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[Dehai-WN] Globalresearch.ca: Tremor within the Chinese Communist Party

From: Berhane Habtemariam <Berhane.Habtemariam_at_gmx.de_at_dehai.org>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2012 01:04:16 +0100

Tremor within the Chinese Communist Party


By <http://www.globalresearch.ca/author/socialist-project> Socialist
Project

Global Research, November 08, 2012

chinaflag

By Ahmet Devrim

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is holding a new congress, the 18th, due
to start on November 8. The CCP is at the helm of the single-party system of
the People's Republic. The nine-member Politbureau Standing Committee (PSC)
acts as the supreme body that rules over this vast country with a population
of 1.3 billion souls. The secretary general of the party, ranking number one
in the PSC, automatically becomes the president of the country and the
number three member the premier.

As is commonly known, under Mao Zedong, the country was ruled not only by a
single party but simply by one single man. After the death of Mao in 1976,
there was no question of one-man rule, although the rule of the single party
was sustained. A tradition was developed whereby the PSC elected in one
congress is authorized to rule the country for two consecutive terms. Given
that the CCP convenes a congress approximately every five years, this
implies that each president and premier serves for a decade. The
vice-president and the deputy premier are also members of the PSC. These
people are largely expected to take over the posts of president and premier
in the future. In short, the elections to the PSC determine who will rule
China over the next decade. That is why serious conflicts (and occasionally
purges) occur in the period leading up to a congress within the party
bureaucracy.

There are, of course, certain conflicts within the bureaucracy that cannot
be reduced directly to class interests or questions relating to political
orientation, conflicts that may simply be attributed to personal or small
group interests. However, in those cases when the conflict has assumed
unusually grave proportions, these should be traced to conflicting class
interests and divisions over political orientation that go beyond mere turf
struggles. A severe conflict of this intensity did occur between 1976-1981,
when four leaders, among whom Mao's spouse Jiang Qing, who had risen to
prominence under the Cultural Revolution, were arrested and purged through a
palace coup immediately after Mao's death. At a 1981 show trial reminiscent
of the Moscow Trials of 1936-1938, they were indicted for having formed a
"Gang of Four" and betrayed the party and the country and ultimately found
guilty. Thanks to the liquidation of the so-called "Gang of Four," the wing
of the party led by Deng Xaioping consolidated its power and began, in
December 1978, a process that was ultimately going to culminate in the
restoration of capitalism.

On the eve of the 18th Congress, we have witnessed the outbreak of the most
severe conflict of the last three decades within the CCP bureaucracy. This
conflict came out into the open in March this year with the purge of Bo
Xilai, party secretary for Chongqing, and certainly goes beyond turf wars of
the ordinary kind. It reflects, on the one hand, the deep fault lines within
the Chinese bureaucracy and, on the other, the severe discontent in the
ranks of the proletariat and the peasantry (progressively proletarianized
itself) face to the restoration of capitalism. To grasp the roots of this
conflict and to be able to decipher the secrets of the congress, we have to
briefly draw up a balance sheet of the economic and political developments
of the last three decades.

Capitalist Restoration, Class Struggle and the CCP (1978-2012)

The performance of the Chinese economy over the last three decades, with
growth rates almost consistently reaching double-digit figures, has been
historically exceptional. Despite this tremendous economic success, the
dissatisfaction of the proletarian and peasant masses with the regime has
not diminished, but on the contrary grown. There are several reasons for
this. First, the development of capitalist relations of production has
increased inequality between the classes. The contradiction between rich and
poor, inexistent under Mao, has increasingly sharpened. Secondly, job
security has been totally destroyed as a result of the reorganization of
state enterprises according to principles of capitalist management, the
privatization of some and the revision of labour legislation. It is true
that rapid economic growth has (so far) prevented the emergence of
unemployment as an explosive problem, but capitalist exploitation has been
stepped up thanks to the threat of layoffs, with mass unemployment at times
of crisis becoming a Damocles' sword hanging over the working-class as in
the rest of the capitalist world. Add to these economic factors the nature
of the single-party regime restricting the democratic expression of all
discontent and we arrive at the roots of the discontent of the masses.

