Yemen: can southern separatists break up Yemen?
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/helen-lackner> Helen Lackner
23 October 2012
By mid-2012, those demonstrators supporting a unified democratic Yemen were
out-manoeuvred by separatists who now dominate the southern movement both in
Aden and in Mukalla, the other main southern city. What are their plans?
Yemeni unity in 1990 was greeted with enthusiasm by Yemenis at large,
whether from the former Yemen Arab Republic (
<
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen_Arab_Republic> YAR) or People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Although there was considerable
discussion and disagreement in the leadership about the form it took, there
is no doubt that for ordinary Yemenis the possibility of travelling anywhere
in the country was welcome.
While many women in the YAR had looked forward to the spread of the PDRY's
Family Law to the whole country, many men and women everywhere hoped to see
the same for qat consumption laws, and southerners were looking forward to
economic liberalisation, all were swiftly disappointed when the economy
collapsed after the sanctions taken against Yemen by neighbour states
following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In addition, after the initial
flourishing freedom of expression through a multiplicity of new parties and
newspapers in the first years of enthusiasm, the political situation rapidly
deteriorated as tension developed between the two former ruling groups.
Starting with some clearly targeted assassinations of Southern leaders, this
eventually brought about the 5 months Civil War of 1994 which was decisively
won by Sana'a's forces.
From 1994 onwards many southerners, in particular the former elite and other
Aden residents, considered themselves to be oppressed by outside forces.
Land grabs by powerful northerners (often linked to various
military/security institutions) as well as the appointment of northerners to
senior political and security positions in Aden and elsewhere in the South
did nothing to improve the situation. Many former military and security
officers from the south were soon forcibly 'retired', their pensions paid
irregularly or not at all. Over the years, resentment increased as no
solutions were found and people's living conditions continued to
deteriorate. Aden, officially the 'economic capital' of the country was
neglected; its Free Trade Zone received little investment. The port which
many southerners still see as a possible panacea
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/yemen-can-southern-separatists-b
reak-up-yemen#_ftn1> [1] to the country's economic problems, was contracted
out to Dubai Ports World (DPW) on an agreement that served the international
strategy of DPW, rather than that of Yemen. As a result it stagnated.
Continued increase in the population, drought in rural areas, deterioration
in the quality of education and health services, all contributed to
worsening living conditions and impoverishment for the majority of the
population with only a minority (mainly composed of northerners) benefiting
from the new opportunities.
'Peaceful' beginnings
In 2007 a movement of former military officers and men started in Lahej and
Dhala' Governorates, the areas of origin of the majority of the military
leadership and men from the PDRY period, those who had been dismissed in
1994. Following on the model started in 1996 in Hadramaut, this movement
decided to be 'peaceful' from its earliest days and its demands were
originally straightforward and economic: reinstatement in their positions or
full payment of their pensions at current rates. As if it did not have
enough problems with the Houthi rebellion in the far North, Ali Abdullah
Saleh's regime chose to answer their demonstrations with force rather than
conciliation; whether this was incompetence or deliberate policy remains to
be seen.
Confrontations escalated over the following two years and spread to Aden and
Mukalla where the movement became a more widespread 'anti-north' movement,
associating all 'northerners' with the hated regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh,
regardless of the equally difficult living conditions of ordinary
'northerners'. By the end of 2010, Aden and parts of the South were
effectively 'low level war zones' where the State's army was retrenched
behind sandbags in fortified positions and under frequent attack from local
insurgents and where flags of the former PDRY flew openly and were painted
all over the place. In Aden, demonstrations were frequent and usually
greeted with the force of guns. As a result the number of deaths increased
and each one was the occasion for further demonstrations and bloodshed.
Alienation of the population was widespread, though it is notable that these
movements were particularly strong in Aden, Lahej and Dhala'. Elsewhere in
the southern Governorates, the situation was less clear: in Abyan and
Shabwa the main forces apparently opposing the regime were those associated
with the armed fundamentalists of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP],
whose relationship to the previous regime can be best described as
ambiguous. Further east in Hadramaut and al Mahara, while dissatisfaction
with the Sana'a regime was high, it did not necessarily translate into
secessionist ambitions.
In this context, the street sit-ins which started everywhere in the country
in January 2011 were opportunities for the Southern movement to expand and
develop, as it suddenly found itself as one of many movements which all
shared as main objective the removal of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and
his autocratic regime. Most demonstrators hoped to replace it with a truly
democratic regime which would respond to the needs and aspirations of the
majority of the Yemeni population. Many believe that a Parliamentary,
rather than a Presidential, regime would be the solution. This was the
opportunity for the southern movement to unite with that of all Yemenis in a
joint struggle for a better constitution and a regime free of corruption and
extortion.
