The future of democracy in Ethiopia
By Yohannes Berhe | July 19, 2012
Recently, reports have been floating about the ill health of dictator
Zenawi. There is, of course, a strong element of wishful thinking
attached to the rumours – a reflection how reviled the regime is.
Emotions aside, however, the situation calls for a sober assessment of
our current situation and what is to come should a sudden change of
event occur in Ethiopia. In my previous commentary -- Are we condemned
to repeat history? -- I lamented the lack of purposeful and coherent
leadership that will guide the country through the all-important
transitional period.
The “Arab Spring” that signaled the emergence of democracy in Libya,
Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and a number of Middle Eastern countries
currently faces severe challenges. It seems overthrowing a
dictatorship is much easier than building a functioning democracy and
a stable society to replace it. The main reason is, of course, the
absence of a democratic culture.
In order to mold an obedient and docile citizenry, a totalitarian
political system encourages a culture of passivity and apathy,
therefore purposefully discourage free thought and suppress the
emergence of various institutions -political parties, civic
associations that would have created a culture of civil participation
and with it the practice of peaceful negotiation and compromise.
In the case of Ethiopia, the regime deliberately sowed the seeds of
hatred and paranoia, and discouraged any active civic participation in
public life as well as dissent. Therefore a carefully crafted
transitional plan is of paramount importance.
If we want to avoid past mistakes in our history and chart a path to a
prosperous and peaceful future for our embattled country, there are
several factors we should consider
Election is not an instant panacea
Elections are the inescapable sin qua non of democracy and a key
component of legitimate power, but without democratic institutions
prior to and after elections to operate, elections will only produce
the shell of democracy without the benefits of a truly accountable
government. As we have seen in many institutionally weak countries
elections have the potential to compound the existing problem and
create a fertile ground for an increasingly disillusioned population
that will opt for stability over more decisive democratic changes. The
graveyard of history is full of betrayed revolutions and democratic
aspiration by clever demagogue spouting populist rhetoric, while
forging new dictatorships. That is what we witness in almost all
postcolonial regimes in Africa, Asia and Middle East. Even in the
Western World where constitutional liberalism is a deeply rooted
tradition to protect the individual from coercive powers of the state,
populist rhetoric can be appealing. After all, Adolf Hitler became
chancellor of Germany via free elections. Close to home, who doesn’t
remember the accolades and even kisses bestowed upon Colonel Mengistu
Hailemariam by none other than the hyperactive and progressive
students of Addis Ababa University, who would later on become his
primary target for elimination?
An election without the safeguard of the basic “rules of the game” and
firmly entrenched democratic institution (i.e. independent judiciary,
free press, civic groups, etc.) does not produce a lasting result. To
get elected, populist candidates appeal on instincts and emotions.
And, the easiest emotions to address are those of envy and hate.
Populist candidates typically present clear pictures of the “enemies”.
They often are elected on the basis of what they oppose, not of what
they support. Such agendas typically false are not in the best
interest of those governed because the assumption is always that only
others will suffer from the hate policies, and that the individual
supporter of a populist will not be affected. This indeed is a
dangerous error, because governments that are popular because of their
opposition to certain "enemies" of society develop their own momentum.
When they get rid of one enemy, they will need another and sooner or
later even the initial supporters of a populist will suffer. No one
can deny the current situation in Ethiopia is emotionally charged-a
fertile ground for hatred and manipulators. Therefore, coming up with
a creative solution to deal with this quagmire is a tall order.
The ethnic factor
TPLF started as a parochial struggle for the liberation of Tigray, not
as a broad based movement with a vision for a complex nation such as
Ethiopia. It had neither the capability nor the foresight to
administrate the country. Therefore, resorting to populist rhetoric is
the predictable outcome. Initially the bogeymen to blame were the
Amhara. They were the easy target, but it didn’t stop there: the
Gurage, the Eriterean, etc. were further stigmatized to secure power.
This foray of TPLF exclusionary politics finally resulted in the
creation of ethnic enclave or Kilil. This policy has been in place for
the last 20 years. During this period boundaries have been redrawn and
resources reallocated in an arbitrary manner; mainly, to reward its
allies and punish the “enemies”. Most of all the policy has created an
entrenched view of identity and entitlement, not to mention suspicion
and hatred among the various groups. The fact that the high echelon
of power is held by TPLF loyalists adds another layer of complexity
and puts Tigrigna speaking population in an unviable position of being
seen as beneficiary of largesse at the expense of other group despite
their minority status, or even worst being a collaborator of an
unpopular regime. Whether these are true or not is irrelevant once the
genie of ethnic hatred is out of the bottle. Moreover, Melese and his
cohorts have done everything, but dispel this suspicion. In fact they
actively fanned the hatred and created insecurity among the Tigrigna
speaking population.
Sociologist Charles Tilly makes a compelling analogy between the
authoritarian regime and a racketeer. He defines racketeer as someone
who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction in order to
gain control and consolidate power. In this regard, the Melese regime
differ little from racketeers, to the extent that the threat against
which they claim to protect the Tigrigna speaking population are
mainly the consequence of their own action, and in some cases
imaginary.
