The struggle for security and against terrorism in Yemen: in whose
interests?
Helen Lackner <
http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/helen-lackner> , 23 July
2012
People perceive that cash and support are available for military and
security costs but not for development or humanitarian needs which affect
the vast majority of the population on a daily basis.
When Yemen features in the news, it is usually due to the supposed
activities in Yemen or outside of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP],
the group said to be a follower of Osama Bin Laden's similarly named
organisation. The most prominent such events have been the 2010 'underpants
bomber' who was trained in Yemen, the 2011 'cartridge' bombs which were sent
from Yemen and - most important for Yemenis - the occupation of a Southern
Governorate [Abyan] by AQAP and its associate Ansar al Shari'a between May
2011 and June 2012, when they were ousted.
AQAP and Ansar al Shari'a
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/struggle-for-security-and-agains
t-terrorism-in-yemen-in-whose-interests#_ftn1> [1]
While the first two of these events are of limited interest to the average
Yemeni, the presence of AQAP is one of the many security issues which
Yemenis have to face on a daily basis. Although AQAP had been present and
active in many remote parts of the country [Shabwa, Mareb and Abyan
Governorates] since the beginning of the century, this presence only became
a direct serious threat to the population in the last year when they
occupied all the major towns of Abyan as well as some in Shabwa. Although
earlier their presence had made it difficult for development and aid
agencies to operate, these occupations led to mass displacement of over
200,000 people who have taken refuge either with relatives in neighbouring
governorates [eg al Baidha] or moved to Aden where they settled in schools
and other facilities and became Internally Displaced Persons [IDPs]
recognised as such by UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies. These groups
were successfully ousted from their positions between May and mid-June 2012
after holding the area for a year.
How come this supposedly major threat was largely eliminated in such a short
time? To answer this it is also important to understand why and how these
groups were able to occupy towns in the first place. Collusion and support
from some elements of the former regime were clearly partly responsible: in
early 2011, at a time when the former ruler Ali Abdullah Saleh was under
pressure to resign, he was determined to demonstrate to his US allies the
truth of his claim that without him the country would descend into chaos and
be taken over by AQAP. Suddenly, the main government troops in the coastal
area of Abyan evacuated their bases, leaving weapons and ammunition behind
and accessible. Unsurprisingly, AQAP moved in and took over, installing a
form of fundamentalist rule which is clearly not to the taste of the
majority of the population, who showed their views of the new rulers by
voting with their feet and leaving en masse.
A year later, under a new regime determined to restore central government
control over all of Yemen, and to prove to its US and other allies that it
is actually serious in its efforts to put an end to the fundamentalist
threat, AQAP was ousted from Abyan and most of Shabwa within a matter of
weeks. This was as clear an indication as any that their ability to
'control' the area for a year was due to inertia [at best] of the previous
regime rather than either military strength or popular support.
In addition to State armed forces and US airstrikes, a major contributor to
the ousting of the fundamentalists came from the popular committees.
Composed mainly of men from the local tribes, they were given some support
by government in the form of ammunition for their weapons and stayed on the
ground to fight the fundamentalists, most of whom are either from other
parts of Yemen or foreigners. The role of the tribes is extremely important
and disproves the rash and widespread assumption that tribes support
fundamentalism
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/struggle-for-security-and-agains
t-terrorism-in-yemen-in-whose-interests#_ftn2> [2]. While being very
socially conservatively religious, Yemeni tribes people - the majority of
the country's population, estimated to number about 75% of the country's
population - are not supporters of fundamentalist political ideology. It is
worth noting that the areas in Abyan where Ansar attempted to rule according
to its ideology (Ja'ar and to a lesser extent Zinjibar) are areas where
tribes are a minority and the majority of the population are from the lower
status, cultivating but not landowning, social group.
While a major victory and indicator to all that this regime is different
from its predecessor, this victory has not come without a price:
- Over a hundred government soldiers were killed and wounded in the process
[including by landmines], and its immediate aftermath saw the assassination
in Aden of the military commander of the southern region, General Qatan, as
well as the attack in early July on the Police Academy in Sana'a which
killed about 9 people. More such attacks are to be expected from
individuals who have gone into hiding in the cities but have not given up
their ideology or objectives. In addition they certainly still have some
support in the military/security establishment.
- Fighting on the ground was accompanied by at least 66 US air strikes and
drone attacks in the first six months of 2012.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/struggle-for-security-and-agains
t-terrorism-in-yemen-in-whose-interests#_ftn3> [3] While these may have
contributed to military success, they are also a major cause of anger for
Yemenis throughout the country, but particularly among the rural population
who are most aware of frequent drone flights. Given that the majority of
these flights take place over the former PDRY, this is a further
contributory factor to the southern population's alienation from the regime.
- Despite considerable talk, very little aid has yet materialised to repair
the damage caused by the fighting whose towns have been practically reduced
to rubble. The collapse of buildings and of the physical and social
infrastructure, as well as the presence of landmines throughout the area,
are preventing the population from returning home and thus worsening their
already abysmal living conditions and increasing anger and frustration.
These are reducing people's confidence in the new regime which does not have
the funds to finance reconstruction and, at the same time, are ensuring that
Yemenis lose what little trust they had in the international community's
assertions of concern and support for Yemen's transition to a more
democratic and prosperous state.
The active involvement of the Group of 10 ambassadors, the UN Security
Council and its special representative are viewed with mixed feelings by the
majority of Yemenis: they welcomed international assistance and support to
get rid of Ali Abdullah Saleh (and, gradually, many of his relatives and
cronies). However, people note with dismay that cash is available for
military intervention against the terrorists but is not forthcoming when it
comes either to humanitarian aid (over 10 million Yemenis are currently food
insecure, one million children are going hungry, the UN's Consolidated
Appeal Process for humanitarian needs for 2012 is funded at less than 50% of
requirement), or for reconstruction or general development investment, let
alone basic running costs for social and developmental institutions. In
short, people perceive that cash and support are available for military and
security costs but not for development or humanitarian needs which affect
the vast majority of the population on a daily basis.
