Saudi Arabia and the Future of Yemen
By: Abdullaziz Dhafer. Translated from
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/about/sources/altagheer> Al-Tagheer
(Yemen).
Nov 27, 2012
Summary:
Abdullaziz Dhafer analyzes Saudi Arabia's role in supporting the Gulf
Initiative in Yemen, and whether Riyadh may be playing both sides to
maintain influence, on Sanaa.
No one can deny the key role played by Saudi Arabian King Abdullah bin Abdul
Aziz, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries in general to prevent the outbreak
of civil war in Yemen last year.
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/01/theres-something-rotten-in
-the-y.html> The Gulf Initiative was the lever used by the Saudi leadership
to do so.
Although the Gulf Initiative was initially a proposal made by the former
president of Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries as a political exit to help
Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh avoid the fate of former Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak and former Tunisian President Zine Abidine Ben Ali,
it does not change the fact that Saudi Arabia is the actual godfather of the
Gulf Initiative.
I believe that the most important and positive aspect about the Gulf
Initiative is that it emphasizes the unity of Yemen and the need to preserve
it, in addition to emphasizing the international community's support for a
unified and stable Yemen.
Thus, the initiative helped to crystallize a clear and explicit regional and
international position on Yemen after the February 2011 revolution, and
tried to cut off all secessionist attempts early on. In theory, it placed
those who advocated for secessionist projects into the category of hinderers
of the political settlement. It is also a basic reference on which the
United Nations Security Council based resolutions 2014 and 2051 and
statements issued regarding the situation in Yemen, all of which emphasized
the unity of Yemen.
There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia played a key role in this remarkable
international position on the unity of Yemen. This is not a strange position
from the kingdom, which has, through its senior leaders and official
statements, repeatedly stated its support and adherence to the concept of a
single, stable Yemen.
Moreover, the Arabism and nationalism of King Abdullah are known to all. His
participation in the celebrations of our country's Unity Day in Aden years
ago confirms his strong support for Yemeni unity. The same goes for Crown
Prince Salman. In his first meeting with a Yemeni delegation headed by Dr.
Abdul Aziz Bin Habtoor, president of the University of Aden, after becoming
crown prince, he called for upholding and preserving the unity of Yemen as
an important asset for the Yemeni people, as well as the Arab and Islamic
nation.
Despite Saudi Arabia's indirect support for Yemen's secessionists in the
<
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_civil_war_in_Yemen> 1994 civil war (which
was due to the Yemeni position on the occupation of Kuwait at the time),
Sheikh Abdullah's statements in his memoirs about King Fahd - in which he
urged him in a meeting they had during the war to quickly resolve the battle
due the great pressure he was being subjected to - shows that the Saudi
leadership considers the unity of Yemen as a strategic asset for the
kingdom, and a way to ensure its vital interests and maintain security and
stability in the region and the world.
The way some branches of the [Saudi] ruling family dealt with the
secessionist leaders, particularly in the recent period, gives an impression
to many that there is a huge gap between the public Saudi support for Yemeni
unity and what is happening on the ground, in the sense that there are some
ambiguities that need to be clarified by the brothers in Saudi Arabia to
clear off the confusion. These include:
- It is known that the main funding for the secessionist mobility forces in
Yemen comes from expatriate businessmen and traders living in Saudi Arabia.
Yet, the Saudi government has not taken real steps to dry up funding for the
mobility. It also did not take any measures against the active mobility
leaderships living on its soil like Abdul Rab al-Naqib, for example.
- Unlike the Sultanate of Oman - which revoked the citizenship of former
President of South Yemen Ali Salem al-Bid and asked him to leave its
territories when he decided in 2009 to resume political activity - Riyadh
did not take any action against prominent mobility leaders who carry Saudi
citizenship and reside on its soil like al-Asnaj, al-Jafri and al-Attas.
This is despite the fact that those personalities, particularly Attas, had
stepped up their suspicious activity and movements against Yemeni unity
since the end of last year.