The discontent first erupted during the gigantic outburst of worker and
student protests on Tienanmen Square in Beijing in 1989 that lasted for
weeks on end. These were brutally quashed in blood by the army. In the
immediate aftermath of the Tienanmen events, Jiang Zemin was appointed
secretary general of the CCP with the approval of Deng Xiaoping. Under
Jiang, who served as party secretary general between 1989 and 2002 and as
head of state between 1993 and 2003, capitalist restoration was consummated
and China became a fully capitalist country. A great majority of the
so-called "Township and Village Enterprises," that is the industrial
establishments of the countryside, were either shut down or privatized. A
part of the large state enterprises in urban areas were privatized in the
late 1990s, with approximately 50 million workers losing their jobs in the
process. State support extended to agriculture and to the rural areas, home
to the great majority of the people, was decimated. Social services in rural
areas, such as education and health care, which had flourished under Mao,
came close to bankruptcy in the 1990s.

"
The 16th Congress of 2002 adopted the "Theory of Three Representations"
developed by Jiang, which allowed for the admission of capitalists as
members into the CCP. The CCP bureaucracy had itself long been transformed
into a bourgeoisie. "

All this created mass discontent in the countryside. The repression that
descended on the Tienanmen protests pushed back urban protest for a while,
but the same did not occur in the countryside. On the contrary, protest
actions grew by leaps and bounds, both in sheer number and with respect to
the level of participation. By the end of the decade of the 1990s, even the
party and state bureaucracy admitted a simmering rural crisis that limited
the capacity of the government to rule, a crisis that was the subject matter
of intense debate within the public at large. (Since then this matter has
been debated in China under the rubric of the "three rural questions," these
being the agricultural question, the peasant question and the question of
the countryside.) In 2001, China's accession to the World Trade Organization
was completed. The 16th Congress of 2002 adopted the "Theory of Three
Representations" developed by Jiang, which allowed for the admission of
capitalists as members into the CCP. The CCP bureaucracy had itself long
been transformed into a bourgeoisie. This decision was in fact an overture
toward the capitalists outside the party and aimed at coopting them into the
party.

Such was the situation in 2002, when the duo Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao took over
the party leadership from Jiang. The most urgent problem confronting the duo
was the rural question. A new policy dubbed the "New Socialist Countryside"
was adopted. This policy involved the abolition of the agricultural tax, a
certain increase in subsidies extended to agriculture, mandatory education
of seven years in the countryside, the provision of textbooks, educational
materials etc. to students by government, a system of monthly cash payments
to peasants over the age of 60. It aims at placating social discontent
through a certain amount of concessions to the masses, without putting a
brake on capital accumulation. It is a kind of social policy that does not
go beyond the kind of poverty assistance implemented by the Lula
administration in Brazil or the Erdogan government in Turkey.

The second fundamental characteristic of the Hu-Wen period that sets it
apart from the Jiang incumbency was the absence of a comprehensive
privatization drive. The overwhelming majority of Chinese companies that
appear on the list of top global companies published by Forbes magazine are
still under state property. Notwithstanding this, because new public
investment is limited and because private investment has grown by leaps and
bounds, the trend of decline in the weight of the public sector within the
economy has continued unabated under the Hu-Wen administration.

To sum up, there was no serious change of course over the last decade apart
from an increase in welfare assistance to the peasantry. The most
significant consequence of increasing inequality at the beginning of the new
century has been the rise in the struggles waged by the subordinate classes.
The workers' movement, which markedly retreated in the aftermath of the
Tienanmen incident, has come back with a vengeance. Militant mass strikes
and struggles are being waged across all regions and industries. In the
countryside, the adoption of welfare programs has reduced to a certain
extent the number of actions that derive from absolute poverty. However, the
incessant drive of real estate interests to grab village land at very cheap
prices has led to the continuation of struggle over land. Apart from strikes
and struggle over land, other types of protests are also abundant. Protest
against bad treatment meted out to hawkers by security guards and police,
against factories that pollute the environment or against the injustices and
corruption of local officials, sometimes joined by crowds of tens of
thousands have become quotidian affairs.

