Ethiopia after Meles
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/ren%C3%A9-lefort> René Lefort ,
9 August 2012
Does the Ethiopian state rest on the shoulders of a single man? His illness
and recent disappearance from the public eye give some urgency to the
question says René Lefort.
When Meles Zenawi, the omnipotent Prime Minister of Ethiopia, last appeared
in public on 19 June, he looked pale, thin and gaunt.
It took the government a month to break the silence. Meles Zenawi is
“recovering health-wise,” and, above all, “he's not staying out of duties as
Prime Minister”.[1] On 1 August, a senior spokesman issued another statement
about the elusive PM: “there is no change and there will be no change in the
near future.”[2] But what next? And what illness was he suffering from?
Silence. Where is he? It depends whom you ask. With no sign of Meles either
in person or indirectly, these statements are becoming less convincing as
the days go by.
The often outrageous, even delirious counter-information, especially on
internet sites run by government opponents living abroad, is no more
convincing either. According to some of them, Meles is already dead, and a
raging battle has started for his succession.
Yet, these hypotheses are not entirely out of the realm of possibility,
especially given the history of Ethiopia, where secrecy is a cardinal
virtue. Menelik, the founder of modern imperial Ethiopia, continued to
"reign" for three years after he was incapacitated by a stroke. His
successor finally took power once the Shakespearian internal power struggles
were over inside the Palace. Haïle Selassie was deposed in 1974 by a
military junta, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had him suffocated to
death a year later. In 1991 Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe, having been defeated
by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), led by Meles Zenawi, in a
civil war that ended in Addis Ababa.
If history is anything to go by, it will be hard to find a peaceful and
orderly route to succession. The Ethiopian people know this, moulded as they
are by their own history. On the surface, it's "business as usual", the
government governs and people go about their daily affairs as usual. But
under the surface there is an extremely heavy atmosphere, with an
overwhelming feeling that this is just the calm before the storm. The
widespread conviction shared by most diplomats and experts is that, whether
Meles is dead or alive, he is no longer in charge and never will be again,
so the candidacy for his succession is open. Under this hypothesis, which is
still no more than a hypothesis, it is all the more difficult to speculate
on what will happen when the leadership operates under a cloak of complete
secrecy, almost unequalled anywhere else in the world. Whatever is
happening, one thing is obvious, the succession will have to navigate a
untold number of threats, unknowns and divisions.
The first of these is institutional: nothing in the Constitution says what
to do if the Prime Minister dies or is incapacitated.[3] The second is
economic: inflation has reached a new high, even if it has started to come
down again,[4] and growth has slowed down having been exceptional up until
now (officially 11% a year for the past eight years). The third is
political: the internal crisis of the TPLF in 2001 ended with the expulsion
of part of the "old guard". The opposition pulled off a triumphal surge in
the 2005 elections, which forced the regime to a counter-attack, and from
which the opponents never really recovered. After 2005 "Ethiopia has
definitely fallen back into the camp of authoritarian regime’ as it is ‘de
facto ruled by a ‘monolithic party-state’”.[5] The Front is now facing a
third major challenge that could prove to be particularly severe. The Muslim
community – officially 34% of the population, but in reality more – has been
moderate and tolerant for centuries, but now it is being caught up in
government manoeuvres to forcefully enlist followers for the obscure branch
of Islam – al-Ahbash – whose enemy number one is Wahabism, which the regime
thinks is growing too strong in Ethiopia. Specialists on the subject play
this down and think that the regime's actions are likely to have the
opposite effect on the Muslim community. In the meantime, the protests and
arrests continue.[6]
In addition to this tense context, this possible succession can basically be
looked at from three main points of view, which are of course not mutually
exclusive, but even reinforce one another, namely: institutional, ethnic and
"class".
Up until the internal crisis of 2001, the leaders of the TPLF stood out in
African politics. Even if power was effectively confined to a very small
inner circle, it still operated in an exceptionally collective manner. To
the outside world, Meles was perceived as a strong leader, but he was more
the Primus inter pares. The TPLF delegated a great deal to him, but remained
ultimately able to hold him to account, and, if necessary, they would put
him in place. But after 2001 the edifice of power under went a dramatic
change with Meles as its sole architect and master. He centralised power by
utilising the three main pillars of the state.
First, there was the security apparatus, in other words, the police and, if
things really got out of hand, the army, one of the largest and most
efficient in all of sub-Saharan Africa. Then he reinforced the power of his
inner circle, which, for the first time, was no longer comprised of key
figures in the party leadership of the TPLF. He shook up the Front’s
leadership (the nine-member Executive Committee) removing the remaining
influential characters, under the guise of injecting young blood. At the
same time, he promoted people the opposition have dubbed “yes-men” –
characterless officials whose support he could rely on – including his own
wife, Azeb Mesfin. The upshot was that none of the founders of the TPLF were
left, Meles himself having only joined a few months after the start of the
armed struggle. On top of this, his closest collaborators, and therefore
those to whom he delegated most power, were his advisers, who didn’t belong
to this leadership. The pre-eminence of the party, with its collegial
leadership structure, became no more than a distant memory.
