time, we can say from 1977
up to the demise of the Nadew Command. Therefore, the fall of the Nadew
Front and the liberation of the town of Afabet were the outcome of
everything I have been talking about and not some bonus from heaven or
anywhere else.
Q: In 1987 when the EPLF was in a better position, the Second and Unity
Congress was conducted between the EPLF and ELF leadership. Politically,
what was the importance of this to the struggle for independence? What did
this signify?
In the first place, it confirmed the unity of the freedom fighters.
Previously, unity was understood differently by different ELF factions. On
our part, we [EPLF) believed that the unity of the fighters was more
important than the unity of a few people in the circle of leadership.
National Unity could be promoted through bottom-up approaches, and not
through a top-down process. This was a strongly shared perspective on the
part of EPLF. The other groups, however, placed more emphasis on a top-down
process of ensuring unity. However, such a process was likely to be a futile
one as foundation of unity had to be strengthened at the grassroots level.
We endeavored a lot to ensure unity through a bottom-up process. This was
the stand of the EPLF since the early days of its formation. This belief was
shared by the different groups that later formed the EPLF. These groups
themselves (PLF group one, PLF group 2 and PLF group 3) were also able to be
eventually united through such a process. The first and second groups raised
the awareness of the fighters with the intention of developing mutually
shared understanding regarding the common good of the country and the
importance of unity in fighting the common enemy. Unity was achieved
progressively through such a process. Through a progressive manner, stage by
stage the fighters started to eat together, to fight side by side in the
battle field and to trust each other. When PLF group one and the other two
were united in such a process, the EPLF conducted its First Congress in
1977.
The Second and Unity Congress of 1987 was the result of such a cumulative
process. At that time, unity was achieved between the EPLF and one major ELF
faction Sagim. The EPLF also did its best to have the different ELF factions
that remained in the field after the disintegration of ELF integrated in the
struggle for the independence of Eritrea. Through such efforts, those groups
were being integrated not to the EPLF but they were being integrated to the
common cause at large. While EPLF was an independent liberation movement
with its independent political programs that enabled it to lead the struggle
for independence, not only the EPLF but the Eritrean people at large had a
burning desire for independence. That is why 99.8% of the people of Eritrea
voted for independence during the referendum that was conducted after the
liberation of Eritrea. Actually, this was envisioned by the EPLF and this
indicates that the EPLF reflected the heart-felt aspirations of the Eritrean
people. The people on the other hand shouldered the responsibility of
implementing the strategies designed by the EPLF. Without conducting
referendum, the Eritrean independence could not have been achieved. This
indicates the farsightedness of the EPLF. The EPLF was a committed
leadership with clear objectives and action plans.
Q: In the 1980s, the EPLF had prepared a proposal regarding referendum. At
that time, the proposal seemed to be not much acceptable. What was the
reason behind preparing that proposal or considering referendum? Did this
signify that the EPLF felt that it was weak or had some fears, or was it
because the EPLF believed that it was the right thing to conduct referendum?
At that time, close ties had been established between the Ethiopian regime
and the Sudanese government (the Numeri administration) through the
mediation of Italy, Aden, Libya and others. Certain issues were being raised
by the aforesaid groups and other actors regarding the need to consider the
Eritrean case as internal affair of Ethiopia and accordingly solve it
internally within Ethiopia. Such actors might naively talk about the said
concerns. The real motives, however, were associated with the intention to
promote the national interests of the United States of America and that of
the Soviet Union through the green light that would be provided by the
Megistu regime in Ethiopia.
