The African Union, Algeria And Mali: The West’s War Against
African Development Continues
*By Dan Glazebrook*
17 February, 2013
*Counterpunch*<
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/02/15/the-wests-war-against-african-development-continues/>
Africa’s classic depiction in the mainstream media, as a giant basketcase
full of endless war, famine and helpless children creates an illusion of a
continent utterly dependent on Western handouts. In fact, the precise
opposite is true – it is the West that is reliant on African handouts.
These handouts come in many and varied forms. They include illicit flows of
resources, the profits of which invariably find their way into the West’s
banking sector via strings of tax havens (as thoroughly documented in
Nicholas Shaxson’s Poisoned Wells). Another is the mechanism of
debt-extortion whereby banks lend money to military rulers (often helped to
power by Western governments, such as the Congo’s former President Mobutu),
who then keep the money for themselves (often in a private account with the
lending bank), leaving the country paying exorbitant interest on an
exponentially growing debt. Recent research by Leonce Ndikumana and James K
Boyce found that up to 80 cents in every borrowed dollar fled the borrower
nation in 'capital flight’ within a year, never having been invested in the
country at all; whilst meanwhile $20billion per year is drained from Africa
in 'debt servicing’ on these, essentially fraudulent, 'loans’.
Another form of handout would be through the looting of minerals. Countries
like the Democratic Republic of Congo are ravaged by armed militias who
steal the country’s resources and sell them at sub-market prices to Western
companies, with most of these militias run by neighbouring countries such
as Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi who are in turn sponsored by the West, as
regularly highlighted in UN reports. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
are the pitifully low prices paid both for African raw materials and for
the labour that mines, grows or picks them, which effectively amount to an
African subsidy for Western living standards and corporate profits.
This is the role for which Africa has been ascribed by the masters of the
Western capitalist economy: a supplier of cheap resources and cheap labour.
And keeping this labour, and these resources, cheap depends primarily on
one thing: ensuring that Africa remains underdeveloped and impoverished. If
it were to become more prosperous, wages would rise; if it were to become
more technologically developed, it would be able to add value to its raw
materials through the manufacturing process before exporting them, forcing
up the prices paid. Meanwhile, extracting stolen oil and minerals depends
on keeping African states weak and divided. The Democratic Republic of
Congo, for example – whose mines produce tens of billions of mineral
resources each year – were only, in one recent financial year, able to
collect a paltry $32million in tax revenues from mining due to the proxy
war waged against that country by Western-backed militias.
The African Union, established in 2002 was a threat to all of this: a more
integrated, more unified African continent would be harder to exploit. Of
special concern to Western strategic planners are the financial and
military aspects of African unification. On a financial level, plans for an
African Central Bank (to issue a single African currency, the gold-backed
dinar) would greatly threaten the ability of the US, Britain and France to
exploit the continent. Were all African trade to be conducted using the
gold-backed dinar, this would mean Western countries would effectively have
to pay in gold for African resources, rather than, as currently, paying in
sterling, francs or dollars which can be printed virtually out of thin air.
The other two proposed AU financial institutions – the African Investment
Bank and the African Monetary Fund – could fatally undermine the ability of
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund to manipulate the
economic policies of African countries through their monopoly of finance.
As Jean Paul Pougala has pointed out, the African Monetary Fund, with its
planned startup capital of $42billion, "is expected to totally supplant the
African activities of the International Monetary Fund which, with only
US$25 billion, was able to bring an entire continent to its knees and make
it swallow questionable privatisation like forcing African countries to
move from public to private monopolies."
Along with these potentially threatening financial developments come moves
on the military front. The 2004 AU Summit in Sirte, Libya, agreed on a
Common African Defence and Security Charter, including an article
stipulating that "any attack against an African country is considered as an
attack against the Continent as a whole", mirroring the Charter of NATO
itself. This was followed up in 2010 by the creation of an African Standby
Force, with a mandate to uphold and implement the Charter. Clearly, if NATO
was going to make any attempt to reverse African unity by force, time was
running out.
