1964: The watershed year in Uganda’s history
By Peter Nyanzi, <
http://www.independent.co.ug/home> independent
October 8th, 2012
In early 1964, units of the British led Uganda Army mutinied, demanding “the
fruits of independence” and better working conditions. One of the most
respected officers at the time, Idi Amin instigated the mutiny when the
British army commander then, Lt.-Colonel W.W. Cheyne resisted the soldiers’
demands. In an interesting turn of events, Idi Amin was proposed as
‘mediator’ between the mutineers and the UPC-KY government. As it turned
out, the Milton Obote-led government rather unwisely conceded to the
mutineers’ demands with the result that the British officers lost their jobs
with Amin subsequently taking over along with a promotion to Major.
Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) was a small party though it had a few
prominent politicians such as Grace Ibingira, Felix Onama, Mathias Ngobi and
Edward Rurangaranga, who were representing their own regional interests. Two
other parties – the Catholic-leaning Democratic Party (DP) and the
Buganda-sponsored Kabaka Yekka (KY) contested for the pre-independence
elections in April 1962. DP unexpectedly won the most seats, but not a
majority that would enable it to form a government. Obote saw an opportunity
there and maneuvered a UPC/KY alliance. This enabled him to have a majority
in Parliament and an appointment as the first Prime Minister. The so-called
‘unholy alliance’ or ‘a marriage of convenience’ would finally end in 1964.
It was inevitable.
The advancement of Buganda interests in independent Uganda was one of the
key reasons for the alliance and indeed the formation of KY. However, a
coalition government involving an executive prime minister and the Kabaka as
president was bound to run into rough waters. As much as Obote proved adept
at meeting the diverse demands of his allies including Buganda’s claim for
special treatment, he found the going difficult when faced with similar
demands from other kingdoms. As the man entrusted with running the whole
country, he knew that the 12-month honeymoon with Buganda would have to come
to an end sooner or later. The Idi Amin factor would prove to be crucial.
Obote saw in Amin, a loyal soldier he would groom as a protégé for his own
political survival. However, the move would eventually prove fatal not only
to Obote and his young government, but also to the country for many years to
come.
Fifty years later, Ugandans and the indeed the whole world are yet to come
to grips with the effects of his 9-year reign of terror. It was after
appointing Idi Amin as deputy commander in 1964 that the military began to
assume a more prominent role in Ugandan politics and become an important
tool for winning political contests.
With the army under his control, Obote felt it was the right time to address
to address the potentially explosive issue of the “lost counties,” (Buyaga
and Bugangaizi), which the colonial government had conveniently postponed
for the post-independence government to address. This was also made possible
because his UPC party had managed to acquire a majority in Parliament
following the crossing of DP members to his UPC. But the real turning point
came when several DP members of parliament from Bunyoro agreed to join the
government side if Obote would carry out the referendum on the “lost
counties,” which they were sure would succeed.
Amidst opposition from Buganda and the threat of civil war, the referendum
was held on November 4, 1964 with an overwhelming desire by residents in the
lost counties annexed to Buganda in 1900 to be restored to Bunyoro.
This triumph for Obote and the UPC strengthened the central government and
threw Buganda and its KY into confusion with the result that many KY MPs
“crossed the floor” to join Obote’s UPC.
Naturally, Obote knew that his support in the Buganda region was gone. In
response, he ordered the security forces to react with maximum force to any
perceived sign of opposition instigated by Mengo. This new policy, which was
unprecedented, was starkly demonstrated on November 10, 1964 when the
security forces descended on Nakulabye and shot dead six people in what has
been referred to as the ‘Nakulabye massacre.’ This was to mark a major
turning point in Buganda’s relations with UPC. But with its majority in
Parliament, the UPC government was able to have its way. Indeed, the seeds
of majoritarianism that we are reaping today under President Yoweri
Museveni’s NRM were sown many decades ago. The ruling party thrived but not
for long because Idi Amin, Obote’s military protégé, became the ultimate
source of disharmony.
Corruption monster
Like it is today, allegations of corruption – sometimes contrived for
getting political mileage – were one of the ills that beset post-colonial
Uganda and its supposed effects undoubtedly contributed to Obote’s downfall.
