The Emperor’s Ghost: How the Transformations in the Horn of Africa and Red
Sea Reflect, and Help Change, the Global Energy and Geopolitical Scene
By <
http://oilprice.com/contributors/Gregory-R.-Copley> Gregory R. Copley |
Sun, 29 July 2012 22:05 | 7
The Red Sea and Africa’s north-east move deeper
into an era of great change, with global ramifications as energy acquisition
patterns also transform, impacting the relative geopolitical centrality of
the region.
Ethiopians gathered quietly, on July 23, 2012, in larger numbers than in
recent years, and in more places around the world, as well as in Ethiopia,
and remembered the birthday of the late Emperor, Haile Selassie I, born 120
years earlier.
The manner of their gatherings, and the growing and open remembrance of the
“good times” of Ethiopian growth and prosperity in the Imperial period, were
strategically significant. They reflected the reality that change has now
begun in Ethiopia, and that there is less to fear from what had been the
growing xenophobia of the Tigrean-born Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, against
potential rivals and against the Amhara people from whom the late Emperor
had risen.
Has the Age of Meles Ended?
By July 23, 2012 — the Emperor’s birthday anniversary — it was clear to
those exchanging rumours in the Mercato in Addis Ababa that Meles Zenawi,
57, was either seriously ill, or perhaps even already dead. He had failed to
participate in the African Union (AU) summit in Addis, and to meet a
delegation from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Ethiopia’s most
important investor/trading partner.
Meles’ situation — regardless of how serious his health problems might be at
present — mirrors the problems of leadership elsewhere in the region: in
neighbouring Somaliland; in Yemen; and particularly in Eritrea, where Pres.
Isayas Afewerke is almost certainly in failing health, if not already dead
or incapacitated. The pattern of governmental “transitions” and power
vacuums and difficulties in these states, as well as in Egypt, Sudan, and
Somalia, has profound implications for the stability and security of the Red
Sea/Suez sea lanes, and for the region generally. As we discuss in this
report, the “unravelling” of the situations in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt,
in particular, was picking up pace by mid-2012.
By July 18, 2012, even Agence France Presse (AFP) had picked up reports from
“diplomatic sources” that Meles was in a “critical condition” in a Brussels
hospital, although one source confirmed that he was, at least, still alive.
Earlier in the week, Government spokesmen were saying that reports that
Meles was being treated at a Brussels hospital were “false and wrong”. By
July 20, 2012, the Government Communications Office said that Meles was in
good health and would be back at his post in a few days, but confirmed that
he “recently had a health problem that needed professional attention”.
The speculation — and it was only that — was that he was suffering from a
brain tumor; no official would confirm the nature of his illness. By July
18, 2012, as well, Deputy Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn confirmed at
least that Meles was ill, explaining Meles’ absence from his scheduled
chairmanship at a meeting in Addis of the New Partnership for African
Development (DEPAD) on July 14, 2012, and his scheduled AU leaders’ summit
on July 15, 2912.
The notably anti-Meles Ethiopian Review in early July 2012 commented:
“Ethiopia’s khat-addicted dictator Meles Zenawi has been diagnosed with
blood cancer and is receiving treatment at a Belgium hospital.”
His wife, Azeb Mesfin a member of Parliament and a key figure in the Tigré
People’s Liberation Front: TPLF), visited Brussels for one day to see her
husband in hospital. The former Foreign Minister (1991-2010) Seyoum Mesfin
(currently Ethiopian Ambassador to the PRC, but still a key figure in the
TPLF, which totally dominates the Government coalition, the Ethiopian
Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front: EPRDF) also visited him, before
returning to Addis Ababa. Seyoum is a strong contender to replace Meles.
There seems little doubt that Azeb Mesfin has been positioning herself to
succeed her husband, although possibly not — initially — with the title of
Prime Minister. Talk is that the Deputy Prime Minister, Hailemariam
Desalegn, would take over, at least for an interim period. But there is
little doubt that Azeb Mesfin (although with some Amhara family heritage of
her own) shares her husband’s anti- Amhara policies, or at least uses this
as a badge of legitimacy in the TPLF, which is also her only power base.