Yet the creation of the African Standby Force represented not only a
threat, but also an opportunity. Whilst there was certainly the possibility
of the ASF becoming a genuine force for independence, resisting
neocolonialism and defending Africa against imperialist aggression, there
was also the possibility that, handled in the right way, and under a
different leadership, the force could become the opposite – a proxy force
for continued neocolonial subjugation under a Western chain of command. The
stakes were – and are – clearly very high.
Meanwhile, the West had already been building up its own military
preparations for Africa. Its economic decline, coupled with the rise of
China, meant that it was increasingly unable to continue to rely on
economic blackmail and financial manipulation alone in order to keep the
continent subordinated and weak. Comprehending clearly that this meant it
would be increasingly forced into military action to maintain its
domination, a US white paper published in 2002 by the African Oil Policy
Initiative Group recommended "A new and vigorous focus on US military
cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa, to include design of a sub-unified
command structure which could produce significant dividends in the
protection of US investments". This structure came into existence in 2008,
under the name of AFRICOM. The costs – economic, military and political –
of direct intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, however – with the costs of
the Iraq war alone estimated at over three trillion dollars - meant that
AFRICOM was supposed to primarily rely on local troops to do the fighting
and dying. AFRICOM was to be the body which coordinated the subordination
of African armies under a Western chain of command; which turned, in other
words, African armies into Western proxies.
The biggest obstacle to this plan was the African Union itself, which
categorically rejected any US military presence on African soil in 2008 –
forcing AFRICOM to house its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, a
humiliating about turn after President Bush had already publicly announced
his intention to set up the HQ in Africa itself. Worse was to come in 2009,
when Colonel Gaddafi – the continent’s staunchest advocate of
anti-imperialist policies – was elected Chairman of the AU. Under his
leadership, Libya had already become the biggest financial donor to the
African Union, and he was now proposing a fast-track process of African
integration, including a single African army, currency and passport.
His fate is clearly now a matter of public record. After mounting an
invasion of his country based on a pack of lies worse than those told about
Iraq, NATO reduced Libya to a devastated failed state and facilitated its
leader’s torture and execution, thus taking out their number one opponent.
For a time, it appeared as though the African Union had been tamed. Three
of its members – Nigeria, Gabon and South Africa – had voted in favour of
military intervention at the UN Security Council, and its new chairman –
Jean Ping – was quick to recognize the new Libyan government imposed by
NATO, and todownplay and denigrate his predecessor’s achievements. Indeed,
he even forbade the African Union assembly from observing a minute’s
silence for Gaddafi after his murder.
However, this did not last. The South Africans, in particular, quickly came
to regret their support for the intervention, with both President Zuma and
Thabo Mbeki making searing criticisms of NATO in the months that followed.
Zuma argued – correctly – that NATO had acted illegally by blocking the
ceasefire and negotiations that had been called for by the UN resolution,
had been brokered by the AU, and had been agreed to by Gaddafi. Mbeki went
much further and argued that the UN Security Council, by ignoring the AU’s
proposals, were treating "the peoples of Africa with absolute contempt" and
that "the Western powers have enhanced their appetite to intervene on our
Continent, including through armed force, to ensure the protection of their
interests, regardless of our views as Africans". A senior diplomat in the
South African Foreign Ministry’s Department of International Relations said
that "most SADC [Southern African Development Community] states ,
particularly South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Tanzania, Namibia and Zambia
which played a key role in the Southern African liberation struggle, were
not happy with the way Jean Ping handled the Libyan bombing by NATO jets".
In July 2012, Ping was forced out and replaced – with the support of 37
African states – by Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma: former South African Foreign
Minister, Thabo Mbeki’s "right hand woman" – and clearly not a member of
Ping’s capitulationist camp. The African Union was once again under the
control of forces committed to genuine independence.