The military
The regime has consolidated its power through ethnically defined
institutions as well as from interlinked set of TPLF-affiliated
businesses. The pervasive control of the economy has enabled the
regime to extract loyalty by threatening to deny service or
public-sector jobs to its opponents, or simply using violence as a
means of coercion. Similarly, the military has been organized along
ethnic lines. While the lower levels of the military are multiethnic,
its top officers are overwhelmingly members of TPLF; according to
Center for Strategic & International Studies (2011) “As many as 58 of
the top 61 officers are members of the TPLF”. Organizing the army
along ethnical lines deprives the country a national army with a
unified national character needed to confront its numerous security
threats. Indeed, it’s a callous disregard for the security of the
country and treason of very high order unparalleled in the nation’s
history. Despite much touted military strength of the regime, the
centre dominated by TPLF is holding only because of the mixture of
threat and largesse. If there is a crisis, however, the military might
unravel and breakup into ethnic factions allowing the regional power
brokers to strengthen their position in various regions, a dynamics
that might put the unity of the Ethiopian state at risk.
Regional factors
Ethiopia is Africa’s second largest populated country and a
significant player in a region where political instability, civil
strife and interstate conflict have been defining features over the
last few decades. Any change in the Ethiopian political landscape will
be viewed in the region at best with apprehension and at worst with
suspicion. The most troublesome borders might be the ones with Eritrea
and Somalia. Eritrea and Ethiopia are still technically at war (having
never signed a peace treaty after the 2000 war). Any political changes
in Ethiopia would be closely followed by Asmara, and potential
miscalculation on either side is real. As for Somalia, there has been
no effective government since 1991, the threat is more an Eritrean
proxy war through ONLF or an OLF sprinter group to weaken Ethiopia or
exert some influence in the ensuing power struggle.
On the positive side, Ethiopia occupies an important position in the
volatile and strategically important Horn of Africa. It has used its
position to its advantage, offering its assistance as a security
partner with the West. As a result, the West –mainly the United
States- has a stake in seeing the country united and stable. It’s a
trump card that can be used to leverage diplomatic as well as sorely
needed financial assistance.
The opposition
The spaces for dissenting voices and alternative views have
effectively been closed. Those who have challenged the regime have
been harassed, killed, forced into exile, and had their property
seized and jobs taken away. Barring some dissenting voice here and
there, the latest by Ethiopian Muslim, well organized domestic
opposition is virtually non-existent. Disengagement and cynicism have
for now replaced the remarkably energetic participation witness during
the 2005 election. This apparent capitulation, however, may be
pragmatic and tactical retreat. It could evaporate quickly if the
regime’s power seems to be weakening. The diaspora community on the
other hand, has been growing steadily more vocal. In spite of its
clout and potential resources at its disposal, however, has yet to
make inroads in influencing events in Ethiopia. The movement (if it
can be called such) has to evolve beyond protest and present an
authentic political agenda. By this I don’t mean an agenda to assume
power. Diaspora communities tend to adopt more extreme positions to
compensate for being removed from the realities at home. Instead, the
challenge for the Diaspora, as John Holloway once put it, is to
“change the world without taking power”. That is, to build and
strengthen the alternative institutions of democracy, such as human
right organization, media, civil society. Institutions providing the
foundation for liberal democracy and are defined by their own
autonomy.
Humanitarian concern
Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of foreign aid for the last
twenty years. Most of it is in the form of food aid. Despite the
massive injection of aid, food security in Ethiopia has been an
elusive goal. At any one time upwards of four million people are
affected by famine or food shortage. If the country becomes unstable,
the situation can easily degenerate into serious humanitarian crisis
with potential for civil strife spreading in large areas of the
country.
Ethiopia is a complex country in a complex region where an intolerance
of dissent and acrimonious issues are deeply rooted in its history.
Despite a history marred by tragedy and injustice, the country has
projected the outward appearance of deceptively calm nation relative
to the rest of Africa. This might have created a sense of complacency
and a belief the country will once again emerge from the current
crises with its unity intact. I would love to be proven wrong,
however, this time around the circumstances and the difficulty facing
the country are much more pernicious and its effects can be
far-reaching and with sweeping consequences. This is not to say we
have no control on our future, on the contrary we have all the
resources required to shape our future. In fact, as I will argue in my
follow-up commentary, albeit its risks, our recent past might even
present us a unique opportunity to forge a union based on equality and
respect for each other.
In this commentary, I tried to touch on some of the issue we should
consider in the event the situation in Ethiopia changes drastically.
It’s not, by all account, an exhaustive list of issues the country
could face. My aim is quite modest –to elicit discussion and remind us
anew that “those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat
it”.
In my follow-up (Part II) commentary I will try to suggest some
solutions that might be considered to tackle the various issues herein
presented.
--
Based in Ottawa, Canada, the writer can be reached at yohannesb23_at_gmail.com
Received on Thu Jul 19 2012 - 22:24:00 EDT
