From: wolda002@umn.edu
Date: Mon Mar 09 2009 - 22:45:44 EST
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2009/02/GRESH/16773
English version:
http://mondediplo.com/2009/02/02gazawar
Gaza war changes Middle East equation at Israel’s expense
By Alain Gresh
Feb 17, 2009, 06:44
The long march of folly that began in 1967
The European Union’s policy of funding Gaza’s development is just one
casualty of Israel’s unprecedented attack, which has weakened the
Palestinian Authority but left Hamas politically stronger than ever
“They’re still living in the War of Independence (1948) and the Sinai
campaign (1956). With them, it’s all about tanks, about controlling
territories or controlled territories, holding this or that hill. But these
things are worthless. (…) The Lebanon war (2006) will go down in history
as the first war in which the military leadership understood that classical
warfare has become obsolete” (1).
This view, expressed in September 2008, comes not from an Israeli pacifist
but the country’s prime minister, Ehud Olmert. It would take a highly
sophisticated analyst to fathom the subconscious of this politician, who is
responsible both for the catastrophic war in Lebanon in 2006 and the recent
offensive in Gaza, and who at the same time claims his country needs to
abandon its narrow vision of security.
He and the majority of those who govern Israel probably share the view
bluntly expressed in 2002 by Israel’s then chief of staff, general Moshe
Yaalon: “The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest
recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people” (2).
With each new war comes the same old refrain from Israel’s leaders: the
Arabs only understand force; teach them a lesson and peace will at last be
possible. “We’re going to keep our finger on the trigger” (3) was how
foreign minister Tzipi Livni put it. Olmert and his government are in
favour of peace in the same way that the US government in the 19th century
was in favour of the peace
they decided to impose on the Native American
tribes.
The shelling of Gaza came to a provisional halt on 18 January. The Israeli
government wanted its troops out of Gaza before Barack Obama was sworn in
and Hamas gave Israel a week to withdraw its soldiers and reopen crossing
points with Gaza. Beyond the deliberate destruction of vital infrastructure
– which includes ministry buildings and fire stations, the parliament and
the university – the human cost shown on TV screens the world over has
been overwhelming. Even the French media, which has previously been very
timid, hasn’t been able to obscure the extent of the catastrophe. Leaving
to one side a moral reckoning and the crimes which may mean that Israeli
leaders one day face an international tribunal, how has the fighting
changed the political landscape at local and regional level?
The prime objective of the Israeli government was to permanently weaken
Hamas politically and militarily. It claims to have succeeded in this and
taught the “terrorists” a lesson. But is it that simple? The tactic of
massive bombardments and avoidance of close combat limited Israeli army
losses – the third phase of the operation, which was never put into
action, would have been an infantry assault of towns – but hasn’t
broken up the military core of Hamas, which comprises between three and
five thousand fighters. Like Hizbullah in 2006, Hamas was able to keep
firing rockets until the very last moment and its arms supply lines held
up, albeit at a reduced level.
Whatever the criticisms of Hamas’s strategy, including their rocket
attacks on civilian targets, the vast majority of the Palestinian
population holds the Israeli government responsible for the destruction. As
Elena Qleibo, a Gaza-based aid worker from Oxfam and an ex-Costa Rican
ambassador to Israel says: “People are extremely angry, and the level of
hate against Israel is very high. I have lived and worked in Gaza for many
years, and I have never seen such hatred from the population” (4).
The Palestinians also resent the Palestinian Authority’s passivity during
the war. The internal crisis in Fatah, which was already factionalised, has
deepened, in spite of the call for unity and resistance made by Marwan
Barghouti from prison. President Mahmoud Abbas, who is himself weakened and
marginalised, has called for the creation of a government of national
unity. So the Gaza of tomorrow will either remain under Hamas control or
will be governed by a national authority in which Hamas plays a central
role. Surely not what Israel wanted.
The next phase
The focus of the next phase will be the reconstruction of Gaza, which the
Israeli government wants to control tightly. No project will be accepted
and not a dollar will reach Gaza without their agreement, according to
Israeli officials. In addition, Hamas are to be prevented from claiming
this aid. Israel has gained support on this from the EU commissioner for
external affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (5), but as there is no other
authority in Gaza but Hamas, reconstruction risks being limited to
humanitarian aid. All the conditions for renewed hostilities against Israel
will once again be met; the Israeli blockade was one of the principal
causes for the last escalation.