Clearly, her only lever in the power stakes would be to attempt to continue
the Tigrean (read TPLF) domination of the EPRDF and of Ethiopian life.
Here is where evidence is emerging of broad opposition to that, both within
the EPRDF’s non-Tigrean membership, and from within the broader Ethiopian
community, which has, until this point, been heavily constrained from
voicing any opposition to Meles’ policies.
Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s Muslim community has been engaging in a growing
fratricidal conflict, mainly between members of the moderate Ethiopian
Islamic community and those converted by the large injections of Saudi
funding to neo-salafist beliefs. These clashes grew to the point where riot
police intervened in recent (July 2012) clashes in Addis Ababa just before
and just after the AU summit in Addis. Foreign media reporting has indicated
that these protests have been about the marginalization of the growing
Muslim minority from governance. Deeper analysis how’s it is between the
imported and domestic strands of Islam, and between neo-salafist and
moderate strands, and the Meles Government has been supportive of the
imported, moderate brand. Saudi Arabia has, for the past few decades
funnelled billions of dollars worth of investment in Ethiopia, and also the
source of funding for a massive campaign of mosque-building, to facilitate
the proselytization of Saudi neo-salafist Wahhabism.
Ethiopian Muslims have protested against Government support for the Al
Ahbash sect of Islam, which is ostensibly apolitical. Al Ahbash is also
known as the Association of Islamic Charitable Projects, a Sufi movement,
following the teachings of Ethiopian religious scholar Abdulla al-Harari. It
is possible that the Government supported Al Ahbash to counterbalance the
influence of imported Saudi Wahhabism.
But what is important is that the dissent by Ethiopian Muslims for or
against imported strands of Islam, but in any event protesting against the
Government, as well as the open support being shown for the memory of the
late Emperor (and therefore, by definition, backing off from the hostility
toward the Amhara ethnic group, and from the suppression of the Oromo
peoples), are symptomatic of the reality that Meles and the TPLF have been
unable to sustain the tightness of their grip on Ethiopia in recent months.
Meles’ health condition — for some months a matter of speculation — may well
have been at the root of the Administration’s declining ability to sustain
its control.
There have been other, small, indicators, as well, such as the defection of
the driver of Meles’ wife, Azeb Mesfin, who reportedly disappeared on about
July 20, 2012, and apparently turned up in Rome. Why now? What spurred him
to make the break? Was it the fact that he heard about the impending
collapse of the Government, or the death or disability of Meles? And did
Azeb prompt him to make the move?
Azeb Mesfin herself received an Italian visa on July 18, 2012, and was in
Rome by July 19. It was reported on July 20, 2012, that Azeb had herself
left Ethiopia to escape from Sebhat Nega, a key TPLF official whom she
forced out of the party’s top leadership in 2009. She also had him removed
from his chairmanship of the multi-billion-dollar Endowment Fund for the
Rehabilitation of Tigré (EFFORT) around the same time. Sebhat Nega began
manoeuvring from about the first week in July 2012 to make a comeback as the
TPLF power. It was Sebhat who engineered Meles’ rise to power and he was the
second most powerful figure in the ruling party until he was humiliated and
removed by Azeb. Nonetheless, even though Sebhat has significant support
within the TPLF, he is not seen as a successor to Meles, but he appears to
have retained his influence and the loyalty of his supporters. And Sebhat
has been known to oppose Meles’ own choice of a successor, Berhane
Gebrekiristos.
This was perhaps one of the most significant pointers to the reality that
Meles Zenawi was no longer in power, or likely to recover (assuming he was
still alive). Indeed, it is also significant that his wife, Azeb, left Addis
the day before Meles reportedly returned to the capital (on July 20, 2012).
