<
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/18/oh_brother> Oh, Brother
Why Egypt's new Islamist president is keeping the Saudis up at night.
BY STEVEN MILLER |
JULY 20, 2012
Mohamed Morsy's young presidency in Egypt hasn't started all that smoothly.
It's largely been characterized by a series of standoffs with the Egyptian
military, including this week's
<
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2012/07/17/squabbles_i
n_egypt_court_ahead_of_key_ruling/> controversial court case on the legality
of an assembly tasked with drafting the country's new constitution. But
Morsy is also performing a less publicized high-wire act in trying to court
vital benefactors in the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. How this
endeavor plays out could prove just as consequential for his political
survival.
Since Morsy became president last month and resigned from the Muslim
Brotherhood, he has worked hard to ease tensions with jittery Gulf
countries. Dubai's police chief has been
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/27/net-us-uae-brotherhood-twitter-id
USBRE82Q17H20120327> warning Gulf leaders since March that local Brotherhood
cells "want to stir the streets" against them, but Morsy's real challenge is
to reassure a visibly nervous Saudi Arabia, which lost its key ally Hosni
Mubarak to Egypt's popular uprising. In an effort to secure Saudi aid, Morsy
has done all the right things:
<
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i_Xrvx3rzRQkp0U-w8Drk8ex
UURw?docId=CNG.b427100ac45d92b76358ffa0029eb52a.321> pledging not to export
Egypt's revolution,
<
http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/20120710/Con20120710516349.htm>
describing the Gulf countries' security as a "red line" that should not be
crossed, and
<
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303644004577520911170661298.h
tml> making the kingdom his first foreign destination as president last
week.
So far, Morsy's overtures appear to have placated the Saudis, who have
continued sending Egypt financial support. But while there are similarities
between the Brotherhood's ideology and Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi brand of Islam
-- both are Sunni, religiously zealous, and critical of Western influence in
Muslim countries -- it's safe to say that the Saudis
<
http://www.timesofisrael.com/for-saudi-arabia-better-a-secular-egyptian-pre
sident-than-a-religious-one/> preferred Egypt's old order.
As a Sunni Islamist who came to power through democratic elections, Morsy
challenges the autocratic system that Saudi Arabia's rulers have been
fighting tooth and nail to uphold. Just last year, the Saudis doled out
nearly
<
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/31/the_costs_of_counter_revo
lution_in_the_gcc> $130 billion in aid packages to their citizens to assuage
discontent. But they did not simply rely on cash to save themselves. The
kingdom's leaders also preempted planned "day of rage" protests in March
2011 by
<
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudis-mobilise-thousan
ds-of-troops-to-quell-growing-revolt-2232928.html> sending thousands of
troops to Shiite-majority provinces,
<
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/9422550.stm> locking down
the capital, and
<
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/03/14/how-stable-is-saudi-arabia/
preachers-of-hate-as-loyal-subjects> unleashing loyal clergy to threaten
potential protesters with violence.
Those measures brought some calm to Saudi Arabia, but not for long. Violent
protests <
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18768703> erupted
last week in the Eastern Province -- home to the country's oil and most of
its Shiite population -- after security forces shot and arrested prominent
Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr for instigating "sedition." With restless Shiite
citizens in the region already chafing at the state's discrimination, Saudi
authorities
<
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/10/sable_rattling_in_the_gul
f> poured gasoline on the fire when they
<
http://www.france24.com/en/20120709-saudi-arabia-shiite-sunni-qatif-cleric-
protests> fatally shot two men during the demonstrations. More than a week
later, crowds are still taking to the streets in protest and showing no
signs of letting up.
The Shiite question is just one of several reasons why the Saudis worry
about the future of Egypt. Long before Morsy's election, the Saudis were
nervous that Shiite Iran would exploit Egypt's transition. Although Egypt
and Iran severed diplomatic relations in 1980 because of Egypt's close
relationship with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and its signing of a peace
treaty with Israel, the two countries have
<
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/11/how-egypt-is-helpi
ng-iran-to-circumvent-sanctions/66557/> maintained economic ties. One
example is the <
http://www.midb.com.eg/main/english/home.asp> Misr Iran
Development Bank, a joint venture that was founded in 1975 and survived the
next 30 years of turmoil in the Egyptian-Iranian relationship. Today, U.S.