Throughout 2011, street demonstrations continued, mainly in Aden where some
areas (such as the Main street in Ma'alla and some streets in al Mansoura)
became full-time sahas or tented areas occupied by young demonstrators on a
full-time basis. The geography of Aden as a number of towns separated by
narrow passes may have contributed to the political and social isolation of
the different groups, each one occupying its area and with different
leaders. Overall by mid-2012 those demonstrators supporting a unified
democratic Yemen were out-manoeuvred by separatists who now dominate the
southern movement both in Aden and in Mukalla, the other main southern city.
The separatists
Although it is highly questionable whether the majority of the population of
the former PDRY would actually vote for separation were they given the
opportunity to decide on the matter, the political debate in late 2012 is
entirely dominated by separatists of different hues. Similarly, although
the majority of street demonstrators in Aden and elsewhere are young people,
most of whom were born after unification, and others were small children at
the time, the debate is dominated by elderly statesmen, long past their
'sell by' date who should, by any logic, be living in retirement in their
various exile locations, enjoying the benefits of their (in some cases
ill-gotten) gains over past decades.
Their claim to leadership of the movement can only be explained by the
absence of new young leaders with alternative policies; one of the main
unanswered questions is why no new young leadership has emerged. The
attraction of separatism for youth is based on two perceptions: the first is
nostalgia for an imaginary past which ignores and suppresses the negative
features of the previous regime (in particular the in-fighting of its
leadership) and promotes an idealised collective 'memory' of the 'good old
days' which, incidentally includes the British Colonial period as well as
the PDRY. The second is the equally erroneous belief that all northerners
have a good deal and that it is only southerners who are oppressed by the
regime.
Instead of a common Yemeni struggle for better economic conditions and
democracy, southern citizens find that the politicians who claim to
represent them are a multiplicity of individuals and small groups, each of
which claims to represent the South, many of whom are holding conferences
and meetings to seek to establish their position as leaders and none of whom
has demonstrated his (there are no women among them) ability to represent
the interests of the population at large, whether rural or urban, in any of
the southern Governorates.
However, they all share the following characteristics
- Lack of any political or development programme beyond the
re-establishment of a southern state within its pre-1990 borders, despite
the fact that these borders were artificial and that socially, politically
and culturally, they are largely meaningless
- Refusal to participate in the National Dialogue, presenting a
variety of unacceptable pre-conditions, mainly the demand that the dialogue
be between the two former states and no more than a discussion on the
procedures for separation
- Displaying their divisions and inability to agree about anything
(other than the ambition for separation); this bodes ill for any future
independent southern state. In itself this situation should be enough to
persuade most citizens to vote for unification, if only to avoid bloodshed
in the future.
- Complete disregard for the economic situation and the living
conditions of the majority of the population, other than to claim that 'all
will be well once the old state is restored.'
- Utter neglect of the international political situation or the
economic viability of a potential southern state. Both the GCC initiative
and the UN Security Council resolutions affirm that any solution to the
Yemeni problems must be within the framework of a united state. Have they
considered the implications of becoming another Somaliland?
- Refusal to acknowledge that the likelihood of the population from
the different areas wanting to form a single state under the domination of
any one of these leaders is so low as to be insignificant. Economic, social
and cultural conditions in Hadramaut are entirely different from those
prevailing in Lahej, for example. Should Yemen divide, Hadramis will almost
certainly go their own way, given that they have not only oil, but also
considerable capital and possibly the only viable mini-state of the former
PDRY area. Whether Mahra will join Hadramaut or Oman is something that only
Mahris are able to decide. But further west, the divisions are likely to
gradually re-create the micro-states existing during the British Colonial
period, retaining their main characteristics, namely extreme poverty, lack
of resources, and mutual antipathy. Not a recipe for success.
National Dialogue - who will participate?
Despite this situation and due to the importance of the southern question,
the various national and international institutions involved in supporting
the Transitional Regime in Yemen are actively trying to coax these factions
to participate in the National Dialogue, which will determine the political
future of the country. Why haven't the many mediators succeeded? Are these
southern 'leaders' hoping to scuttle the National Dialogue? Are they
totally unable to overcome their own personal petty in-fights for status and
'power'?
The
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/yemen%E2%80%99s-national-dialogu
e-will-it-succeed> National Dialogue will set the bases for a new political
structure and Constitution for Yemen. Non-participation by any one party is
likely to strongly and negatively affect not only its own future but that of
the country as a whole. Given their past record, the current political
'leaders' of the southern separatist movement should at least show some
modesty and behave in a manner suggesting that they have concerns other than
their own self-promotion. But they seem to live in a world of their own and
are likely to come down with a major bump when they find that the population
at large is very much against them and that other southerners do participate
in the Dialogue and, indeed, these may be more representative of public
opinion in the South.
_____
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/yemen-can-southern-separatists-b
reak-up-yemen#_ftnref> [1] In the 1950s Aden port was among the world's
largest and the city's main source of income. Many southerners are deluded
into believing it could return to such a level and be the economic engine
of the entire country. In reality, while with good management, the port
could play a meaningful role, there is no likelihood of it ever being more
than a reasonably successful regional port, producing a moderate income.
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Received on Tue Oct 23 2012 - 17:49:35 EDT
