Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition
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Middle East Report N°125 3 Jul 2012
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As messy as it has been and unfinished as it remains, Yemen’s transition
accomplished two critical goals: avoiding a potentially devastating civil
war and securing the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had
ruled the impoverished country for over three decades. It also cracked the
regime’s foundations, while making it possible to imagine new rules of the
game. Still, much remains in doubt, notably the scope and direction of
change. The nation essentially has witnessed a political game of musical
chairs, one elite faction swapping places with the other but remaining at
loggerheads. Important constituencies – northern Huthi, southern Hiraak,
some independent youth movements – feel excluded and view the transition
agreement with scepticism, if not distain. Al-Qaeda and other militants are
taking advantage of a security vacuum. Socio-economic needs remain unmet.
The new government must rapidly show tangible progress (security, economic,
political) to contain centrifugal forces pulling Yemen apart, while reaching
out to stakeholders and preparing the political environment for inclusive
national dialogue.
On 23 November 2011, following eleven months of popular protest, Saleh
signed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative and an accompanying set
of implementation mechanisms. Boiled down to its essentials, the GCC
initiative provided the former president domestic immunity from prosecution
in return for his stepping down. The UN-backed implementation document added
flesh to the bones, providing valuable details on the mechanics and
timetable of the transition roadmap.
The agreement outlined a two-phase process. In the first, Saleh delegated
powers to his vice president, Abdo Robo Mansour Hadi. Feuding politicians
then formed an opposition-led national consensus government with cabinet
portfolios split equally between the former ruling party, the General
People’s Congress (GPC), and the opposition bloc, the Joint Meeting Parties
(JMP). The president established a military committee tasked with reducing
tensions and divisions within the armed forces, which had split between pro-
and anti-Saleh factions during the uprising. Phase one ended with early
presidential elections, on 21 February 2012, in which Hadi was the
uncontested, consensus candidate.
In phase two, Hadi and the government are given two years to, among other
things, restructure the military-security apparatus, address issues of
transitional justice and launch an inclusive National Dialogue Conference
with the goal of revising the constitution before new elections in February
2014. It is a laudatory program, but also plainly an ambitious one. Already
the scorecard is mixed, as implementation has fallen short.
Indeed, although much has changed, a considerable amount remains the same.
Begin with the most important: the settlement failed to resolve the highly
personalised conflict between Saleh and his family on the one hand, and
General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, as well as, the powerful al-Ahmar family, on
the other. As both camps seek to protect their interests and undermine their
rivals, the contours of their struggle have changed but not its fundamental
nature or the identity of its protagonists. Likewise, the underlying
political economy of corruption has remained virtually untouched. The same
families retain control of most of the country’s resources while relying on
patronage networks and dominating decision-making in the government,
military and political parties.
For frustrated independent activists, the struggle at the top amounts to
little more than a political see-saw between two camps that have dominated
the country for some 33 years, a reshuffling of the political deck that has,
at the party level, hurt the GPC and helped the JMP. This has serious policy
implications. As politicians squabble in Sanaa, urgent national problems
await. Humanitarian conditions have worsened dramatically since the
uprising, with hunger and malnutrition levels growing at an alarming rate. A
year of political turmoil has resulted in severe shortages of basic
commodities; aggravated already high poverty and unemployment rates; and
brought economic activity to a virtual halt.
The army is still divided, with warring commanders escaping the president’s
full authority. Armed factions and tribal groups loyal to Saleh, Ali Mohsen
or the Al-Ahmars remain in the capital; elsewhere the situation is far
worse. The government’s writ over the periphery, already tenuous before the
uprising, has contracted sharply since. In the North, the Huthis have vastly
expanded their territorial control. In the South, the government must
contend with challenges from the Hiraak and its affiliated armed groups.
Most worrisome is the spread of Ansar Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law), a
murky mix of al-Qaeda militants and young local recruits, many of whom
appear motivated by economic rewards more than by ideological conviction.
The government, fighting alongside local popular committees, has recaptured
territories in the South, but the battle with al-Qaeda is far from over.
Yet, despite these multiple crises, partisan politics and jockeying for the
most part persists in the capital. Encumbered by infighting and lacking
capacity, the new government has yet to articulate or put forward a
political and economic vision for the transitional period. What is more, it
has done too little to bring in long-marginalised groups and is sticking to
a largely Sanaa-centric approach. Reformers are concerned that vested
interests in both the GPC and JMP are seeking to maintain a highly
centralised, corrupt state that favours northern tribal and Islamist
leaders, thus further deepening the divide with the rest of the country.
Securing Saleh’s peaceful exit from the presidency was hard enough;
implementing the remainder of the agreement will be harder still.
Neutralising potential spoilers – competing elites associated with the old
regime as well as the divided military/security apparatus – is a priority.
This cannot be done too abruptly or in a way that privileges one side over
the other, lest it trigger violent resistance from the losing side. Instead,
Hadi should gradually remove or rotate powerful commanders in a politically
even-handed fashion and end their control over individual army units, while
forcing them to demonstrate respect for the military chain of command under
the president and defence minister. In like manner, the influence of
powerful political parties and interest groups should be diluted in a way
that ensures no single one finds itself in a position to dominate the
transitional process. Equally important, the national dialogue needs to be
broadly inclusive, requiring immediate confidence-building measures and
continued outreach efforts toward sidelined groups: the youth, the Huthis
and the Hiraak.
