Militancy in Central Asia: More Than Religious Extremism
August 10, 2012 | 0900 GMT
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By Eugene Chausovsky
Since 2010,
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/central-asias-increasing-volatility>
Central Asia has become increasingly volatile, a trend many have attributed
to a rise in militant Islamism. Militancy has indeed risen since 2010, but
the notion that militant Islamists primarily are responsible for Central
Asia's volatility is shortsighted because it ignores other political and
economic dynamics at play in the region.
But if these dynamics, not jihadist designs, inspired much of the region's
recent militant activity, the impending U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in
2014 could put Central Asia at greater risk for militant Islamism in the
future. Combined with upcoming leadership changes in several Central Asian
states, the withdrawal could complicate an already complex militant
landscape in the region.
Regional Militancy: Late 1990s and Early 2000s
Central Asia was an important region for Islamist militancy in the late
1990s and early 2000s. The region is predominantly Muslim, though like all
religious practices, Islam was suppressed during the Soviet era. Given the
region's secularization under Soviet rule, many religious groups and figures
either went underground or practiced openly to the extent that the Soviets
would allow. These groups and individuals were
<
http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/russias-ambitions-fergana-valley
> concentrated in the Fergana Valley, the demographic core of Central Asia
that encompasses parts of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Islamists
were particularly prevalent in Uzbekistan, which is home to several
important religious and cultural cites in areas such as Samarkand and
Bukhara.
As Central Asian countries gained independence in the 1990s, religion began
to be practiced more openly, and Islamist elements operating on the margins
of society were freer to come out accordingly. This created a space in which
the Islamist environment grew stronger, just as the ability of the new
Central Asian regimes to control and suppress Islamist movements weakened.
As a result, some Islamist groups began to call for a regional caliphate
governed by Sharia.
Among these groups were the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb
al-Tahrir, both of which drew inspiration from the Afghan mujahideen that
had fought the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989. Despite their similarities --
they both advocated ousting Uzbek President Islam Karimov -- the two groups
differed in a fundamental way: Whereas the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
used violence to further its cause, Hizb al-Tahrir did not. Other groups,
such as Akromiya, would later adopt the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's use
of violence while espousing Hizb al-Tahrir's ideology.
Karimov clamped down on these groups in the early to mid-1990s, but the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan gained refuge in Tajikistan, which was
ravaged by civil war from 1992 to 1997. Because of the resultant power
vacuum and its long, porous border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan became the
primary base of operations for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In the
late 1990s and early 2000s, the group conducted attacks from Tajikistan
throughout the Fergana Valley and into southern Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
The 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, a country that provided both material
and ideological support to Islamist groups in Central Asia from the
ultra-conservative Taliban regime, effectively curtailed jihadist activity
and ambitions in Central Asia. With the help of the U.S. military, including
U.S. special operations forces, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was
largely driven out of Central Asia, finding refuge in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. For its part, Hizb al-Tahrir went
underground.
The Central Asian regimes, especially Karimov's, were then able to crack
down on the remaining Islamist militants. Attacks grew rarer throughout the
next decade as militant Islamist groups struggled to survive in
U.S.-occupied Afghanistan.
Militancy Since 2010
Militant attacks in the region became more frequent in June 2010, when
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/kyrgyzstan-eyes-turn-moscow-instability-gr
ows> clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks broke out in Kyrgyzstan's
southern Fergana Valley provinces of Osh and Jalal-Abad. As a result, Kyrgyz
authorities conducted security sweeps through predominantly Uzbek
neighborhoods under the pretense of rooting out suspected militant
Islamists.
In reality, these sweeps most likely were directed at ethnic Uzbeks. Many
ethnic Kyrgyz have long been suspicious of Kyrgyzstan's ethnic Uzbeks, which
constitute a substantial portion of Osh's and Jalal-Abad's population. Thus,
security sweeps targeting these areas and the resulting armed resistance to
the sweeps do not necessarily fit neatly with the claims of religious
extremism. Rather, militant activity could be related to the internal ethnic
and political tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Indeed, these tensions
have surfaced periodically since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
A similar dynamic can be seen in Tajikistan. After the country's civil war,
reconcilable Islamist militants, such as those of the Islamic Renaissance
Party of Tajikistan, were incorporated into the government and security
forces, while the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other jihadist elements
were suppressed. Violence peaked in the early 2000s, after which Tajikistan
experienced nearly a decade of relative calm. However, a
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/effects-militant-leaders-reported-death-ta
jikistan> high-profile prison break in Dushanbe in August 2010 interrupted
this calm. During the escape, about 24 prisoners deemed former Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan members fled to the Rasht Valley in eastern
Tajikistan. This precipitated security sweeps in the Rasht Valley, which in
turn led to attacks against Tajik military convoys -- attacks that the Tajik
government blamed on Islamist militants.