Mutatis mutandis, the predominance of Meles is equally apparent within the
ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF). This has four components, with equal representation in its
leadership for the Tigreans (6% of the population), the Oromos (35%),
Amharas (26%), and finally various ethnic groups from the South (20%). The
latter three were creations of the former when it became imperative that the
TPLF's struggle against Mengistu needed to extend beyond the Tigray alone.
Ultimately, they remained under his control. “The EPRDF, at least outside
Tigray, has never been able, or indeed has never been allowed, to develop
into an effective political organisation whose regional leadership could
exercise any autonomous authority, or represent the communities that they
governed”.[7] The change that Meles introduced was not so much this
subjugation, which still persisted, but how it was managed. While it was
once controlled by the leadership of the Front, it instead became completely
under the control of Meles. He changed the leaders whenever he wanted and
clipped the wings of anyone who looked as though they were gaining political
support.
The third pillar is the economy. The government effectively controls two
thirds of the “modern” economy – excluding the small holders in agriculture
-, via the remaining nationalised enterprises and the so-called
"para-statal" enterprises, because they are effectively the economic arm of
the Front. This means it controls the banks, insurance companies,
telecommunications, transport, industry, etc. It is the classical process
whereby the former revolutionary elite "turns into the ruling class through
the primitive accumulation of capital that is possible because of the very
fact of holding power.”[8] Political, business and even family roles are all
confused, even though they now respect a strict hierarchical order. And here
again, the last word goes to Meles himself, or Azeb Mesfin, whom he put in
charge of the largest "para-statal" conglomerate. Outside of this inner
circle of oligarch-leaders another, "private" oligarchy was formed, although
it can only operate within the orbit of a political "patron".
The second viewpoint arises from Ethiopia's diversity, being a patchwork of
“nations, nationalities and peoples”, as laid down in the Constitution. To
take this situation into account, a Federal State of ethnic groups was set
up, with power shared equitably between them, at least in theory. The
reality is something else. The “national question” still persists – in other
words, the inability of successive regimes to manage the diversity of
Ethiopia in an equitable manner. Having not been resolved for centuries,
this remains the major source of potential conflicts. It is the leaders from
the Tigrean minority - 6% of the population - who hold the reins of
political power. Both the police force and military command are entirely in
their hands. Holding political power means that they can be over-represented
in the state and para-statal economy, as well as in the so-called "private"
economy, thanks to the favours they benefit from.
To pass this ethnic bias, along with its growing authoritarianism, the
regime successfully played its only trump card – soaring economic growth.
One of the premiums is that the beneficiaries end up offering the regime
their political support, or at least moving from a position of opposition to
one of neutrality, thus providing it with the social basis it needs to
sustain its durability. The stratification of social "classes" – the third
angle from which to view this possible succession – has gained pace. A
middle class – those households that can provide for their own basic needs -
has effectively emerged, not just in the urban areas, but also in the rural
areas where a process of “kulakisation" is patently operating.
What could happen if the cornerstone of this whole edifice were to disappear
? Would everything come tumbling down, like a house of cards, as the
opposition websites predict and hope for? Or, on the contrary, as one
diplomat in Addis-Ababa points out, has the “the structure” demonstrated
that it does not rest on the shoulders of one single man, since it is
continuing to function without any obvious hiccups or crises?[9] But is
this just a matter of its momentum? And in reality or just appearance? For
the long term or just temporarily?
If Meles is out of the game, it is obviously in the best interest of the
TPLF to take the initiative by putting forward a solution for his
replacement as quickly as possible so as to keep its hold on power. Also,
because Meles cleared away any possible contenders from his entourage, there
is no obvious, strong candidate who could step in at short notice. “He will
be leaving very big boots that cannot be filled by anyone else,” according
to one of the founders of the Front, now a member of the opposition.[10] The
solution could therefore consist of entrusting formal power to the Deputy
Prime Minister, Hailemariam Dessalegn, who is from the South or somebody
else with the same profile, while the effective power, at least for the time
being, would be in the hands of a collective leadership at the top the
Front, the army and the security services playing a key role in its
composition and in decision-making. And since the Constitution stipulates
that the Prime Minister has to be a member of parliament from the majority
party or coalition, the Front could propose that one of the members of this
collective be ultimately elected to the newly vacant post, which would give
a window dressing of legality to the succession.