Mike Constable union-art.com Finally, the ire created by the total
repudiation for the last six decades of the right of self-determination for
non-Han nations, a right that had been a promise of the CCP before its rise
to power, has recently been rekindled.

All in all, the number of so-called "mass incidents," a blanket category for
all kinds of action including strikes, rallies, protests, conflicts etc.
rose from 8700 in 1993 to 90,000 in 2006 and 180,000 in 2010. Ironically,
then, precisely in the same period when China attained double-digit growth,
social unrest also grew exponentially. The prospect of social unrest
sharpening as the world economic crisis takes its further toll on the
Chinese economy (and all indicators show that things are moving in that
direction) is a nightmare for the capitalists and bureaucrats of China.
This, in brief, is the overall economic and political situation in China on
the eve of the 18th Congress of the CCP.

Opposition Movements in China

The opposition in China today can be classified under three different
categories: the right-wing opposition, the left-wing opposition, and
national movements. Because the Han ethnic group forms ninety per cent of
the population and because the policy of the Chinese government of
transferring Han populations to Tibetan and Uighur territories has advanced
quite far, the impact of national movements on the overall political climate
is quite restricted. The real struggle is today between the CCP leadership
and those who oppose it from the right or the left.

The right-wing opposition has no qualms about the capitalist policies of the
CCP. On the contrary, it demands further privatization leading to even more
marked retrenchment of the economic weight of government. It is rather in
the political sphere that the right-wing opposition clashes with the CCP.
This opposition demands the abolition of the monopoly of power the CCP
enjoys and the establishment of a multi-party system. It is impossible to
know to what extent the idea of a multi-party bourgeois democracy enjoys
support in the population at large, but it is clear that there is a
considerable number of partisans of this idea within the ranks of those
elements of the bourgeoisie that do not owe their wealth to the CCP, as well
as among white collar employees, intellectuals and students.

Falun Gong is the most vociferous group within the right-wing opposition. It
pretends to be a movement for spiritual renewal making use of a series of
exercise and meditation techniques that derive from a peculiar synthesis of
Buddhism and Taoism. It first came out into the open as a result of some
public sermons given by its leader, Li Hongzhi in 1992. The Tienanmen
movement had been crushed in blood only three years before and there was
immense repression of political movements. The Chinese state at first
tolerated the existence of Falun Gong, which claimed to be an apolitical
spiritual movement and eschewed the transmission of any political messages.
However, the Chinese, totally alienated as they were from the CCP as a
result of the Tienanmen massacre, were ready to fill the ranks of any
organization that remained outside of the CCP, so long as its existence was
legally tolerated. It was this that led to the situation in which Falun Gong
turned, within a couple of years, into a movement that was supported by
millions. In many cities of China, thousands of people joined the activities
of Falun Gong, ranging from exercises to meditation and sermons.

In the end, Falun Gong was banned in 1999, the group being hunted down by
the police and declared a "diabolic" and "heretic" organization. Falun Gong
responded in kind, starting a large international campaign demanding an end
to one-party rule by the CCP. At present, Falun Gong has many partisans in a
series of countries. The leaders of the organization reside in the United
States and Canada and enjoy good relations with the governments of those
countries. The group is known to possess a widespread illegal network within
China itself. Falun Gong continues to be the best organized, strongest and
the most disciplined group within the right-wing opposition to the CCP.

As for the left-wing opposition, this consists of groups that come up
partially or entirely against the capitalist policies of the CCP. The
overwhelming majority of the left-wing opposition is made up of social
democracy and the different variants of Maoism. Classical social democracy
garners support from among intellectuals.