Not surprisingly, the root of all this was the fight for political control
that started in 1964 when Grace Ibingira replaced John Kakonge as UPC
secretary general in the elections held at the party’s annual general
meeting at Gulu. After the elections, UPC and Uganda never remained the
same. From that time, the government was characterised by three factions
namely, Obote’s, Ibingira’s and Kakonge’s.
Coincidentally, it did not take long before key government ministers and
army officials, including Obote and Idi Amin, were put on the spot over
corruption and smuggling of ivory and gold in DR Congo. The scandal was
sparked by an incident when Idi Amin walked into a commercial bank with a
bar of gold and demanded for cash in exchange. Amin’s account in the Ottoman
Bank was subsequently credited with a sum of £17,000 – a hefty sum of money
by then. As expected, a war broke out in the UPC dominated Parliament.
Obote’s rivals and Buganda’s friends saw an opportunity to force Obote and
Idi Amin out. Although the duo survived, their opponents kept pushing.
On February 4, 1966, with Obote absent from the House, a motion moved by
Daudi Ochieng was unanimously passed to have the so-called Congo Gold
scandal re-investigated. UPC Secretary General Ibingira successfully
instigated a “vote of no confidence” in their leader and the MPs resolved
that Amin ‘steps aside’ until investigations are completed. But as it
turned out, the ‘Gold scandal’ was a mere façade for an intense power
struggle that would end in bloody fashion. Ochieng died of alleged
poisoning only a day before he appeared as a witness before the Judicial
commission of inquiry that was set up by Obote.
Militarised politics
But the lesson of involving the army in politics –symbolised by the
appointment of Idi Amin – would never be lost on Ugandans. Amin became a
target of the anti-Obote forces, which wanted to weaken Obote’s influence in
the army. But Obote knew their tricks. He promoted Amin to the position of
army commander to replace Shaban Opolot, who was known to be pro-Mutesa and
Ibingira. A day earlier, on February 22, 1966, Obote had called a Cabinet
meeting ostensibly to discuss the way forward after the resolutions of
Parliament on the gold scandal. At the cabinet meeting, five of the cabinet
ministers, including Ibingira, were arrested. The next day, he shunted
Shaban Opolot aside by `promoting’ him to chief of defense staff. Amin was
promoted to chief of staff and Oyite Ojok became quartermaster general.
Obote then moved to purge his rivals influence from the party and
government.
On March 2, 1966 Obote abolished the offices of president and vice president
and assumed all executive powers. Then on April 15, 1966 forced parliament
to adopt a new constitution which they had not read that came to be called
the ‘pigeon-hole’ constitution. With military planes flying over a
parliament surrounded by the military, Obote was sworn-in as executive
president.
As expected, the Mengo government flatly rejected this. A hastily convened
Buganda Lukiiko on May 21 passed a bold or rather misguided resolution that
Obote’s government departs from Buganda soil within ten days. Historians say
that Mengo expected that the government would panic and ask for
negotiations. It badly backfired in a bloody fashion. Instead, Obote on May
24 ordered Idi Amin to attack the Kabaka’s palace and arrest him. This was
done ostensibly to forestall a coup plot.
The Kabaka escaped and fled to exile in England where he died three years
later. Buganda was divided into four administrative districts and ruled
through martial law as UPC became the only legal political party. These
events have left a bitter taste in the mouth of Buganda, which might never
go away.
But although Amin did an excellent job of containing the crisis, Obote soon
started getting concerned about the waning loyalty of his protégé. Obote
began to beef up the army with members of his ethnic Luo group – Acholi and
Langi – and accelerated their promotions in a bid to counter the large
numbers of soldiers recruited by Amin from his own West Nile District. Among
those promoted were Tito Okello, David Oyite Ojok and Olara Okello among
others. As expected, in October 1970 serious allegations emerged about Amin
over corruption. Amin was subsequently put under house arrest but captured
power in a military coup in January 1971. Historians such as Samwiri
Karugire (“Roots of Instability in Uganda) argue that the events of 1964
unleashed a repressive military-backed political regime that culminated into
the coup and the chain of events that followed thereafter.
Under Idi Amin, the killings and terror by the army spread from Buganda to
others parts of the country especially Lango and Acholi. Obote, along with
some of his top army commanders, went into exile in Tanzania, to join other
liberators including Yoweri Museveni, to embark on a protracted struggle to
topple Idi Amin’s dictatorship. As Museveni narrates in him book, ‘Sowing
the Mustard Seed,’ the struggle against Idi Amin ultimately shaped Uganda
into what we see today.