Treasury officials
<
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/8314513/UNDER-SECRETARY-LEV
EY-DISCUSSES-IRAN.html> suspect that Iran may use the bank as a means of
skirting international sanctions on its nuclear program.
Saudi anxieties only deepened in February when Egypt allowed Iranian naval
ships to
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/21/us-syria-iran-canal-idUSTRE81K09B
20120221> pass through the Suez Canal -- an act Mubarak's regime prohibited.
In May, Morsy <
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QkP-_H5fZRY> said that he
hoped to have "relations" with Iran during a televised interview with
Egypt's CBC network, though he was careful to not specify what type of
relationship he wants with Iran and to emphasize that the relationship would
not come at the expense of Gulf countries' security (Iran's Fars News Agency
later quoted Morsy as saying that he wanted to strengthen ties with Iran to
strike a strategic "balance" in the Middle East, in a
<
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/06/news-iran-agen
cys-morsi-interview-denied-death-sentences-for-drinking.html> purported
interview that Morsy vehemently denies giving).
In response to these growing concerns, the kingdom is doing what it always
does: throwing petrodollars at the problem. In June, the Saudis
<
http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE8570CW20120608> gave
Cairo $1.5 billion toward the state budget (the
<
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cedf3406-c92e-11e1-bcb4-00144feabdc0.html#ax
zz20ofOHXrC> Financial Times has reported that the Egyptian government
expects a budget deficit this year of 7.6 percent). The kingdom, which
currently
<
http://aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=686027&issueno=12280> funds
more than 2,300 projects in Egypt and maintains investments there that are
estimated to be worth anywhere from
<
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/50-increase-egypt-saudi-trade-volume-2
012> $12 billion to
<
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/14/226298.html> $27 billion, also
<
http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE8570CW20120608> provided
Cairo with a $750 million credit for Saudi oil imports, $230 million for a
range of water and agriculture projects, and $200 million for Egyptian
businesses.
These goodwill gestures come on the heels of an April spat in which the
Saudis arrested Egyptian lawyer Ahmed al-Gizawy on charges of
<
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/41564/Egypt/Politics-/ElGizawi
-accomplices-deny-Saudi-drug-charges.aspx> smuggling narcotics into the
kingdom, sparking large-scale protests near the Saudi embassy in Cairo. In
response, Riyadh quickly
<
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-29/saudi-arabia-delays-aid-delegation
-visit-to-egypt-masry-says.html> postponed negotiations over a $2.7 billion
aid package to Egypt, closed its embassy and consulates in the country, and
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/28/saudi-arabia-recalls-egypt-amba
ssador> recalled its ambassador.
For Egypt, which is battling an
<
http://www.almesryoon.com/permalink/8939.html> official unemployment rate
of around 12.6 percent, ending the dispute was critical. An estimated
<
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Jul-13/180432-mursi-mends
-fences-with-riyadh-on-first-official-trip-abroad.ashx#axzz20fBUlg4g> 1.6
million Egyptians work in the kingdom and provide important remittances to
their families back home -- the Central Bank of Egypt
<
http://www.egypt.iom.int/Doc/A%20Study%20on%20the%20Dynamics%20of%20the%20E
gyptian%20Diaspora%20%28English%29.pdf> estimated that these remittance
flows amounted to $785 million in 2006. And bilateral trade between the
countries reached a
<
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/50-increase-egypt-saudi-trade-volume-2
012> record $1.2 billion during the first quarter of 2012, with Egyptian
exports to Saudi Arabia totaling $528 million.
Eventually, the Saudis restored relations and agreed to deposit
<
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/05/10/egypt-secures-financial-aid-from-sa
udi-arabia/> $1 billion in Egypt's central bank and sign
<
http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news05101201.aspx> other financial
agreements, but not until a Brotherhood-led parliamentary delegation
traveled to Riyadh and
<
http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/brotherhood-goes-saudi> apologized
directly to King Abdullah. As for Gizawy, he remains in a Saudi prison and
is
<
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egyptian-lawyer-s-trial-begin-saudi-ar
abia-wednesday> slated to stand trial this Wednesday.
