No Wars for Water
Why Climate Change Has Not Led to Conflict
Shlomi Dinar <
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/shlomi-dinar> , Lucia De
Stefano <
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/lucia-de-stefano> , James
Duncan <
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/james-duncan> , Kerstin Stahl
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/kerstin-stahl> , Kenneth M. Strzepek
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/kenneth-m-strzepek> , Aaron T. Wolf
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/aaron-t-wolf>
October 18, 2012
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138208/shlomi-dinar-lucia-de-stefano
-james-duncan-kerstin-stahl-kenneth/no-wars-for-water?page=show> Article
Summary and Author Biography
The world economic downturn and upheaval in the Arab world might grab
headlines, but another big problem looms: environmental change. Along with
extreme weather patterns, rising sea levels, and other natural hazards,
global warming disrupts freshwater resource availability -- with immense
social and political implications. Earlier this year, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence published a report,
<
http://1.usa.gov/Ruuh8h> Global Water Security, assessing hydropolitics
around the world. In it, the authors show that international water disputes
will affect not only the security interests of riparian states, but also of
the United States.
In many parts of the world, freshwater is already a scarce resource. It
constitutes only 2.5 percent of all available water on the planet. And only
about .4 percent of that is easily accessible for human consumption. Of that
tiny amount, a decreasing share is potable because of pollution and
agricultural and industrial water use. All that would be bad enough, but
many freshwater bodies are shared among two or more riparian states,
complicating their management.
Of course, the policy community has long prophesied impending "water wars."
In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon warned that "water scarcity ... is
a potent fuel for wars and conflict." Yet history has not witnessed many. In
fact, the only official war over water took place about 4,500 years ago. It
was a conflict between the city-states of Lagash and Umma in modern day Iraq
over the Tigris river. More recently, there have been some close calls,
especially in the arid Middle East. About two years before the 1967 War,
Israel and Syria exchanged fire over the Jordan River Basin, which both said
the other was overusing. The limited armed clashes petered out, but the
political dispute over the countries' shared water sources continues. In
2002, Lebanon constructed water pumps on one of the river's tributaries,
which caused concern for downstream Israel. The project never provoked any
formal military action, but with peace in the region already precarious,
verbal exchanges between the two countries prompted the United States to
step in. Both parties eventually accepted a compromise that would allow
Lebanon to withdraw a predetermined amount of water for its domestic needs.
In short, predictions of a Water World War are overwrought. However,
tensions over water usage can still exacerbate other existing regional
conflicts. Climate change is expected to intensify droughts, floods, and
other extreme weather conditions that jeopardize freshwater quantity and
quality and therefore act as a threat-multiplier, making shaky regions
shakier.
So what river basins constitute the biggest risks today? In a
<
http://bit.ly/NGXAO7> World Bank report we published in 2010 (as well as a
subsequent article in a special issue of <
http://bit.ly/RwrJ7I> the Journal
of Peace Research) we analyzed the physical effects of climate change on
international rivers. We modeled the variability in river annual runoff in
the past and for future climate scenarios. We also considered the existence
and nature of the institutional capacity around river basins, in the form of
international water treaties, to potentially deal with the effects of
climate change.
According to our research, 24 of the world's 276 international river basins
are already experiencing increased water variability. These 24 basins, which
collectively serve about 332 million people, are at high risk of water
related political tensions. The majority of the basins are located in
northern and sub-Saharan Africa. A few others are located in the Middle
East, south-central Asia, and South America. They include the Tafna (Algeria
and Morocco), the Dasht (Iran and Pakistan), the Congo (Central Africa),
Lake Chad (Central Africa), the Niger (Western Africa), the Nile
(Northeastern Africa), and the Chira (Ecuador and Peru). There are no strong
treaties governing the use of these water reserves in tense territories.
Should conflicts break out, there are no good mechanisms in place for
dealing with them.
By 2050, an additional 37 river basins, serving 83 million people, will be
at high risk for feeding into political tensions. As is the case currently,
a large portion of these are in Africa. But, unlike today, river basins
within Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and Central America
will also be at high risk within 40 years. Some of these include the
Kura-Araks (Iran, Turkey, and the Caucasus), the Neman (Eastern Europe)
Asi-Orontes (Lebanon, Syria, Turkey), and the Catatumbo Basins (Colombia and
Venezuela).
