Sudan: Reviewing the Addis Ababa Peace Agreements 2012
By Aly Verjee, 5 October 2012
Analysis
The maxim that the test of any agreement is in its implementation is
familiar to those who follow Sudanese politics, even from a distance. This
article reviews the latest agreements reached between Sudan and South Sudan
on September 27 in Addis Ababa, brokered by the African Union High Level
Implementation Panel (AUHIP). The full text of the protocols is available
<
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/09/27/sudan-and-south-sudan-fu
ll-text-of-agreements/> here.
Both Sudan and South Sudan were under threat of UN sanctions if a deal was
not reached. In time, the new agreements may be seen as the start of a more
productive relationship between the two states, heralding the "brighter
future" Ahmed Badawi
<
http://africanarguments.org/2012/10/03/sudan-and-south-sudan-a-civilised-di
vorce-by-ahmed-badawi/> describes. But it could easily be a false dawn, in
a relationship still beset with mistrust.
Either way, the latest agreements add another eighty pages of text to the
long list of historic commitments made by Khartoum and Juba. Forty years
after the
<
http://sudanarchive.net/cgi-bin/pagessoa?e=01off---v--%2c%2cAddis+Ababa+Agr
eement%2c1%2c%2c%2c%2c%2c%2c%2c%2c--100125-%5b1%5d%3aSE+%26+%5bAddis+Ababa+A
greement%5d%3aTI+-1-0-SectionLevel-0-0-1-10&a=d&cl=&d=Dvgrgd1_18.1.2&hl=1&vp
c=-1> Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, ending the first Sudanese civil war,
Addis Ababa 2012 comprises a general cooperation agreement and eight
specific protocols on oil, security arrangements, mobility rights for
citizens of both countries, post service benefits for civil servants and
pensioners, trade, banking, assets, debts and cultural property, as well as
that holdover of agreements past: management and demarcation of the border.
Opposition to Agreement
There has been some local opposition to the deal, on both sides of the
border. The South Sudan Law Society
<
http://allafrica.com/stories/201210030533.html> criticized the agreement,
suggesting that the primary motivation was survival of the ruling SPLM, and
that ordinary citizens were ignored. Governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal
Paul Malong had more specific criticism, rejecting the commitment to
withdraw SPLA troops from the disputed 14 Mile area, and in Aweil
<
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44104> protests have taken
place.
In Sudan, President al-Bashir's uncle, Al-Tayeb Mustafa, publisher of the
hard-line daily newspaper Al-Intibaha, predictably criticized elements of
the deal, provoking the security services into
<
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44058> censoring his planned
editorial on the matter.
A number of advocacy groups have voiced concern:
<
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/public-accountability-absent-new-sudan
-and-south-sudan-oil-deal> Global Witness decried the lack of public
accountability on the oil protocol. Waging Peace called the agreement
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/01/sudan-peace-agreement-d
epressingly-familiar> "depressingly familiar.the new peace will look awfully
and horrifically like business as usual."
Diplomatic success at the top
Without question, these agreements are less monumental than the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) they now supersede. While it is common
to hear criticism of the CPA today, particularly in light of the renewed
conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and ongoing impasse in the final
resolution of control of the disputed territory of Abyei, in 2005 criticism
of the CPA was a minority opinion, and there was certainly little
significant discontent being voiced only days after the agreements were
signed.
Today's expectations are different. Khartoum's invasion of Abyei in May
2011, just weeks before South Sudan's declaration of independence, and the
sequence of events that has followed showed that the details of divorce were
more immediately consequential than the latter-day failures of an
optimistically transformative peace treaty (the CPA).
One encouraging success for the Addis mediation is the return (and success)
of presidential diplomacy. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and President
of South Sudan Salva Kiir know each other well, through the years of the
CPA's triumvirate presidency. That both men stayed in Addis for five days,
much longer than was originally planned, and managed to cut a deal, is good
news.
Unresolved issues: Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Abyei
The continued failure to make progress in resolving the distinct, but
clearly related, conflicts in Blue Nile and South Kordofan is more sobering.
But Juba-Khartoum negotiations can no longer be the forum for such
discussions, notwithstanding the implications here for South Sudan's broader
border security. It's important that pressure on Sudan to engage in
meaningful negotiations with the SPLM-North continues, as UN
<
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2012.shtml> Security Council
resolution 2046 makes clear.
For Juba, there is no choice but to focus on South Sudanese interests, which
by definition no longer include South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Of course,
Abyei is another matter, where South Sudan's basic interests have not
changed, despite independence from Sudan. With Sudan's earlier decision, on
September 25, to "
<
http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/bashir_letter_to_auhip_on_the_final_sta
tus.pdf> categorically reject the [AU's Abyei] Proposal in its entirety," it
would seem that the mediators are back to the drawing board in finding
agreement on the future of the disputed territory. The new cooperation
agreement does, however, reaffirm the
<
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/abyei/Addis-Ababa-Ag
reement-20062011.pdf> June 2011 Temporary Arrangements for the
Administration and Security of the Abyei Area.
