Meles Zenawi's legacy for the Horn of Africa
Video- Inside Story - Life after Ethiopia's
Meles Zenawi
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/11/20121116121222738150.html
Zenawi's regime will be remembered for holding Ethiopia together as one
country even under the centripetal ethnic order.
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Any recent visitor to Ethiopia would be struck by the ubiquitous billboards
commemorating the late Prime Minister's life, two months after his demise.
Meles Zenawi's photo form the backdrop to the TV screens and adorns the
streets of all the major towns and villages.
These sights were supplemented by the chorus of Africa leaders that attended
the PM's funeral and who lavished praise on this "dedicated son of African
soil". He was depicted as the untiring leader who toiled for the upliftment
of the indigent peoples of Ethiopia and Africa.
Among this choir were African presidents and prime ministers whose own
policies have degraded the lives of their people. The least distinguished of
these visitors were the former President and Prime Minister of Somalia whose
tenure in power was marred by their total subservience to the Ethiopia
regime.
One wonders if this orchestrated and well managed public love of the late
Zenawi reflects the thoughts and feeling of the peoples of Ethiopia and the
neighbouring states where the PM's policies had the greatest footprint.
Putting aside the propaganda of the Ethiopian governing party, the
admiration of his cohort of political friends and partisan Ethiopian
critics, most objective analysts would agree that, unlike the visiting
African leaders, Zenawi left behind a record that deserves critical
scrutiny.
Zenawi's legacy
Zenawi's legacy can be viewed through two analytical lenses: a) his domestic
footprint; (b) and his regional impact.
To assess the PM's legacy, we need to understand the political and economic
context of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa when Zenawi and his party, the
Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), came to power in 1991.
First, Ethiopia was devastated by a brutal military dictatorship that
massacred hundreds of thousands of people, while it also presided over the
catastrophic famine of 1984 that devastated several regions of the country.
Additionally, the military regime wasted Ethiopia's meagre and precious
resources to oppress the legitimate struggle of the Eritrean people, as well
as others inside Ethiopia, such as Tigray, Somali and the Oromos, to mention
a few. War, famine and oppression were the hallmark of Ethiopia in 1990, and
the regime was exhausted and had run out of ideas and energy to move the
country beyond multiple calamities.
Then came the last drive of the Eritrean resistance against the regime since
they already controlled the entire countryside and surrounded the capital
Asmara. Their ally in Ethiopia (TPLF) then pushed towards Addis Ababa and
within a couple of months, it became clear that the regime's days were
numbered.
Given the ethnic character of the TPLF, it was not clear whether its
takeover of the capital will induce a new civil war with the Oromo
liberation Front and other communities. Concerned about the possibility of
having another failed state in the region, with all the attendant problems
such as a tidal wave of refugees, the United States brokered an agreement
between the regime and the TPLF. This pact allowed for a "peaceful" takeover
of the capital and Mengistu's departure for exile.
The TPLF brought with it a client group of ethnic political parties, the
so-called PDOs (People's Democratic Organisations), who jointly formed what
became known as EPRDF. But there has never been any doubt that TPLF
controlled the levers of power in the country.
The junior partners of the "coalition" were supposed to provide national
legitimacy for the new ethnic authority, however, the Ethiopian public
largely considered the PDOs as lackeys. The independent Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF), which initially joined the ruling coalition, failed to
understand TPLF's militarist agenda and paid the ultimate price as the
latter swiftly destroyed its military base.
After this defeat, OLF went underground where it has virtually become
inconsequential. Establishing the new order and consolidating TPLF's power
took nearly a decade after which the regime turned more of its attention to
other matters.
After 21 years in power, we can emphatically state that Zenawi's regime has
been a Janus-faced order. Its political rhetoric exuded democracy, peace,
national harmony and development, but behind that façade was a determined
security apparatus that crushed even the most democratic attempts to
challenge its authority.
This rhetoric proved seductive enough for outsiders, but all indications are
that it has failed to sway a majority of the population. It is these two
faces of the regime that the remaining section of this brief will focus on.
But I must first provide an explanatory note about the nationalist character
of the regime. I can categorically state that the late Premier Zenawi was an
Ethiopian nationalist, despite the claims of some of the opponents that he
was building Tigray for an eventual secession, if needs be.
Many critics of the TPLF regime claim that it exploited the resources of
most regions in Ethiopia to develop its home province. There is a grain of
truth to this assertion, but I would suggest that to be a nationalist does
not exclude a regime from internally differentiating regions by privileging
some over others.
