The 1962 War: Will China Speak About It?- Analysis
By: <
http://www.eurasiareview.com/author/idsa/> IDSA
October 20, 2012
By Jagannath P. Panda
50 years ago on 20 October 1962 China launched a war against India because
of differences on the boundary issue. The attack by the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) was concurrently from both west and east. In the Western Sector,
the targeted area was Chushul, and the PLA went on to capture the Chip Chap
Valley in the Aksai Chin region. In the Eastern Sector, it captured both
banks of the Namka Chu River and finally reached Tawang. While the memory of
that war is fading away at many levels, India still needs to explore the
reasons behind the Chinese decision to attack in 1962 and China’s current
approach to that episode of unhappy historical memory.
It is very likely that figuring out the exact reason why China attacked
India may not be possible. Six major reasons are often cited for the Chinese
attack: (a) differences over the McMahon Line; (b) growing political
differences between Mao Zedong and Jawaharlal Nehru; (c) China’s
construction of roads in the Aksai Chin area, which compelled India to
initiate military patrols; (d) Mao’s attempt to divert the attention of the
Chinese people from domestic crisis; (e) China’s resentment towards India on
the refuge given to Dalai Lama and over the Tibetan issue; and (f) the
global situation, which was not in favour of China. Each of these arguments
has its own merits in the historical discourse. But what is less understood
today is the current Chinese thinking about the war.
While India lost the war as well as some territory and the defeat came as a
moral shock for Nehru leading to his downfall as a leader, for China the war
has almost been a non-issue. In the Chinese official and public discourse,
the boundary negotiation process with India has been the prime subject along
with the issue of Dalai Lama and Tibet rather than the 1962 war itself. The
Chinese media, which has played a critical role in shaping the public
discourse on the issue, has reflected this tendency from the 1960s itself.
During the war, Jen-Min Jih-Pao (Wade-Giles Romanization of Renmin Ribao)
published an editorial on 27 October 1962 mainly blaming Nehru for the war.
The editorial noted that it was Nehru’s ‘British legacy’ that primarily
triggered the war and that Nehru was using “China’s Tibet region as an
Indian sphere of influence”.1 It further stated:
“Nehru’s policy on the Sino-Indian Boundary question and the whole process
by which he engineered the Sino-Indian border clashes have shed new light on
the expansionist philosophy of the Indian big bourgeoisie and big
landlords”. 2
Nothing much has changed in Chinese thinking since then. 50 years later,
China still blames Nehru and India for the war. And instead of talking about
the war per se or about its consequences, the focus of the Chinese discourse
has been upon ‘India’s fault’ and the boundary negotiation process. For
instance, on 21 November 1963, Jen-Min Jih-Pao published an editorial, in
which it focused more on starting the negotiation process and finding
‘peaceful’ solution to the boundary issue rather than the scale or
consequences of the war. The editorial noted:
As far as China is concerned, the door is wide open for reopening
Sino-Indian negotiations and for a peaceful settlement of the boundary
question. China has patience. If it is not possible to open negotiations
this year, we will wait until next year; if it is not possible next year,
then the year after next.3
One can see similar formulations expressed in current commentaries as well,
including putting the blame on Nehru and pious sentiments about boundary
negotiations, even though the Chinese media has become more open, flexible
and articulate on conflicting or sensitive issues. A reference can be made
to the article “China won, but never wanted, Sino-Indian war” recently
published in Global Times on 28 June 2012.4
Hong Yuan, its author, who is an expert from the Chinese Academy of Social
Science (CASS), mainly traces the event as a political clash of interests
and quarrel between Nehru and Mao. While indicating primarily that “India’s
provocation eventually breached China’s bottom-line”, the piece notes that
“the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was forced to join the battle in
self-defense”, and “the PLA’s performance in the war shocked Western
strategists and did its country proud”. Most alarmingly, the piece notes:
“War is a negotiating approach, but not a goal. Similarly, China’s decision
to fight back against India in the 1962 border war was to strike a peace
with its neighbour”. The article justifies Mao’s decision to attack India
and notes that Mao thought that the “battle with India was also a political
combat, and the real target was not Nehru but the US and the Soviets that
had been plotting behind the scenes against China”.
Recent commentaries and editorials also indicate that China is still in no
mood to accept its own fault. A further reference in this regard may be made
to an article written in Beijing Review (12 July 2009) by a well-known
expert on India, Prof. Ma Jiali a former professor of the China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). The article, titled “Fanning
the Flames”,5 strongly opposed the proposed decision of the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) to grant loans for infrastructure development in
Arunachal Pradesh and stated that “the eastern section, which contains the
largest area of disputed territory, is under Indian control known as
Arunachal Pradesh”. Ma went on to note:
The border issue between China and India is attributed to the Western
colonists’ invasion of China’s southwest frontiers … India inherited the
legacy of the British imperialists after its independence in 1947. It even
went so far as to illegally seize areas north of the McMahon Line. By 1953,
it gained control of most territories south of the McMahon line. The border
disputes between China and India culminated in an armed conflict in 1962.