However, Gaddafi’s execution had not only taken out a powerful member of
the African Union, but also the lynchpin of regional security in the Sahel
– Sahara region. Using a careful mixture of force, ideological challenge
and negotiation, Gaddafi’s Libya was at the head of a transnational
security system that had prevented Salafist militias gaining a foothold, as
recognized by US Ambassador Christopher Stevens in 2008: "The Government of
Libya has aggressively pursued operations to disrupt foreign fighter flows,
including more stringent monitoring of air/land ports of entry, and blunt
the ideological appeal of radical Islam…Libya cooperates with neighbouring
states in the Sahara and Sahel region to stem foreign fighter flows and
travel of transnational terrorists. Muammar Gaddafi recently brokered a
widely-publicised agreement with Tuareg tribal leaders from Libya, Chad,
Niger, Mali and Algeria in which they would abandon separatist aspirations
and smuggling (of weapons and transnational extremists) in exchange for
development assistance and financial support…our assessment is that the
flow of foreign fighters from Libya to Iraq and the reverse flow of
veterans to Libya has diminished due to the Government of Libya’s
cooperation with other states…"
This "cooperation with other states" refers to the CEN-SAD (Community of
Sahel-Saharan States), an organization launched by Gaddafi in 1998 aiming
at free trade, free movement of peoples and regional development between
its 23 member states, but with a primary focus on peace and security. As
well as countering the influence of Salafist militias, the CEN-SAD had
played a key role in mediating conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and
within the Mano River region, as well as negotiating a lasting solution to
the rebellion in Chad. CEN-SAD was based in Tripoli and Libya was
unquestionably the dominant force in the group; indeed CEN-SAD support was
primarily behind Gaddafi’s election as Chairman of the AU in 2009.
The very effectiveness of this security system, was a double blow for
Western hegemony in Africa: not only did it bring Africa closer to peace
and prosperity, but simultaneously undercut a key pretext for Western
intervention. The US had established its own 'Trans-Sahara
Counter-Terrorism Partnership’ (TSCTP), but as Muatassim Gaddafi (Libyan
National Security Advisor) explained to Hilary Clinton in Washington in
2009, the "Tripoli-based Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and
the North Africa Standby Force obviated TSCTP’s mission".
As long as Gaddafi was in power and heading up a powerful and effective
regional security system, Salafist militias in North Africa could not be
used as a 'threatening menace’ justifying Western invasion and occupation
to save the helpless natives. By actually achieving what the West claim to
want (but everywhere fail to achieve) – the neutralization of 'Islamist
terrorism’ – Libya had stripped the imperialists of a key pretext for their
war against Africa. At the same time, they had prevented the militias from
fulfilling their other historical function for the West – as a proxy force
to destabilize independent secular states (fully documented in Mark Curtis’
excellent Secret Affairs). The West had supported Salafi death squads in
campaigns to destabilize the USSR and Yugoslavia highly successfully, and
would do so again against Libya and Syria.
With NATO’s redrawing of Libya as a failed state, this security system has
fallen apart. Not only have the Salafi militias been provided with the
latest hi-tech military equipment by NATO, they have been given free reign
to loot the Libyan government’s armouries, and provided with a safe haven
from which to organize attacks across the region. Border security has
collapsed, with the apparent connivance of the new Libyan government and
its NATO sponsors, as this damning report from global intelligence firm
Jamestown Foundation notes: "Al-Wigh was an important strategic base for
the Qaddafi regime, being located close to the borders with Niger, Chad and
Algeria. Since the rebellion, the base has come under the control of Tubu
tribal fighters under the nominal command of the Libyan Army and the direct
command of Tubu commander Sharafeddine Barka Azaiy, who complains: "During
the revolution, controlling this base was of key strategic importance. We
liberated it. Now we feel neglected. We do not have sufficient equipment,
cars and weapons to protect the border. Even though we are part of national
army, we receive no salary". The report concludes that "The Libyan GNC
[Governing National Council] and its predecessor, the Transitional National
Council (TNC), have failed to secure important military facilities in the
south and have allowed border security in large parts of the south to
effectively become "privatized" in the hands of tribal groups who are also
well-known for their traditional smuggling pursuits. In turn, this has
jeopardized the security of Libya’s oil infrastructure and the security of
its neighbors. As the sale and transport of Libyan arms becomes a
mini-industry in the post-Qaddafi era…the vast amounts of cash available to
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb are capable of opening many doors in an
impoverished and underdeveloped region. If the French-led offensive in
northern Mali succeeds in displacing the Islamist militants, there seems to
be little at the moment to prevent such groups from establishing new bases
in the poorly-controlled desert wilderness of southern Libya. So long as
there is an absence of central control of security structures in Libya,
that nation’s interior will continue to present a security threat to the
rest of the nations in the region."