Although the Saudi leadership is keen on ensuring the success of the
political settlement and implementing the Gulf Initiative, and is aware that
exerting pressure and threatening both parties of the crisis with
international sanctions was the main reason for the success of the political
settlement until now, the kingdom has so far not shown any willingness to
use its influence with the most prominent leaders of the secessionist
movement at home and abroad, and try to pressure them to persuade them to
participate in the national dialogue conference and abandon their impossible
terms.
This is despite the fact that this rejection has actually become the main
obstacle to holding the conference and major threat to the success of the
political settlement as a whole.
If the calls of Abdul Rahman al-Jafari, Haidar al-Attas and Ali Nasser, who
receives 10,000 Saudi riyals [$2,667] per month from the Special Committee,
as claimed by Al-Shari newspaper - for federalism and self-determination [as
a means] to resolve the Southern issue was an excuse for Saudi Arabia not to
intervene to put pressure on these leaders, then the situation changed days
ago.
Attas, Jafri, and Hassan Baoum (whom Riyadh recently succeeded to polarize
and used to divide the Southern Mobility Movement council and to weaken
Bid's pro-Iranian current) announced in Cairo on Nov. 17 that they reached a
political agreement that calls for secession and abandons [the call for]
federalism. Although this position totally contradicts the Gulf Initiative
and the Saudi position, Saudi Arabia has so far ignored the matter as if it
did not concern it or has lost control over these worn-out leaders, which it
has always manipulated by remote control.
That is not all. Some suspect that the recent rapprochement between Baoum
and the Nasser-Attas current, and Jafri's sudden decision to join them, was
premeditated by Riyadh as part of its efforts to curtail the gulf iniative.
This is especially true since Baoum said in a statement before leaving for
Cairo that he met while receiving treatment in Saudi Arabia months ago the
then Minister of the Interior Prince Ahmed bin Abdul Aziz, a meeting that
was far from innocent.
Unconfirmed information leaked by sources close to Baoum suggests that the
latter met with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the current interior minister,
during his stay in Saudi Arabia and that the meeting may have resulted in a
deal whereby Prince Mohammed gave Baoum a check worth $10 million as a down
payment.
Although the details of the deal are not known, the coup led by Baoum
against Bid once the latter returned home was part of the terms of the deal.
I believe that if the information on the deal is true, then Baoum will no
longer accept money as a reward for his staging a coup against Bid, but he
may have other demands. The important question to ask here is: What is the
political reward requested by Baoum from Prince Mohammed?
Are there promises by the prince to seek, for instance, to convince the king
and crown prince to reconsider Saudi Arabia's position on Yemeni unity, or
at least to not interfere to block a likely external direction to pressure,
through the national dialogue conference, the interlocutors to accept
granting the South the right to self-determination?
The aforementioned Cairo Declaration reinforces this argument. I believe
that what Attas, Baoum and Jafri agreed on is a mere tactical move made by
these leaders before officially announcing approval of participating in the
national dialogue as the sole representative of the mobility that is
recognized by the international mediators, with the conclusive exclusion of
Bid's stream.
Thus, these leaders deliberately raised the bar of their demands for
federalism with [the right to] self-determination to secession before going
to the dialogue table, so they would - in response to the expected pressure
from the mediators during the dialogue sessions - abandon [the demand] for
secession in return for the consent of the other party on granting the south
the right of self-determination.
If the supposedly Saudi-affiliated leaders managed to obtain the right to
self-determination at the dialogue conference with a green light from
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia will have fallen into the trap that was set up by the
secessionist mobility forces and committed a grave strategic mistake that
will soon affect it negatively.
Saudi Arabia has no guarantees that the public disputes between the mobility
leaders are real differences, and not just an exchange of roles that is
being skillfully directed. This is especially true given the conviction of
the various mobility forces that the only way to persuade Saudi Arabia to
change its firm position on unity is by exploiting its fears of the Iranian
direction that aims to find a foothold for Tehran in the South.
