Will the World Go to War to Save Mali?
The French say an intervention is a "matter of weeks" away-but what could it
look like and how may it backfire?
By <
http://world.time.com/author/itharoor/> Ishaan Tharoor |
<
http://www.twitter.com/ishaantharoor> _at_ishaantharoor | October 18, 2012 |
<
http://world.time.com/2012/10/17/will-the-world-go-to-war-to-save-mali/#dis
qus_thread> 17
Another clash with global consequences looms, apart from the awful
conflagration in war-ravaged <
http://topics.time.com/syria/> Syria. On Oct.
12, following weeks of French pressure, the U.N. Security Council set a
45-day deadline for intervention into <
http://topics.time.com/mali/> Mali,
the northwest African nation that has seen roughly half of its territory
overrun by rebels and militias with links to al-Qaeda's North African wing
(AQIM). France's Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian
<
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jUdmhVwP2t-HZxDKVVz1Rzis
abOw?docId=CNG.1bde5d7f9e021e793919841aa98ed79f.441> insisted Tuesday it was
a "matter of weeks, not months" before decisive action would be taken to
reclaim a vast stretch of desert and semiarid scrubland that has become a
"terrorist sanctuary." The instability of the past half-year in Mali has
sparked fears on both sides of the Mediterranean of a broader regional
crisis. Six French nationals are currently being held hostage in the Sahel.
Only "the integrity of Mali," said Le Drian, "assures Europe's security."
Metaphors of doom now swirl in what was once one of Africa's democratic
success stories. Some say that Mali is the
<
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-foreign-ministers-agree-on-mi
litary-deployment-in-mali-a-861581.html> next Somalia, where a patchwork of
warlords and insurgents ranges itself against a dysfunctional, crisis-hit
state. Others say it is the
<
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/mali-next-afghanis
tan> next Afghanistan, where extremist militias, some with jihadist
connections, make hay in a security vacuum, arming and funding themselves
through illicit drug smuggling networks. (Islamist groups in control of
historic Saharan entrepots such as the cities of Timbuktu and Gao have
instituted Shari'a law and, like the Afghan Taliban a decade ago,
<
http://world.time.com/2012/07/02/timbuktus-destruction-why-islamists-are-wr
ecking-malis-cultural-heritage/> destroyed ancient tombs and relics
considered idolatrous within their own puritanical creed.) And now it may be
the
<
http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/09/27/clinton-links-ambassa
dors-slaying-to-mali/> next Libya-where only foreign military intervention,
framed as humanitarian action, can stabilize a steadily deteriorating state
of affairs.
(MORE:
<
http://world.time.com/2012/07/02/timbuktus-destruction-why-islamists-are-wr
ecking-malis-cultural-heritage/> Why Islamists are wrecking Timbuktu.)
Still, despite the confidence of the French Defence Minister, concrete
action looks
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/17/military-intervention-mali-dang
erous-idea?CMP=twt_gu> far away. The U.N. Security Council resolution calls
on the Malian government and ECOWAS, a bloc of West African states that
includes Mali, to jointly prepare a plan to retake the country's north.
While ECOWAS nations all share concerns over the havoc in Mali spreading
across its borders, there are pronounced deficits in trust between various
parties. Moreover, as related in a
<
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/mali/b090-mali-the
-need-for-determined-and-coordinated-international-action.aspx> report
published in late September by the International Crisis Group, a
Brussels-based think tank, the ECOWAS armies are accustomed mostly to
conflict in forested areas and will need considerable help to launch a
successful campaign in the Malian Sahel. The bloc, says the ICG report,
"displays a rhetorical ambition that goes beyond its capacity to deliver."
