Shia Days of Rage
The Roots of Radicalism in Saudi Arabia
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/frederic-wehrey> Frederic Wehrey
December 13, 2012
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138498/frederic-wehrey/shia-days-of-
rage?page=show> Article Summary and Author Biography
Saudi Arabia may have at first appeared untouched by the 2011 Arab
uprisings, but the apparent calm belies a simmering crisis. Shia and Sunni
sectarian tensions are arguably at the highest level since the 1979 Iranian
Revolution, and a harsh government crackdown is mobilizing radical elements
in the Shia community and undercutting its pragmatists. The United States
faces no shortage of crises in the region, but it would do well to not let
this one slip too far off the radar. Aside from obvious concerns about human
rights and reform, the continued unrest in the predominantly Shia Eastern
Province of the Sunni-led kingdom presents a potential strategic threat to
U.S. interests. Iran has historically sought to aid beleaguered Shia
communities in its neighborhood, and, as evidenced by the 1996 Khobar Towers
bombing and, more recently, the cyberattack on Saudi Aramco in August of
this year, it has the capability and intent to hit Saudi Arabia. Currently,
there is little evidence of Iranian material support of Shia groups in the
Eastern Province, but continued unrest could change that. The mounting
frustrations of Saudi youth could translate into a ready pool of recruits,
or prompt the reincarnation of the Saudi Hezbollah.
Comprising ten to 15 percent of the kingdom's population, Saudi Shia have
long faced religious discrimination, political marginalization, and economic
hardship. Although the Eastern Province contains the majority of Saudi oil
reserves, the Shia population there has yet to benefit economically,
especially when compared with Sunnis living in the central Najd region, the
historic seat of Saudi power. It is therefore unsurprising that the 2011
revolts in Tunis and Cairo reverberated strongly in the east.
Riding on the wave of change in the region, moderate Shia activists
rekindled long-dormant relationships with Sunni reformists in the Najd and
Hijaz provinces and planned countrywide protests for March 11, 2011. But the
so-called Day of Rage fell apart, undermined by mutual distrust among Sunnis
and Shia. As the day approached, Web sites and Facebook pages appeared
proclaiming uniquely Shia demands and calls for reform. A number of
Web-based Sunni activists lambasted the Shia organizers for pursuing a
narrowly sectarian agenda that diluted the overall movement and played into
the hands of the regime. This development later proved a watershed in the
fracturing of the opposition and, arguably, the demise of the Saudi Spring.
On March 9 and 10, approximately 600 to 800 Shia protesters demonstrated in
the eastern, Shia-dominated city of Qatif denouncing the regime's recent
arrest of the popular Shia cleric Tawfiq al-Amer and other activists. The
police responded with percussion grenades and rubber bullets, provoking
further anger and demonstrations across the east. The moderate Shia Web site
Rasid tried to distance itself from these Shia-specific, violent protests
that overshadowed cross-sect efforts. But by the end of March, hope of a
Sunni-Shia Saudi Spring had been extinguished by sectarianism.
In an attempt at reconciliation, the governor of the Eastern Province,
Prince Mohammad bin Fahd, and his deputy met with a delegation of young
people and clerics in late March 2011 and reportedly promised to redress
Shia grievances. At the same time, however, the regime began a concerted
crackdown, maintaining a near constant presence of security forces,
helicopters, and armored vehicles on the streets of Qatif. On November 2,
2011, the spokesman for the Saudi Interior Ministry announced that Eastern
Province police would set up a Facebook presence and assign a special team
to monitor social media in the region. The alleged purpose of the Facebook
page was to encourage tips and information from anonymous informants
regarding outlawed activity in the region. Nearly simultaneously, the regime
blocked a number of Eastern Province Web sites.
Aside from the deleterious effects on living conditions, the security and
media crackdowns have had far-reaching consequences for the Shia political
movement. They have hastened the declining credibility of the pragmatic,
pro-dialogue approach of the Islahiyyin ("reformists"), a moderate Shia
opposition movement led by Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar. These pragmatic Shia
interlocutors, with whom the Saudi regime has traditionally dealt, are being
replaced by something entirely new and more worrisome. Frustrated with the
moderates' failure to deliver tangible results, younger Shia activists have
adopted more violent, militant tactics. In a 2012 sermon, Saffar
acknowledged this rage with surprising candor, warning that, "although
previous generations tolerated and adapted to problems, the current
generation is different."
Responding to this pressure, Islahiyyin leaders have made statements that
are increasingly strident and critical of the regime. A longtime supporter
of King Abdullah's ten-year "national dialogue" project, which encourages
communication among religious sects, Saffar has never condoned or incited
violence. But younger activists have forced him into a more rigid position.
