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[Dehai-WN] Crisisgroup.org: Somalia: From Troubled Transition to a Tarnished Transition?

From: Berhane Habtemariam <Berhane.Habtemariam_at_gmx.de_at_dehai.org>
Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2012 14:50:32 +0200

Somalia: From Troubled Transition to a Tarnished Transition?

Nairobi/Brussels | 21 Aug 2012

The term of Somalia's Transitional Federal Institutions has expired, and
there is no new president to take office as envisaged. The current political
process has been as undemocratic as the one it seeks to replace, with
unprecedented levels of political interference, corruption and intimidation.
The end of the transition roadmap process - that is supposed to usher in an
inclusive political dispensation - may fail to bring stability. Convening an
incomplete parliament and electing a contested, tainted leadership in
Somalia's polarised political environment could easily unravel the
painstaking humanitarian, political and security progress made in the past
three years. The extremist Islamist movement Al-Shabaab is down but not out,
and it is evolving, and plots to take advantage of the resulting chaos to
regain power.

To prevent this from happening, the international community should now focus
on ensuring the final stages of the roadmap's implementation are not rigged
by its signatories and technical selection committee (charged with vetting
individuals nominated for parliament), and that the new leaders and
institutions in Mogadishu create a foundation for national unity rather than
an acrimonious "winner-takes-all" outcome.

The current political and legal quagmire transpired because the signatories
to the "end of transition roadmap" (six unaccountable leaders from the
government and regional administrations under the auspices of the UN
Political Office for Somalia) controlled and dominated it. For more than ten
months, they acted as though they were the roadmap's sole owners, rather
than merely its supervisors. Short-term political expediency - at the
expense of legality, transparency and fair play - became the norm. In the
rush to monopolise the roadmap's implementation they ignored the
Transitional Federal Charter, bypassed the parliament, sidelined the
cabinet, and otherwise manipulated the process in an effort to predetermine
who would lead the next Somali government. The adoption of a new
"provisional" constitution is their only tangible achievement - though this
too was manipulated, heavily criticised by traditional elders and civil
society and only promulgated after protracted and disputed negotiations.

Sustained public outcry and intense international pressure forced the
roadmap principals to shift two of the most important end-of-transition
responsibilities - the selection of the national constituent assembly and
parliamentarians - to a council of traditional elders, now sitting in
Mogadishu. But this too they corrupted. Some elders foisted on the council
were phony and, after two months of incessant delays and brazen politicking,
the outcome was anything but dignified. Some elders allegedly nominated
uneducated and objectionable individuals, some sold seats to highest
bidders, and others even nominated their own family members.

Rather than deal with these issues, three of the signatories are busy
electioneering. Puntland's president, meanwhile, continues to insist on
creating an upper house (to represent his state and other undetermined local
authorities), even though establishing the lower house alone has become a
daunting if not unattainable task. Indeed its formation may bring the whole
roadmap to a grinding halt. Another signatory, the region of Galmudug's
president, was recently voted out - a move he refuses to concede - and the
TFG president and prime minister are engaged in a public spat with each
claiming the other is irrelevant and engaged in unlawful and
unconstitutional adventures.

Barring a full-blown meltdown, the selection and ratification of the lower
house parliamentarians (however tainted) could still be completed in coming
days if not weeks. But then the new body must elect a speaker, deputies and
a president. The president also has to appoint a prime minister within a
month who must then assemble a cabinet in 30 days, pending approval of the
parliament. All these tasks will take time and the earliest Somalia could
realistically have a fully working government is late October.

To salvage a botched process and avoid its collapse, the signatories,
traditional elders and the international community should ensure that:

* the transition process concludes in a responsible manner. The TFI's
mandate should not be extended, but nor should artificial deadlines be
pursued at any cost. They must be a means to completing the protracted
transition, not an end in themselves;
* neither the roadmap signatories nor the technical selection
committee should frustrate the elders' prerogative to appoint
parliamentarians for their constituents. The committee should only
transparently screen nominees according to the agreed minimal criteria. Only
a court of law should be able to determine who is a warlord and who is a
spoiler;
* both Somali politicians and the international community must resist
zero-sum politics; having winners and losers will only undermine what has
been achieved, particularly in the security front.
* the issue of an upper chamber of parliament - whether it represents
regions or the traditional elders - should be determined by the new
parliament, or an effective constituent assembly, not the roadmap
signatories, since these issues are contentious, complicated and require
careful deliberation devoid of time pressure and short-term political
calculations; and
* if the roadmap signatories do not resolve their political
differences within 60 days, and continue to manipulate the transition
process, the international community should recognise Somalia's council of
elders (albeit with some bad apples) as the legal representatives of the
Somali people and the depository of Somalia's sovereignty. They should be
asked to form a caretaker government that would ensure continuity of
government and more importantly assume responsibility for concluding the end
of the transition process and ushering in an inclusive and accountable
government.

Time has run out for a smooth end to the current transitional institutions.
Any further political turmoil will have an adverse effect on the fragile
security and humanitarian gains. The international community, roadmap
signatories and the traditional elders should not ignore the impending
debacle, but work to find a speedy resolution to the impasse. The process
should not be driven by artificial deadlines, but should be fair and free of
manipulation, paving the way for a unifying national political dispensation.

 




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Received on Tue Aug 21 2012 - 08:50:48 EDT
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