CROSSING THE NILE
Among the larger African basins, the Nile has the greatest implications for
regional and global security. Tensions over access to the river already pit
Ethiopia and Egypt, two important Western allies, against one another. Egypt
has been a major player in the Middle East Peace Process and Ethiopia is an
important regional force in the Horn of Africa, currently aiding other
African forces to battle Al-Shabbab in Somalia.
Over the years, a number of international water treaties have made rules for
the basin, but they are largely limited to small stretches of it. In
particular, only Egypt and Sudan are party to the 1959 Nile River Agreement,
the principal treaty regarding the river. Egypt, which is the furthest
downstream yet is one of the most powerful countries in the region, has been
able to heavily influence the water-sharing regime. Upstream countries, such
as Ethiopia and Burundi, have been left out, hard-pressed to harness the
Nile for their own needs.
In 1999, with increasingly vitriolic rhetoric between Egypt and Ethiopia
sidetracking regional development, the World Bank stepped up its involvement
in the basin. It helped create a network of professional water managers as
well as a set of investments in a number of sub-basins. Still, the drafting
of a new agreement stalled: upstream countries would not compromise on their
right to develop water infrastructure while downstream countries would not
compromise on protecting their shares. In 2010, Ethiopia signed an agreement
with a number of the other upstream countries hoping to balance against
Egypt and Sudan. More recently, the country has also announced plans to
construct a number of large upstream dams, which could affect the stability
of the region.
By 2050, the environmental state of the Nile Basin will be even worse. That
is why it is important to create a robust and equitable water treaty now.
Such a treaty would focus on ways to harness the river's hydropower
potential to satiate the energy needs of all the riparian states while
maintaining ecosystem health. The construction of dams and reservoirs
further upstream could likewise help even out water flows and facilitate
agricultural growth. Projects such as these, mitigating damage to ecosystem
health and local populations, would benefit all parties concerned and thus
facilitate further basin-wide cooperation.
UP IN THE ARAL
Another water basin of concern is the Aral Sea, which is shared by
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The basin
consists of two major rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya. During the Soviet
era, these two rivers were managed relatively effectively. The break-up of
the Soviet Union, however, ended that. The major dispute now is between
upstream Kyrgyzstan and downstream Uzbekistan over the Syr Darya. During the
winter, Kyrgyzstan needs flowing water to produce hydroelectricity whereas
Uzbekistan needs to store water to later irrigate cotton fields.
The countries have made several attempts to resolve the dispute. In
particular, downstream Uzbekistan, which is rich in fuel and gas, has
provided energy to Kyrgyzstan to compensate for keeping water in its large
reservoirs until the cotton-growing season. Such barter agreements, however,
have had limited success because they are easily manipulated. Downstream
states might deliver less fuel during a rainy year, claiming they need less
water from upstream reservoirs, and upstream states might deliver less water
in retaliation. Kyrgyzstan, frustrated and desperate for energy in winter
months, plans to build mega hydro-electric plants in its territory. And
another upstream state, Tajikistan, is likewise considering
hydro-electricity to satiate its own energy needs. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan is
building large reservoirs.
Although these plans might make sense in the very near term, they are
inefficient in the medium and long term because they don't solve the real
needs of downstream states for large storage capacity to protect against
water variability across time. In fact, both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan,
along with Kazakhstan, will see substantial increases in water variability
between now and 2050. And so, the need to share the benefits of existing
large-capacity upstream reservoirs and coordinate water uses through strong
and more efficient inter-state agreements is unavoidable.
A stabilized Aral Sea basin would also benefit the United States. With its
withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington has been courting Uzbekistan as a
potential alternative ally and provider of stability in the region. The
Uzbek government seems willing to host U.S. military bases and work as a
counter-weight to Russia. Kyrgyzstan is also an important regional player.
The Manas Air Base, the U.S. military installation near Bishkek, is an
important transit point. The country is also working with the United States
to battle drug trafficking and infiltration of criminal and insurgent
groups. Regional instability could disrupt any of these strategic
relationships.
If the past is any indication, the world probably does not need to worry
about impending water wars. But they must recognize how tensions over water
can easily fuel larger conflicts and distract states from other important
geopolitical and domestic priorities. Since formal inter-state institutions
are key to alleviating tensions over shared resources, it would be wise,
then, for the involved governments as well as the international community to
negotiate sufficiently robust agreements to deal with impending
environmental change. Otherwise, freshwater will only further frustrate
stability efforts in the world's volatile regions.
------------[ Sent via the dehai-wn mailing list by dehai.org]--------------
Received on Thu Oct 18 2012 - 17:43:18 EDT