The war has profoundly altered the regional order, too, though not in the
way that Israel wished. First, it has confirmed the isolation of the
Palestinian Authority. It has encouraged the consolidation of a resistance
front based in Qatar (site of the biggest US base in the region) and Syria.
This alliance was made concrete at a meeting in Doha, in which 12 Arab
countries took part (among them Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon and Iraq,
America’s supposed ally) along with Senegal (which holds the presidency
of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference), Turkey, Indonesia,
Venezuela and Iran. Mauritania has suspended diplomatic relations with
Israel and Qatar has broken off economic links. Venezuela and Bolivia have
also severed their diplomatic relations.
A few days later, on 19 and 20 January, the Arab summit in Kuwait brought a
fragile reconciliation even if it didn’t remove differences of opinion.
This was made easier by Israel’s refusal to negotiate a ceasefire as
proposed by president Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Angered by this rebuff and by
the signing of a separate US-Israeli agreement to combat arms imports to
Gaza (and therefore control the border with Egypt), Mubarak toughened his
stance.
Turkey, Israel’s traditional ally, has confirmed its growing importance
on the regional stage. Like Mubarak, Turkey’s prime minister, Recip
Erdogan felt humiliated by Olmert, who kept quiet about his intentions
regarding Gaza when he saw his Turkish counterpart during a visit to Ankara
on 22 and 23 December. The day after the offensive was launched on 27
December, Erdogan said: “This attack, coming while we are making such
efforts for peace, is a blow against peace” (6). Not only did Turkey, the
mediator which had brought Israel and Syria to the verge of resuming direct
negotiations, suspend its efforts, it also called for Israel’s suspension
from the UN the day after it fired on UN buildings in Gaza.
During the crisis, Turkey has strengthened its relations with Hamas and is
hoping to mediate between it and the Palestinian Authority. And Turkish
popular opinion has translated into demonstrations in which several million
people have taken to the streets in Turkish towns
and villages.
Iran has also seen its regional position strengthened. It has extended its
alliances in the Arab and Islamic world. Its radical discourse has been
increasingly echoed within the region and it is now in a position of
strength vis-à-vis the new US administration. However, Tehran has shown
restraint in the crisis. Iranian supreme leader ayatollah Ali Khamenei has
even declared that “our hands are tied on that terrain” (7). The firing
of rockets from Lebanon prompted fears that a second front might open up.
Although this didn’t happen, the incident can be taken as a warning: Iran
has told the Egyptian government through diplomatic channels that it will
not allow Hamas to be crushed.
Contempt for Arab opinion
Western governments have nothing but contempt for Arab popular opinion.
This was clear when they challenged Hamas’s victory in the democratic
elections held in Palestine in 2006. They simply shrugged when in a
communiqué on 12 January the Saudi government condemned the “racist
genocide” in Gaza. They ignore the extent of protest in the Arab and
Muslim world, especially in Egypt (despite the state of near-siege in
Cairo) and in Afghanistan. Yet which Arab government would now be willing
to sit down to peace talks with Israel? The Saudi king has announced that
the 2002 Arab initiative for a comprehensive peace between the Arab world
and Israel in exchange for the creation of a Palestinian state on territory
occupied by Israel in 1967 won’t remain on the table for much longer.
Meanwhile, on Sunday 18 January, while Western journalists broadcast images
of Gaza’s lunar landscape, prime minster Olmert was to be seen expressing
his pleasure to six European leaders, including Nicolas Sarkozy, over their
“extraordinary support for the state of Israel and their concern about
its security”. More than in any other conflict since 1967, the European
position, especially that of France, has been aligned with the Israeli
government’s (see “A people abandoned”). In retrospect, the upgrading
of relations between the EU and Israel in early December 2008 looks like a
green light to the operation in Gaza. In spite of the Israeli offensive,
the EU (and France) will strengthen their bilateral relations with Tel Aviv
(8).