Economic turmoil
Inevitably, Uganda’s economic fortunes were ruined by the political turmoil
and economic mismanagement of the 1970s under Idi Amin. Interestingly, the
policy framework in the immediate post-independence period was built on the
recommendations of a World Bank mission whose implementation also started in
1964. Its focus was on the promotion of commodity exports and the promotion
of private investment by encouraging existing investors and creating
incentives to attract new ones, particularly local ones. It worked well for
the post-independence period (1962-1966). But barely a year after taking
power, Idi Amin declared an “economic war” during which more than 50,000
Asians were expelled and their productive and personal assets distributed to
government cronies. This affected both agricultural and industrial
production through the huge loss in skilled personnel, whose effects are
still felt today.
The Asian community, which was in control of commerce and trade, left
everything in the hands of inexperienced Ugandans who totally ruined
everything. Increased military and other expenditures led to large fiscal
deficits, which were financed by government debt with inflation as the
predictable outcome. To make matters even worse, a series of negative
external shocks during the mid-1970s also contributed to this collapse,
including higher oil prices and the break-up of the East African Community.
Inevitably, Idi Amin was overthrown in April 1979 by a combined force of
Ugandan exiles, under the umbrella of Uganda National Liberation Army
(UNLF), and the Tanzania Peoples Defense Force (TPDF). The UNLF brought
together disparate groups, interests and individuals – imagine Obote, Yusuf
Lule and Museveni together at the Moshi Conference – but united by the
common goal of ousting the Amin regime.
Prof. Yusuf Lule was picked to be in charge of the first UNLF government and
quickly appealed to the Baganda sentiments. He only lasted 58 days and was
replaced by Godfrey Binaisa, and then Paulo Muwanga who was put in charge of
the Military Commission to organise the December 1980 general elections.
Obote’s UPC was declared winner of those elections that were generally
considered rigged. For a second time, Obote became President of Uganda.
Museveni, his partner in the liberation struggle, opted for a guerilla war
against him.
Like it was in 1964, Obote put Tito Okello and Olara Okello along with his
kinsmen, in charge of the army in an attempt to flush out Idi Amin’s men.
Insecurity, fuelled by Museveni’s bush war in Luwero devastated the country.
An estimated 500,000 Ugandans lost their lives. Sharp divisions arose in
the army when Obote alienated the Acholi including Olara-Okello and Tito
Okello by appointing his fellow ethnic Brig. Smith Opon Acak as army Chief
of Staff. There was a huge tribal conflict between the Acholi and Langi.
Obote’s own men turned against him.
On July 27, 1985, an army brigade of the UNLA commanded by Olara-Okello, and
composed mostly of troops took over power. Parliament was dissolved and a
Military Council was established, which Olara Okello and Tito Okello chaired
between them. Six months later, Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA)
captured power on January 26, 1986. Acholi soldiers fled back to their
homeland with their weapons and became the seeds from which several rebel
outfits in the north sprang up. To this day, the north is yet to recover
from the devastation and plunder it has gone through after more than 20
years of insurgency. With the political turmoil of the 1960s seemingly
forgotten, in July 2005 a national referendum was held in which the people
of Uganda resolved to return to multi-party politics. Though UPC fronted
Miria Obote a muganda as its presidential candidate for the 2006 elections,
the party got the least votes in Buganda – a clear indication that most
populous region had not forgotten the wounds of betrayal in 1964.
In retrospect, it is clear that 1964 was the watershed year in Uganda’s
history. We can safely say that it laid the ground for Uganda’s politics
until today.
However, Prof. Aaron Mukwaya, a senior political science lecturer at
Makerere University, describes 1962 as the year that was the turning point
in Uganda’s history. He lays all the blame squarely on the door of the
colonialists, who he says did not prepare Africans for the post-colonial
period and how they would run their country. “I think it was deliberate,”
he says, adding, “The colonialists knew that the Africans would eventually
fail to run their country.”
“What happened in 1964 and in 1966 were purely inevitable because there is
no way a Republic could have a Kabaka acting both a cultural leader and
president of Uganda.”
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Received on Mon Oct 08 2012 - 07:52:33 EDT