What further supports this argument is Baoum's call to the mobility leaders
after its general conference held in Aden early October to unite and
postpone their differences after achieving secession, and the many meetings
between Ali Nasser with Bid, the latest of which was held in Beirut during
the Eid al-Adha.
Despite the apparent difference in vision between the two men, it asserts
that they have overcome their personal antagonism. Furthermore, the
Nasser-Attas current's adoption of the demand for secession and abandoning
federalism practically finishes the main disagreement with Bid's current.
It is important that Riyadh realizes that supporting the self-determination
of the South means accepting secession.
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/01/06/the-dictatorship-of-hunger-a
nd-t.html> In light of the deteriorating Yemeni economy, the weakness of the
state, and the large number of open files in addition to the continuous
regionalist provocation in the south against national unity,
self-determination and all these factors make the secession the most likely
outcome that will come out of any referendum held in the south.
Going back to secession means that Saudi Arabia will find itself in an
unenviable position. The fact that Saudi Arabia is not intervening to curb
the separatist figures that are considered its allies and is not obstructing
the secessionist plan represents a good opportunity for the enemies of Saudi
Arabia in the northern provinces who have resumed their campaign and have
been trying to incite the citizens against the kingdom.
This also paves the way for
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/01/09/al-qaeda-houthi-tribes-vie-f
or-influence-in-yemen.html> the Houthis (in alliance with the Nasserites),
the Ba'thists and the socialists to control the north.
Similarly, it is very likely that the enemies of Saudi Arabia will seize
power in the south. This is due to the fact that the influence of [Ali
Salim] Al-Bid and his followers exceeds that of the leaders loyal to Riyadh
in the south, particularly since the followers of the Yemeni Socialist Party
and the youth forces will ally with Bid given that Saudi Arabia has always
been considered a historical enemy as it has supported Yemen's unity.
Additionally, several Southern Mobility leaders have rejected the Jeddah
Agreement on the demarcation of the border, not to mention the southerners'
deep-seated belief that Saudi Arabia is behind inciting Hadramawt to secede
from the south.
In recent months, Hadramawt has been increasingly calling for disengagement
from the south with the growing activity of the sons of Sultan al-Kathiri
and other committees in Hadramawt such as the League of Hadramawt Forces.
In that sense, Saudi Arabia will find itself surrounded by a Shiite crescent
and two hostile entities in the South. It is unenviable that those two
entities will, spurred by Iran, work on supporting the Shiite rebellion in
the south and the east of the kingdom, particularly since the atmosphere is
receptive for such a thing with the arrival of the Arab Spring to
monarchical states such as Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain, and the threat the
Arab Spring poses on the ruling regimes in these countries.
It is also possible that the Arab spring might reach Saudi Arabia as the
ruling family is occupied with the illness of King Abdallah and trying to
look for an acceptable procedure to transfer power to the younger generation
within the family.
Often, countries seek to impose influence on the surrounding countries to
maintain their national security and strategic interests, which is similar
to Saudi Arabia's relationship with [Yemen].
Despite the end of the border issue between the two countries after the
signing of Jeddah Agreement, the elusiveness of the former president and his
tactics, which contributed to aggravating the threat of the Houthis and
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/01/08/a-yemeni-analyst-al-qaeda-ha
s-re.html> al-Qaeda, were two of the reasons that forced Saudi Arabia to use
the south as a pressure card in a way that would serve its vital interests.
Unfortunately, it seems that certain parties within the ruling family are
still adhering to this policy despite the fact that the credibility and
seriousness of the Yemeni leadership represented by President Abdo Rabbuh
Mansour Hadi requires them to abandon this policy and provide him with
various kinds of support and assistance to fulfill his promises, and
cooperate with him to face the common dangers posed to both countries.
Personally, I am still counting on the unity and Arabism of King Abdullah
and Crown Prince Salman to carry out direct intervention and abandon the
policy that considers the south a pressure card that can be used against
Sanaa from time to time.
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Received on Tue Nov 27 2012 - 11:23:16 EST
