Nile Basin at a Turning Point as Political Changes Roil Balance of Power and
Competing Demands Proliferate
The recent changes in leadership in Egypt and Ethiopia raise the prospect of
improved relations between the Nile Basin states. One potential area for
greater dialogue is the contentious issue of water security, argues New
Security Beat's Carolyn Lamere.
By Carolyn Lamere for Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP)
5, Oct 2012
_____
In 1979, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
<
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NavigatingPeaceIssuePKM.pdf
> famously said that "the only matter that could take Egypt to war again is
water." Sadat's message was clear: the Nile is a matter of national security
for Egypt.
Indeed, Egypt relies on the Nile for
<
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/mubarak-urges-nile-basin-states-renego
tiate-water-deal> 95 percent of its water. But it is not the only state with
an interest in the world's longest river. There are 11 states in the Nile
River basin, which stretches from Africa's Great Lakes region - Tanzania,
Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo -
to the Ethiopian and Eritrean highlands through South Sudan, Sudan, and
Egypt to the Mediterranean Sea.
Each of these 11 countries has a different plan for the river, from
Ethiopia's hydropower aspirations to Egypt's cotton farming. And competition
for Nile water is not limited to the countries of the basin, as states like
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/aug/24/indian-agribusines
s-land-east-africa> India and
<
http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4516-squeezing-africa-dry-behind-every
-land-grab-is-a-water-grab> Saudi Arabia have recently turned to large-scale
land and agricultural investments in Ethiopia, South Sudan, and other East
African countries to help feed their growing populations. Agriculture
requires irrigation, and they will be vying for water rights too.
The situation is further complicated by recent political instability. Two
long-time giants in the basin are no longer in power: Egyptian President
<
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?pagewanted=
all> Hosni Mubarak resigned after 30 years in power following protests in
2011, and Ethiopian Prime Minister
<
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/world/africa/meles-zenawi-ethiopian-leade
r-dies-at-57.html?ref=global-home> Meles Zenawi died August 20, after 17
years in office.
The Arab Spring has made it unclear if Egypt is willing or able to enforce
its long-held dominance of the region. Further downstream, the Great Lakes
region is notoriously prone to conflict; Sudan and South Sudan are still
clashing over a number of issues not settled by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace
Agreement or the South's subsequent secession; Ethiopia and Eritrea remain
on edge since the formal end of their war in 2000; and Kenya, Burundi, the
DRC, and Rwanda have had recent questionable elections and remain volatile.
Despite their differences, the Nile River basin countries have one thing in
common: rapid growth, both economically and demographically, which is
increasing demand for water across the board and lends urgency to
negotiations for a common sharing agreement.
New Challenges to Historic Dominance
At the root of the current dynamic are agreements signed by Egypt with
former colonial power Great Britain in
<
http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/03_Lumumba.pdf> 1929, and Sudan in
<
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/uar_sudan.html>
1959, which gave Egypt the lion's share of the Nile as well as the power to
veto any upstream projects which might threaten its access to water. Egypt
claims these treaties give them the legal right to halt construction on
projects like the <
http://grandmillenniumdam.net/> Grand Renaissance Dam, a
massive project recently begun in Ethiopia that would provide electricity to
Ethiopia and surrounding states but also reduce downstream flow
significantly.
However, as is the case elsewhere in Africa, the fact that many of the basin
countries were governed by colonial powers during that period complicates
things.
Many upstream countries did not gain their independence until the 1960s and
were therefore excluded from initial allocation discussions. They claim the
treaties are colonial relics and are no longer binding to newly independent
countries. Ethiopia has been
<
http://iijd.org/index.php/news/entry/africas-waning-waters-dispute-over-the
-nile/> especially vocal in its opposition; although it was independent at
the signing of the 1959 treaty and the Blue Nile, which originates in
Ethiopia, <
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE6AN01S20101124>
provides 85 percent of the Nile's water, they were not invited to
negotiations.
The first modern attempt to come to a collective water sharing agreement was
the <
http://www.nilebasin.org/newsite/> Nile Basin Initiative (NBI),
established in 1999. Although representatives of the then-nine member
countries of the NBI met on a regular basis over the course of the next
decade, negotiations <
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3541617.stm> failed
to progress. Upstream countries had hoped to forge a new agreement which
would give them more rights to Nile water than the 1959 agreement, but it
soon became clear that Egypt had no intentions of yielding water to other
riparian states, regardless of political situations when the first
agreements were signed.