But the TPLF itself is anything but homogeneous. The first fissure comes
from the individuals concerned. Even if the major figures excluded from
power in 2001 no longer seem likely to be able to make a reappearance,
regardless of their historical calibre, other leaders who were once in the
forefront, only to be sidelined recently, might wish to make their
come-back, notably by advocating the restoration of the pre-eminence of the
Front. They would naturally meet with resistance from those who have
recently been promoted. But how strong would the latter be, given that they
owe their position to the whims of Meles? Those most often cited as being in
control now include: Behrane Gebre-Kristos, the diplomat, and Neway Gebreab,
the economist, advisers to Meles; Samora Yunus, commander in chief of the
armed forces; Getachew Assefa, head of the security apparatus; Abay Woldu,
chief of the Tigray region. Only the latter is a member of the Executive
Committee, and only two of the four others sit on the 45-members Central
Committee.
The second fissure is geographical. At the TPLF congress before the last,
the majority of voters outside of Tigray supported Meles, while those from
Tigray itself backed Arkebe Equbay, the former mayor of Addis Ababa, who
ended up winning the most votes. He withdrew spontaneously. Since then he
has been relegated to the Central Committee and holds no other
responsibilities at all. In addition, the over-representation of leaders
hailing from Meles' home town of Adwa, causes considerable gnashing of
teeth.
Last, but not least, the TPLF itself is criss-crossed by political
divisions, which is totally logical, given that simply belonging to the same
ethnic group does not mean automatically sharing the same political views.
These divisions are themselves centred around three points. What position
should be adopted vis-à-vis Eritrea, with which Ethiopia has been neither at
war nor peace since 2002? When Meles decided to put a stop to the victorious
offensive of the Ethiopian army in Eritrea (2000) and signed the Alger
agreements which brought the war to an end, a number of Tigrean leaders felt
these decisions showed an inexcusable weakness. And which economic model
should be followed, or, in other words, how far to go in creating a free
market and what should be the place of the public and para-public sectors?
But the main point is the Tigrean stranglehold. “Hard liners” still feel
that 17 years of bloody and exhausting armed struggle against the Mengistu
regime gives them an undisputed right to govern, and that this legitimacy is
irrevocable, because it is more deserving than any that could be claimed by
an alternative force emerging through the ballot box.[11] At the other
extreme, a “realist” wing feels that maintaining this stranglehold can only
end in disaster, and that a more equitable form of power sharing, that would
still allow most of the acquired positions and interests, would be worth a
lot more than trying to hold out indefinitely and risk losing everything.
Supposing that the TPLF reaches an agreement on a mode of succession – both
a mechanism and a person - it will be obliged to get it endorsed by the
three other factions within the EPRDF. Two should logically be most vocal in
their attempt to seize this opportunity to try to shift the balance of power
in their favour. First, there are the Oromos, subjugated during the imperial
conquests, then practically colonised until Haïle Selasse was overthrown,
and now permeated by an increasingly marked sense of identity, that the
regime has dubbed “narrow nationalism” and that poses the greatest threat
to it. Then there are the Amharas. This was the dominant ethnic group during
the entire imperial era. It is within this group that the most vigorous
opposition to ethnic federalism is to be found, alongside the hope of
re-establishing a form of “Ethiopianism” that transcends ethnic diversity.
The regime made it pay a high price for its former domination and has
disqualified its aspirations as “chauvinist” and “vindictive”.
But what cards do these two factions hold in the succession stakes? The
intrinsic weight of the two parties representing these two ethnic groups has
been reduced considerably by the hold the TPLF has over them, at least up
until now, depriving them of any significant claim to be truly
representative.
So the edifice of power is completely turned in on itself in all sectors.
But this brings with it the risk that, if there is indeed a battle for
succession, the long stifled, but well-founded demands and aspirations will
bubble over if they are not taken into account. The regime was so aware of
this risk that its worst fear – that the "Arab Spring” would spread – led
them to crack down even further on any dissenting voices.
But the first concern of tens of millions of Ethiopians when they get up in
the morning is whether or not they will have enough to eat that day. They
are frightened of the disturbances and insecurity, not to say the chaos that
could follow. Their very survival would be at stake. Also, after centuries
of subjugation, they still see it as inconceivable that they could have any
say in politics, especially at the top: “The King who rules is my King”, as
the saying goes.
This alienation is attenuated and even disappears altogether as one enters
the new middle class. But this class is not homogeneous and is divided by
contradictory attitudes – between frustration and satisfaction, desire and
fear of change. It knows that its rise is precarious, and to a great extent
is dependent on economic growth that any kind of "disorder" could wipe out.
Some feel proud of the country’s economic progress or Meles’ standing on the
international scene, but others – and sometimes they are the same people –
are hoping for radical changes. The arrogance, authoritarianism and
omnipresence of the regime are increasingly being rejected, as this kind of
behaviour could in particular put a stop to their socioeconomic ascension.