The greatest force on the Chinese left is Maoism. The Maoist groups defend
the policies of the pre-1978 period and perceive the process of capitalist
restoration set in motion by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 as a counterrevolution.
These groups embrace Chinese nationalism, just as Mao did in his day. They
are against the recognition of the right to self-determination for the
Tibetans and the Uighurs and totally back the chauvinistic line of the CCP
on the national question. They defend even more hawkish policies regarding
the disputes China has in the Pacific region with countries such as Japan,
Taiwan, Vietnam or the Philippines. They are certainly not against one-party
rule. Nevertheless, there are undeniable differences between Maoists of
different orientation regarding the attitude to be adopted toward the CCP. A
rather small minority characterizes today's CCP as a hopelessly
bourgeoisified force that cannot be redeemed. Hence, they aim for a new
Maoist party in order to make revolution. From time to time, the Chinese
government unleashes the police to repress these groups.

Both wings of Maoism initially addressed former party members and academics.
Their impact was very restricted among young workers and intellectuals.
However, the situation started to change gradually from the late 1990s on.
There was a perceptible increase in the display of Mao posters and in
references to Mao in the slogans chanted. Parallel to the growth in Internet
use, the number of Maoist Internet sites has also increased. These have
started to create an alternative perception of Mao, different from the
official assessment of the historic leader. In the context of the world
economic crisis that started in 2008, many young people started to read the
Maoist literature. Although the partisans of bourgeois democracy have not
lost any of their clout, the Maoist opposition has recently succeeded to
make itself heard more. To sum up, a left-wing movement, a cross-breed
between social democracy and Maoism, is on the rise in China.

The Earthquake Within the Party

We can now examine the conflicts and purges inside the CCP before its 18th
congress by putting them into the economic and political context explained
above. The purge of Bo Xilai, the party secretary of Chongqing municipality,
lies at the core of the conflicts within the party. Bo Xilai is the son of
Bo Yibo, one of the most important leaders of the CCP who was purged and
jailed by Mao during the Cultural Revolution and rehabilitated after Mao's
death. In China, the second and third generation male members of the
families of old leaders like Bo Yibo are known as "princelings." Princelings
hold important top positions within the party-state hierarchy. For example,
Xi Jinping, who is expected to be elected as secretary general in this
congress and become the president of the PRC soon after, is a well-known
princeling.

In order to understand Bo Xilai's importance within the Chinese bureaucracy,
we should briefly glance at China's administrative system and the specific
features of Chongqing municipality. It is impossible to govern a huge
country like China (with a population of 1.3 billion living in provinces
whose population is larger than many large individual countries) with a
strictly central administration. For this reason, China's administrative
system has strong elements of decentralism. As we will see below,
decentralism allows the implementation of different policy models in
different regions of China. Four important metropolises of China are
governed by municipalities under the direct authority of the central
government in Beijing rather than being administered by provincial
governments. Chongqing is one of these metropolises (the other three are
Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin). More than 28 million people live within the
borders of Chongqing municipality, which makes it one of the largest
metropolitan areas of the world. China's administrative system gives the
party secretaries of a municipality greater power than its mayor. In other
words, the party secretary is the highest authority in the municipality.
Working as the party secretary of a huge metropolis like Chongqing certainly
indicates a high position within the Chinese party-state bureaucracy.
Moreover, Bo Xilai was elected to the CCP's 25-member Politburo in the 17th
congress in 2007 and was expected to be elected to the 9-member Politburo
Standing Committee in the upcoming 18th congress.

After his appointment to the job of party secretary of Chongqing in 2007, Bo
implemented a set of policies that distinguished Chongqing from the rest of
China. These policies then came to be labeled the "Chongqing model." It is
necessary to take a brief look at this model that lies at the core of the
recent battles inside the party which led to the purge of Bo Xilai.