This was engineered taking into account the geopolitical importance of
Eritrea's strategic location. So it was a conspiracy. Given this situation,
what choice was available to us? As the EPLF used to confidently know the
heartfelt needs of the Eritrean people, this was not a challenge for it. At
that time, there were continuous meetings in Port Sudan, Khartoum and in the
field. Finally, the EPLF leadership decided in Khartoum that referendum
would be necessary for our case and that would enable us to challenge those
who would provide us with different packages of a proposal. Hence, the need
to conduct referendum was decided then. The issue of self-determination was
not an issue of concern only for the EPLF; it was an issue of concern mainly
for the Eritrean people at large. So the Eritrean people had to be consulted
and heeded. Whether the people of Eritrea wanted to be part of Ethiopia,
wanted to be entirely independent or wanted to be granted some sort of self
administration, the people had to be given a chance to voice their heartfelt
concerns. All the aforementioned actors were shocked when the decision to
conduct referendum was officially announced in 1980. They did not expect
such a level of political consciousness and maturity in the Horn of Africa.
Hence, they were so surprised. This is one of the reasons or strengths why
the EPLF has to be praised. It acted sensibly to promote the Eritrean cause.
Implementing this decision ten years later was also one of the strengths of
the EPLF. In relation to this issue, I strongly feel that the Eritrean
people are lucky. In my view, if there were no EPLF, Eritrea would not exist
as independent state and we would not talk about it proudly. It would be
disintegrated and would exist in a different form. Stated differently,
Eritrea would not be a united entity and it would not have an independent
identity. This is the foundation of the state of Eritrea.
Q: Let us proceed to another chapter in the Eritrean struggle for
independence. When it was decided to destroy the 'Nadew Command', what were
the factors that were considered to take that step? How was the capability
of the army stationed in the area and how was the extent of the coverage of
the front that was under the control of the enemy? And what was the reason
behind the decision on the part of the EPLF, what convinced the EPLF that it
can successful manage the military operation associated with destroying the
said command? The EPLF unusually announced in a leadership meeting following
its Second and Unity Congress that it would offensively attack the enemy.
This encouraged the people very much. What enabled or caused the EPLF to
officially say these things? Frustration? Eagerness to realize independence?
Or were there objectively studied realities?
The Nakfa Front was initially established in 1979 with the intention to
control Nakfa. It was hoped that controlling Nakfa would enable the Derge to
destroy EPLF bases. This was engineered to finally liquidate the EPLF.
Consequently, in 1977and 1987, there were many attempts to control Nakfa on
the part of the enemy. The length of the front covered 165 kilometers. It
extended from parts of the Red Sea coastal areas in the north to the parts
of the Anseba region in the south. Its width was estimated to be 100
kilometers. It extended from Nakfa in the north to Meshalit in the south.
The Eritrean fighters were also stationed accordingly in order to defend
themselves effectively. This front was one of the demanding fronts. There
were three large divisions of foot soldiers, one mechanized brigade, and ten
artillery battalions. Overall there were about 20,000 enemy soldiers
stationed at this front. But from 1st January 1987 onwards, the enemy was
being weakened because the EPLF had previously started to repeatedly attack
the enemy. For example, the EPLF had attacked the Derge soldiers stationed
at the Nakfa, Anseba, Halhal, Qinafna, Areza, Karneshim fronts.
Consequently, some 7,000 enemy soldiers were killed, around 5,000 soldiers
were wounded, and there were 1400 commanders and private captive soldiers.
All these were part of the preparation for eventually controlling the Nakfa
front. At the mid of 1987, the commander of the Nadew Command was Brigadier
General Tariku. Tariku was killed by Mengistu. Besides, the commander of the
Mekit Command, Brigadier General Kebede Gashaw, was also killed in the same
way, another important commander who was also a member of the central Derge
leadership, General Regassa Jima, was jailed, another important
commissioner; Shewargaw Bihunegn (a member of the central committee of the
Derge party) was also fired from his post. When these actions are examined
in terms of military standards, these were just the consequences of the
battles that took place at the mentioned fronts. In other words, the Derge
suffered considerable losses due to the repeated attacks of the EPLF. It was
after such successes that the EPLF attacked the Derge forces stationed at
the Nakfa Front (Nadew Command) on 17-19 March 1988. The command was
controlled by the EPLF within 73 hours. This was a step towards the Fenkil
Operation. The Fenkil Operation in turn was a stepping stone towards
controlling Dekmehare and then Asmara. 1977-1978 was a strategic withdrawal
and then 1987- 1988 was characterized by EPLF'S strategic attacks against
the Derg regime.