This Western alliance engaged in the fight against “Islamic terrorism”
has more than a hint of the crusades about it. Without going as far as
Silvio Berlusconi, who explained in Jerusalem: “When I heard about the
rocket fire at Israel, I felt that it was a danger to Italy, and to the
entire West” (9), or the director of L’Express, who wrote that the
Israeli army was fighting “for our peace” (10) – some on the right
used to explain in the 1980s that the apartheid government was fighting
“for us” in southern Africa, against communism, the Soviet Union and
Cuba – president Sarkozy has explained on many occasions that Hamas bore
a heavy responsibility for this war as it had broken the truce, which is
untrue (see “Reasons for war: lies, lies and more lies ”, opposite).
In spite of Sarkozy’s flying around on numerous foreign trips, France has
lost a great deal of credit, as demonstrated by the unprecedented attacks
on it in the Arab press, including in moderate countries, where it is now
bracketed with the US of George Bush. The Saudi daily Al Watan wrote on 11
January “all the great powers have supported Israel’s position,
including France, which has thus far been the symbol of balance in regional
causes”. And France’s decision to fight against smuggled arms in Gaza
can only be construed as an operation to protect an occupying power: no one
has called upon Israel to stop re-arming itself.
“A pointless war has led to a moral defeat for Israel” – so ran the
headline in the British Sunday paper, the Observer on 18 January. The
majority of moral barriers have crumbled in Israel during the Gaza
offensive. A phrase sums up this vision: baal habayit histhtageya (“the
boss has gone mad”). Its essence is captured by Giora Eiland, a former
Israeli national security adviser: “If our civilians are attacked by you,
we are not going to respond in proportion, but will use all means we have
to cause you such damages that you will think twice in the future” (11).
This tactic was used in Lebanon in 2006 and was referred to as the Dahiya
doctrine, after the district in south Beirut where Hizbullah was based. The
aim is to destroy an entire district or village as soon as it is believed
to harbour terrorists who are firing on Israel. It was employed again in
Gaza and constitutes what international law recognises as a war crime. Yet
it is now openly demanded in Israel. In a letter to prime minster Olmert in
2007, the former Sephardic grand rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu explained “there
is absolutely no moral prohibition against indiscriminate killing of
civilians during a potential massive military offensive on Gaza aimed at
stopping the rocket launching” (12). The longer the occupation, the more
it corrupts the occupier. One can only imagine what liberties would have
been taken by France in Algeria if the war had gone on for 40 years.
The South African government, showing more determination than most, has
condemned Israeli aggression against Gaza. The long experience of fighting
the apartheid regime taught ANC leaders all about the hypocrisy of western
rhetoric on violence and terrorism. Writing about his negotiations with the
white South African government and its demands for the end to violence,
Nelson Mandela said: “I responded that the state was responsible for the
violence and that it is always the oppressor, not the oppressed, who
dictates the form of the struggle. If the oppressor uses violence, the
oppressed have no alternative but to respond violently. In our case, it was
simply a legitimate form of self-defence” (13).
Translated by George Miller
Footnotes:
(1) As quoted in “The time has come to say these things”,
New York
Review of Books, 4-17 December 2008.
(2) Rashid Khalidi, “What you don’t know about Gaza”,
New York
Times, 7 January 2009.
(3) Interview with Le Monde, 18-19 January 2009.
(4) Mel Frykberg, “Gazans Do Not Blame Hamas”, IPS,
20 January 2009.
(5) Declaration of 19 January 2009.
(6) Today’s Zaman, Ankara, 29 December 2008.
(7) Trista Parsi, “Israel, Gaza and Iran: Trapping Obama in Imagined
Fault Lines”, The Huffington Post, 13 January 2009.
(8) The EU has decided, in agreement with Israel, to temporarily suspend
this upgrading of relations. The Union for the Mediterranean has also been
a victim of the war; all meetings have been put on hold at Egypt’s
request.
(9) Haaretz.com, 19 January 2009.
(10) Christophe Barbier, “Une guerre juste, juste une guerre”,
L’Express, 14 January 2009.
(11) International Herald Tribune, 20 January 2009.
(12) Jerusalem Post, 30 May 2007.
(13) Nelson Mandela, A Long Walk to Freedom, Little, Brown, New York and
London, 1994, p545.
Original text in French:
Contrecoups imprévus de la guerre livrée aux Palestiniens
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2009/02/GRESH/16773
English version:
http://mondediplo.com/2009/02/02gazawar