Ethiopia: Meles Zenawi - Two-Sided Man Who Took the Long March to Power
By Richard Dowden, 23 August 2012
Analysis
Earlier this year I wrote that 'Meles Zenawi is the cleverest and most
engaging Prime Minister in Africa' but I always felt that when I talked to
Ethiopians about him it seemed like I was speaking about a different person.
It was as if he had two personalities - one for Ethiopians, the other for
Farangis - as westerners are called in Ethiopia. The Ethiopians saw a dour
dogmatic man who rarely smiled. We saw a shrewd but diffident, laid-back guy
who was always ready for a joke.
There is a basic rule in journalism that you must report what you see and
hear if it is important. To leave something important out is as bad as
inventing a fact or story. The only occasion on which you may leave
something is if you are morally certain that someone will die as a result. I
have rarely had to do this. But one occasion was during peace talks in 1999
over the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. I flew to Asmara and got to see
Issias Afkwerke, the Eritrean President. He showed me the GTZ map which had
been drawn up by a German NGO wrongly showing a great slice of Eritrea,
including the vital town of Badme, to be in Ethiopia. "You see", said
Issias, "this is what Zenawi is trying to steal from us."
I took the map, flew to Sa'ana and then to Addis, managing to get to Meles
only two days later. I told him his brother Issias sent his greetings (which
was not quite true, but made Meles laugh) then produced the map and asked
him, "Is this what you are claiming?"
Meles studied the map and looked grave. Then he said with an innocent smile.
"Oh no. We are claiming much more than that!"
I didn't report that. Afwerke has no sense of humour and the war probably
have restarted.
He was not always the hard disciplined Stalinist he is sometimes made out to
be, but he did not like his weaknesses to be known. He used to be a chain
smoker and during another interview with him I lit a cigarette and left the
packet on the table. After a while he paused and then said quietly. "Could I
have one please?" As he lit it he said: "Just don't' tell the American
Ambassador. He's my tennis partner and I have promised him I have given up
smoking."
The first and second times I met him were in London. He really had done the
Long March - fleeing from Addis Ababa University when Mengistu seized power
in 1974 and taking to the mountains in his native Tigray to start the
revolution. It took them 15 years to make it back to the Ethiopian capital.
While he was up in the mountains the revolutionaries moved around
cautiously. A (male) journalist colleague found Meles in a Catholic convent
hostel up in the mountains but there were no spare rooms and it was too cold
to stay outside. Meles promptly let the journalist share the small room with
him.
In 1990 the Soviet Union, Mengistu's main backer, had collapsed and the
rebel armies had reached Dessie in Wollo province. It was clear it was only
a matter of time before the regime collapsed. When I found Meles I said, "I
think I am shaking hands with the next Emperor of Ethiopia". When I met him
again recently, he reminded me. "Do I look like an emperor?"
"No," I said, "but we are in one of the imperial palaces."
* Richard Dowden is Director of the Royal African Society and author
of Africa; altered states, ordinary miracles. For more of Richard's blogs
click here
<
http://africanarguments.org/category/politics-now/richard-dowden-blog/> .
*************************************************************************
Meles Zenawi: in his own words - By Peter Gill
August 23, 2012
In the rush to judgement on the record and the legacy of Meles Zenawi as
Ethiopia's leader for the past two decades, the man himself has barely left
the shadows. Yes, he achieved record economic growth for his country, and
yes, he was a force for stability and an ally in the West's 'war on terror,'
and no, he was certainly not a liberal democrat.
He was also a much more attractive and significant figure than these
achievements and positions suggest. His work rate was punishing enough to
have cost him his health (he was only 57) and his political predominance
owed as much to an extraordinary intellect as to his control over the
apparatus of party and state. Reflecting his country's tradition of
independence and its inclination to keep foreigners in their place, he
articulated a vision of an Africa where the West no longer ruled the world.
Educational attainment is no indicator of political capacity, but Meles'
academic exploits were exceptional. At 19 he dropped out of his medical
degree in Addis Ababa to become a guerrilla fighter. Seventeen years later
he took up his studies again (and insisted most of his young cabinet do the
same) through the Open University, and got one the best business degrees
they have ever awarded. He went on to a master's degree at Erasmus
University in Rotterdam, an undertaking inconveniently interrupted by the
war with Eritrea.
His thesis, appropriately, was on the functioning of African economies. As
he explained to me, it 'was primarily intended for our own local consumption
to see if our policies could stand up to the rigour of some academic
scrutiny.' He got his Master's in 2004.
