<
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/24/the_somali_spring> The
Somali Spring
Is the poster child of failed states finally getting its act together?
BY KEN MENKHAUS |
SEPTEMBER 26, 2012
After the twin
<
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/how-africas-most-t
hreatening-terrorist-group-lost-control-of-somalia/262655/> suicide attacks
that killed 14 people in Mogadishu last week and an assassination attempt on
the president a little more than a week before that, predictions of a Somali
Spring would seem to be, at the very least, premature. But buried beneath
the grisly headlines of the last few weeks was some unexpectedly good news:
The newly appointed Somali parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to serve
as the first post-transition head of state. This is a seismic event in
Somalia -- but not for the reasons many observers presume.
Mohamud's election does not signal an end to Somalia's 21 years of state
collapse. Nor will it bring a quick end to the country's systemic political
violence. The new president is taking the reins of a failed government that
exercises only nominal control over the capital, Mogadishu, and faces a
real, if diminished, threat from the al Qaeda affiliate al-Shabab. Even in a
best-case outcome, it will take years for the government to extend and
deepen its authority. And though it brings to a conclusion Somalia's deeply
flawed, eight-year political transition, Mohamud's new administration must
still take on a host of difficult, unfinished transitional tasks.
The real significance of Mohamud's election -- as well as the election two
weeks earlier of Speaker of Parliament Mohamed Osman Jawari -- is that it
demonstrates that Somalia's civil society is alive and well, after years of
political violence that forced many of Somalia's best and brightest to flee
the country or withdraw from public life. The election constituted a
well-executed civic mobilization against the corrupt, illegitimate
government of transitional President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the
mafia that surrounded him. According to U.N. investigations,
<
http://www.voanews.com/content/un-reports-says-somali-government-corrupt/14
05372.html> 70 percent of foreign aid and other revenues flowing to Sheikh
Sharif's transitional government in 2009 and 2010 went unaccounted for,
earning Somalia the top spot on Transparency International's 2011 ranking of
the world's <
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/> most corrupt
governments.
This may be the start of a Somali version of an Arab Spring, with all the
uncertainties that entails. It has involved no street protests and no
bullets, just ballots -- and a lot of commitment, savvy, and collective
action by a coalition of professionals and civic leaders who jumped into
what looked like a fixed game and beat the incumbent.
Practically no one saw this coming. The last year of the Transitional
Federal Government was grim. Key transitional tasks -- like the drafting of
a constitution -- were rammed through, circumvented, or only partially
completed; the transitional government was paralyzed by infighting and
corruption; and the country was emerging from a serious famine. Desperate to
produce a sitting parliament, U.N. diplomats engineered what became known as
an "appointocracy" -- appointees appointing appointees. Understandably, the
process had little legitimacy in the eyes of Somalis.
Most observers were convinced that appointed members of parliament would be
in the pockets of Somalia's "moneylords" -- a quarreling, dysfunctional
coalition of political entrepreneurs who have used control over
transitional-government finances to rent allegiances and enrich themselves
since 2009. Instead, a combination of nationalists, moderate Islamists,
business people, and cross-clan interests outmaneuvered Sheikh Sharif and
his supporters. Mohamud, a civil society leader, educator, and
peace-builder, emerged as a finalist in a runoff vote against Sheikh Sharif
and won resoundingly.
Critics of the vote argue that money was passed around by both sides, and
they are probably right. But what matters is this: In a power struggle
between two rival coalitions, the "constructive elite" -- the group known
and admired for having built universities, hospitals, charities, and
businesses in the country during the long civil war -- defeated a parasitic
elite coalition that had devoted all its energies to diverting public funds.
Mohamud's victory electrified Somalis and both surprised and relieved the
international community. Only two groups emerged as losers: the moneylords
and warlords who sought to maintain the status quo, and al-Shabab.
Al-Shabab has taken a big hit with this election. For years, the corruption
and misbehavior of the transitional government was one of the jihadi group's
biggest recruiting tools. Many angry and disaffected Somalis passively
supported al-Shabab, in part because the alternative was so uninspiring. Now
that support could evaporate as Somalis rally behind the new government.
Mohamud's government thus poses an existential threat to al-Shabab, which,
though weakened, is still capable of carrying out devastating terrorist
attacks. As a result, we should expect al-Shabab to take desperate actions
to attack and discredit the government, including widening its terrorist
campaign into neighboring countries.
But Mohamud's government must also wage a rear-guard battle against the
mafia of marginalized warlords and moneylords. They have demonstrated a
willingness to resort to intimidation and political violence, and they could
end up being as great a danger to the new government as al-Shabab.
Yet for all the challenges, this is a critical window of opportunity -- and
the international community must approach it with the right policies. These
cannot be the usual gift box of good-governance and rule-of-law foreign aid.
More than anything else, Mohamud's administration will need political space.
Somalis want to own their government and its policies. They want an end to
warlordism and jihadism, but they also want an end to foreign domination.
Mohamud will be under domestic pressure to reduce the influence of the
United Nations and donor states, and gradually to exert more say in the
operations of the African Union peacekeeping forces in Somalia. Outsiders
need to respect Somalis' desire to reclaim their sovereignty and need to let
the new government take the lead in proposing mechanisms to improve
accountability and good governance.
The international community should also anticipate the possibility that
Mohamud's government will reach out to "redeemable" wings of al-Shabab with
an eye for reaching a negotiated settlement. Now that a post-transition
government is in place and al-Shabab is sufficiently weakened, this may be a
good moment to attempt that strategy. Mohamud may also have to cut deals
with some of the moneylords and warlords to keep the peace.
These and other policies may create anxiety in neighboring states and
Western donor countries, but foreigners need to understand and accommodate
the complex negotiations among Somalis that will come next. Mohamud is a
decent and experienced man who has the respect of Somalis at home and in the
diaspora. If ever the stars were aligned for Somalia to emerge from its
20-year crisis of war and state collapse, this is it. Let's try not to get
in the way.
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Received on Wed Sep 26 2012 - 17:29:41 EDT
