Somalia: Obstacles to Progress - Somalia's Fault Lines
By Abukar Arman, 8 August 2012
Analysis
Somalia's post-transition government will face an array of complex
challenges in reforming the country.
Somalis have largely been disillusioned with the various governments that
have ruled over them for the past few decades. If the new post-transitional
government is to break this mould, it must craft a viable strategy of
reforming the function of the government and transforming Somali society
politically, socially, and economically.
Transformation is not a random act. It is driven by vision, specific goals
and objectives articulated and implemented by transformational leaders. It
is by no means an easy task, nor is it one without serious obstacles and
threats. Transforming Somali society may be particularly precarious given
the number of dangerous fault-lines that run through Somalia's political
crust. Some of these are outlined below.
The blinding effect of clan-centrism
Though things have been getting better, it is no secret that ideologies of
clanism continue to fuel Somalia's political machine. Politics is often seen
as a vicious zero-sum game in which another's gain is one's own loss and
vice versa. There is a mentality that, regardless of how abundant resources
are, others should always be kept in an inferior position. In recent years,
groups have been carving and re-carving out their own clan-based fiefdoms,
setting the stage for perennial zero-sum conflicts over power and resources.
This attitude, which gained prominence in post-civil war Somalia, is summed
up well by the following fable: Satan visits a villager and says "I come to
offer you a gift. Ask me anything and I shall give it to you on the
condition that I will give your neighbour double of the same request".
Knowing his neighbour is from another clan, the villager thinks for a
second, then answers, "Here, poke one of my eyes out".
A self-defeating frame of mind
The growing attitude in certain circles is that the official end of
Somalia's transitional period on August 20 will be xiligii kala guurka
('time to part-ways'), ought to be a matter of concern. In a clearly
coordinated effort to inculcate a certain attitude of apathy toward
nationhood and de-synthesise certain nationalistic sensitivities, xiligii
kala guurka became the motto of a number of politicians and media groups.
Make no mistake, language matters, especially in politics.
Influence of external actors
Front-line states such as Ethiopia and Kenya have security-related concerns
in Somalia, and their political intentions are often thinly veiled. States
who use their organised military machines, intelligence services, and
individual political actors to advance their own strategic or proxy
geopolitical objectives could make life difficult for Somalia's leaders.
Command and control challenges
The Somali National Army is being rebuilt without much urgency, due to
(among other things) lack of resources, friendly militia groups such Ahlu
Sunnah Wal Jama'ah (ASWJ), the Ras Kamboni, Azania, while several others
exist and operate outside the official central command. The proliferation of
small arms in Somalia means that some of these militia groups are
well-equipped and are better funded than Somalia's national army. A number
of these groups have signed deals with the transitional government but
should any of these groups decide that it is not in their interest to side
with the government, they might become a destabilising factor.
Private security contractors
A significant proportion of the fighting in Somalia has been contracted out
to transnational, often American or South African, security firms. Companies
such as Bancroft Security Development (US) and Saracen International (South
Africa) are employed by the US government to train Somalia troops on the
frontline. Such companies insist that their employees are not mercenaries
but consultants and advisors. However, their involvement is far from
transparent. Lack of transparency and anonymity of personnel combine to make
such private security companies hard to regulate and control. The cases of
Sierra Leone and Angola have demonstrated that these kinds of contractors
can operate with great impunity while they engage in various outlawed
operations such as arms trafficking and acting as a proxy war machine in
favour of one domestic contender or another.
US drone attacks
The use of drones to kill high-ranking al-Shabaab targets has increased in
recent years. US President Barack Obama has been described as "a true
believer in drones" and strikes look set to continue. Drone attacks not only
hit targets, but can kill, maim, and terrorise local villagers. This could
set the stage for what could be called Drone War Syndrome that would
galvanise public outrage both toward the US and the government, not to
mention provide significant propaganda ammunition to the Islamist militant
group al-Shabaab.
Influence of the "ghost lords"
"Ghost lords" refers to certain elements of the NGO and international
community involved in Somalia who are motivated by their own agendas. These
groups are determined to see an entity they routinely refer to as "South
Central Somalia" - i.e. Somalia minus the regions of Puntland and Somaliland
- adopt its own constitution, hence ending Somali unity.
Recently, Ambassador Augustine Mahiga, the UN Special Representative to
Somalia wrote in a letter to the Somali people that "the adoption of the
provisional constitution will indeed be a watershed". But crucially, Mahiga
failed to mention that the constitution will not unequivocally delineate the
territorial boundaries of Somalia. This leaves open the possibility of the
balkanisation of Somalia.
Somalia already has a democratic constitution that was ratified in 1961.
However, those arguing that a new constitution is unnecessary run the risk
of being labelled a 'spoilers' of the peace process and having their assets
frozen. It is worth mentioning that there are also those within Somalia who
are pushing for the new constitution including some regional and national
politicians with myopic interests who joined the bandwagon for political
expediency.
Domestic profiteers and corporate freeloaders
Domestic profiteers are those who, through their fluid businesses or NGOs,
have callously benefited from the status quo and lawlessness of the past two
decades. Corporate freeloaders are those running unregulated business
conglomerates which grew exponentially in the past two decades. Business can
thrive but it will need to be taxed properly if it is to benefit Somalis.
This is a significant challenge.
The Lower Juba enigma
Adding a layer of complexity to the matter in what seems like a haphazard
effort to disturb the transition in this final period, representatives from
several interest groups met and signed a document declaring what they
describe as a "new democratic regional administration within the federation
of Somalia". In theory, this call for greater autonomy for Jubaland should
allay Kenyan fears of al-Shabaab influence in the region. However, such
devolved power also hinders the progress of Somali unity.
Threat of religious conflict
The more Kenya continues its contentious involvement in Somalia, fighting
al-Shabaab and controversially occupying part of the Somali continental
shelf, the more likely it is to exacerbate the newly-ignited religious
sensitivities in Kenya. The recent attack by al-Shabaab on Christian
churches in Garissa were thankfully defused by the local Christian and
Muslim leadership who have a good relationship and used their instinct and
prudence to avoid an escalation of the situation. Muslim volunteers, for
example, were assigned to guard all the churches in Garissa to send a clear
message to the extremists.
Abukar Arman is Somali Special Envoy to the United States. Before his
current role, Arman was a widely published political analyst and a community
advocate. His focus is post civil-war Somalia, Islam, and US foreign policy
toward Africa and Middle East. Arman is also one of Ohio Humanities
Council's lecturers. Follow him on twitter _at_AbukarArman.
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Received on Wed Aug 08 2012 - 08:55:55 EDT