Q: Politically, there were also changes associated with the defeat of the
Derge regime in Afabet. The Derge regime called for peace talks, and many
countries also started to be interested in our struggle and accordingly
there were also new forms of interference on the part of some countries. To
this effect, what were the political gains associated with the defeat of the
Derge at Afabet (the Nadew Command)?
In the course of liberating Afabet or controlling the Nakfa front, the Nadew
Command, one of the special military commands of the Derg, was almost
entirely destroyed within 48 hours. This was a miracle performed by the
Eritrean liberation fighters! After the strategic withdrawal, that is, after
ten years of bitter struggle the Nadew Command was totally destroyed. Those
bitter battles experienced by the freedom fighters and the people at large
really showed the steadfastness and the strong commitment of the Eritrean
people to ultimately make Eritrea an independent state. By the standards of
military strategy, it was not thinkable to entirely control and destroy
within 48 hours a front that covered 165 kilometers.
It really takes a long, long time to examine and recount how this was
realized. To this degree, what is being narrated is just a fraction of what
happened then. It was just a miracle. So what was its outcome? The fact that
the Nadew Command was completely destroyed was a heavy blow to the Derge
regime. It was for the first time in the Horn of Africa that three military
officers of the Soviet Union were captured in this battle. What made that
very special was the fact that it was done by a mass liberation movement.
Such a situation has never happened in history, elsewhere in the world. The
Soviets were not captured in Somalia, Yemen or Afghanistan. But this just
happened in Eritrea!
As a result, much was talked about the success associated with the defeat of
the Derge regime in Afabet. Basil Davidson, a great English historian, for
example said," After 1954, it is for the first time in history that we are
witnessing a mass liberation movement to cause such considerable losses on
such a large colonial army." This is an important testimony and one can
easily imagine the political gains resulting from such a successful
achievement. Right after that front was destroyed, many who were previously
against the EPLF started to be on its side and to voice their support for
the EPLF. And many, including Gorbachev-who was Soviet Union's leader at
that time started to say that the Eritrean case should be resolved through
peaceful means. There were also two sessions held with Erich Honecker in
Germany towards this purpose. He placed more emphasis on the need for a
peaceful mechanism for resolving the conflict. This indicated that what was
previously asserted, by saying that the case of Eritrea is an internal
affair of Ethiopia that had to be addressed internally, was changed. But the
EPLF was not disrupted by such futile initiatives. It launched the Fenkil
Operation attack. That operation surprised many.
Like what Davidson asserted the Nadew operation was the first of its kind,
after 1954 when the Vietnamese defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu, in
which a liberation movement was able to defeat a government that had a
considerably large army. The fact that the Eritreans defeated the Ethiopians
in that manner was a colorful achievement. The Derge regime along with its
army was the most feared regime in our region (Yemen, Somalia and Sudan).
When Eritreans patriotically defeated the regime at Afabet, they felt
relieved. The fear associated with Ethiopia and its regime started to get
eroded. In my view, the achievements linked with the Nadew operation
motivated the Ethiopian Opposition groups of that time - the TPLF, the Oromo
and others-to play a role in weakening the Derge regime by launching an
attack within Ethiopia against the regime in a concerted manner with what
had to be done by the Eritreans.
Q: Thinking that there were further sacrifices paid in the course of
ultimately making Eritrea an independent state, why was the EPLF not able to
make use of the calls for peace talks following the demise of the Nadew
Command? There are some who feel that this would have been helpful for
avoiding the sacrifices that were paid in the following three years
(1988-1991)?
