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[Dehai-WN] Muslimnews.co.uk: South Yemen: Unification dream becomes nightmare

From: Berhane Habtemariam <Berhane.Habtemariam_at_gmx.de_at_dehai.org>
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 15:19:23 +0100

South Yemen: Unification dream becomes nightmare

14-11-2012

Aden, (Al-Akhbar):

Many south Yemenis have become disillusioned concerning the prospects of
reunification. A look at their recent history explains why their dream has
become a nightmare, with many recalling the north's dismantling of the
south.

Although clashes between protesters demanding secession from North Yemen and
security forces have become less frequent, the appearance of calm belies the
simmering crisis just beneath the surface.

Many are in a state of restless anticipation over the ultimate fate of what
is known here as the "Southern Question." While the southern Yemenis were
once among the most fervent supporters of reunification, they have since
become disillusioned.

When the unification of Yemen was declared in 1990, the south Yemenis
thought that they had finally succeeded in achieving their old slogans that
called for safeguarding the Yemeni revolution, unity, and democracy.

For a long time, school students in south Yemen chanted these slogans and
sung the praises of unification. But the years that followed the
reunification of Yemen were sufficient to turn this dream into a nightmare
for most south Yemenis.

"Before unification, we were one people in two states, but after
unification, we became two peoples in one state," is a common refrain.

The fading sense of belonging to the Republic of Yemen as it stands can be
felt on many levels. Today, if you talk to any individual from the south of
Yemen, he would soon begin to list the grievances and the abuses brought
about by 22 years of unification, comparing the brutality of the Yemeni
state with that of Israel.

Many southerners assert with confidence that what Sana'a has perpetrated
against the south and its people is worse even than what the Israeli
occupation has done in Palestine. For this reason, the term "northern
forces" is absent in the discourse of many southerners, who prefer to use
the term "the occupation" instead.

Similarly, places in the south inhabited by northerners are called
"settlements," while people from the north are referred to by the derogatory
term Dahbashi, a colloquial Yemeni word used to describe a naive person.
Accumulated incidents over the years have sown resentment among southerners
toward the people and government of the north, and paved the way for the
flare-up of the Southern Question years ago.

Today, more than ever, various segments of the political spectrum in Yemen
agree that the Southern Question started out chiefly as a human rights issue
that snowballed over time because of Sana'a's indifference toward it.
Inevitably, it morphed into a political issue and a question of a lost
identity that the southerners are now seeking to restore, but without
agreeing on the shape of their new identity or the path they must tread to
achieve their goal.

Some like to trace the roots of the Southern Question to a time before the
unification agreement was signed, specifically to the transformations
witnessed in the internal arenas of both the People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic.

These, it is argued, had paved the way for Ali Salem al-Baid and Ali
Abdullah Saleh to merge the two states, but without a careful study of
whether coexistence between them was possible, or even a well-thought-out
formula for unification that would ensure participation by both northerners
and southerners in the administration of the new Republic of Yemen.

The repercussions of this rushed decision did not take long to appear,
quickly emerging in the months that followed unification, when the first
hints of the marginalization of the south began to surface. At the time,
this sparked a huge dispute between the "two Alis," Baid and Saleh.

The Document of Pledge and Agreement, signed in late 1993 in Jordan,
attempted to put an end to these differences, but to no avail. Not long
after that, a full-blown war erupted between the partners of unification
after Baid announced the secession of the south from the Republic of Yemen
on 21 May 1994.

The economic and political gains accrued by Saleh and his allies after
unification, however, meant that they could not let the south slip from
their hands under any circumstances. Civil war thus returned to Yemen.

The northern government, led by Saleh, defeated the southern secessionists
on 7 July 1994, and imposed unity by force with the help of a group of
southerners that had defected to its side. This ushered in one of the
cruelest stages in the lives of south Yemenis, who were systematically
excluded and marginalized.

Speaking to Al-Akhbar, Hussein al-Aqel, a university lecturer, said that the
south was lured into a trap in the name of unification in order to eliminate
the state structure and the institutions of the People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen.

Aqel, who is the author of a book on the Southern Question and the abuses of
the north in south Yemen, explained, "Baid was told a few months before
unification that he could make any demands he wanted, which would then be
met."

Aqel said that this turned out to be an ambush for the southern side, citing
the subsequent assassinations carried out against a number of southern
leaders who moved to Sana'a immediately after reunification.

The belligerence of Sana'a escalated further in the wake of the 1994 war,
and only a few years later, most of the wealth in the south fell in the
hands of the elite in the north.

Aqel, who was imprisoned and tortured for conducting a precise study of the
conditions of governmental and private institutions in the south in the
aftermath of these events, explained how the south's resources were
systematically destroyed by the north.

For example, up to 46 governmental and public sector institutions and
establishments were forcibly seized, including the Monetary Authority and
the General Establishment for Flour Mills. Aqel also said that more than 28
state-owned factories were appropriated, including manufacturers of
textiles, dairy products, and agricultural equipment.

But this did not stop with the public sector. About 11 mixed private-public
and privately-owned production plants were also seized, in addition to
around 33 state-owned farms with a total area of approximately 28,000 acres,
scattered throughout the southern provinces. The 56,000 employees of these
establishments were fired after the war of 1994.

Furthermore, 86 agricultural and service cooperatives were confiscated, in
addition to properties owned by agricultural associations. Their members,
who are estimated to number around 16,449, were in turn denied access.
Similarly, the fishing fleet belonging to the People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen was looted, having once been the second largest Arab fleet of its
kind.

The army did not fare any better. To be sure, Sana'a disbanded the armed
forces of the southern state, which were composed of 58 brigades and 14
battalions, and dismantled their capabilities for good measure.

Perhaps the most serious thing to happen in the aftermath of these practices
is the fact that mandatory retirement was forced upon more than 467,649 out
of 604,200 employees of the army, without giving them retirement benefits.
This meant that a large number of the army staff became unemployed, and had
to cope with difficult economic conditions as a result.

Aqel emphasized that these figures, which he tackles in more detail in his
book, were taken from northern and not southern sources. He said it was
important to make comparisons between what northerners owned in the south,
and what southerners owned in the north, pointing out that individuals
affiliated with the north of Yemen own up to 42 percent of the area of Aden.


He then cautioned against current plans to alter the demographic landscape
in the south, particularly in Aden, and mentioned plans to build six new
residential developments in the Aden area between 2025 and 2030, which would
be settled by northerners - including Enma City located between the towns of
Mansoura in the east and al-Shaab in the west.

This development, which is owned by a company controlled by the sons of
Sheikh Abdullah Bin Hussein al-Ahmar, will contain 5,150 residential units.
Meanwhile, Green City, which, according to Aqel, can accommodate only 1.4
million inhabitants, is expected to take in up to 3 million residents over
the next ten years. Similar plans for large-scale real estate projects exist
in other cities in the south of Yemen.

Concerning the oil industry, Aqel explained the shifts seen in this sector,
and said that shortly after the reunification, there were two oil companies
operating in south Yemen. After the 1994 war, the number rose to more than
30 firms.

These companies were mostly owned by northern figures, and were established
under the direct orders of President Ali Abdullah Saleh at the time. More
than 80 companies, which Aqel called "gangs," then came into existence.

Aqel believes that the main cause of such practices stems primarily from the
fact that the south, following the war, "was seen as a spoil that the elite
in the north could do with as they pleased," until the south ultimately
became part of the north's backyard.

 




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