Mali, preparing for war
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/paul-rogers> Paul Rogers 15 November
2012
Mali's army will be unable to dislodge the Islamist hold on the country's
north, even with the help of fellow west African forces. This makes direct
western military intervention more likely.
Mali's deepening insecurity has taken several forms over this year. The
messy aftermath of a coup in Bamako in March 2012 was followed by the
successive advance of Tuareg forces and Islamist militias in the north of
the <
http://go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_htm/mali.htm> country, effectively
dividing the west African state. The establishment of control by the
Islamists has increased speculation about the possibility of external
intervention to wrest back the northern region (see "
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/mali-and-next-war> Mali, and the
next war", 1 November 2012).
Many reports on the intervention issue have lacked concrete information. The
most reliable noted clear signals of a move to intervene, expected to
involve several west African states; less certain was the extent of western
involvement (which the
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/mali-and-next-war> column argued
would be considerable, if covert). In the past fortnight, three
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/stephen-ellis/saharas-new-cargo-drugs-and-radi
calism> regional issues offer a guide to a deeper assessment.
The regional limits
First, there is the question of whether Malian army
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19372083> units can be trained and
equipped to win in the north. The army's strength, around 7,000 at the start
of 2012, is now much diminished: largely through desertions, and because the
elite paratrooper group that axted as the presidential guard was disbanded
after the
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/gilles-olakounl%C3%A9-yabi/malis-crisis-pitfal
ls-and-pathways> coup (see Jeremy Binnie & Lale Sariibrahimoglu, "
<
http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?id=1065972
530> Mali intervention planning intensifies", Jane's Defence Weekly, 24
October 2012).
It is doubtful that more than 3,000 troops could be prepared and deployed in
the coming weeks to a level that would enable them to take over the north.
Moreover,
<
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/14/who-are-ansar-dine/>
Ansar Dine and other Islamist groups are skilled at operating across the
desert and could readily disrupt supply-lines to any garrison implanted in
northern towns; and aerial resupply could be vulnerable to mobile
anti-aircraft missiles that may have seeped into Mali from Libya.
Second, therefore, the main elements of the operation will have to be drawn
from established armies in other west African states, under the auspices of
the Economic Community of West African States ( <
http://www.ecowas.int/>
Ecowas). A force estimated at 3,000-3,500 is likely to be assembled and to
operate from neighbouring countries (principally
<
http://go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_htm/burkina.htm> Burkina Faso, to Mali's
southeast). But even this will face problems. The entire operation would be
greatly aided were Algeria to be supportive, and the United States state
department is making efforts to persuade
<
http://www.el-mouradia.dz/francais/president/biographie/presidentfr.htm>
Abdelaziz Bouteflika's government. Algeria seems unlikely to alter its
stance, however. A security advisor of Algeria's government, Kamal Rezzag
Barra, says that external intervention would not work and that instead a
political
<
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/mali/b090-mali-the
-need-for-determined-and-coordinated-international-action.aspx> solution
must be found (see "
<
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/algerian-official-international-
military-intervention-in-northern-mali-would-be-useless/2012/11/10/4cebeec8-
2b88-11e2-aaa5-ac786110c486_story.html> Algerian official: international
military intervention in northern Mali would be 'useless'", Washington Post,
10 November 2012).
True, Algeria is reportedly deploying additional troops along its 1,200-mile
border with Mali, but this seems designed to ensure security and help
prevent rebel militias crossing into Algeria in the wake of any intervention
(see "
<
http://world.time.com/2012/10/29/u-s-seeks-algerias-support-in-possible-mal
i-move/> U.S. Seeks Algeria's Support in Possible Mali Move", Time, 29
October 2012).
Third, the largest component of a west African regional-intervention force -
though its exact composition is not yet clear - will probably be Nigerian,
with Burkina Faso also significant. But even Abuja may send as few as 600
troops, not least because its internal-security problems include unrest in
the oil-rich Niger delta and an expanding conflict with Boko Haram in
Nigeria's own north (see "
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/al-qaida-franchise-nigerian-case>
Al-Qaida franchise: the Nigerian case", 25 August 2011).
These three issues suggest that the region seems capable of
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20315423> generating a relatively
small force of a few thousand, comprising six or more national military
groups, that will have to be equipped and trained to operate over long
distances in difficult territory, against paramilitaries
<
http://www.irinnews.org/report/96578/MALI-Islamists-lure-back-northerners>
adept at guerrilla tactics. In short, it won't work - even with extensive
European (and especially French) military advice and supplies.
The international prospect
All this explains why it is as certain as can be that there will indeed be
direct foreign involvement, on the ground (the
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/mali-and-next-war> column of two
weeks ago said: "If, as is now likely, west African military action in Mali
<
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/23/uk-germany-mali-idUKBRE89M15S20121
023> evolves in the coming weeks and months, then there will in some
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20086980> form be extensive western
participation"). Indeed, a Nigerian source reports this week that European
countries will send up to 400 special forces to operate alongside the west
African troops; and that a meeting of military planners from France, Spain,
Germany, Italy and Poland is working out the details of the operation (see "
<
http://www.punchng.com/business/europe-to-send-400-special-forces-to-mali/>
Europe to send 400 special forces to Mali", Punch [Lagos], 14 November
2012).
A European diplomatic source says that the troops will be in supporting
roles only, with a focus on training, but this is frankly implausible. The
indications are that as the military operation develops in early 2013 it
will prove near-impossible to complete if dependent on the Ecowas troops
assigned to it. The logical consequence will be the deployment of an
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20086980> expanded force with a
substantial foreign input, whose responsibilities include a direct combat
role, no doubt supported by both armed and reconnaissance drones (see "
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/remote-control-new-way-of-war>
Remote control, a new way of war", 18 October 2012).
It is possible that in the coming weeks there will be serious attempts to
negotiate with at least
<
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gsKvraoOB-EFFIh18ks5kxut
Lc8A?docId=CNG.b2fb0ccc773dda2628c5b27991d91ca1.4b1> some of the
paramilitary Islamist groups operating in northern Mali. If they are
successful, a conflict might
<
http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mali-rebels-offer-concessions-1.1423546>
still be avoided. It is clear, though, that intensive planning for military
involvement is now underway, principally in Europe. If that military option
does ensue, the result will be another international conflict with western
participation - albeit likely to be on a smaller scale than
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/libya-and-decade%E2%80%99s-war>
Libya, and much smaller than Iraq or Afghanistan.
Its significance, though, may be less its size and
<
http://world.time.com/2012/11/12/malis-looming-war-will-military-interventi
on-drive-out-the-islamists/> intensity and more its status as a further
example of western intervention against an Islamic region. In itself that
may have little traction even with the great majority of the world's Muslim
community, but for a core minority it will have a sharp impact. The most
immediate effects may be felt in west Africa, where radical Islamist
movements are influential, but
<
http://world.time.com/2012/07/03/countering-al-shabab-how-the-war-on-terror
-is-being-fought-in-east-africa/> also in east Africa, where similar
currents are evolving. The
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/america%E2%80%99s-military-failure
s-of-success> experience of such wars also shows that once started they can
take alarming directions, have very destructive results, and often enhance
the very movements they are designed to counter. Whether such forewarnings
make any difference remains to be seen.
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Received on Thu Nov 15 2012 - 17:59:59 EST