The EPLF entirely liberated Eritrea in 1991. At that time, the EPLF could
have declared the independence of Eritrea. But the EPLF realized that it was
not a feasible option to do so and the need to conduct referendum was
considered to be a more sensible option. Why? It was sensibly necessary to
show that the independence of Eritrea was not an issue of concern for the
EPLF only; it was also the burning desire of the people of Eritrea to make
Eritrea independent. This is a just legal process. And that was why we
waited for two years before the official recognition of Eritrea as an
independent state. However, it was quite possible, as it is common
elsewhere, to immediately declare impendence. In my perspective, if
referendum were not conducted, some would say this type of independence was
desired by the EPLF, but not by the people of Eritrea. In that case, it
would be argued that the Eritrean people were not consulted. This would
enable some actors to conspire with America and others to undo or at least
to undermine the independence of Eritrea. In this case, the EPLF was
proactively farsighted more than any other actor. And we have seen the
result of referendum. More importantly, it was appropriately judged to be a
sensible process at it was witnessed by the Ethiopians themselves and by the
international community at large. They all witnessed the heartfelt desire of
the Eritrean people. This was all the result of a job well done by the EPLF.
Q: Mr. Alamin at the time the Nadew Command was destroyed, you were head of
the Department of National Guidance So in terms of news coverage, do you
feel that the Nadew operation was comprehensively communicated? How was this
issue handled at that time? Does the demise of the Nadew Command convey an
important message or signal to the world? How effectively was it shared
locally and internationally?
If we had half of the technology we have now, it would have been really
helpful for covering the issue extensively and for sharing it widely.
However, I feel that despite our meager resources, we were able to
reasonably and widely communicate it. More attention was paid to it
everywhere in the world. In side Eritrea, there were Dimtsi Hafash (The
Voice of the Masses) - radio-and some magazines that used to communicate the
good news and the achievements associated with it. Internationally, I
believe those parts of the struggle with civil uniforms, journalists, who
were the supporters of the struggle for independence in Eritrea, as well as
solidarity communities that supported us were all helpful for covering the
issue reasonably and extensively.
Q: It has been 25 years since Afabet was liberated and the Nadew Command was
liquidated, and it has been 22 years since Eritrea finally became an
independent state. Therefore, how do we assess, through retrospective and
proactive, the effectiveness of the EPLF in discharging the responsibilities
it started to shoulder many years ago? What are the most important issues of
concern that can be raised at this stage of our history?
There are a number of issues to be raised. It would be better to discuss
such issues at some time in the future. While there are many concerns that
we have to talk about, for this time it would be good to limit our
discussions to the Nadew operation. I feel it is important to arrange a
separate session for discussing our current concerns.
We were able to get where we are now simply because, the EPLF was able to
strengthen itself and the Eritrean masses. Even now for Eritrea to be much
stronger and to considerably push forward our achievements the front should
further strengthen its capability, and its perspectives; it needs to be much
stronger. What we should do and how we do what we have to do can be open to
discussion. The fundamental issue is that the EPLF was so important in the
past, and it remains to be equally important now. On my part, I do not tend
to feel that there is an option to it. All the gains -political, military
and any other gains - will be maintained only if the EPLF is strengthened
further.
Q: As a freedom fighter and a senior official of the ruling front in the
country (PFDJ), what messages do want to share with the public?
I would love to reiterate what I stated you earlier. If everything we do is
to be fruitful and effective in Eritrea, there is not option other than
strengthening the front. All the citizens in this country, young and adults,
have spent their precious time in the struggle and sacrificed all their
resources for that matter. And still we should relentlessly continue what we
have been doing. We need to work hard as ever before and we should be all
committed. This is the belief of the EPLF. When I say the EPLF, I am not
referring to individuals. I am talking about principles, about politics,
about unity and about perspectives.
Q: While the EPLF was encircled in the Sahel hills, the environment was
against the front to further mobilize additional resources. At that time, it
was only the freedom fighters who were martyred and faced injuries alone
with no option to reinforce what they were doing. To the contrary, the
divisions of the Derg regime were being hatched almost daily. The regime had
no problem at all to replace those who were either killed or disabled in the
battles. Were there some doubts and a tendency to give up harbored in the
minds of fighters during those trying times? How do you see such a
situation?
