Sudan: Major Reform or More War
Africa Report N°194 29 Nov 2012
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/194-sud
an-major-reform-or-more-war.pdf
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The “Sudan Problem” has not gone away with the South’s secession. Chronic
conflict, driven by concentration of power and resources in the centre,
continues to plague the country. The solution is a more inclusive government
that addresses at least some of the peripheries’ grievances, but pledges to
transform governance remain unfulfilled. A key hurdle – though not the only
one – is President Bashir, who has further concentrated authority in a small
circle of trusted officials and is unwilling to step aside. Many hope for
regime change via coup but have not considered the dangers. The goal should
be managed transition to a government that includes, but is not dominated by
his National Congress Party (NCP). He might be willing to go along if he
concludes greater disorder or even a coup is growing more likely, but only
if the right incentives are in place. The international community should
contribute to these provided a credible and inclusive transitional
government, a meaningful national dialogue on a new constitution and a
roadmap for permanent change in how Sudan is governed are first put firmly
in train.
The regime in Khartoum is in crisis, faced with multiple challenges that,
combined, profoundly threaten its existence and Sudan’s stability. The
economy is in a freefall that any oil deal with South Sudan will only slow,
not arrest. NCP members are deeply unhappy with the leadership, its policies
and massive corruption. Feuding factions within the ruling party and the
Islamic movement are jockeying to present an acceptable alternative to the
NCP government. At the same time, political opposition forces are growing
more assertive, and the war with the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) is
slowly expanding, bleeding the military dry and draining the treasury.
Many hope a coup, or popular uprising, could force Bashir and the NCP regime
out, but there is a great risk that either event could trigger more
violence. Since he came to power in a military coup in 1989, he has
deliberately fragmented the security services and frequently rotated
commanders to make an army takeover more difficult. Unless commanders are
united, the army could easily split into competing factions. There are also
a host of other security services and armed militias loyal to different NCP
leaders. Added to this combustible mix are numerous armed tribes outside of
Khartoum that would seek to take advantage of turmoil in the capital to
create facts on the ground difficult for a new regime to reverse.
Bashir and the NCP likely recognise that the dangers of the present phase
are greater than the social and economic troubles they have survived in the
past. Their instincts are to cut a deal with the fractured opposition
(ceding some power and resources to one or two of the political parties
and/or a major armed group) and take advantage of the partial settlement
with South Sudan to get the oil flowing again. But that can only buy more
time, not resolve the causes of chronic conflict or stop the spreading civil
war.
The international community should learn the lessons of past failed
settlement initiatives: Sudan needs a truly comprehensive peace agreement,
not a partial settlement that serves the government’s divide-and-rule
tactics and perpetuates the unacceptable status quo. At the same time, the
NCP needs to be part of any transition. Leaving it out in the cold would be
costly. Its elites are too powerful to ignore, and the opposition is too
divided and inexperienced to rule alone. A comprehensive solution and
genuine political reform including national reconciliation acceptable to
all, with the NCP on board, is the only way out of the trap of endless
conflict.
The president and his colleagues will have to reach their own conclusion
that the present crisis requires more radical adjustments than those they
used for survival previously. If they do, however, the international
community, by providing incentives, can help them to act on that conclusion
consequentially and responsibly. These should be carefully tied to Bashir
and the NCP meeting specific, irreversible benchmarks, such as those Crisis
Group set out as early as 2009, and verifiably continuing the transition
process. Such cooperation might be unpalatable to many who hold Bashir
responsible for atrocity crimes, but it would be necessary to prevent
further conflict and continued humanitarian crises in Sudan as well as South
Sudan. He is crucial to a managed transition that incorporates both the NCP
and opposition leaders – civil and armed – and that could put Sudan on a
more inclusive, sustainable path. The alternative would be continuation of
the status quo, with the NCP desperately clinging to power at whatever
humanitarian cost, and the opposition pursuing a military strategy that
risks more national fragmentation.
Most Sudanese know what is necessary to end decades of conflict. Even before
independence in 1956, it was clear that power and resources should be shared
more equitably with marginalised regions. The historical focus was often on
South Sudan, but other areas have suffered as well. At different times, most
peripheral regions have risen in armed revolt to demand greater
representation and more development. This dynamic will not change unless
there is fundamental structural reform of how the country is governed, and
all its political forces – the NCP, the traditional parties, the SRF and
youth groups – work together to create a more inclusive and representative
government that accepts and respects the tremendous diversity of the
Sudanese peoples.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To achieve an inclusive transitional government and initiation of meaningful
and verifiable national dialogue
To the Government of Sudan:
1. Bring the NCP, opposition forces and civil society together in an
arrangement to manage government for a limited period with well-defined
parameters (based on agreed principles reiterated in multiple agreements
over decades) that is intended to lead first and foremost to a comprehensive
ceasefire and humanitarian access to conflict areas, as well as to allow the
political forces to come together to flesh out a roadmap for a durable peace
process.
2. Create a process that includes armed and unarmed political forces from
all regions to:
a) debate and agree on a system of governance that can put an end to the
conflicts between the “centre-Khartoum” and Darfur, Southern Kordofan, Blue
Nile, East and North; and
b) draft a permanent constitution.
3. Implement legal and judicial measures to end impunity, such as:
a) appointing non-partisan judges, including in the special courts;
b) ensuring the independence of courts and reviewing police investigation,
arrest and prosecution procedures;
c) holding all government forces and associated militias accountable for
their violations of international humanitarian law; and
d) amending the provisions in the police law, the criminal law and the
criminal procedural law that give the police and security personnel
immunity.
To the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) and Political Opposition Forces:
4. Subordinate individual ambitions in order to develop and articulate
detailed political platforms and visions that can form the framework for the
transition process.
5. Work to broaden the opposition’s support base and popular support for a
transitional framework.
To assist in ending conflict and building sustainable peace and reform
To the Republic of South Sudan:
6. Urge the SRF and other opposition forces to recognise that a managed
transition is much preferable to a coup or violent regime change and their
likely attendant chaos.
7. Encourage the SRF to develop a detailed political platform and work with
other opposition forces.
To Members of the UN Security Council, AU Peace and Security Council and
Council of the League of Arab States:
8. Demand and work for a single, comprehensive solution to Sudan’s multiple
conflicts.
9. Offer President Omar al-Bashir, as well as NCP elites, incentives to
create a transitional government and firmly and irreversibly place Sudan on
a transitional path, including:
a) assistance to stabilise the economy, such as normalisation of relations,
lifting of sanctions, expediting Highly Indebted Poor Country (HPIC) status
and other debt relief measures, on condition that transition roadmap
benchmarks are met and progress is made in negotiations with South Sudan on
post-separation issues; and
b) If concrete moves towards a credible transition process are undertaken,
and should it emerge as a genuine obstacle to its peaceful conclusion, a
Security Council request to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to defer
prosecution of Bashir for one year under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.
There would be no obligation to renew such deferrals if Bashir reneges on
his transition commitments.
10. Support through training and capacity building during the transitional
period the establishment and growth of issue-based parties that can
represent and articulate the demands of marginalised constituencies,
including the peripheries, youth, women and urban and rural poor.
Nairobi/Brussels, 29 November 2012
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Received on Fri Nov 30 2012 - 08:48:05 EST
