| Jan-Mar 09 | Apr-Jun 09 | Jul-Sept 09 | Oct-Dec 09 | Jan-May 10 | Jun-Dec 10 | Jan-May 11 | Jun-Dec 11 | Jan-May 12 |

[Dehai-WN] Eurasiareview.com: Syria: It's All Anybody's Guess - Analysis

From: Berhane Habtemariam <Berhane.Habtemariam_at_gmx.de_at_dehai.org>
Date: Sun, 22 Jul 2012 00:40:44 +0200

Syria: It's All Anybody's Guess - Analysis


By: IDN <http://www.eurasiareview.com/author/idn/>

July 21, 2012

By Jaya Ramachandran

Covert support for anti-regime fighters in Syria is likely to increase as
disillusionment with current diplomatic efforts grows, according to
knowledgeable sources. Although Saudi Arabia and Qatar have officially
denied reports that they have been supplying arms to rebel Free Syrian Army
(FSA) fighters, arms shipments from the Gulf, including anti-tank weapons,
reportedly increased significantly in June, says a new analysis.

But Western involvement is likely to be limited to support activities such
as intelligence gathering, coordination, training by special forces and the
supply of non-lethal equipment, avers UK-based Maplecroft in the analysis.
Such support will of course be extremely important to the anti-regime
forces.

Of significant concern, says the report, is the possibility of militant
Islamist groups acquiring weapons and increasingly sophisticated arms
reaching militants in neighbouring states such as Iraq and Lebanon. In fact,
this accounts in large part for the reluctance to arm anti-regime fighters.


Chemical and Biological weapons


Pointing to another important aspect of the situation in Syria, the report
says: "Although Pentagon officials stated on July 13 that there is little to
suggest that Syria's stockpiles of chemical weapons have become less secure,
contingency plans are likely to have been made to secure stockpiles if
necessary."

A case in point is that in May 2012, the U.S. alongside 18 other countries
participated in the Eager Lion military exercise in Jordan which included a
strong focus on securing chemical and biological weapons. "As the conflict
escalates, it cannot be altogether discounted that the regime will consider
using chemical weapons," according to the Maplecroft analysis.

It refers to the warning by former Syrian ambassador to Iraq, Nawaf Fares,
following his defection that the regime would likely be prepared to use its
chemical weapons if placed under greater pressure. "Whilst the comments may
have been largely intended to garner support for stronger international
action, the warning should not be ignored given Fares' familiarity with the
modus operandi of the regime," states the report.

"That said, the operational utility of deploying chemical weapons against an
insurgency would be limited - a fact that Bashar al-Assad is likely to be
aware of. In fact, it could backfire and accelerate the political fallout.

"Yet, as a reflection of its desperation, the regime may eventually use such
weapons in an effort to put down mass uprisings in restive towns. The regime
is nonetheless mindful that the use of chemical weapons would reflect Bashar
al-Assad's desperation and may remove Russian and Chinese opposition to
stronger action."


Impact of Damascus Attack


The analysis examines the impact of the attack against the national security
building in Damascus - which killed several senior officials on July 18 - on
the conflict between supporters of the regime and the armed opposition.

Though the circumstances of the attack are unclear, the impact will be
significant, says the analysis. It explains: In view of both the rebel FSA
and Jihadist Group 'The Brigade Of Islam' having claimed responsibility for
the attack, the upper echelons of the regime are likely to be alarmed that
one or several assailants were able to target key political figures.
Significantly, Defence Minister Dawoud Rajah and President Bashar al-Assad's
brother-in-law and deputy head of the armed forces, Assef Shawkat, both
died.

While it has long been evident that Assad is unable to put an end to the
uprising, the direct attack targeting the core of the regime could spark
mass defections by key civilian and military officials, says an analysis by
Maplecroft. "The attack has also landed a major strategic blow to the
government given the death of key figures in the security establishment. The
response is nonetheless likely to be severe with casualties likely to
spike," says the UK-based company in a new report.