The French and their European partners say they will provide
<
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i-ssSDM84tTOcFZ3iV8Rmn0x
IE7Q?docId=CNG.0602af1344224b2597ffacb7a5fe3a93.621> training and
logistical support to the Malian army, but will not put any boots on the
ground. Though it's clear that most Western countries, especially the U.S.,
have no desire to get mired in yet another military imbroglio abroad, many
analysts have difficulty imagining a successful operation into northern Mali
without direct foreign-specifically French-assistance, involving possible
air strikes and intelligence sharing. Considering the operational
difficulties France faced during last year's Libyan mission, it's all the
more likely the U.S. would be dragged into Mali's conflict to some extent.
The abject mess the Malian army finds itself in doesn't help, either: in
March, disaffected units led by Captain Amadou Sanogo toppled the civilian
government. A quashed counter-coup in April involving some of its most crack
regiments led to more fissures in the military. Power in the capital,
Bamako, is now awkwardly shared by a civilian president and prime minister
installed by ECOWAS as well as Sanogo, ensconced in the barracks town of
Kati in Bamako's environs. At the same time, an emboldened ethnic Touareg
insurgency, joined by Islamist factions and armed with weapons lifted from
<
http://topics.time.com/muammar-gaddafi/> Muammar Gaddafi's arsenals in
Libya, swept through the country's restive north and declared it an
independent country.
(MORE: <
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2110804,00.html>
Gaddafi's gift to Mali-civil war.)
"Mali's army needs to be almost completely reformed," says
<
https://en.twitter.com/tweetsintheME> Andrew Lebovich, a researcher on
North African and Sahel affairs, based in Washington. "For years, parts of
the army existed as a kind of patronage institution. Now some of the
best-trained and equipped segments of the military"-loyal to the previous
civilian government-"have been effectively disbanded."
Even if ECOWAS and Bamako launch an offensive, it's hardly guaranteed to
succeed. They're up against experienced, hard-bitten fighters, used to
maneuvering and slipping away in the Sahel's terrain. "If the military skill
set and political willpower is there," says Gregory Mann, Mali expert and
professor of history at Columbia University, "I imagine it would not be
enormously difficult to remove these Islamist fighters from urban centers
like Timbuktu and Gao." What happens thereafter is a different matter, with
the increased likelihood of al-Qaeda-backed actions in West African
capitals. "A kind of urban guerrilla terrorism could emerge that we haven't
seen before in this region," says Mann.
In another scenario, the ICG warns of the risk of ethnic and communal
bloodletting:
In a worst-case scenario, chaos would break loose in Bamako, triggering the
redeployment of the army, possibly led by even more radical commanders; the
buffer zone between north and south would become the theatre of clashes
between communal militias and armed Islamist groups; and atrocities would be
committed against civilians. Another collapse of the state in Bamako would
spread unrest throughout the country, as the regular army would be just as
uncontrollable as the rebel militias and groups in the north.
But the worst-case scenario is not the most likely and there's still a
chance political dialogue can stave off the military intervention that some
believe is inevitable. That's only possible, though, if the various camps in
Bamako can achieve a semblance of consensus and, moreover, if some of the
main elements among the insurgent forces, in particular the Islamist militia
known as
<
http://world.time.com/2012/07/02/timbuktus-destruction-why-islamists-are-wr
ecking-malis-cultural-heritage/> Ansar Dine, can be coaxed to abandon ties
with AQIM and other jihadists.
However this plays out, once-democratic, pluralistic Mali will never be the
same. In the past few months, those living under Islamist rule in the North
have seen the rebels take over the basic trappings of the state; water pumps
are made to run, a shell of a civil service remains. "What people are afraid
of is the possibility that some Malians in the north may get used to these
groups," says Lebovich. In a settled peace, that means their agendas could
stick. "A new reconstituted Mali may not be a secular Mali," says Mann. "The
country may have the same shape, but it would have a very different set of
politics."
Read more:
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z29gq9zMU7>
http://world.time.com/2012/10/17/will-the-world-go-to-war-to-save-mali/#ixzz
29gq9zMU7
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Received on Thu Oct 18 2012 - 17:53:40 EDT