First of all, it is necessary to underline the fact that the "Chongqing
model" was not an anti-capitalist or socialist model. Similar to the rest of
China, capitalist relations of production have remained as dominant
production relations in Chongqing. During Bo's rule between 2007 and 2012,
no steps were taken against the capitalist system or bourgeois power.
Furthermore, giant capitalist corporations (including the U.S. information
technology giant, Hewlett Packard; Foxconn, a Taiwanese company that is the
world's largest supplier of electronic components; BASF, a German company
which is the world's largest chemical products manufacturer; and Chang'an
Automobile Group, Ford's partner in China) transferred a significant portion
of their production and management to Chongqing during Bo administration. It
is an obvious fact that giant corporations will not make significant
investments to a region where an anti-capitalist model is under
experimentation. In fact, in its July 2011 edition, Fortune magazine
included Chongqing as one of the top 15 new cities for business. Moreover,
according to a detailed investigation report published by Bloomberg news on
23 April 2012, the Bo family owns a wealth of at least $136-million (U.S.),
which is composed of shares in different companies and real estate
investments. In short, Bo himself is a bureaucrat-bourgeois similar to the
other members of the CCP bureaucracy. The comments made by various Chinese
and foreign leftists regarding the "socialism" of Bo and the Chongqing model
do not reflect anything but their ideological and political poverty.

After pointing out the capitalist character of the Chongqing model, we can
now take a look at its specific features. In the economic sphere, the most
important difference of Bo's Chongqing from the rest of China was the
dominance of the government in the real estate sector. It is a well-known
fact that ongoing urban expansion and gentrification projects in the middle
and lower income countries allow real estate capital to accumulate
significant amounts of capital. Similar to other parts of the world,
industrialization and urbanization in China increasingly lead to the
conversion of rural land to urban land. In China, this conversion requires
first the transfer of the rural land ownership from the village collectives
to the local governments (although collective production in rural areas was
abolished during the nationwide decollectivization campaign between 1978 and
1982, government at the village-level is still called the "village
collective" in contemporary China). Local government takes over the rural
land by paying relatively low compensation, improves the infrastructure in
the area, and finally declares it as urban land. The local government's
declaration of a piece of land as urban land means that the land is now open
to construction. Hence the value of the land starts to climb astronomically.
The monopolistic position of the local government in this process (of
transformation of rural land to urban land) enables it to take over village
land by paying low compensations and then sell it to real estate (or
industrial) capital at significantly higher prices. Today these sorts of
land deals constitute the largest share of local government revenue in China
(Villagers' resistance against land expropriations by demanding higher
compensation and the increasing wealth of the local officials through
kickbacks from real estate tycoons or directly getting involved in real
estate business forms the reverse of the medallion). As real estate capital
construction takes off and the region develops further, the value of land
increases much higher than the first stage (of conversion of rural land to
urban land). While the profits of the real estate companies increase
dramatically, local government gets almost nothing since they have already
transferred the land to the real estate sector. Another effect of the
increasing dominance of the private sector in real estate business is
increasing house prices and rents, which lead to the deterioration of living
conditions for urban workers.

While this remained to be the general situation in China, Bo Xilai
implemented a different model in Chongqing after 2007. Instead of
transferring large tracts of recently-developed urban land to the real
estate companies, Chongqing municipal government started to use these lands
through government-owned companies and investment funds. Thanks to this new
policy, the lion's share of the real estate profits started to accumulate
not in the hands of the private sector but in the coffers of the local
government. During this process, local government obtained huge bank loans
by using these lands as collateral. Chongqing government then used these
recently-created funds to establish several big companies working in various
industries. As a result, the state sector in Chongqing became significantly
larger than the rest of China.