It points out that fighting in central Damascus, which began on July 16,
highlights that opposition fighters continue to place regime forces under
pressure. However, the Syrian army's increasing deployment of artillery and
helicopter gunships underscores that the regime is prepared to escalate its
use of force concurrently with the armed opposition's improving
capabilities, the report adds.

Acknowledging that ongoing skirmishes in the city suggest that anti-regime
forces are gaining momentum, the report considers a swift military victory
for the rebels in the short term unlikely. "The regime will almost certainly
concentrate its forces in the capital and heavier fighting is likely to
ensue as a result."

By declaring a major battle for Damascus, says the report, the armed
opposition risks reversing the growing sentiment that it is gaining momentum
if regime forces are able to quickly defeat the rebels in the capital or
force a retreat. "However, if anti-regime forces can maintain pressure on
the regime in the capital over the next weeks, support for the regime is
likely to erode further with defections also likely to accelerate
significantly," predicts the report.

Although there have been renewed calls from Western leaders for both sides
to work towards a political solution, the failure of the UN-backed Kofi
Annan peace plan highlights that the Syrian regime remains determined to
hold onto power through the use of force. It is clearly not interested in an
externally-brokered political solution.

Similarly, there has been no support amongst opposition groups and forces
for a transition which would preserve the current power structure even if
President Bashar al-Assad were to step down as part of such an agreement.


Opposition Rejects Ba'athist regime elements


The report says: "Given the degree of force employed by the regime,
proposals allowing the upper echelons of the Ba'athist regime to retain
representation in a new government are unlikely to materialise. As a result,
fighting between regime forces and armed opposition groups will continue
with the likelihood of massacres rising as the regime increasingly relies on
heavy fire-power to suppress the insurgency."

The Maplcroft expects the intensity of the conflict to increase - especially
as anti-regime forces become better armed - but does not see any portents
that either side will be able to gain a decisive victory through the use of
force alone in the short term.

"Hollow concessions aside, the regime's primary approach has been to
escalate the use of force in an attempt to subdue the opposition. On a
strategic level, it is evident that the violent crackdown has failed to
break the will of the opposition as strong-armed resistance continues," says
the report adding: "At the tactical level, the regime retains the advantage
although not to the extent that it is able to deal a decisive blow to the
armed opposition led by the FSA. Furthermore, government control over the
country's periphery - especially in the north - is waning."

On the contrary, while the armed opposition has registered a degree of
success at the tactical level, it is far from being able to dislodge the
regime through force alone. Even with improved accesses to anti-tank
weapons, anti-regime fighters are likely to avoid major open engagements
with the Syrian army and instead focus on ambushes and operations aimed at
wearing down state forces or capturing weapons and ammunition.

Improved access to anti-tank weapons could nonetheless significantly improve
the FSA's defensive capabilities and could allow it greater operational
freedom as a result, says the analysis.

The report is of the view that external pressure on the Ba'athist regime is
increasing, but it considers decisive action such as military intervention
or the establishment of an enforced humanitarian corridor "unlikely in the
short term despite the limited impact of diplomatic efforts and sanctions so
far."

It adds: "Staunch opposition from Russia and China to stronger action
remains the main stumbling block although the appetite for military
intervention amongst Western leaders is also low. Significantly, given the
Obama administration's focus on reaching an agreement with Iran over its
nuclear programme through the 5+1 group, any form of involvement in the
conflict which could significantly worsen relations with Russia is likely to
be avoided.

"The US presidential election in November is also an important factor as the
current administration will want to avoid becoming embroiled in the conflict
as the race for the U.S. presidency gathers pace."

 




      ------------[ Sent via the dehai-wn mailing list by dehai.org]--------------
Received on Sat Jul 21 2012 - 18:41:00 EDT
Dehai Admin
© Copyright DEHAI-Eritrea OnLine, 1993-2012
All rights reserved