Relationships between NBI states deteriorated further in 2010 when Ethiopia,
Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania set off on their own and
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/27/nile-water-pact> signed a
new water distribution agreement to replace the 1959 treaty. The
<
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jGGOTBz_8m8-Udatx2YtFswh
pBtQ> Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement, also known as the Entebbe
Agreement, prevents countries from using the flow of the Nile in ways which
would harm downstream states, a principle which aligns
<
http://www.unece.org/env/water/text/text.html> with other trans-boundary
river treaties. But importantly, the new treaty removes Egypt's absolute
veto power over upstream projects.
Unsurprisingly, the Entebbe Agreement has proven controversial, and Egypt,
Sudan, and South Sudan - the downstream countries which benefit most from
the colonial-era treaties - remain opposed to the new agreement.
The situation has been further complicated by the Arab Spring and Egyptian
revolution. Burundi at first pledged not to sign the agreement
<
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/mubarak-burundi-vp-rufyikiri-discuss-n
ile-sharing> at the urging of Hosni Mubarak, then-president of Egypt. But
<
http://www.bikyamasr.com/29133/burundi-signs-nile-basin-initiative/>
Burundi reneged on its promise just weeks after Mubarak was deposed in
February of last year, gambling that Egypt's domestic problems would keep it
from retaliating. Burundi was the sixth country to sign the agreement, and
the latest so far. The DRC has remained neutral, and Eritrea, as a country
in the watershed but not situated along the Nile or one of its tributaries,
has only observer status in the NBI and is thus not eligible to sign.
The NBI continues to meet and carry out standard functions - for example
during a meeting in July, South Sudan was admitted as a new state, Ethiopian
engineer
<
http://www.nilebasin.org/newsite/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=129:-engineer-teferra-beyene-becomes-the-next-executive-director-of-the-n
ile-basin-initiative&catid=40:latest-news&Itemid=84&lang=en> Teferra Beyene
Asfaw was appointed executive director, and a
<
http://www.nilebasin.org/newsite/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=130%3Anile-council-of-ministers-approves-nbis-five-year-strategic-plan&ca
tid=40%3Alatest-news&Itemid=84&lang=en> new five year plan was approved -
but little progress has been made towards a comprehensive agreement
acceptable to all basin states.
Growing Demand, On the Continent and Abroad
The importance of the Nile's waters - and Egypt's potential loss of
hydrological veto power - is heightened by increased demand in the region.
Many of the Nile basin countries are experiencing rapid population growth;
every country except Egypt has a
<
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Documentation/glossary.htm> total fertility rate
(TFR) above 4.5 children per women. Ethiopia's TFR of 4.6 is at the low end,
while the Democratic Republic of the Congo tops the list at 6.1. Egypt is
not
<
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2011/05/dot-mom-usaid-egypts-health-and.html
> growing as quickly as other riparian states, with a total fertility rate
of 2.9, but scarcity is already a problem. In 2009, Egyptians had access to
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/18/idUSLI438735> only 860 cubic
meters per capita, well below the
<
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml> UN threshold for water
scarcity of 1,000 cubic meters, and
<
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/residents-close-giza-governorate-headq
uarters-protest-water-shortage> protests over chronic water shortages have
been reported.
Overall, the population of Nile Basin Initiative countries is projected to
more than double over the next 40 years, from 429 million in 2012 to 945
million people. In other words, over the course of the next four decades
more people will be born into the region than currently live there now.
<
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2012/04/ugandas-demographic-and-health.html>
Growing populations require more water, but so does growing affluence. While
there is huge potential for development in the basin, lack of access to
water and energy limit growth for upstream countries. For example,
<
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview> the World Bank
reports that Ethiopia has experienced remarkable economic development over
the past decade, with annual GDP growth rates reaching 11 percent, but last
year,
<
http://www.voanews.com/content/nations-seek-to-prevent-uprisings-by-control
ling-food-prices--114713164/157323.html> high food and fuel prices
contributed to a decreased growth rate of around seven percent, leading to
<
http://gadaa.com/news/4083/2011/03/20/ethiopia-crackdown-on-opposition-to-p
revent-protests/> public protests over inflationary prices. Similarly,
neighboring Uganda has recently experienced overall GDP growth rates of
around seven percent, but
<
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2012/04/ugandas-demographic-and-health.html>
rapid population growth means that this has translated to only around a four
percent growth in GDP per capita.