Another consequence of this change had been the allocation of about one
third of the recently-constructed houses to urban workers under cheap
housing programs (the remaining part of the housing projects were allocated
to the construction of luxury residents for the big bourgeoisie and medium
level housing for the middle classes, as in the rest of China). Government
spending in social services also increased thanks to the new revenue sources
of the local government. This allowed the registration of a large number of
migrant workers (of rural origin) as urban residents in a relatively
smoother manner than the rest of the country, where the rural-urban divide
is a big problem because rural residents do not have access to many of the
social services that are provided to urban residents (The only significant
social right of the rural residents in China is guaranteed access to a piece
of farmland provided by the village collective, which is part of the
economic legacy of the pre-reform era. However, access to a small piece of
farmland is often not enough for the rural resident to receive education,
healthcare, and other social services that an average urban resident has
access to). In brief, a portion of the real estate profits were
re-distributed to the proletariat.

Another practice of Bo Xilai was to attack organized crime through
large-scale police operations. The biggest such operation took place on 20
June 2009. 2915 people were arrested and a significant amount of funds
controlled by the mafia was seized by the local government. That operation
went beyond the low-level, insignificant members of the mafia organizations
as some capitalists and bureaucrats were arrested and sentenced to severe
penalties. After that event, the popularity of Bo Xilai and his Chongqing
model increased all over China.

The third main component of the Chongqing model was the local campaigns
which involve positive references to the themes and motifs of the Mao era.
The distance between Mao's theory and practice and the new theories and
practices accepted during the reform era has increasingly widened in the
last three decades. The pressure exerted on the party by the Maoist
opposition made the adaptation of "Mao Zedong Thought" into CCP's official
theory and discourse increasingly difficult in recent years. In this
particular historical context, Bo Xilai started a cultural and political
campaign in Chongqing with a lot of positive references to Mao and the
achievements of the pre-reform era. In this campaign, many choirs singing
the revolutionary songs of the Mao era were established and the local
population was constantly encouraged to gather in squares and sing these
songs. Local government started sending the lyrics of these songs as well as
various quotes from Mao to every cell phone subscriber in Chongqing. The
local television of the Chongqing municipal government started broadcasting
programs praising various features of the Mao era. The most radical step
taken within this campaign was to stop the broadcasting of commercials
altogether on Chongqing television from 1 March 2011 on. The symbolic
significance of this move can be understood better if we recall the fact
that all television channels in China (including the China Central
Television owned by the central government in Beijing) broadcast
commercials. Mass mobilization methods inspired by Mao era practices were
also used to a limited extent as exemplified by the high number of written
petitions against specific members of mafia organizations openly signed by
the people of Chongqing, who were encouraged to participate in the "Strike
the Black" campaign.

By combining the Chongqing model with his personal charisma, Bo Xilai
managed to establish a strong base of political power in Chongqing supported
by the local population. Bo's political platform cannot be understood
outside the context of the recent rise of a reformist version of Maoism in
China. The great majority of the leftist opposition in China has supported
Bo Xilai by hoping to transform the CCP from inside. Bo aimed to use public
discontent and the rise of the left to get him elected to the Politburo
Standing Committee in the 18th congress. While the date of the congress was
approaching, the political debate in China was heated up with frequent
comparisons between the Chongqing model, which is characterized by a strong
state sector, and the more liberal "Guangdong model" (implemented in
Guangdong province, the most important powerhouse of China's export
economy), which is characterized by the dominance of the private sector in
the economy. The question of which of these models will determine China's
future has often been asked in these debates. Bo's election to the Politburo
Standing Committee in the upcoming congress would certainly increase the
possibility of the implementation of policies inspired from the Chongqing
model in the rest of China. In this context, Bo's opponents inside and
outside the party started to raise their concerns about his Chongqing model.
Many articles were published in newspapers criticizing Bo's Mao-inspired
campaigns and his harsh methods during the anti-mafia operations in
Chongqing by arguing that China is currently facing a threat of returning to
the days of the Cultural Revolution.