Meanwhile, Berhane Gebrekiristos and Teodros Adhanom, another close
confidante of Meles, were reportedly — by July 10, 2012 — named as acting
Prime Ministers of Ethiopia.
Clearly, then, the Age of Meles in Ethiopia has ended, or was ending by
early July 2012. More important now, is to calculate what this could mean to
Ethiopia and the region.
What has been significant, during this “interregnum”, however, has been the
reality that Eritrea quietly occupied the contested border area which
includes the city of Badme. Ethiopia and Eritrea had, in fact, agreed to the
ceding of this area in the Algiers Accord of 2002, but Meles had — even up
to May 2012 — refused to allow the transfer of the town to Eritrea. There
were valid reasons for this, but what was significant was that Eritrea —
which has its own leadership problems at present — had not challenged
Ethiopia on the matter until June-July 2012, when it seemed clear to Asmara
that Meles’ grip on power had loosened.
The Strategic Impact
Many factors on the regional and global stage have begun to coalesce. New
and fundamental questions must now be raised about whether the geo-strategic
importance of the core Middle East — the Arabian Peninsula and the seas to
the north, east, and south of it — has also begun to be transformed.
The changing of the guard in Ethiopia is just one watershed event. Meles’
apparent incapacitation came at a time when Eritrea’s Isayas was also
incapacitated (and, equally possibly, close to death), and at a time of
political transitions in Egypt and Yemen, and internal preoccupation in
Sudan (to the point of war with South Sudan). Indeed, it comes also at a
time when the Saudi Arabian leadership itself is contemplating generational
change.
At best, the end of the Meles and Isayas autocracies compounds the break of
the status quo of the past few decades in the Red Sea/Suez sea lane of
communication (SLOC), the broader Horn of Africa, and in Egypt itself. This
has profound implications for East-West trade, which depends on the SLOC;
transforming Egypt’s traditional hostility toward Ethiopia (which has
utilized Eritrea as a staging horse to isolate Ethiopia, so as to minimize
Ethiopian interference with the Blue Nile source waters); and opening up the
prospects for Israel to once again more safely project naval power down the
Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.
At the same time, however, the centrality to the global market of the oil
and gas exports from the region (and particularly the Arabian Peninsula and
Persian Gulf) has been declining. The question has to be asked as to whether
the Red Sea/Suez SLOC is as strategically critical as it was, say, two
decades ago? Certainly, in terms of ship movements and revenues to Egypt
(Suez Canal), it may have risen in direct, statistical terms. But is it as
critical in overall terms of strategic balance?
For the PRC and Japan, for example, while exports from the Persian Gulf
remain critical, these can bypass the Red Sea/Suez SLOC, and, increasingly,
the PRC is seeking overland oil and gas transfers from the Northern Tier
(Iran and the Caspian Basin), rather than via sea lanes. To some degree, for
Europe as well, pipelines are the dominant traffic lanes of the future,
rather than sea lanes. On the other hand, oil and gas from the Horn of
Africa itself — as well as from Yemen — is of growing importance, although
oil from South Sudan is being postured to go via new pipelines through Kenya
to the Indian Ocean, rather than allowing South Sudanese exports to continue
to be subject to Sudanese control. [The original pipelines went from what is
now South Sudan up to the Red Sea, through what is now Sudanese territory.
The Kenyan route itself is not without problems, given the potential for
instability and even secessionist activities taking place in Kenyan coastal
regions.]
Japan itself, now highly conscious of the vulnerability of its oil and gas
sea lanes through the Indian Ocean — as US influence declines (despite the
US’ “Pacific pivot”), and because of increased PRC activities to control the
chokepoints: the South China Sea sea-lanes, which link the Indian Ocean (and
therefore the Red Sea) to the Pacific and on to Japan. As a result, Japan is
seen as likely to increase its attempts to acquire Canadian oil and gas,
largely from the Alberta fields, especially since the US Barack Obama
Administration rejected (for the time being) plans for a pipeline from
Alberta down through to the US markets. But the Canadians are also now more
aware of, and ready to act on, the reality that an export market exists for
their oil outside of the US. Significantly, as the global energy pattern
changes, however, the US demand even for Canadian energy is seen as likely
to decline.
