From: wolda002@umn.edu
Date: Mon Feb 09 2009 - 23:56:47 EST
Stratfor
---------------------------
MUNICH AND THE CONTINUITY BETWEEN THE BUSH AND OBAMA FOREIGN POLICIES
By George Friedman
While the Munich Security Conference brought together senior leaders from
most
major countries and many minor ones last weekend, none was more significant
than U.S. Vice President Joe Biden. This is because Biden provided the first
glimpse of U.S. foreign policy under President Barack Obama. Most conference
attendees were looking forward to a dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy
under
the Obama administration. What was interesting about Biden's speech was how
little change there has been in the U.S. position and how much the attendees
and the media were cheered by it.
After Biden's speech, there was much talk about a change in the tone of U.S.
policy. But it is not clear to us whether this was because the tone has
changed, or because the attendees' hearing has. They seemed delighted to be
addressed by Biden rather than by former Vice President Dick Cheney --
delighted to the extent that this itself represented a change in policy.
Thus,
in everything Biden said, the conference attendees saw rays of a new policy.
Policy Continuity: Iran and Russia
Consider Iran. The Obama administration's position, as staked out by Biden,
is
that the United States is prepared to speak directly to Iran provided that
the
Iranians do two things. First, Tehran must end its nuclear weapons program.
Second, Tehran must stop supporting terrorists, by which Biden meant Hamas
and
Hezbollah. Once the Iranians do that, the Americans will talk to them. The
Bush
administration was equally prepared to talk to Iran given those
preconditions.
The Iranians make the point that such concessions come after talks, not
before,
and that the United States must change its attitude toward Iran before there
can be talks, something Iranian Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani emphasized after
the meeting. Apart from the emphasis on a willingness to talk, the terms
Biden
laid out for such talks are identical to the terms under the Bush
administration.
Now consider Russia. Officially, the Russians were delighted to hear that
the
United States was prepared to hit the "reset button" on U.S.-Russian
relations.
But Moscow cannot have been pleased when it turned out that hitting the
reset
button did not involve ruling out NATO expansion, ending American missile
defense system efforts in Central Europe or publicly acknowledging the
existence of a Russian sphere of influence. Biden said, "It will remain our
view that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and
choose their own alliances." In translation, this means the United States
has
the right to enter any relationship it wants with independent states, and
that
independent states have the right to enter any relationship they want. In
other
words, the Bush administration's commitment to the principle of NATO
expansion
has not changed.
Nor could the Russians have been pleased with the announcement just prior to
the conference that the United States would continue developing a ballistic
missile defense (BMD) system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The BMD
program
has been an issue of tremendous importance for Russians, and it is something
Obama indicated he would end, or change in some way that might please the
Russians. But not only was there no commitment to end the program, there
also
was no backing away from long-standing U.S. interest in it, or even any
indication of the terms under which it might end.
Given that the United States has asked Russia for a supply route through the
former Soviet Union to Afghanistan, and that the Russians have agreed to
this
in principle, it would seem that that there might be an opening for a deal
with
the Russians. But just before the Munich conference opened, Kyrgyzstan
announced that Manas Air Base, the last air base open to the United States
in
Central Asia, would no longer be available to American aircraft. This was a
tidy little victory for the Russians, who had used political and financial
levers to pressure Kyrgyzstan to eject the Americans. The Russians, of
course,
deny that any such pressure was ever brought to bear, and that the closure
of
the base one day before Munich could have been anything more than
coincidence.
But the message to the United States was clear: While Russia agrees in
principle to the U.S. supply line, the Americans will have to pay a price
for
it. In case Washington was under the impression it could get other
countries in
the former Soviet Union to provide passage, the Russians let the Americans
know
how much leverage Moscow has in these situations. The U.S. assertion of a
right
to bilateral relations won't happen in Russia's near abroad without Russian
help, and that help won't come without strategic concessions from the United
States. In short, the American position on Russia hasn't changed, and
neither
has the Russian position.
The Europeans
The most interesting -- and for us, the most anticipated -- part of Biden's
speech had to do with the Europeans, of whom the French and Germans were the
most enthusiastic about Bush's departure and Obama's arrival. Biden's speech
addressed the core question of the U.S.-European relationship.
If the Europeans were not prepared to increase their participation in
American
foreign policy initiatives during the Bush administration, it was assumed
that
they would be during the Obama administration. The first issue on the table
under the new U.S. administration is the plan to increase forces in
Afghanistan. Biden called for more NATO involvement in that conflict, which
would mean an increase in European forces deployed to Afghanistan. Some
countries, along with the head of NATO, support this. But German Chancellor
Angela Merkel made it clear that Germany is not prepared to send more
troops.