Most critics do not understand that there are two kinds of nationalists:
civic and sectarian nationalists. Civic nationalists genuinely try to treat
all regions and citizens alike and fairly. In contrast, sectarian
nationalists protect the territorial integrity of the country but also
establish a hierarchy of power which privileges certain groups and political
factions.
Zenawi and his regime represented the latter version of nationalism and are
not alone in this regard in the developing world.
Domestic footprint
Zenawi's group and those they invited to take part in the political
conference in the early 1990s produced a constitution which nominally
privileged ethnic identity. They subsequently divided the country into
ethnic provinces.
There is little doubt that this political architecture gave modest
advantages to most ethnic groups in the country who were the subjects of the
empire, but such gains belied the fact that Addis Ababa remained the
decisive power centre of the country.
More critically, a small group of TPLF cadre and the security establishment
they strategically controlled have had the final say about all the major
issues. Even when the affiliates of the TPLF became senior ministers, they
remained pliant cadre without a backbone.
I have witnessed the humiliation that comes with such status. The absence of
any degree of autonomy on the part of those affiliates manifestly
demonstrates that belonging to EPRDF has been like George Orwell's Animal
Farm where "All animals are created equal, but some animals are created more
equal than others".
Despite cowering their partners and most of the population, Zenawi and his
regime can legitimately claim several major accomplishments. First, the
regime has created a physical infrastructure for the country that is better
than what was left behind by all the previous regimes combined. The road
network that spans to most regions of the country can facilitate national
integration and development if progressively used.
Second, the number of public universities has increased substantially over
the last decade and this has allowed many young Ethiopians to gain access to
some form of higher education.
Third, the electrically grid of the country has been expanded and more
hydroelectric dams have been built or are under construction and this has
expanded the country's energy supply. Some of these dams were initiated
illegally because other riparian countries that have a stake in the rivers
were not consulted and no agreements were reached to satisfy all parties.
Despite such illegal and unethical preemptions, the growth in electric
production bodes well for the country's economic growth.
Fourth, an intensive regime of mineral exploration has been put in place
which could deliver dividends for the country in the long run.
Fifth, Zenawi and his team have not ameliorated the population's
vulnerability to famine, but fortunately the country has avoided the
catastrophic famines that used to take hundreds of thousands of lives.
Finally, there has been an increase in the volume of foreign investment in
the country and the rate of economic growth has been substantial despite
starting from a very low base.
The regime's liabilities are also numerous, but here is a sample of the
major ones. First, in spite of the seemingly smooth transfer of authority to
the Deputy Prime Minister, power is still wielded by individuals without
legitimate institutional anchors. As such, authority in Ethiopia is
extremely concentrated in two nodes that completely overlap: the TPLF core
and the security establishment.
The ultimate anchor of power is the security apparatus which has been loyal
to the TPLF rather than the country and the constitution. Such concentration
of power has enfeebled all other institutions and has created a political
culture and society deeply marooned in fear rather than genuine loyalty and
respect for national institutions. The political and social consequences of
this republic of fear are far reaching.
Second, although the economic sphere has been somewhat more liberalised,
loyalty to the regime is still central to an entrepreneur's ability to
succeed. In many instances, party connections are essential to start a major
business, and important sectors of the economy are dominated by the party
and its friends.
Third, the republic of fear has suffocated the entire political spectrum
through its unwillingness to tolerate even a minor political opposition. By
claiming to win over 95 per cent of the votes in the last election, the
regime has created a make-believe world where it is adored by all.
Fourth, in some parts of the developing world, academics are not free to
present their ideas/work regarding their countries' ailments, and Ethiopia
appears to be the model of academic unfreedom. This has been accomplished
through the elimination of tenure or long-term contracts for faculty and the
appointment of political loyalists to top academic positions.
If a professor indulges in critical analysis of the political and
development affairs of the country, there is little chance that his or her
contract will be renewed. Fear is the life blood of this system and compels
productive academics to either leave the country if they can, or languish in
the margins, or simply become sycophants of the regime to maintain their
livelihoods. Nevertheless, there are a few courageous scholars who have
stayed true to the ethos of the academy and still remain in the country
against incredible odds.
Fifth, poor people dominate the landscape of Ethiopian cities and towns, and
the UN has reported that over 80 per cent of the building structures of the
capital are of slum quality.
Mindful of this image, the regime has embarked on urban renewal that will
ultimately remove most of the poor from the city and allocate the "freed"
spaces to shopping malls and investors. It intends to house the indigents
removed from those areas in apartments built on the outskirts of the city
without examining alternative schemes that will keep these residents in
their neighbourhoods.