The most obvious victim of this destabilization has been Mali. That the
Salafist takeover of Mali is a direct consequence of NATO’s actions in
Libya is not in doubt by any serious analysts. One result of the spread of
NATO-backed destabilization to Mali is that Algeria – who lost 200,000
citizens in a deadly civil war with Islamists in the 1990s – is now
surrounded by heavily armed Salafist militias on both its Eastern (Libya)
and Southern (Mali) borders. Following the destruction of Libya and the
toppling of Mubarak, Algeria is now the only state in North Africa still
governed by the anti-colonial party that won its independence from European
tyranny. This independent spirit is still very much in evidence in
Algeria’s attitude towards Africa and Europe. On the African front, Algeria
is a strong supporter of the African Union, contributing 15% of its budget,
and has $16billion committed to the establishment of the African Monetary
Fund, making it the Fund’s largest contributor by far. In its relations
with Europe, however, it has consistently refused to play the subordinate
role expected of it. Algeria and Syria were the only countries in the Arab
League to vote against NATO bombings of Libya and Syria, and Algeria
famously gave refuge to members of Gaddafi’s family fleeing NATO’s
onslaught. But for European strategic planners, perhaps more worrying than
all of this is that Algeria – along with Iran and Venezuela – is what they
call an OPEC 'hawk’, committed to driving a hard bargain for their natural
resources. As an exasperated article in the Financial Times recently
explained, "resource nationalism" has taken hold, with the result that "Big
Oil has soured on Algeria [and] companies complain of crushing bureaucracy,
tough fiscal terms and the bullying behavior of Sonatrach, the state-run
energy group, which has a stake in most oil and gas ventures". It goes on
to note that Algeria implemented a "controversial windfall tax" in 2006,
and quotes a western oil executive in Algiers as saying that "[oil]
companies…have had it with Algeria". It is instructive to note that the
same newspaper had also accused Libya of "resource nationalism" – that most
heinous of crimes for readers of the Financial Times, it seems – barely a
year before NATO’s invasion. Of course, 'resource nationalism’ means
exactly that – a nation’s resources being used primarily for the benefit
and development of the nation itself (rather than foreign companies) – and
in that sense Algeria is indeed guilty as charged. Algeria’s oil exports
stand at over $70bn per year, and much of this income has been used to
invest in massive spending on health and housing, along with a recent
$23billion loan and public grants programme to encourage small business.
Indeed, high levels of social spending are considered by many to be a key
reason why no 'Arab Spring’ style uprising has taken off in Algeria in
recent years.
This tendency to 'resource nationalism’ was also noted in a recent piece by
STRATFOR, the global intelligence firm, who wrote that "foreign
participation in Algeria has suffered in large part due to protectionist
policies enforced by the highly nationalistic military government". This
was particularly worrying, they argued, as Europe is about to become a
whole lot more dependent on Algerian gas as North Sea reserves run out:
"Developing Algeria as a major natural gas exporter is an economic and
strategic imperative for EU countries as North Sea production of the
commodity enters terminal decline in the next decade. Algeria is already an
important energy supplier to the Continent, but Europe will need expanded
access to natural gas to offset the decline of its indigenous reserves."