Amid all this, the Saudis remain deeply ambivalent about Morsy. Since his
election victory, Saudi and Saudi-owned pan-Arab news outlets have
<
http://alwatan.com.sa/Articles/Detail.aspx?ArticleID=11461> complained that
challenger Ahmed Shafiq's campaign was undermined by mistrust and
intimidation, and that Iran may be able to manipulate Morsy. They have also
<
http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=30128> questioned Morsy's
current affiliation with the Brotherhood, in light of his resignation from
the group after assuming the presidency, and one paper
<
http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=30181> speculated that he
might mishandle touchy foreign-policy issues such as clamping down on
"Tehran's support for local groups and attempts to spread the Shiite
ideology" in Egypt.
The Saudi-Brotherhood relationship has always been complicated. The Saudi
royals -- led by King Abdullah, who is formally known as the "Custodian of
the Two Holy Mosques" -- fancy themselves the leaders of the global Muslim
community, and rely on clerics to shore up their rule and command political
submission from their people.
The Brotherhood, by contrast, originated in Egypt as a response to Western
colonialism and decadence, which its founder, Hassan al-Banna, felt were
degrading Muslim societies. The Brotherhood relies on religious pretexts to
advance a populist political movement.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Saudis embraced their common ground with the
Brotherhood, encouraging
<
http://books.google.com/books?id=kSjgflRJPQoC&printsec=frontcover&source=gb
s_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false> thousands of its members to
emigrate from Egypt, Iraq, and Syria to the kingdom as a means of
counteracting Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arab socialist
advances. The Brothers quickly became
<
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saud/themes/backgrounder.pdf>
influential in Saudi society and particularly in the education system, where
they composed a large portion of the university faculty.
At first, the alliance was mutually beneficial, but Brotherhood activists
soon challenged the kingdom's political establishment. The most infamous
byproduct of Saudi exposure to the Brotherhood was Osama bin Laden himself,
who took inspiration from Palestinian Brother and jihadi theorist Abdullah
Azzam's lectures in Jeddah during the early 1980s. After the outbreak of the
first Gulf War in 1991, the Saudis suffered another Brotherhood-induced
headache from the Sahwa ("Awakening") clerics, a group of ultraconservative
Islamists who directly challenged the monarchy over the "infidel" U.S.
military presence on the Arabian Peninsula.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, the late Saudi Crown Prince Nayef blamed
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/19/prince-nayef-middle-eas
t-saudi-prince> all his country's problems on the Brotherhood. Those charges
only intensified in 2003 when bin Laden's foot soldiers carried out
<
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf>
attacks inside the kingdom for the first time. In the ensuing years, the
Saudis appeared to regain the upper hand in their
<
http://www.saudiembassy.net/files/PDF/Reports/Counterterrorism.pdf>
struggle <
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09883.pdf> to contain "deviant"
interpretations of Islam, breaking up local al Qaeda cells, arresting or
killing suspected militants, launching a "counter-radicalization" program,
and monitoring thousands of mosques, schools, and websites.
But the Arab uprisings that began last year reversed that momentum, toppling
several Saudi allies and heralding the rise of Brotherhood movements across
the Middle East. The Saudis reacted with immediate alarm. Following
Mubarak's overthrow, according to
<
http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/nayef%E2%80%99s-demise-relief-broth
ers> Egypt Independent, the Saudi government pulled all public school books
that mentioned Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna from circulation because
they incited "violence."
With this troubled Saudi-Brotherhood relationship hanging over his head,
Morsy is walking a delicate line with Riyadh. The Saudis are ambivalent
about his Islamist credentials, but they also want to thwart Iranian
aspirations in the Arab world. Their main goal now is to pull the new Egypt
into their sphere of influence.
Luckily for them, Morsy desperately needs Saudi money to repair Egypt's
economy and has virtually no choice but to accept the terms that come with
it. Unlike Iran, the Saudis are free to sell their oil. And for now, they
have Morsy exactly where they want him: over a barrel.
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Received on Sat Jul 21 2012 - 18:30:34 EDT
