Somalia: Implementation of the ‘New Deal’ scuttled
Mohamud M Uluso
2012-10-26, Issue <
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/issue/603> 603
<
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/84949>
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/84949
The motley crowd of international players pursuing their own geopolitical
agendas is not genuinely interested in a peaceful and stable Somalia,
despite their posturing.
Somalia adopted a UN-drafted Provisional Constitution, formed a new national
parliament representing the entire population of the country and elected a
national leadership for ending 12 years of a chaotic transition period and
established a permanent, representative and accountable government eligible
for substantial Official Development Assistance (ODA). Majority of Somalis
believed that the international community would treat the post-transition
government as a sovereign authority primarily representative of and
accountable to its people. That belief was encouraged by the communiqué the
Secretary General of the United Nations issued after the conclusion of the
mini-summit on Somalia held in New York on 26 September 2012, in which he
said:
‘We reaffirmed our respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
political independence and unity of Somalia and pledged our support to a
peaceful, democratic, stable and prosperous Somalia. We recognized that
Somalia had entered a new political era and committed to forge a new
partnership for peacebuilding and statebuilding, which should be based on
principles of national ownership, mutual accountability and transparency.
‘We committed to a new Somali owned and led partnership, which will work
towards a compact between the Somali authorities and the international
community inspired by the principles outlined in the New Deal, agreed in
Busan in November 2011.’
The New Deal for the International Engagement in the fragile and conflict
affected countries (the ‘New Deal’) is an integral part of the outcome of
the international efforts on Aid Effectiveness and Development led by the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) under the High Level Forum (HLF)
comprising developed and developing countries plus bilateral and
multilateral institutions. Those efforts were supported by the International
Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) working with fragile and
conflict affected countries called g7+, parliamentarians, regional
organizations and civil society representatives. After series of meetings of
the HLF and IDPS between 2003 and 2011, the fourth HLF meeting attended by
IDPS group and held in Busan, Republic of (South) Korea, between November
29-December 1, 2011, adopted the basic document titled the Busan Partnership
for Effective Development Cooperation which has endorsed the New Deal worked
out by the IDPS. Somalia is one of the 17 countries of the g7+ chosen for
the implementation of the New Deal.
As it is clear from the principles of national ownership of development
interventions, mutual accountability and transparency mentioned in the
communiqué, the New Deal builds on the vision of peacebuilding and
statebuilding centered on the dual compacts between the state and its
citizens on one side and between the state and the international community
on the other side. The compact between the state and its citizens comes
first. The leaders of the fragile states are entrusted with the
responsibility to present a comprehensive owned plan which lays out the
vision and policies that respond to the five goals of the New Deal: (1)
political legitimacy and inclusivity, (2) security, (3) justice, (4) strong
economic foundations, and (5) good management of resource and revenue.
There are other principles agreed for good international engagement in
fragile states like (a) the consideration of the specific context in each
country, (b) avoidance of the creation of new social divisions and worsening
of corruption and abuses, (c) the use of aid recipient management systems
(institutions) and (d) the need to act fast and to stay engaged to give
success a chance.
In the light of the above, the first gesture expected from the international
community was to allow and encourage the newly elected leaders of Somalia to
set up their cabinet administration and define their own national
development plan and to treat them with diplomatic deference. That
expectation faded quickly and sense of frustration is emerging in the face
of the unilateral and divisive actions of the international community on
many critical issues. The commitments made in the New Deal and the message
of the Secretary General have not been honoured and translated into
practice. The principal-agent relationship between the international
community and Somalia is in display. Unfortunately, the international
community reneged on the implementation of the New Deal commitments in
Somalia. Indeed, Mark Bowden, the outgoing humanitarian coordinator for
Somalia said:
‘Skimping on aid now, particularly when recently developed institutions are
new and delicate, could put fledgling political advancement at risk and
cause a new surge of violence and upheaval.’
The job of the new Federal Government (FG) is overridden by the activities
of regional bodies or international mechanisms that control functions and
responsibilities invested constitutionally in the Somali government. Some of
those mechanisms and bodies include Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB)
located in Nairobi, Kenya, which controls the aid to Somalia under the
Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), PricewaterhouseCoopers financial
contract, the Joint Financial Management Board (JFMB), the role of the
United Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) post-transition, UNDP Budget
support project for the Somali Government, the continuation of the US dual
track policy, the centrality of the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD- Ethiopia and Kenya) in the internal politics of Somalia,
the Kampala Accord, the resource competition between the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali national and local security
forces, and the international aid policy based on geopolitical and security
interests of the donors rather than on the peacebuilding and statebuilding
priorities in Somalia.
It is instructive to note that the International Crisis Group (ICG) instead
of encouraging other donors to follow and complement Turkey’s widely
appreciated model of assistance in Somalia, which adheres to the New Deal,
has suggested that Turkey should change its aid policy if it wants to play a
major and sustained role in Somalia. This attempt is disadvantageous for
Somalia. The focus on the global security imperatives produces humanitarian
crisis and political instability.
Without doubt, Somalia has had a poor record of public financial management
throughout its history. However, its political independence is dependent
upon its independent and accountable management of its national resources
for public interests as emphasized in the New Deal. The management of public
finance is the cornerstone for building national authority with legitimacy
and institutional capacity.
The federal parliament must open a debate on the issues limiting the
progress towards statebuilding for collective understanding. The review of
the scope of the JFMB in light of the provisional constitution and national
interests is critical. For example, the creation of JFMB abolishes the role
of the national institutions responsible for the management and oversight of
the government operations as detailed in the provisional constitution. It
would suppress public vigilance and criticism against government’s
mismanagement. The former Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has resisted
the acceptance of the JFMB.
It is presumable that some donor countries will threaten to withhold their
financial assistance unless their proposed mechanisms that will limit FG’s
influence on the allocation, management and accountability of the resources
provided are accepted. The main excuse for the donors’ demand will be the
widespread corruption allegations against former TFG leaders, despite their
complicity. Inevitably, the new FG must immediately put in place a new
mechanism that will guarantee timely reporting, investigation,
accountability and confidence in the management of public funds. It can also
request experts and auditors working within the national institutions
involved in the collection and expenditure of financial resources.
The election of Prof. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prof. Mohamed Sheikh Osman
‘Jawaari’ as president and speaker respectively and the subsequent
appointment of the new Prime Minister Dr. Abdi Farah Shirdoon ‘Saa’id’ have
sparked public revulsion against former TFG leaders for their incompetence
and corrupt performance and raised the hope of the Somali people for a
better future. The public is waiting to know what the FG has inherited from
the TFG in terms of resources, assets, institutional capability, public
records and pending commitments. The ICG’s characterization of the legacy of
the TFG as troubled transition to tarnished transition must ring a warning
bell for the new FG leadership.
In addition to their advanced educational qualifications, the trio has in
combination a good track record in public administration and politics,
direct involvement in the search for peace, national reconciliation and
political solution to the tragic situation of Somalia, good knowledge of the
causes behind the collapse of the Somali state and of the failures of their
preceding leaders as well as the aspirations of the Somali people.
Nevertheless, the reality is that the new FG leaders face formidable
challenges that will test their vision, sense of patriotism, personal
leadership skills, endurance and dexterity in confronting the internal as
well as the external political crisis and traps. FG must take account of the
reluctance of the international community to embrace the New Deal
commitments and plan for such predicament. The future forebodes more
pessimism and treachery than optimism and trustworthiness.
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Received on Fri Oct 26 2012 - 17:30:38 EDT