Oil gets the
<
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/uk-south-sudan-oil-idUKBRE88R11T20
120928> headlines, but the agreements cover a much wider range of subjects.
The new agreements establish a timetable for implementation across the eight
specific protocols, as well as a host of new joint committees and
initiatives (and accompanying acronyms).
Cooperation, security and border issues
The Cooperation Agreement references and incorporates nine older agreements
between Sudan and South Sudan, some dating back to December 2010, before the
end of the CPA era. Most of these concern general security arrangements.
The CPA is not specifically mentioned in this section, and is left to the
penultimate page of the Cooperation Agreement's text. When mentioned, it is
referenced in only two specific respects: the Sudan-South Sudan border, and
prior agreement on post-secession arrangements. While the patient has been
in terminal decline for some time, this is the effective death notice for
the rest of the CPA (barring perhaps the Abyei Protocol of 2004).
The first step in the Cooperation Agreement is ratification of the agreement
by the national parliaments of Sudan and South Sudan within 40 days of
signature, i.e. no later than November 6. However, the security protocol
calls for actions, which read by the language of that particular document,
are immediately due even before ratification of the overall set of
agreements. The parties must:
* "immediately cease all hostile propaganda and inflammatory
statements in the media," (preamble of the text)
* "immediately issue instructions to their forces to withdraw
unconditionally" to the January 1, 1956 borders
* "immediately operationalize the Joint Border Verification and
Monitoring Mission (JBVMM) and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ)."
The JBVMM is to be implemented according to two 2011 agreements (
<
http://www.rssnegotiationteam.org/uploads/1/2/8/8/12889608/05_border_monito
ring_agreement_300711.pdf> July 30), (
<
http://www.rssnegotiationteam.org/uploads/1/2/8/8/12889608/07_jpsm_decision
_18092011.pdf> September 18), and is to follow the map developed by the
AUHIP in November 2011.
* immediately activate a committee (the JBVMM Ad-Hoc Committee) to
receive and investigate complaints about violations of the demilitarized
zone
* immediately reopen the 10 agreed border crossing corridors, as per
the September 18 agreement (link above).
While most of these border commitments have been made before, Khartoum's
prior <
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article43445> rejection of the
AUHIP map has been massaged by the promise of "additional special
arrangements" for the 14 Mile Area. How these arrangements will work in
practice is not entirely clear, and the agreement is explicit that such
"additional measures are temporary whilst the parties resolve the final
status of the boundary."
In the Agreement on Border Issues, Sudan and South Sudan officially adopt
the idea of a "soft" border, with an "integrated border management
approach." Demarcation of the border remains as it was under the terms of
the CPA, that is, based on the border as it was on January 1, 1956, at the
moment of Sudan's independence from the United Kingdom. Demarcation is to
be conducted by a joint committee, to be formed within two weeks of
ratification of the agreement, and the committee is to meet no later than
two weeks after it is formed. Within two weeks of its first meeting, the
committee must come up with a plan and budget for the demarcation exercise,
and actual demarcation is to start no later than 60 days after the agreement
is ratified. Once the committee starts its work, it has three months to
complete the demarcation exercise, although the parties may agree to extend
the demarcation period.
Another entity, the Joint Border Commission (to which the demarcation
committee is subsidiary), is to be formed to manage the border. It too is
to be formed within two weeks of the agreement's ratification.
The adoption of "other agreements to facilitate the movement of members of
border communities across the international boundary," is not ruled out. On
the one hand, this is a practical acknowledgment of the reality of the needs
and movements of nomadic and pastoralist communities. On the other, it
demonstrates that the subtle details of how the border will operate are yet
to be determined, and that season by season, year by year, negotiations will
continue to be needed.
Both the border and security protocols describe specific, time-bound
obligations for both parties, so it will be easy to measure progress (or the
lack thereof). Like the CPA before them, the Addis agreements will require
just as much monitoring post-agreement as was required in mediation effort
to get to the signing ceremony. And it is not enough for people of good
will and competence to be appointed to this flurry of new committees and
commissions, if appointees and secretariats do not have political backing
from the highest levels to endorse and implement whatever it is they decide.
There are spoilers on both sides. But those in Khartoum generally have
greater influence on the government, and much depends on what these
hardliners ultimately determine: to accept to implement the letter and
spirit of the deal signed by the president, or as so often has been the case
before, to stall, frustrate and undermine this agreement and its subsidiary
protocols.
Part two to follow.
Aly Verjee is senior researcher at the Rift Valley Institute.
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Received on Fri Oct 05 2012 - 17:06:52 EDT