Meles famously had no small talk. Chris Mullin, as a junior Foreign Office
Minister, tells how he was ushered into his office after a dramatic flight
across the country from the Red Sea coast. 'Spectacular country, Prime
Minister,' ventured Mullin, to break the ice. Meles smiled and said
nothing. 'It must be very difficult to govern,' offered Mullin in
desperation. 'Spectacularly difficult,' replied Meles. They then got down
to business.
What he lacked in small talk he made up for in willingness to debate and
argue, more enthusiastically with foreigners than with Ethiopians. In
researching my book '
<
http://astore.amazon.co.uk/royaafrisoci-21/detail/0199569843> Famine and
Foreigners: Ethiopia since Live Aid' I trailed Meles to a series of
'Farmers' Festivals' where he would give up a day to listen to speeches and
hand out prizes. I heard him lecture on African development to several
hundred economists, foreigners and Ethiopians, and then take questions for
more than two hours.
It was after one of these occasions that I got my introduction. I told him
who I was, what I was doing and said I wanted to conduct extensive
interviews with him. He beamed good-naturedly. 'I would be honoured,' he
said in as subtle a lack of formal commitment as I have ever received as a
journalist. In the event I saw him for a total of four hours, and was free
to tackle all the awkward questions, from Ethiopia's image around the world
to democracy and human rights and his plans to hand over power.
Here are some of the more surprising and challenging observations that Meles
made to me. They help account perhaps for the regard in which he was held
by fellow leaders in Africa and beyond:
On the shame and embarrassment of his country's association with hunger and
starvation:
'Humiliation can be a very powerful motivation for action and therefore I
don't hate the fact that we get humiliated every day so long as it's based
on facts. If we feel we deserve to be treated like honourable citizens of
the world, then we have to remove that source of shame.'
On the failure to respond effectively to the 2008 famine in southern
Ethiopia:
'That was a failure on our part. We were late in recognising we had an
emergency on our hands. We did not know that a crisis was brewing in these
specific areas until emaciated children began to appear.'
On how western aid agencies were also to blame:
'They did not respond quickly. They didn't have the means to respond
quickly. But they were exaggerating, and it appears to us that they were
deliberately exaggerating. My own interpretation is because they have to
shock and awe the international community to get money.'
On the 2015 deadline for realizing the main Millennium Development Goal:
'As far as halving poverty is concerned, we will achieve it. I have no
doubt about it. I believe by 2025 we will be a middle income country with a
per capita income of at least $1,000 a year and at around that time,
slightly before perhaps, we will be completely free of aid of any variety.'
On the merits and limitations of democracy:
'We believe that democracy, good governance and transparency and fighting
corruption are good objectives for every country, particularly for
developing countries. Where we had our differences with the so-called
neoliberal paradigm is first on the perception that this can be imposed from
outside. We do not believe that is possible. Internalization of
accountability is central to democratisation. The state has to be
accountable to the citizens, and not some embassy or foreign actor.'
On the pressure from western aid donors to adopt free market economics:
'Our argument has been that the neoliberal model does not work in Africa.
In developed countries it is a perfectly legitimate alternative (or it was -
it needs serious modifications now). In the case of under-developed
economies without the push of the state, an effective developmental state,
it is very unlikely that the markets that do exist are going to function
efficiently and push the country forward.'
On the restrictions imposed on foreign-funded Non Government Organisations:
'These NGOs were initially seen as an antidote to what was seen as the main
problem in Africa - the bloated state. This was supposed to be an
alternative. You reduce the role of the state, including your social
services, and you encourage NGOs to provide as much of the public services
as possible. In the end we argue that the NGOs have turned out to be
alternative networks of patronage. NGOs have not provided an alternative
good governance network.'
On his wish to step down from power:
'It's not just about Meles. It's about the old generation of leadership,
the armed struggle leadership. There is consensus that the leadership has
to go. Sometime during the next term [2010 - 2015] the whole leadership has
to go.'
Meles' work was not quite done. It is still unclear how far the transition
to a new, younger leadership has progressed. It is still less clear whether
sufficiently strong party and state institutions are in place to withstand
the shock of his departure and the challenges that the new hierarchy will
face. The ultimate objective, he told me in 2009, had always been for the
ruling party to make itself redundant. Was that still the aim? 'If it
doesn't do that, it has failed absolutely - miserably failed in its
objective.'
Peter Gill is the author of
<
http://astore.amazon.co.uk/royaafrisoci-21/detail/0199569843> Famine and
Foreigners: Ethiopia since Live Aid, published in paperback this year by
Oxford University Press.
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Received on Wed Aug 22 2012 - 18:46:18 EDT
