Eastern Congo: Why Stabilisation Failed
Africa Briefing N°91 5 Oct 2012
OVERVIEW
Since Bosco Ntaganda’s mutiny in April 2012 and the creation of the 23 March
rebel movement (M23), violence has returned to the Kivus. This crisis shows
that today’s problems are the same as yesterday’s because the 2008 framework
for resolution of the conflict has yet to be put in place. Instead of
implementing the 23 March 2009 agreement between the government and the CNDP
(National Council for the Defence of the People), the Congolese authorities
pretended to integrate the CNDP into political institutions, while the rebel
group pretended to integrate into the Congolese army. In the absence of army
reform, military pressure on armed groups only had a temporary effect and
post-conflict reconstruction was not accompanied by essential governance
reforms and political dialogue. To move away from crisis management and
truly resolve the two-decades-old conflict, donors should put pressure on
both Kigali and Kinshasa.
The M23 is behaving in a similar fashion to previous rebel movements by
creating its own administration and its own financing system in parts of
North Kivu. Meanwhile, Mai-Mai groups are expanding in rural areas where
they commit atrocities that exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions. Pursuant to
the peace and security architecture, the International Conference on the
Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) organised in July a regional dialogue to avoid
conflict between Rwanda and the DRC. Unfortunately, it seems to be promoting
an unrealistic and ineffective solution by advocating for the deployment of
a 4,000-strong neutral force at the border between Rwanda and the DRC.
If international donors and African mediators persist in managing the crisis
rather than solving it, it will be impossible to avoid the repetitive cycle
of rebellions in the Kivus and the risk of large-scale violence will remain.
To move from crisis management to conflict resolution, Rwanda’s involvement
in Congolese affairs must end and the reconstruction plan and the political
agreements signed in the Kivus must be implemented. For that to happen,
Western donors should maintain aid suspension against Rwanda until the
release of the next report of the UN group of experts. They should also make
clear to the Congolese authorities that they will not provide funding for
stabilisation and institutional support as long as the government will not
improve political dialogue, its governance and the army in the east, as
recommended by Crisis Group several times.
In the short term, this crisis can be dealt with through the following
initiatives:
* a ceasefire between the Congolese authorities and the M23 must be
negotiated and monitored by the UN;
* the joint and permanent verification mechanism for the DRC and
Rwandan border reactivated by the ICGLR should be effective and provided
with the necessary technical and human resources;
* the individuals and entities that supported the M23 and other armed
groups must be added to the UN sanctions list and an embargo on weapons
sales to Rwanda should be considered;
* the 23 March 2009 agreement must be jointly evaluated in the
framework of the international follow-up committee it established and this
assessment should be the basis for resumption of dialogue between the
government and CNDP;
* MONUSCO and the government should launch local peace initiatives in
Walikale, Masisi, Shabunda and Kalehe areas where ethnic tension is high;
* Bosco Ntaganda should be arrested and handed over to the
International Criminal Court (ICC); and
* the ICC should investigate the actions of M23 and new armed groups
and request MONUSCO to transfer its files concerning M23 leaders.
After analysing the failure of the stabilisation of the Kivus in the report
<
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/165-co
ngo-pas-de-stabilite-au-kivu-malgre-le-rapprochement-avec-le-rwanda.aspx>
Congo: No Stability in Kivu despite Rapprochement with Rwanda, this new
Crisis Group briefing explains the surge of violence and underlines that the
Kivus do not need a new strategic approach; rather, the peace agreements and
stabilisation plans should no longer be empty promises. This requires
coordinated and unequivocal pressure from the donors that pay the bills of
the Rwandan and Congolese regimes.
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Received on Fri Oct 05 2012 - 17:22:42 EDT