The chain of events leading to the decline of Bo Xilai took place in this
political context. Wang Lijun, the police chief of Chongqing and one of the
closest allies of Bo, entered the U.S. consulate in Chengdu on February 6,
2012. He stayed in the consulate for about 24 hours. The details of Wang's
negotiations with American diplomats are still not known. What is known is
that Wang told them that Bo Xilai and his wife GuKailai are behind the death
of Neil Heywood, a British businessman who was found dead in a hotel in
Chongqing on 14 November 2011. According to Wang, Heywood was the key
assistant of the Bo family in their money laundering activities. Heywood was
helping the family to transfer their money (the bribes received by Bo and
other types of corruption in which he was involved form the main source of
this money) abroad and therefore knew the dirty secrets of the family. When
his relationships with the Bo family deteriorated, he threatened them with
revealing their secrets, which led to his death by poison, orchestrated by
GuKailai. Bo was deposed from his office in March and expelled from the
Politburo in April. In August, GuKailai was tried and given a suspended
death sentence. On 28 September, Xinhua, the PRC's official news agency,
reported that Bo was expelled from the party and handed over to the
authorities for trial (his current whereabouts remain unknown).

There are many unknowns and suspicions surrounding the Bo Xilai incident.
For instance, a well-known Chinese forensic specialist wrote in her internet
blog that there is no convincing evidence that can prove that the cause of
the death of Heywood is poisoning (the blog entry was deleted by the
internet censors of the PRC). The only thing that is clearly known is
Bloomberg's detailed report showing that Bo family had a wealth of at least
$136-million (U.S.). Given the fact that the monthly salary of Bo was only
$1,585, it is clear that the source of the Bo family's wealth was bribery
and other types of corruption. However, this is obviously not the main cause
of Bo's expulsion from the party. Corruption is the rule rather than the
exception for China's party-state bureaucracy. It is a well-known fact that
the sons of Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Wu Bangguo (number two of the
Politburo Standing Committee) are all capitalists that control significant
amount of shares in various national and foreign companies that do business
with China's state-owned enterprises. On June 29, Bloomberg published a
detailed report revealing that the future general secretary/president Xi
Jinping's sister and her husband control at least $376-million of wealth. On
September 25, The New York Times published a similar report showing that the
current premier, Wen Jiabao's family has a wealth equal to at least
$2.7-billion (Access to these two news reports were immediately blocked by
the PRC's internet censors).

Everybody, people who feel happy or upset about Bo's downfall alike, is
aware of the fact that Bo's expulsion from the party is a political
decision, not an issue of party discipline. The cause of his expulsion is
the political battle over the Chongqing model taking place both inside and
outside the party. Recent statements and actual events have confirmed this
conviction. Guangming Daily, a newspaper controlled by the Central
Committee, not only attacked Bo Xilai for his alleged sins but also attacked
the entire Chongqing model as a "stale political model that brought China
unparalleled disaster." Similarly, premier Wen Jiabao argued that the Bo
incident showed that return to the days of Cultural Revolution is an actual
threat for China. Re-starting of commercial broadcasting in Chongqing local
television is probably the best evidence of the political character of Bo's
purge from the party.

While the CCP leadership (as well as the right-wing opposition to the CCP)
attack Bo Xilai, the majority of China's left, a reformist blend of social
democracy and Maoism, has mobilized to defend Bo. Red China, a prominent
Maoist web site which is currently blocked in China, recently published a
petition signed by more than 1600 people including two retired central
government bureaucrats demanding the impeachment of Wen Jiabao for his plans
about large-scale privatization of state-owned enterprises and his "grave
mistakes and crimes." The great majority of the signatories consist not of
members of the diaspora but of people actually living in China. Demanding
the impeachment of a prime minister implies a great risk of punishment in a
one-party dictatorship like the PRC. This phenomenon itself demonstrates the
high level of current political tensions in the country before the 18th
Congress of the CCP. The battles and disagreements regarding the case of Bo
Xilai caused one-month delay of the announcement of the actual date of the
congress. Also, the actual reason of Xi Jinping's disappearance from the
public in September for almost two weeks remains to be a mystery.