Over the past year or so, Germany has become somewhat estranged from the
United
States. Dependent on Russian energy, Germany has been unwilling to confront
Russia on issues of concern to Washington. Merkel has made it particularly
clear that while she does not oppose NATO expansion in principle, she
certainly
opposes expansion to states that Russian considers deeply within its sphere
of
influence (primarily Georgia and Ukraine). The Germans have made it
abundantly
clear that they do not want to see European-Russian relations deteriorate
under
U.S. prodding. Moreover, Germany has no appetite for continuing its
presence in
Afghanistan, let alone increasing it.
NATO faces a substantial split, conditioned partly by Germany's dependence
on
Russian energy, but also by deep German unease about any possible
resumption of
a Cold War with Russia, however mild. The foundation of NATO during the Cold
War was the U.S.-German-British relationship. With the Germans unwilling to
align with the United States and other NATO members over Russia or
Afghanistan,
it is unclear whether NATO can continue to function. (Certainly, Merkel
cannot
be pleased that the United States has not laid the BMD issue in Poland and
the
Czech Republic to rest.)
The More Things Change …
Most interesting here is the continuity between the Bush and Obama
administrations in regard to foreign policy. It is certainly reasonable to
argue that after only three weeks in office, no major initiatives should be
expected of the new president. But major initiatives were implied -- such as
ending the BMD deployment to Poland and the Czech Republic -- and declaring
the
intention to withdraw BMD would not have required much preparation. But
Biden
offered no new initiatives beyond expressing a willingness to talk, without
indicating any policy shifts regarding the things that have blocked talks.
Willingness to talk with the Iranians, the Russians, the Europeans and
others
shifts the atmospherics -- allowing the listener to think things have
changed
-- but does not address the question of what is to be discussed and what is
to
be offered and accepted.
Ultimately, the issues dividing the world are not, in our view, subject to
personalities, nor does goodwill (or bad will, for that matter) address the
fundamental questions. Iran has strategic and ideological reasons for
behaving
the way it does. So does Russia. So does Germany, and so on. The tensions
that
exist between those countries and the United States might be mildly
exacerbated
by personalities, but nations are driven by interest, not personality.
Biden's position did not materially shift the Obama administration away from
Bush's foreign policy, because Bush was the prisoner of that policy, not its
creator. The Iranians will not make concessions on nuclear weapons prior to
holding talks, and they do not regard their support for Hamas or Hezbollah
as
aiding terrorism. Being willing to talk to the Iranians provided they
abandon
these things is the same as being unwilling to talk to them.
There has been no misunderstanding between the United States and Russia that
more open dialogue will cure. The Russians see no reason for NATO expansion
unless NATO is planning to encircle Russia. It is possible for the West to
have
relations with Ukraine and Georgia without expanding NATO; Moscow sees the
insistence on expansion as implying sinister motives. For its part, the
United
States refuses to concede that Russia has any interest in the decisions of
the
former Soviet Union states, something Biden reiterated. Therefore, either
the
Russians must accept NATO expansion, or the Americans must accept that
Russia
has an overriding interest in limiting American relations in the former
Soviet
Union. This is a fundamental issue that any U.S. administration would have
to
deal with -- particularly an administration seeking Russian cooperation in
Afghanistan.
As for Germany, NATO was an instrument of rehabilitation and stability after
World War II. But Germany now has a complex relationship with Russia, as
well
as internal issues. It does not want NATO drawing it into adventures that
are
not in Germany's primary interest, much less into a confrontation with
Russia.
No amount of charm, openness or dialogue is going to change this fundamental
reality.
Dialogue does offer certain possibilities. The United States could choose to
talk to Iran without preconditions. It could abandon NATO expansion and
quietly
reduce its influence in the former Soviet Union, or perhaps convince the
Russians that they could benefit from this influence. The United States
could
abandon the BMD system (though this has been complicated by Iran's recent
successful satellite launch), or perhaps get the Russians to participate in
the
program. The United States could certainly get the Germans to send a small
force to Afghanistan above and beyond the present German contingent. All of
this is possible.
What can't be achieved is a fundamental transformation of the geopolitical
realities of the world. No matter how Obama campaigned, it is clear he knows
that. Apart from his preoccupation with economic matters, Obama understands
that foreign policy is governed by impersonal forces and is not amenable to
rhetoric, although rhetoric might make things somewhat easier. No nation
gives
up its fundamental interests because someone is willing to talk.
Willingness to talk is important, but what is said is much more important.
Obama's first foray into foreign policy via Biden indicates that, generally
speaking, he understands the constraints and pressures that drive American
foreign policy, and he understands the limits of presidential power.
Atmospherics aside, Biden's positions -- as opposed to his rhetoric -- were
strikingly similar to Cheney's foreign policy positions.
We argued long ago that presidents don't make history, but that history
makes
presidents. We see Biden's speech as a classic example of this principle.
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