The EPLF becomes far stronger in trying times, unlike in stable situations.
Trying times to the EPLF are the same as fire is to gold. As fire enables
gold to glitter more, challenges further strengthen the EPLF. The EPLF was
tested beyond measure, but it eventually tackled all the challenges that
faced it. There were a number of groups and individuals who wished its
demise, but the EPLF was able to effectively strongly resist all the odds
and was able to ultimately get where it is now. Challenges make one much
stronger.
At that time there was no option at all. The only resource was the fighter.
When a fighter was wounded in a battle, it was a norm for him or her to go
back to the trench with unhealed injury. The fighters used to refuse being
hospitalized, even if they were medically required to do so. They wanted to
go back to their comrades in the trenches so as to assists them in any form
(e.g. relaying water) - even if their situation made it impossible for them
to actually fight in the battles. It is this spirit that enabled the EPLF to
succeed. Our enemy lacked this quality as it was overly dependent on
external support. Actually, the Derg regime was overly supported by the
super powers and many others. But all this was futile. To the contrary, the
EPLF was not all externally supported. Let alone other supplies, we had no
enough to eat; we endured and resisted hunger for years. The fighters
resisted and endured everything. This is what we call a real freedom
fighter. And this was the reason behind destroying the Nadew Command.
Q: Diplomatically, how was the image of the EPLF in the eyes of the
international community and the impact of its diplomatic efforts? Did the
Eritrean revolution have any allies at that time? If any, who deserve to be
remembered now? It is often said that the foreign ffices of the EPLF were
repeatedly closed, would you shed more light on it?
Virtually every foreign force was against the front. In this case, the
support or lack of it can be described in two different ways - lack of
official regime support and citizens' support of the different nations. In
he case of regime support, we can take the Sudan as an example. All
successive regimes - Abud through Numeri- of the Sudan, had never sided with
the Eritrean revolution. The interest of all these regimes was aligned with
Ethiopia. By their calculation, Eritrea is a small nation with only three
million populations whereas Ethiopia, with 80 million populations, was a
great nation. And they were calculating our relative capacity based on such
factors. Therefore regimes with such kind of political infantilism fall
under this category. So, despite the legitimate and just cause of Eritrea,
they chose to side with Ethiopia.
In the 1950s, the regime of Huzbel Uma, which preceded the regime of Abud,
had close friendship with Haileselasie. As a result the regime had no
political will to duly consider the Eritrean question. To the contrary, the
regime was torturing the Eritrean-Sudanese citizens for their sympathy with
the Eritrean cause. These people had endured all such hardships! We
Eritreans patiently and relentlessly endured such bitter experiences in our
struggle to be an independent nation. We were tested by all forms of
regionalism, tribalism and division along religious lines. But Eritrea stood
against all odds.
To come back to your question, as I mentioned, there were two contrasting
realities. While the leadership of the regimes had never sympathized with
Eritrean revolution, we had grassroots support of their citizenry. The
citizens of Sudan, Yemen and even Djibouti were on our side. In 1977-1978
Djibouti's regime closed our office there and jailed our representative,
Hamd Ali Dafla. We inquired why such violence was happened. There was no any
justification. It was simply the direct influence of the Mengistu regime.
But the people of Djibouti at that time were beside us. Even in Sudan the
condition was the same; we had no any support from the political
establishments but the citizens had close ties with the Eritrean revolution.
Their citizens were reading our materials and were participating in our
meetings. And the case in Yemen was also not different. Therefore we can say
we had close grassroots support and solidarity with the people of the
nations in our region. But there was no regime level support to the Eritrean
revolution.
We thank you Mr. Alamin
Received on Fri Mar 29 2013 - 22:49:35 EDT