The Coming Storm in China and Socialist Politics
Capitalist restoration, a process set off in December 1978 with the Chinese
Communist Party's embrace of the policy of "reform and opening up," has
fundamentally changed the economic and social structure of China. On the eve
of the 21st century, China was transformed into a capitalist country. The
opening up of the doors of the CCP to business people in 2002 was only the
formalization of an ongoing process. Today the presence of the bourgeoisie
inside the CCP is not restricted to the people that are legally categorized
as business people. As we have already explained, top party-state
bureaucrats who are not officially recognized as capitalists have already
accumulated significant capital through their business links due to their
control over the state-owned enterprises. In short, bureaucrat-capitalist
cadres govern the CCP today.

Striking Chinese workers block the entrance gate of a factory in Shanghai.
The bourgeois regime ruled by the CCP has recently come under significant
stress. In the foreign policy realm, the PRC has serious tensions with U.S.
imperialism and other states from Japan to India. The regime is grappling
with more severe problems inside the country. Rising class inequality
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has increased class struggle to
its highest level since the Tiananmen protests in 1989. The workers'
movement, which started to rise in the mid-2000s, has become increasingly
militant under the impact of the global economic crisis that started in
November 2008. Migrant workers, whose numbers now approaching a quarter
billion, engage in new strikes and struggles every day. The peasant
struggles that started in the 1990s still continue unabated.

While the class struggle between the bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the
proletariat and the poor peasantry, on the other, intensifies, the Chinese
bourgeoisie is also undergoing internal frictions. One fraction of the
Chinese bourgeoisie advocates state-owned enterprises to play a significant
role in the economy and a policy to appease the proletariat and the poor
peasantry by increasing government spending for social services. The other
fraction of the bourgeoisie advocates further privatization and opposes high
increases in government spending for social services. The left-wing of the
CCP led by Bo Xilai represented the former group while the latter group had
a broader representation and power within the party. The Chongqing model
became the biggest symbol and mass appeal of the left-wing of the CCP. The
great majority of the Chinese left that embraces a reformist version of
Maoism has made the Chongqing model its political platform and supported the
bourgeois fraction represented by Bo Xilai.

Bo's possible election to the Politburo Standing Committee in the 18th
Congress might have been a great step for this group. By destroying the
political career of Bo Xilai, the CCP's centrist and right-wing sections,
which are closer to neoliberalism than Bo faction, have prevented this
outcome and advanced their position in the ongoing struggle. However, the
Chinese left's unwavering support for Bo Xilai and severe criticism of the
current party leadership demonstrates the fact that current political
divisions within the CCP cannot be easily overcome. For this reason, it is
necessary to follow the CCP's 18th Congress and subsequent developments in
China very closely.

No matter how and toward which direction the power struggles within the CCP
unfold, it is certainly clear that stability is not on the horizon and
political struggles of great significance are approaching. The Chinese
proletariat is entering this new era without a revolutionary political
leadership. The contemporary Chinese left, embracing a reformist blend of
Maoism, defending Chinese nationalism passionately, and supporting the
bourgeois faction represented by Bo Xilai, does not have any capacity to
develop a political platform independent from the bourgeoisie and provide
revolutionary leadership to the proletariat. Of course, Chinese
revolutionaries can cooperate with other leftist groups to oppose a possible
new wave of privatization and organize strikes and demonstrations. However,
placing unrealistic hopes upon the current Chinese left or supporting its
reformist program means nothing less than betrayal to the Chinese
working-class. The Chinese working-class needs a revolutionary and
internationalist political leadership as opposed to the current reformist
and nationalist line of the great majority of the Chinese left. Establishing
a Leninist party in China as part of an internationalist movement is an
urgent task not only for Chinese revolutionaries but also for all the
socialists of the world. .

Ahmet Devrim is a graduate student based in Istanbul, Turkey.

 






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