Time to Get Serious about Yemen
<
http://nationalinterest.org/profile/daniel-r-depetris> Daniel R. DePetris
|
August 28, 2012
Within mere seconds, security guards outside of Yemen's Defense Ministry
building found themselves in the middle of an ambush. Hundreds of men
carrying rocket-propelled grenades, automatic assault rifles and
military-issued weapons surrounded the defense headquarters in the middle of
Sana, Yemen's capital, unleashing a barrage of gunfire and destruction that
resulted in the deaths of three people.
The attack bore all the usual signs of Al Qaeda's affiliate in that country,
an organization that has killed hundreds of Yemeni security personnel and
civilians since it merged with its weakened allies in Saudi Arabia years
ago. But in Yemen, a country that is still struggling to leap out of the
shadows of its revolutionary period, nothing is as it seems. The assailants
were not fighters linked to Al Qaeda, but
<
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/clashes-in-yemen-highlight-
ongoing-tension/2011/06/19/gJQAgJwfvX_story.html> allies of the former
government under Ali Abdullah Saleh, the same man who was forced out of
power by Yemeni demonstrators after months of marching and bloodshed.
The spark that fueled the confrontation, according to Yemeni and Western
media reports, was none other than a bold move by the current president,
Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, against the old regime. With a mandate to
restructure the military and a generous amount of support from the United
Nations Security Council to fulfill that mandate, President Hadi decided to
transfer some of Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh's units (the former president's
son) to his own command.
As the man in charge of Yemen's most elite branch of the military, Ahmed Ali
was powerful enough to respond to the change in command with a hail of
gunfire-a tactic that has become a common negotiating ploy in Yemen's
heavily armed, tribal society since Hadi was formally put in power after a
popular referendum. The attack-presumably by Republican Guard soldiers under
the orders of Ahmed Ali Saleh-was eventually beaten back after Yemeni
soldiers were rushed to the scene. But while the mutiny was defeated, the
damage was already done. Besides the physical destruction, the shooting in
and around the Defense Ministry was a direct swipe at Hadi's authority as
commander-in-chief and the most audacious illustration yet of the Saleh
family's continued strength in the country, even after the removal of its
patriarch.
Hadi, who has been trying to restructure the Yemeni military since his
inauguration in February, made his own strength known right after the
attack. Sixty-two soldiers
<
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gGj4ebIVkHoeTpGFjO7xTjmD2
PpQ?docId=12d7d1b116514e418f715137d781f06f> have been formally indicted for
participating in the Defense Ministry operation, with the vast majority of
them likely to be charged and imprisoned for fighting against the very state
that they are paid to protect. Unfortunately, the indictments are not likely
to change significantly the power struggle going on between Hadi and his
predecessor. Allies of former president Saleh have permanently put a wrench
into the process of reforming Yemen and transforming its institutions.
As a president with shaky powers in the face of a former regime that is
still very much alive (Ahmed Ali Saleh and Yahya Saleh control Yemen's
Republican Guards and Central Security Forces, respectively), there is only
so much that Hadi can do to fulfill his mandate. Yet his weakness is
precisely why the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), both
of which signed the deal that in theory was supposed to end Yemen's
political crisis, have an obligation to help him exert control. On more than
one occasion, the GCC has pledged its complete support to Hadi in
implementing the transitional agreement. The latest challenge by the Saleh
family, however, has driven home the point that words alone will not do much
good, especially in the absence of tangible sanctions against those who are
deliberately making the transition more difficult.
Last May, President Barack Obama issued an executive order for this very
purpose-freezing assets of anyone found torpedoing the GCC agreement. The
executive order is broad in scope, allowing the U.S. government to
confiscate the finances (under U.S. jurisdiction) of anyone either directly
or indirectly associated with "
<
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/16/executive-order-block
ing-property-persons-threatening-peace-security-or-> obstructing the
agreement of November 23, 2011." As a country that has a primary
national-security interest in ensuring that Yemen's journey to democratic
governance succeeds with as few bugs as possible along the way, the time may
have come for the United States to put that order into immediate effect. As
the commander of a military unit that
<
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=53668>
<
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=53668> actively resisted
Yemen's interim government, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh and Yahya Mohammed
Abdullah Saleh must both be held liable for violating the transfer-of-power
deal, just as the presidential order states.
Holding these officials and other commanders responsible for the mutiny will
indeed be difficult. The Republican Guards and the Central Security Forces
are both integral in combating terrorism and keeping Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula on the run. But as a group of respected foreign-policy experts and
Middle East specialists
<
http://www.acus.org/files/Yemen%20Policy%20Initiative%20Letter%20to%20Obama
%206-25-12.pdf> have passionately argued to the president, the best way for
Washington to ensure that Yemen's terrorism problem is adequately addressed
is by reframing U.S. policy on the country, with a view toward the long
term. Sanctioning individuals who are failing to abide by a pact that was
signed by the parties and endorsed by the GCC and the United Nations would
be a good first step for that change in approach.
President Hadi cannot be expected to stabilize Yemen politically, carry out
the GCC pact, tackle Al Qaeda, resist a growing humanitarian disaster and
reform the military all at once if some of his commanders are attempting to
subvert his work. As a power that has both lent its name to the November
agreement and consistently poured money into Yemen for a variety of noble
purposes, the United States can-and should-assist the head of Yemen's
interim government by following through on its own orders.
Daniel R. DePetris is the senior associate editor of the Journal on
Terrorism and Security Analysis.
------------[ Sent via the dehai-wn mailing list by dehai.org]--------------
Received on Tue Aug 28 2012 - 10:11:15 EDT