Many consider that Yemen is now in a state equivalent to an international
mandate, but that this has a primary security anti-terrorist focus, and
ignores the issues, including security issues, which the majority of the
poor population face on a daily basis. The postponement of the 'donor'
conference to September and the on-going assertions about the weakness of
the country's administration and absorptive capacity for aid are seen as
excuses for not providing the aid which is so desperately needed. The role
of the World Bank in leading development policies is also criticised by many
who believe it and the IMF are responsible for the cuts in food and other
subsidies, the introduction of so-called 'cost recovery' in health services
and the reduction of the role of the state in the provision of social
services.
People's security concerns
While AQAP is the major reason Yemen features in the western world's media,
as far as ordinary Yemenis are concerned, they are not the primary security
concern. For the last two decades life for people in Yemen has been marked
by inadequate policing and arbitrariness. People have suffered regular
hijackings and theft of vehicles on the roads, robberies in their homes,
theft of land as well as physical attacks with various weapons. Most
incidents have been completely ignored by the security institutions,
particularly those involving theft by powerful security and military
individuals of land belonging to farmers or even well-known families.
Appealing to the police for assistance in addressing crimes has routinely
resulted in requests for payments supposedly to cover transport and other
costs. Multiple comic and semi-comic anecdotes are witness to these
practises.
Since 2011 the level of insecurity and lawlessness has increased
dramatically throughout the country, alongside the return of open carrying
of arms. Car thefts, robberies, land thefts etc. have multiplied, as well
as attacks against people. As many security services staff also left their
posts - some joined the revolutionaries or the counter revolutionaries,
while others just stayed at home - this encouraged bandits and others to act
with more or less certainty of impunity. Worsening poverty and need have
been further incentives to resort to any means to survive, including crime.
For ordinary Yemenis, constant insecurity means that they cannot set off on
a trip to nearby towns, or leave home if living in towns without concern and
fear. They are liable to be confronted by bandits demanding their 'money or
their life', or to return home and find it has been robbed. In the past
year there has been no authority or institution able or willing to address
these concerns.
Women
In addition to the problems just mentioned, women have further fears. In a
very strictly sex-segregated society, their movements have become
increasingly restricted due to the risks involved in being outdoors as they
are liable to attacks, verbal and physical. The lawlessness which involves
the possible presence of unknown men in rural areas and urban neighbourhoods
is a major risk for women who are liable to violent sanction if they are
seen to interact with strangers. Worsening deprivation means that many women
have to take these additional risks by seeking food and income outside the
home to feed their children and themselves.
While the uprisings of the last year have been a major contributor to the
empowerment of women, this 'occupy' movement has also had some serious
negative effects with respect to the safety and security of many
participating women. While there have not been the type of collective rape
incidents associated with Tahrir Square in Cairo, participating Yemeni women
have also been threatened and beaten when anti-female forces have had the
upper hand. Not only have they come under attack from the former
president's baltagia tribal militias, but among the revolutionaries there
have been ambiguous attitudes to women's participation. When it served the
various parties' purposes, women have been encouraged, and when women had
views differentiating them from the mainstream, they have been victimised,
attacked physically and verbally
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/struggle-for-security-and-agains
t-terrorism-in-yemen-in-whose-interests#_ftn4> [4].
Conclusion
So while the 'donors' are willing to give real and practical support in
interventions against AQAP, when it comes to increasing security for the
ordinary citizens and for women, the situation is different. Although it is
widely recognised that insecurity is closely related to poverty and
deprivation, as well as to the disempowerment of women, solving these
priority issues for the Yemeni people are currently spoken about, but none
of the urgently needed action is being taken. As Ramadan starts, Yemenis
are to face another month of deprivation, poverty and hunger. This is not a
good sign for the transition.
_____
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/struggle-for-security-and-agains
t-terrorism-in-yemen-in-whose-interests#_ftnref> [1] The term AQAP will be
used here generically to describe the various related armed and aggressive
fundamentalist groups attacking the regime and civilians; the actual
relationship between AQAP and Ansar al Shari'a is unclear; while some claim
it is the same organisation under different names, others believe them to be
different organisations.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/struggle-for-security-and-agains
t-terrorism-in-yemen-in-whose-interests#_ftnref> [2] Another example of this
is the intervention of tribal leaders in the liberation of 73 soldiers
captured by AQAP in Abyan in June. After weeks of fruitless 'negotiations'
with the government, the leaders of the tribes of the majority of the
prisoners came to Ja'ar and informed AQAP that they would attack with all
their forces unless the prisoners were released asap. The release came
within hours.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/struggle-for-security-and-agains
t-terrorism-in-yemen-in-whose-interests#_ftnref> [3] Bureau of Investigative
Journalism website:
<
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/05/08/yemen-reported-us-covert-ac
tion-2012/>
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/05/08/yemen-reported-us-covert-act
ion-2012/. There have been over 103 such attacks since the beginning of the
century and the monthly count in early 2012 was higher than in
Afghanistan/Pakistan
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/struggle-for-security-and-agains
t-terrorism-in-yemen-in-whose-interests#_ftnref> [4] For more analysis on
these aspects see Strong Voices, Yemeni Women's political participation from
protest to transition, Saferworld, London, May 2012, pp 19
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Received on Mon Jul 23 2012 - 18:41:27 EDT