Particularly hard to swallow is the regime’s obsession with control, which
leads to the self-appointed and permanent right to intrude on daily life, as
well as the allegiance they have to constantly show, and the almost forced
membership of the party – that now has some five million members – if they
want to protect themselves or improve their prospects. In the eyes of their
critics, these constraints are a heritage of an age-old archaic Ethiopia
that they are sorry about, whereas its democratisation would be a major
proof of its entry into the modern world.
This spirit of non-compliance that is running through part of this middle
class is fuelling the same kind of hitherto stifled discontent that, as we
have seen in so many other countries, can be a major lever to bring down
authoritarian regimes. But it is being undermined by two major handicaps.
The “civil society” has absolutely no autonomy. Its only organisations are
those that remain within the party orbit, as it does not tolerate that
independent organisations assert themselves. And while there are widespread
hopes for a change, the barrier of fear soon begins to loom. The spectre of
the repression that followed the 2005 elections – almost 200 dead, 30,000
arrested and deported - still haunts peoples' minds. Everyone knows that the
regime would not hesitate in the least to do it again, hence the question
being asked by several dissenters, “who will dare to be the first to go and
get himself killed?"
Does this mean to say that any possible succession process could only go on
behind closed doors within the circles of power? This is likely, unless they
move into an acute and open state of crisis, in other words acted out in
public. In this case, the precedent of the 2005 elections should be borne in
mind, when the regime lifted the lid off the cauldron. No one could have
predicted the scale of the burst of popular reaction that this slackness
would allow, leading to the opposition breakthrough.
One final remark: this analysis does not mention the parliamentary
opposition or the international community. The former has been wiped out, as
evident by the single seat it holds in a house with 537 members. It does not
seem to have the wherewithal to influence the power play for succession. The
latter will be kept out of the way, as the Ethiopian leaders are too
haughtily nationalistic to accept the least interference in their affairs.
Even so, what is at stake is no mean affair.[12] It not only concerns the
second most highly populated country in Africa – with 86 million inhabitants
– but also a Horn of Africa that is in the midst of turmoil. Somalia is the
archetype of the “failed state” and a battleground against one branch of Al
Quaida and the Sudan and the brand new South Sudan have a very long way to
go before they manage to live side by side. At the very heart of the Horn,
Ethiopia is by far the dominant power, and a very reliable western ally in
the fight against radical Islam. At least up to now, compared to its
neighbours, it is a haven of stability.
The TPLF has never envisaged any form of power-sharing compromise.[13] Not
during the 1991 conference which gathered opposition forces to organize the
post Mengistu regime, nor after the 2005 elections, when the opposition had
nevertheless suggested it, nor at any other moment up to now. The
possibility of Meles’ succession offers a new opportunity. Will the Front
seize it? Many Ethiopians would like to see it, many also fear the risks it
would involve, and few expect it to happen.
_____
[1] VOA and AFP, 19 July 2012.
[2] BBC, 1 August 2012.
[3] See
http://open.salon.com/blog/almariam/2012/07/29/ethiopia_in_constitutional_cr
ises
[4] It reached 39% in November 2011, 50% for food (Reuters, 11 December
2011).
[5] Respectively, Aalen, L. & K. Tronvoll 2009. ‘The end of democracy?
Curtailing political and civil rights in Ethiopia’, and Clapham, C. 2009.
‘Post-war Ethiopia: the trajectories of crisis’, Review of African Political
Economy 36, 120.
[6] See, especially, William Davison, CSM, ‘Will Ethiopia crackdown stir
Islamist backlash?’, 28 July 2012.
[7] Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis, Christopher Clapham, 2005,
<
http://www.african.cam.ac.uk/people/registry/subjectlist/clapham.html>
http://www.african.cam.ac.uk/people/registry/subjectlist/clapham.html
[8] Jean-François Bayart, 2008, Le concept de situation thermidorienne:
régimes néo-révolutionnaires et libéralisation économique, Question de
recherche.
[9] AFP, 20 July 2012. But appearances can be deceptive… During the 2001
crisis, the central committee of the TPLF sat night and day for a month
without anyone outside knowing about it
[10] The Economist, 4 August 2012.
[11] Following the opposition breakthrough in 2005, some Tigrean high-level
officials told the author that “if the opposition wants power, let them
start to make as many sacrifices as those we have had to endure».
[12] Bizarrely, the disappearance of Meles has so far hardly been mentioned
in the international media.
[13] It is highly significant that the concept of compromise does not exist
in Tigrinya, or in Amharic, the country’s official language.
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Received on Thu Aug 09 2012 - 14:43:17 EDT
