Uganda's Strategic Interests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Uganda remains accused of providing aid to rebel groups in the Congo.
Outside pressure, however, is unlikely to force Kampala to reassess this
policy any time soon. Its economic reasons for remaining involved in what is
a failed state are just too important.
28 November 2012
_____
Summary
In October, a leaked U.N. Group of Experts report accused Ugandan and
Rwandan officials of supporting M23, a rebel group in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and recommended to the United Nations that it
sanction Kampala. Whether or not Uganda is providing aid to this particular
rebel group, the country has a history of occasionally supporting rebel
activity in the Congo. Security concerns are no longer as pervasive as they
once were, but Kampala still has economic incentives to be involved in the
region.
Uganda denied the allegations in the U.N. report and threatened to
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/ugandas-challenge-un> withdraw its troops
from peacekeeping operations in Somalia and other African regions if the
report is not amended. In a sense, Uganda is hoping to use its peacekeeper
role in Somalia as leverage to reduce international pressure over its
involvement in the Congo. Ultimately, it is unlikely that outside pressure
will force Uganda to reassess its policy toward the Congo.
Analysis
Uganda has long been active in the Congo. Between 1996 and 2003, Uganda
twice intervened directly in the Congo, and it has supported a wide
assortment of rebel groups there over the years. Kampala's interests in the
eastern Congo are twofold. First, there are lingering security concerns
about anti-Uganda rebels across the border. Less than 10 years ago, northern
and western Uganda were under constant attack, but the threat today is not
nearly as pressing. Second, Uganda profits off the Congo's extensive mineral
wealth in various ways. For example, it allows pro-Uganda militant groups to
smuggle Congolese natural resources into Uganda for export.
Security Concerns
A number of armed groups with a presence in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo have attacked Ugandan cities and citizens over the past few decades.
The <
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/uganda-lra-remains-low-level-threat>
Lord's Resistance Army, an Acholi rebel group, attacked northern Uganda
heavily in the mid-2000s but has hardly been a threat since. During the
1990s, other groups, such as the West Bank Nile Front, did the same. Between
1998 and 2004, the Allied Democratic Forces, an Islamic rebel group,
conducted numerous attacks in the central Rwenzori Mountains before being
largely driven out of Uganda by the Ugandan military. Lastly, the tri-border
region between the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda has been a hotbed of Hutu
militant activity since the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. (However, it should be
noted that the Hutu rebels are mostly focused on Rwanda.)
Uganda's two-part strategy to counter these rebels has been to push them out
of Uganda and into the Congo or beyond and to support opposing rebel groups
and the Ugandan military, especially against the Lord's Resistance Army.
This strategy has been relatively successful, pushing the Lord's Resistance
Army well into the Congo and the Central African Republic.
Still, the threat from the rebel groups has not completely subsided. There
have been recent rumors that the Allied Democratic Forces have been
rebounding over the last year or two. Kampala has even claimed that the
Islamic group has attacked police, churches and schools in western Uganda in
2012, though these claims may be false. In the Congo, there is much more
evidence of the Allied Democratic Forces' apparent recovery. In October
2012, for example, three priests were kidnapped, allegedly by the Allied
Democratic Forces, in the Rwenzori Mountains region in Beni, the Congo.
Since the M23 rebel group emerged in April 2012, countries in the African
Great Lakes region have conducted a series of conferences on the
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/democratic-republic-congo-push-authority-e
ast> instability in the eastern Congo and the possibility of intervening.
M23 is the successor to the
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/drc-rwanda-and-doomed-cease-fire> National
Congress for the Defense of the People, a group of mostly Tutsi fighters who
were purportedly backed by Uganda and Rwanda. Uganda's concern about the
Allied Democratic Forces has been central to shaping its approach to these
meetings. Indeed, as a possible illustration of Kampala's concern, since
mid-2012, a number of Muslim clerics in Kampala suspected of having links to
the Islamic group have been assassinated by unknown assailants.
Economic Interests
Despite the possible re-emergence of the Allied Democratic Forces, Uganda's
lingering concern about the security along its border is not immediate.
However, Kampala also has economic interests in the region.
First, Uganda possesses about 2.5 billion barrels of known oil reserves, all
located around the shores of Lake Albert. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni
has begun militarizing -- or, in some areas, already has militarized --
western Uganda in order to protect these interests. Uganda's first oil
production is expected to begin by 2015 or 2016, but any threat to the
development of the country's oil infrastructure could delay that. The Allied
Democratic Forces' threat to Uganda's oil industry is pretty minimal at this
time, but the oil reserves are sandwiched between Uganda's historically most
unstable regions.
Aside from the Allied Democratic Forces, there are a few rebel groups across
the border that could jeopardize Uganda's infrastructure development.
However,
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/uganda-drc-eyes-prize-lake-albert> the
more credible threat could be from the Congo itself. Kinshasa wants to
develop its own side of Lake Albert -- though reserves there have been found
to be much less significant than on the Ugandan side -- and demarcation of
Lake Albert is not without contest between the two countries. Ultimately,
though, militarizing the region has just as much to do with consolidating
oil revenue under Museveni's patronage-based regime as it does protecting
the industry from rebels based in the Congo or the Congolese government
should it ever become coherent.
There are other economic reasons for Uganda's support of groups that are
hostile to anti-Uganda militants. In the early 2000s, Uganda and Rwanda both
supported various rebel groups in the Congo's Ituri province in an attempt
to <
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/drc-continuing-battle> gain control of
the province's extensive gold and other natural resources. The fighting has
largely stopped since then, and gold, timber and other resources are now
smuggled to Kampala before being sold to consumers, but the militias are
still present.
Militias control this entire lucrative smuggling scheme. M23 (and before it
the National Congress for the Defense of the People) taxes and profits from
the charcoal trade; the Congo's national army taxes and overlooks illegal
fishing permits; Hutu rebel groups smuggle and trade palm oil; Mai Mai
militia groups control minerals and tax mining production; and the Allied
Democratic Forces profit from the trade of gold and other resources. With
the exception of the Lord's Resistance Army, every rebel group in the region
is involved in racketeering.
Kampala knows the Congolese army is not only unable to control the region
but also takes part in the illicit economy. In this underground economy
where everyone controls something, no one controls everything. In order to
protect its varied interests, Uganda has thus decided to operate through
rebel groups. At the same time, if Kinshasa could ever stabilize the eastern
Congo through its military, it would probably attempt to consolidate control
of the lucrative industry under itself, threating Uganda's interests.
Uganda's southern neighbor
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/rwandas-strategic-interests-drc> Rwanda
came under fire earlier in 2012 for supporting M23 and destabilizing the
eastern Congo. Kigali saw cuts to its economic aid and harsh rhetoric but
little more, and in October it was actually selected to be Africa's
representative on the U.N. Security Council beginning in January 2013.
Uganda's links to M23 are not as clearly defined as Rwanda's and even now
the full extent is unknown. The international community's treatment of
Rwanda for similar actions and Uganda's multifaceted reasons for supporting
certain rebel groups in the Congo suggest that Uganda is unlikely to change
its strategy in the region.
For additional reading on this topic please see:
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54
e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=124038> The Regional Dimensions
of the War in Northern Uganda
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54
e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=150870> Black Gold in the Congo:
Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity?
Timber Trade in Africa
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54
e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=152517> 's Great Lakes
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Received on Wed Nov 28 2012 - 17:18:47 EST