These militants were much more likely linked to opposition elements from the
country's civil war rather than to jihadist militants. (That they fled to
the east is telling; those from the eastern provinces of Garm and
Gorno-Badakhshan opposed those who came to power in the western provinces of
Leninabad and Kulyab.) The jailbreak could have prompted -- or merely been a
symptom of -- the resurfacing of the political power struggle among Tajik
clans, a struggle that was commonplace during the early years of
independence. In itself, the jailbreak does not signify a jihadist
resurgence.
Moreover, the
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/tajikistan-launches-security-operation-res
tive-east> ongoing military operations in Gorno-Badakhshan can be seen in a
similar light. Security forces were deployed to the region after forces
loyal to warlord and former opposition leader Tolib Ayombekov allegedly
killed the region's top security officer. But Ayombekov likely did not kill
the officer out of any religious motivation. Rather, it was Ayombekov's
reported ties to the lucrative regional smuggling networks, as well as his
resistance to the regime of Emomali Rakhmon, that led to operations and
ultimately the death of the security officer. Like militancy in Kyrgyzstan,
much of the militancy in Tajikistan probably is the result of political and
ethnic rivalries, not religious extremism.
Kazakhstan likewise challenges the theory that Islamist militancy is
proliferating in the region. Given its geographic separation from the
Fergana Valley and a comparatively less religious society, Kazakhstan did
not experience Islamist militancy in the 1990s and 2000s. However,
<
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20111220-dispatch-islamist-militancy-kazak
hstan> in 2011 Kazakhstan began seeing militant attacks for the first time
in its modern history. That the attacks were conducted with different
tactics all across the country, including Almaty, Atyrau and Taraz, is
particularly anomalous.
The Kazakh government blamed Islamist militants and religious propaganda
reportedly circulating throughout the country. However, the timing of these
attacks was curious because they came amid a growing political battle over
the succession of the country's long-serving president, Nursultan
Nazarbayev. It follows that these attacks could have been inspired less by
Islamic radicalism, which has hardly been evident in Kazakhstan over the
past 20 years, and more by the power struggle between various players
seeking to position themselves for Nazarbayev's succession.
Notably, a jihadist group called the Soldiers of the Caliphate claimed
responsibility for some of the attacks, including the October 2011 bombings
in Atyrau. The claims suggest there is a genuine militant Islamist threat in
Kazakhstan. However, the group was unknown until 2011, and there is little
information on its members and leadership.
More recently, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have seen fewer attacks and
reports of militant activity. This suggests that their respective internal
situations are relatively stable and that their governments are secure
enough to not have to use Islamic radicalism to justify their security
crackdowns.
While this is probably true for Turkmenistan, the situation is less clear in
Uzbekistan, which has been more stable than its neighbors in the Fergana
Valley. However, Uzbekistan witnessed an explosion on a rail line near the
Tajik border in November 2011. The government labeled the incident a
terrorist attack. Since the blast occurred in a remote area with relatively
little strategic significance, many speculated that the Uzbek government
conducted the attack to halt traffic and goods into Tajikistan, with which
Tashkent has had several disputes.
Meanwhile, Uzbekistan is undergoing its own succession struggle, which could
result in instability. Indeed, recently there have been reports of protests
in the Fergana Valley province of Andijan, the site of a security crackdown
in 2005 that killed hundreds. In this instance again, the government blamed
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Islamist militant elements. However,
just as in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, this was more likely the result of
power struggles within the country.
Potential Resurgence
As the dynamics and circumstances in most Central Asian countries suggest,
oftentimes it is in the government's interest to refer to any militant
activity as Islamist. Doing so suggests the activity of transnational rather
than localized political elements and gives an excuse to crack down on those
elements.
Of course, jihadist groups and elements exist in Central Asia, but most
evidence suggests that the serious jihadist players have largely been
eliminated, marginalized or pushed into the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater.
However, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan could provoke a jihadist
resurgence in the region. The security vacuum created by the departure of
U.S. and International Security Assistance Force personnel could also
destabilize Afghanistan as various internal forces compete to fill the void.
Due to Central Asia's proximity to Afghanistan and the porous and poorly
guarded border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, there is certainly
potential for violence and instability to spill over. Particularly worrying
to Central Asian regimes are the Islamist militants in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area that have survived and become
battle-hardened in their war against Western forces. However, there have
been reports that Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader Abu Usman Adil was
killed Aug. 4 by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle strike in Pakistan,
suggesting that the group may be struggling to survive even in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan area.
The degree to which Islamist militant elements become active in Central Asia
again will therefore depend on the U.S. withdrawal and the state of the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan by that time. Until then, any developments on
the militant front in the region need to be examined within the context of
the internal power struggles and political dynamics of each country in
addition to the Islamist angle. It is only in this context that the
motivations behind militant actors and attacks in Central Asia can truly be
determined and anticipated.
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http://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/main/images/Ferghana_Valley.jpg
> Central Asia and the Fergana Valley
Read more:
<
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/militancy-central-asia-more-religious-extrem
ism#ixzz23BAfoYWf> Militancy in Central Asia: More Than Religious Extremism
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Received on Fri Aug 10 2012 - 17:01:22 EDT
