Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/b092-
assessing-turkeys-role-in-somalia.pdf
Africa Briefing N°92 8 Oct 2012
OVERVIEW
Turkey is the newest country to intervene in Somalia and its involvement has
produced some positive results. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdošan's
courageous visit to Mogadishu in August 2011 at the height of the famine and
his decision to open an embassy gave fresh impetus to efforts to establish
lasting peace. Widespread Somali gratitude for Turkish humanitarian
endeavours and the country's status as a Muslim and democratic state
established Turkey as a welcome partner. Ankara has signalled it is in for
the long haul. However, it must tread prudently, eschew unilateralism and
learn lessons to avoid another failed international intervention. Over
twenty years, many states and entities have tried to bring relief and secure
peace in Somalia, often leaving behind a situation messier than that which
they found. Ankara must appreciate it alone cannot solve the country's many
challenges, but must secure the support and cooperation of both the Somali
people and international community. Trying to go solo could backfire, hamper
ongoing efforts and lose the immense good-will it has accumulated.
Turkey's presence on the ground is relatively small, but because of its
timely famine relief and the apparent strength of its commitment, as well as
Somalis' gratitude, its contribution is seen as colossal. In addition to its
embassy, there are about a dozen governmental and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) with a limited presence on the ground working in
Mogadishu. But Somalis' dream of a quick and comprehensive recovery has
created great expectations in the regions that are not receiving Turkish
assistance, particularly because of their highly visible activities in
Mogadishu. Yet, besides generous diplomatic and political support, its means
are modest and its material support to Somalia will probably remain limited.
If the Somali people's high expectations are not moderated and if Ankara is
unable to expand its relief and development aid to peaceful regions outside
Mogadishu, the Turkey-Somalia partnership could be strained or quickly
transformed into a relationship beset by resentment.
Vocal Somali criticism of the two conferences (civil society and government)
held in Istanbul from late May to early June 2012 should serve as an
important reminder about the volatility of and multiple fault lines in
Somali politics. Somalia's main political actors backpedalled on clear
political understandings they had with Ankara (such as the traditional
elders' planned trip to Istanbul to participate in the civil society
gathering) and openly criticised and confronted their host on seemingly
benign issues. Turkey overcame these unexpected impediments because of
diplomatic insights gained from its on-the-ground presence and support from
international partners. It should use its new experience to build consensus
and improve external coordination if its intervention is to be effective.
As a new Somali government is established, Turkey is expected to, and can,
play an important role in helping stabilise and develop the war-ravaged
country. In order to play a major and sustained role in Somalia, Ankara
should:
* lay out a public, clear and realistic long-term strategy for its
Somalia policy, backed by secure funding and an increase in the number of
specialists in both Mogadishu and Ankara dedicated to its efforts in
Somalia, and in particular build up its knowledge of Somalia and coordinate
with other countries and international agencies active in the country;
* remain impartial in internal politics and avoid being manipulated by
Somali politicians long experienced in outwitting foreign newcomers;
* expand targeted assistance to peaceful regions outside of Mogadishu;
* prioritise institution building and knowledge transfer, including
investing in the return of educated diaspora Somalis;
* help with political party development, constitutional reform and the
creation of accountable institutions;
* take a more active role in UN peacebuilding efforts;
* manage Somali expectations of how much assistance it can provide;
* establish a standardised and transparent bidding process for
contracts and subcontracts to avoid empowering predatory businesspeople;
* offer mediation expertise and financial assistance to peace and
reconciliation efforts;
* stop being indifferent to the endemic Somali corruption and tie
diplomatic and development assistance to upholding the rule of law and
establishing accountable and effective institutions;
* provide more support to AMISOM and integrate security assistance
within existing international mechanisms, rather than embarking on a
parallel and duplicate process;
* help Somalia create a professional, decentralised police force,
which, rather than external forces such as AMISOM, will be responsible for
the consolidation of peace and security;
* coordinate with other countries and international agencies to
prevent overlap and ensure aid is provided strategically;
* ensure Turkish businesspeople operating in Somalia neither exploit
vulnerable Somalis nor are exploited by Somali elite; and
* support the Joint Financial Management Board agreed to at the London
and Istanbul conferences to ensure that government revenue and international
assistance is used appropriately and efficiently.
This briefing outlines Turkey's ongoing operations and achievements so far.
As Somalia enters a new and uncertain post-transition phase, Ankara may
likely face obstacles and will run into the country's complicated political
and security environment in delivering on numerous expectations as its
honeymoon with Somalis ends. To avoid this, the briefing suggests practical
steps to make the Turkish-Somalia cooperation sustainable and mutually
beneficial.
Nairobi/Istanbul/Brussels, 8 October 2012
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Received on Mon Oct 08 2012 - 17:53:27 EDT