This article suggests that the 1962 war has always been linked in the
perception of the Chinese with various complicated issues that relate to
British India, the McMahon Line and India’s control over most areas near or
around the historic McMahon Line. But this perception clearly demonstrates a
contradiction in the Chinese perspective: China and Chinese scholars have
time and again refused to accept, endorse or acknowledge the legitimacy of
the McMahon Line, but this article seeks to make capital out of the McMahon
Line.
1962 still remains an uncomfortable issue in the broader Chinese strategic
circles. Though it is discussed in many academic and other gatherings,
unlike India, China tries to avoid talking about the actuality and operation
of the 1962 war and tries to blame India for its consequences. Mostly, a
passing reference is made to the war in news reports and articles, without
even faintly acknowledging that China could have avoided attacking India.
There seems to be no regret or realisation in China that the attack on India
ossified the “China threat” perception in a large neighbouring country like
India, which had supported China’s permanent membership in the UN Security
Council, something it could easily desisted from. Instead of introspection,
Chinese strategic circles have pushed the anti-India notion in recent times
both with regard to the border dispute and overall bilateral relations. The
result of an online poll carried out by the popular huanqiu.com in June 2009
suggested an overriding perception in China that “India poses a big threat
to China”. The poll came after India’s decision to deploy some troops in
Arunachal Pradesh.6 More alarmingly, the number of anti-India pieces or
articles has also increased in the mainstream newspapers like Global Times,
China Daily and Renmin Ribao.
The larger public discourse and scholarly views mostly blame India for the
failure of the boundary negotiation process. Not many in China seem to be
aware that India is largely seen as a “peace-loving” or “non-aggressive”
country because it has not attacked any country in the history of its
existence as an independent nation. One of the brighter aspects of India’s
freedom struggle against British colonial power was the non-violent movement
led by Mahatma Gandhi, but he is less well known in China than Rabindra Nath
Tagore. Today, China does see India in a different light, perhaps because of
India’s rise. Though, China is likely to be extremely cautious about
launching another attack on India, there is certainly great regret among
experts about their government’s decision not to gain control over Arunachal
Pradesh in the war, that “it was a costly error on the part of China” to
have declared a unilateral cease-fire on 21 November 1962 without really
gaining control over Tawang vis-à-vis Arunachal Pradesh.7 Military experts
even go to the extent of dismissing India’s capability in the event of a
possible future war with China. A PLA captain, Dai Xu, states in a news blog
that India cannot win a war against China because the “Indian troops do not
have military spirit” and India lags behind China on many fronts.8
Officially too, a clear and unambiguous public explanation is still missing
from China on the issue of the 1962 war. For example, when in a recent
interview India’s Chief of Army Staff remarked that a China-India clash
would not be repeated, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei
said, while answering the question “What is China’s response?”: “Pending the
final settlement, we should maintain peace and tranquillity in the border
area”.9 This stated reply does indicate that China does not want to talk
about the 1962 war in public.
China must utilise the 50th anniversary of 1962 to ponder why the war took
place when it could have perhaps avoided attacking India. Two policy
affirmations are called for. First, China needs to make a firm public
commitment that no matter how complicated the situation on the boundary
dispute or over the negotiating process on the issue, an incident like the
1962 war should never be repeated. China must learn to be patient and take
into account India’s emotions and demands on this score. Second, the time
has come for the Chinese government to publicly acknowledge, if not
apologize for, the damage that the 1962 war has caused to India or the kind
of distrust that it has brought to Sino-Indian relations. China is no more a
rising power: it has emerged as a global power in many respects. And a
global power must not hesitate to acknowledge its historical mistakes: it
needs to have sufficient self-confidence to withstand the consequent
discomfort and embarrassment.
1. Mentioned in The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Foreign Language Press:
Peking (English), 1962, pp.96-100. For the piece, see, “More on Nehru’s
Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question”, Jen-Min
Jih-Pao (Renmin Ribao), Editorial Department, October 27, 1962.
2. Ibid.
3. Cited in Luke T. Chang, China’s Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes,
London: Oceana, 1982, p. 92.
4. Hong Yuan, “China won, but never wanted, Sino-Indian war”, Global Times,
June 28, 2012, at
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/717710.shtml
5. Ma Jiali, “Fanning the Flames”, Beijing Review, July 12, 2009, at
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2009-07/12/content_206855.htm
6. Zhu Shanshan, “90% in online poll believe India threatens China’s
security”, Global Times, 11 June 2009, at
http://www.globaltimes.cn/china/top-photo/2009-06/436320.html
7. Jagannath P. Panda, “China’s eagle eye on Arunachal Pradesh”, IDSA
Strategic Comment, July 10, 2009, at
http://www.idsa.in/strategiccomments/ChinaseagleeyeonArunachal_JPanda_10…
8. “India did not win and will never win in the war against China”, Global
Times, at
http://forum.globaltimes.cn/forum/showthread.php?t=8985
9. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on
September 20, 2012”, Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in
Los Angels, September 21, 2012, at
http://losangeles.china-consulate.org/eng/confenrence/t973304.htm
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Received on Sat Oct 20 2012 - 18:02:50 EDT