Energy production is an essential component of continued development, and
another point of contention between upstream and downstream states. Egypt
has
<
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-24/bp-makes-significant-deep-natural-
gas-find-in-egypt-s-west-nile-delta.html> natural gas resources and Sudan
and South Sudan have oil (although
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17672727> disputes over the
ownership of key fields and
<
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE86R00W20120728> transportation
out of the country make it difficult to access at the moment), but upstream
countries have far fewer energy options.
Uganda has sought to remedy this by building a hydropower station that only
temporarily diverts the river and allows all water to continue downstream.
The <
http://www.bujagali-energy.com/default.htm> Bujagali Hydropower
Project, located on the White Nile near Lake Victoria, generates 250
megawatts of power. After full energy production began in June, William
Groth of Bujagali Energy Limited noted the improvement over previous
diesel-powered generators: "The energy we produce here with water is three
times cheaper than what came from those generators, and it is cleaner, too,"
he <
http://allafrica.com/stories/201207290345.html> told AllAfrica.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, is building more aggressively. It began
construction of the <
http://grandmillenniumdam.net/> Grand Renaissance Dam,
formerly known as the Grand Millennium Dam, on the Blue Nile in 2011. The
massive project will produce 5,250 megawatts of energy - 21 times the
production of Bujagali. It will also have a greater impact on the Nile.
While the magnitude of the reduction of flow will depend on how quickly
Ethiopia fills the dam, Egyptian officials are certain there will be severe
consequences for their country. (Although Nile flow will be constant once
the dam is filled, downstream countries will receive less water while the
reservoir is filling.) A
<
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/morsi-visits-ethiopia-to-seek-unity-in
-nile-nations-over-water> United Arab Emirates-based paper cites a former
Egyptian water minister as saying that "the problems could range from bad to
devastating."
Upstream, past Aswan High Dam, whose completion was a crucial moment in it's
own industrialization, Egypt also faces self-imposed water management
issues. The government is encouraging
<
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/agriculture-minister-egypt-revive-cott
on-farming> increased cotton production, even though the crop demands a
great deal of water for successful cultivation. While some areas have become
adept at implementing new irrigation techniques to make the most of their
allocation, others are less judicious in their use. As a result, much of
Egypt's water is
<
http://www.aucegypt.edu/research/ddc/research/WDM/Pages/WaterUse.aspx> lost
to evaporation and runoff. A key point of evaporation is Lake Nasser, formed
after the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1971. Various estimates put
water loss from the reservoir at
<
http://www.fao.org/docrep/V5400E/v5400e0c.htm> 16 percent of Egypt's annual
allocation,
<
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/does_egypt_own_the_nile_a_battle_over_precious
_water/2297/> 10 to 16 cubic kilometers per year, or enough water to
irrigate an
<
http://www.edwardgoldsmith.org/1016/water-losses-exceeding-gains/>
additional two million kilometers of farmland
Agricultural demand is not limited to the countries in the Nile River basin.
According to a report from the Worldwatch Institute,
<
http://www.worldwatch.org/despite-drop-2009-peak-agricultural-land-grabs-st
ill-remain-above-pre-2005-levels-0> 16.8 million hectares in East Africa
have been sold or leased to foreign companies since 2000 - and most was sold
recently, after the
<
http://www.ifpri.org/publication/responding-global-food-crisis-three-perspe
ctives> 2008 food crisis.
<
http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4479-grain-releases-data-set-with-over
-400-global-land-grabs> Some of the largest buyers in the region are
corporations from Saudi Arabia, India, the United States, and the United
Arab Emirates. Opponents to these large-scale acquisitions point to the toll
they will take on the region's
<
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2011/07/in-rush-for-land-is-it-all-about-wat
er.html> water resources. Water-intensive crops like rice mean that locals -
many of whom
<
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2012/05/taming-hunger-in-ethiopia-role-of.ht
ml> face food security issues of their own (famine is
<
http://www.fews.net/Pages/default.aspx> perennially a challenge in Ethiopia
and Sudan) - lose not only the yields from those fields, but also the water
used to grow them.