Ultimately, an Alberta-Vancouver pipeline may make sound sense to Canada, to
address the Asian markets, including Japan. And Japan might also find that
it can find energy supplies from the US fields in Alaska, given the fact
that the Alaska pipeline itself is under-utilized and facing real questions
as to its viability if demand for Alaskan energy from “the lower 48” states
declines further.
Such a move would instantly free Japan from the strategic uncertainty and
massive cost of importing oil and gas from the north-western Indian Ocean
(Persian Gulf), and give it short, secure sea-lines of communication with
North America. This becomes increasingly important as Japan decides whether
it can, politically, return to nuclear power generation or not.
Inherent in all this is the reality that US reliance on Middle Eastern
energy is declining, and declining rapidly.
In other words, fear and uncertainty over the security of Middle Eastern sea
lanes and choke points should be expected to be a driver in future energy
procurement decisions and trade, pushing energy companies to invest in the
recovery of oil and gas from less politically hostile regions. This could
well spur the US — particularly after this term of the Barack Obama
Administration — to redouble its efforts at recovering energy from its
newly-confirmed oil and gas reserves. Egypt itself could also well turn its
back on the Red Sea to some extent (although it will always be important to
Cairo because of Suez Canal revenues), if Ethiopia can reassure it on the
question of Blue Nile water flow, and if the offshore Mediterranean gas
fields can provide a major energy income from European clients.
Even within Europe, the new availability of energy resources from the
massive shale deposits, as well as the new Eastern Mediterranean gas fields
and the growing network of supplies emerging from Russia and the Caspian Sea
Basin, make the Middle East less critical as an energy resource. Clearly,
the Red Sea/Suez retains its importance as a trade sea route, but even that,
to an extent, is to be supplemented, if not challenged, over the coming
decades by internal overland connections within the Eurasian landmass: the
new Silk Route.
Has Arabia’s brief period in the geopolitical sun come, then, to its apogee?
All of this, then, could cause the PRC and India to become Ethiopia’s (and
South Sudan’s) most interested clients for energy, just as they have become
more important clients for energy from Iran, the Persian Gulf states, Sudan,
and West Africa.
It is unsurprising that the present Turkish Government has begun to exert
its renewed interest in the region, particularly by supporting Sudanese
Pres. Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir and attempting to court the Muslim Brothers
in Egypt. Turkey has reasserted its claim to have an historical interest in
the control of the Red Sea, based primarily on its earlier Ottoman dominance
of what is now Saudi Arabia. While this Turkish claim or posturing may
appear to be unsustainable to regional states, or outside observers, today,
it is nonetheless a factor in Turkish neo-Ottomanism, and is also linked to
Turkey’s grand strategic sense of rivalry with Iran (which also seeks to
assert an influence on the Red Sea and Horn of Africa).
Where does all of this leave Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Horn of Africa?
Significantly, one possibility could be — with the personality-driven
autocracies of Meles and Isayas drifting astern — that Ethiopia and Eritrea
resume their historical relationship, but in such a way that the various
elements of the “old empire” are given their due attention. This could see a
gradually coalescing confederation which would include Eritrea
(historically, the Bar Negus: Kingdom of the North), and Ethiopia, with
greater prominence given to the aspirations of its great regions, such as
Oromo- land, and the Somali regions, Tigré, the Amhara Plateau, and so on.
Nostalgia for the golden days of Emperor Haile Selassie I means that there
are elements of the historical interlinking cultures of the Ge’ez language
based peoples which still have a commonality.
By. Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs
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Received on Sun Jul 29 2012 - 07:58:37 EDT