Finally, the collective effect of these liabilities is that public
institutions in the country are beholden to the individuals in power rather
that embodying national ethos. The shameless use of the security forces to
retain power or intimidate the political opposition, and the culture of fear
this engenders means that Premier Zenawi and his regime reinforced
institutions the public fears but they have failed to create legitimacy for
the post-1991institutions.
Without legitimate institutions that are autonomous from particular leaders,
the country remains in danger of fully sliding into an ethnic political
strife.
The regional impact
The "winds of change" in the Horn of Africa in 1990/1991 created
opportunities which could have produced a bright future for all. Post-1991,
Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders were cut from the same political cloth since
they closely collaborated in the battle field to dislodge the Mengistu
regime.
Nevertheless, one major factor separated the two movements: one was mainly a
national liberation movement while the other was primarily an ethnic
liberation project. On the Eastern front, Somalia provided material and
diplomatic support for the leadership of both the Eritrean and Ethiopian
liberation fronts, and the Somali people keenly followed the advances of the
two fronts against Mengisu's military while they also hoped for the fall of
the Somali dictator.
I remember visiting the border regions of Ethiopia and Somalia after the
fall of Siyaad and Mengistu where I saw the population relish their new
freedoms on either side of the border. The hope was that a new and more
progressive political chapter for the region was in the offing.
But the new lords of Ethiopia were steeped in a sanitised imperial
orthodoxy. During the first decade in power, Zenawi and his subordinates
adopted the same ethnic political logic, tested in Ethiopia's ethnic
provinces, to manipulate Somali affairs in the old Republic.
The authorities in Addis Ababa made no effort to reach out to Somali civics,
but instead chose warlords and sectarian political actors as their best
collaborators. Once the Somali people realised Ethiopia's new strategy of
"divide and rule", old animosities resurfaced and the Ethiopian occupation
of parts of the Somali Republic and its invasion of their country and
capital in 2006-08 dashed the last residue of good well. Nearly all Somali
civic nationalists now see Ethiopia as an enduring enemy.
In the north, the Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders who claimed to be the best
of friends slowly drifted towards conflict and imposed a horrible, costly
and unnecessary war on the population. The goodwill which has been nurtured
in the battlefield of liberation vanished.
After a devastating war which wasted over 100,000 lives, the two regimes
consented to arbitration. An international boundary commission was set and
both governments guaranteed to accept the commission's findings.
Eritrea immediately embraced the findings once the commission rendered its
verdict. Unfortunately, Ethiopia is yet to honour its commitment as it
introduced new conditions to the process and the international community has
failed to enforce the commission's ruling. Consequently and unfortunately,
the two countries remain in a virtual state of war.
The verdict
There is little doubt that history will judge Premier Zenawi as one of the
two major leaders in Ethiopian history. His regime will be remembered for
holding Ethiopia together as one country even under the centripetal ethnic
order which his regime officially introduced.
Second, Ethiopian nationalists will celebrate him as the man who invaded
Somalia and occupied Mogadishu. Third, his government will be regarded for
developing the country's physical and educational infrastructure, and for
refreshingly having the ambition of becoming a developmental state.
What Ethiopian democrats will not forgive is the regime's failing to
establish a political order and national institutions that have earned the
loyalty and respect of the people. The conflation of the regime's interests
with the national cause and the use of the security forces to domesticate
the population is not a sustainable strategy if Ethiopia is to ever evolve
into a vibrant democracy. The republic of fear must give way to the rule of
law to thwart a more foreboding future.
On the regional front, posterity will not be kind to the Zenawi regime as it
has totally squandered the opportunity to forge a more peaceful and
collaborative relations with Eritrea and Somalia given the goodwill of these
two peoples.
Allowing Somalis the opportunity to rebuild their government and society in
a democratic fashion would have eliminated traditional hostilities between
the two countries and boosted their mutuality. Further, this approach would
have shifted hundreds of millions of dollars from the war machine to
development which is desperately needed.
Instead of building on that goodwill, the regime embarked on a reign of
terror to destabilise Eritrea and keep Somalia in its catastrophic
condition. Sadly, the attempt to impose regional tyranny will ricochet on
Ethiopia and shall perpetuate the misery of all the peoples in the region.
It is not too late to change course and anchor developments on the
significant and positive elements of the last two decades, but will there be
the wisdom and the will in Addis Ababa?
Video- Inside Story - Life after Ethiopia's
Meles Zenawi
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/11/20121116121222738150.html
Abdi Ismail Samatar is professor of geography at the University of Minnesota
and a research fellow at the University of Pretoria, South Africa.
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Received on Sun Nov 18 2012 - 05:49:22 EST