Although there are mounting concerns about the
<
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2012/04/a-new-land-security-agenda-to-enable
-sustainable-equitable-development/> ethics and fairness of these deals,
<
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2012/08/u-s-drought-climate-change-lead-food
-riots-political-instability/> fears of another food crisis, stoked by
record drought in the United States this summer and lower yields elsewhere
around the world, make it unlikely that arable land will become any less
valuable on the global market. Soon, the Nile may help support much more
than just the region's population.
Prospects for a Future Agreement
Despite political upheaval and the proliferation of competing interests
along the basin, water is a powerful force for cooperation - there has,
after all, never been a violent conflict over water on the Nile, and water
as a sole source of conflict is exceedingly rare in general, according to
<
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/DatabaseIntro.html>
research by Aaron Wolf.
And there has been recent progress. Mohamed Morsi, newly-elected president
of Egypt,
<
http://thedailynewsegypt.com/2012/07/12/morsy-to-make-historic-visit-to-eth
iopia-after-saudi-arabia/> traveled to Addis Ababa on July 16 for an African
Union Commission meeting where he discussed a future African common market.
While Morsi
<
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/47830/Egypt/Politics-/Morsi-vi
sit-to-Ethiopia-signals-positive-change-in.aspx> only briefly mentioned the
Nile, his very presence in Ethiopia was a positive sign for reconciliation
between the key basin countries. The trip reverses former President Hosni
Mubarak's policy of refraining from traveling to meeting with African states
which he enacted following an
<
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-06-27/news/mn-17703_1_president-mubarak>
assassination attempt in 1995.
Morsi also appointed Water Minister Hisham Qandil to be the new prime
minister. While there has been
<
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/07/2012724103825498223.html>
some concern over Qandil's relative youth and lack of political experience,
he has worked on Nile issues extensively both with the NBI and the
<
http://www.afdb.org/en/> African Development Bank. This appointment
<
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/07/2012724103825498223.html>
may further signal Morsi's dedication to finding a mutually acceptable
agreement to share Nile waters.
Meles Zenawi gave an interview following the signing of the Entebbe
Agreement in 2010
<
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/morsi-visits-ethiopia-to-seek-unity-in
-nile-nations-over-water> in which he said, "some people in Egypt have
old-fashioned ideas based on the assumption that the Nile water belongs to
Egypt." But, "the circumstances have changed and changed forever."
Zenawi likely did not foresee the events of the Arab Spring or the
overwhelming vote for South Sudanese independence within the next year, but
his words ring even truer today. Indeed, Zenawi's death in August may be a
catalyst for change in the region. During the long, speculative period of
his illness, an anonymous Egyptian water official said that a regime change
in Ethiopia might make it easier to come to an agreement over water-sharing.
"While this can in no way be official policy at this point, I believe that
there would be more maneuvering with a new leadership in Ethiopia because
there would be the ability to communicate and not be seen as antagonistic,"
<
http://www.bikyamasr.com/74615/in-ethiopia-a-post-meles-future-could-bring-
end-to-water-tension-with-egypt/> he told Egyptian newspaper Bikya Masr.
The region has been irrevocably altered by political and demographic change
as well as accelerating development. These changes present new challenges,
but perhaps they will also breathe new life into negotiations.
_____
For additional reading on this topic please see:
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54
e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=152248> Water Scarcity and Food
Security along the Nile
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54
e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=136717> Negotiations for a
Nile-Cooperative Framework Agreement
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54
e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=98958> The Nile: Is It a Curse or
Blessing?
Old Aswan Dam, courtesy Herr P/flickr
<
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/deed.en> Creative Commons
- Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.0 Generic
<
http://www.flickr.com/photos/phase9/4863589345/> Creative Commons -
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.0 Generic
The Old Aswan Dam, built from 1898 to 1902
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Received on Fri Oct 05 2012 - 17:46:46 EDT