For example, in one Friday prayer sermon last year, he directly attacked the
Interior Ministry for its heavy-handed response to Shia rioting, arguing
that the regime's statements facilitated an atmosphere of sectarianism. In
February 2012, he delivered a sermon obliquely attacking the hypocrisy of
the royal al-Saud family in criticizing the bloodletting in Syria while
causing civilian deaths in the Eastern Province. These statements, in turn,
provoked an even sharper escalation of anti-Shia rhetoric in the press from
Sunni and pro-regime voices.
The Saudi regime has long isolated radical Shia groups while at the same
time painting the broader Shia movement as Iranian-backed, thus separating
Shia from like-minded, pro-reform Sunnis. An October 2011 pro-regime
editorial in al-Hayat, the Saudi daily newspaper, exemplifies this strategy.
The piece called for the kingdom's authorities to crush allegedly
Iranian-backed Shia protests in the Eastern Province, arguing that "it is
time to admit that there are fighting groups in al-Qatif that have been
trained in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, and to start liquidating and purging
them from the country." Since the article appeared last year, more than 16
protesters have been killed.
Far from isolating the radical Shia current, the security crackdown has only
emboldened and popularized it. Perhaps the most significant turning point
was the arrest of the popular Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr this past summer --
an event that shook the region to its core, prompting a stream of violent
clashes that has yet to abate. Hailing from a clerical family with a long
pedigree of anti-Saud activity, Nimr has been steadily gaining popularity
since 2008. His rhetoric is unapologetically pan-Shia; he has frequently
spoken of a Shia ummah (nation) and has hinted that he would advocate a
separate Shia state if reforms are not forthcoming. Above all, however, he
advocates for dignity and justice. These themes resonated strongly among the
youth of his hometown, Awamiya, an impoverished Shia village that suffers
from endemic unemployment and is now a hotbed of antigovernment sentiment.
In the summer of 2012, Nimr's fiery sermons crossed an unofficial red line
in the eyes of the Saudi regime. On June 27, he delivered a rousing tirade
against the royal family, rejoicing in the recent death of the much-feared
interior minister, Prince Nayef, and imploring God to take the lives of the
"entire al-Saud, Khalifa, and Assad dynasties." On July 8, Saudi security
forces attempted to arrest him; a car chase and firefight ensued. Nimr was
shot, wounded in the thigh, arrested, and taken into custody. Compelled to
start his tenure with a firm hand, the then-newly appointed interior
minister, Prince Ahmed bin Abdul al-Aziz, promptly issued a scathing
statement deriding Nimr as mentally ill.
After this incident, Shia activists on Facebook called for countrywide
protests, while moderate leaders encouraged calm in sermons and statements.
40 Shia clerics across the ideological spectrum -- from the moderate
Shiraziyyin to the pro-Iranian Khat al-Imam -- implored Shia youth to remain
steadfast and cease all violence to avoid playing into the hands of the
regime. But the Shia clergy has appeared increasingly anemic and out of
touch; social media -- not the sermon -- has become the ascendant channel of
political communication in the Shia east.
On July 12, 2012, the Saudi oppositionist Web site al-Jazira al-Arabiya
posted a statement from a hitherto unknown opposition group called the Youth
of al-Qatif Revolution, which threatened to "assault police stations and
blow up oil wells" if Nimr were not released. Hundreds of Shia protesters
took to the streets, and clashes with security forces in Awamiya and Qatif
have become an almost nightly occurrence.
Finally, the anti-Shia crackdown has not even placated the country's Sunnis.
The summer and fall of 2012 saw continuous anti-regime Sunni protests in
Qassim, a longtime stronghold of conservative Salafism. This simultaneous
unrest in the center and east -- and what it reveals about the breadth of
opposition in the country -- was not lost on Saudi Arabian activists on
social media. As one popular Twitter user noted: "Qassim & Qatif both having
protest in such short time apart ought to be making (the Saudi government)
very nervous." Another warned: "The 2 most opposite cities in Saudi, Qassim
and Qatif are both protesting. If ppl A to Z want change, current system
won't stand much longer."
The protests may not be an imminent threat to the Saudi government, but
their persistence and increasing violence show that the status quo cannot be
taken for granted. By ignoring long-standing grievances, playing the
sectarian card, and unequivocally treating the opposition as Iranian-backed
radicals, the regime is aggravating the very situation that it would like to
defuse.
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Received on Thu Dec 13 2012 - 12:37:26 EST