British and Dutch North Sea gas reserves are estimated to run out by the
end of the decade, and Norway’s to go into sharp decline from 2015 onwards.
With Europe fearful of overdependence on gas from Russia and Asia, Algeria
– with reserves of natural gas estimated at 4.5 trillion cubic metres,
alongside shale gas reserves of 17 trillion cubic meters – will become
essential, the piece argues. But the biggest obstacle to European control
of these resources remains the Algerian government – with its
"protectionist policies" and "resource nationalism". Without saying it
outright, the piece concludes by suggesting that a destabilized 'failed
state’ Algeria would be far preferable to Algeria under a stable
independent "protectionist" government, noting that "the existing
involvement of EU energy majors in high-risk countries like Nigeria, Libya,
Yemen and Iraq indicates a healthy tolerance for instability and security
problems." In other words, in an age of private security, Big Oil no longer
requires stability or state protection for its investments; disaster zones
can be tolerated; strong, independent states cannot.
It is, therefore, perceived to be in the strategic interests of Western
energy security to see Algeria turned into a failed state, just as Iraq,
Afghanistan and Libya have been. With this in mind, it is clear to see how
the apparently contradictory policy of arming the Salafist militias one
minute (in Libya) and bombing them the next (in Mali) does in fact make
sense. The French bombing mission aims, in its own words, at the "total
reconquest" of Mali, which in practice means driving the rebels gradually
Northwards through the country – in other words, straight into Algeria.
Thus the wilful destruction of the Libyan-centred Sahel-Sahara security
system has had many benefits for those who wish to see Africa remain
consigned to its role of underdeveloped provider of cheap raw materials. It
has armed, trained, and provided territory to militias bent on the
destruction of Algeria, the only major resource-rich North African state
committed to genuine African unity and independence. In doing so, it has
also persuaded some Africans that – in contrast to their united rejection
of AFRICOM not long ago – they do, after all, now need to call on the West
for 'protection’ from these militias. Like a classic mafia protection
racket, the West makes its protection 'necessary’ by unleashing the very
forces from which people require protection. Now France is occupying Mali,
the US are establishing a new drone base in Niger and David Cameron is
talking about his commitment to a new 'war on terror’ spanning six
countries, and likely to last decades.
It is not, however, all good on the imperialist front. Far from it; indeed
the West had almost certainly hoped to avoid sending in their own soldiers
at all. The initial aim was that Algeria would be sucked in, lured into
exactly the same trap that was successfully used against the Soviet Union
in the 1980s, an earlier example of Britain and the US sponsoring a violent
sectarian insurgency on their enemy’s borders, attempting to drag their
target into a destructive war in response. The USSR’s war in Afghanistan
ultimately not only failed but destroyed the country’s economy and morale
in the process, and was a key factor behind the gratuitous self-destruction
of the Soviet state in 1991. Algeria, however, refused to fall into this
trap, and Clinton and Hollande’s good cop-bad cop routine – the former’s
'pressure for action’ in Algiers last October followed by French attempts
at sucking up 2 months later – came to nothing. Meanwhile, rather than
sticking to the script, the West’s unpredictable Salafi proxies expanded
from their base in Northern Mali not North to Algeria as intended, but
South to Bamako, threatening to unseat a Western-allied regime that had
only just been installed in a coup less than a year earlier. The French
were forced to intervene to drive them North and back towards the state
that had been their real target all along. For now, this invasion appears
to have a certain level of support amongst those Africans who fear the
West’s Salafi proxies more than the West’s own soldiers. Once the
occupation starts to drag on, boosting the credibility and numbers of the
guerillas, whilst exposing the brutality of the occupiers and their allies,
we will see how long that lasts.
*Dan Glazebrook* is a political writer and journalist. He writes regularly
on international relations and the use of state violence in British
domestic and foreign policy.
Received on Fri Feb 22 2013 - 10:22:57 EST