Implementation also is suffering from its overall opaqueness. No one – not
the government, parliament, or military committee – has publicly kept score
so as to shed light on who is violating the agreement and how. Nor has Hadi
formed the interpretation committee, even though it is mandated by the
agreement, and even though it could usefully settle disputes over the
meaning of the initiative and its implementation mechanisms.
The political settlement has numerous flaws. It was an elite compromise that
excluded many original protesters as well as marginalised constituencies. It
failed to adequately address issues of justice, and it kept in power leaders
and parties at least partially responsible for the country’s woes. But, at a
minimum, it offers the chance for a different future. If politicians in
Sanaa fail to resolve, or at least contain, the ongoing elite confrontation
and move forward with an inclusive dialogue, the country risks experiencing
further violence and fragmentation. Yemen has long run away from critical
decisions. It should run no more.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Yemeni Armed Forces:
1. Respect and fully implement President Hadi’s and the defence minister’s
orders, notably regarding military rotations, retirements and appointments,
and return all military forces to their barracks as specified by the
agreement and by the military committee, unless ordered otherwise by the
defence minister.
To Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the al-Ahmar family and allies in Islah:
2. Remove all militias from urban areas as well as troops from areas
surrounding protest squares as mandated by the initiative and by order of
the military council.
In order to improve the political situation
To the Yemeni Government:
3. Ensure that existing laws, especially the civil service law, are
rigorously implemented during the transitional period.
4. Maintain distance during the transitional period from divisive political
figures such as former President Saleh, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Hamid
al-Ahmar.
To all Signatories and Supporters of the GCC Initiative and the
Implementation Mechanism:
5. Implement the agreement and notably the national dialogue without
preconditions and halt inflammatory press statements targeting political
adversaries.
To President Hadi:
6. Establish and empower immediately the interpretation committee as
mandated by the agreement.
7. Avoid to the extent possible regionally-based appointments and
communicate transparently with relevant stakeholders and the public on
issues pertaining to major civilian and military rotations, forced
retirements and appointments.
To the General People’s Congress Party (GPC):
8. Renovate the party, notably by
a) organising internal elections for a new leadership; and
b) reaching out to youth activists and empowering them within its
decision-making apparatus.
To the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP):
9. Minimise the role of divisive figures such as Hamid al-Ahmar and Ali
Mohsen al-Ahmar during the transitional period.
10. In the case of Islah, hold internal elections to renew party
leadership, allow new voices to be heard and intensify outreach to other
coalition members to ensure broad and adequate consultation on decisions
related to the transitional process and notably the national dialogue.
To President Saleh and his family:
11. Respect and honour Hadi’s orders and presidential authority fully.
12. Allow GPC internal reform by encouraging Hadi to head the party and
acquiescing in Saleh moving to an advisory role.
13. Support the spirit of the initiative by disengaging from politics and
assuming a less prominent role during the transitional period.
To Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Hamid al-Ahmar:
14. Support the spirit of the initiative and encourage reconciliation by
playing a less prominent role in the transitional period and, in the case of
Ali Mohsen, reaffirming unconditional commitment to retire from the military
by doing so when Hadi sees fit.
In order to ensure inclusion of marginalised groups
To the Government of Yemen:
15. Carry out confidence-building measures immediately to ensure meaningful
participation in the national dialogue of independent youth groups, Huthis
and the Hiraak, possibly to include, inter alia:
a) publicly apologising for injustices committed against the Huthis and the
Hiraak;
b) releasing all political prisoners;
c) increasing humanitarian assistance and access to internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in the North and in the Abyan and Aden governorates;
d) establishing and empowering a land dispute committee and/or employment
committee in the South to investigate and mediate longstanding grievances;
and
e) addressing issues of transitional justice and national reconciliation by
investigating acts of violence related to the 2011 uprising and compensating
victims, while assuring citizens that these issues will be further debated
and discussed during the national dialogue.
To non-signatories who reject the initiative including some independent
youth groups,
the Huthis and the Hiraak:
16. Participate in the preparatory stage of the national dialogue by
communicating with and eventually taking part in relevant
government-established committees.
17. Refrain from placing preconditions on the national dialogue and instead
present realistic requests aimed at improving the political environment;
In order to maximise international support for Yemen’s transition
To international actors supportive of the GCC Initiative and Implementation
Mechanisms (including the UN Special Envoy, Security Council, EU, GCC, IMF,
and World Bank, Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey and Japan):
18. Continue to support the Yemeni government’s efforts to implement the
agreement with technical, diplomatic and financial assistance and ensure the
UN maintains a leading role in facilitating national dialogue.
19. Avoid the reality or appearance of taking sides in local political
disputes, notably by:
a) expressing willingness to talk to all parties;
b) identifying and criticising openly any signatory that fails to honour the
agreement; and
c) promoting local oversight of implementation by pressing for establishment
of the interpretation committee and encouraging civil society and youth
organisations to assume an oversight role.
To the Government of Iran:
20. Support the UN-sponsored national dialogue to resolve longstanding
political challenges in Sadaa and the South and encourage the Huthis and the
Hiraak to participate.
Sanaa/Brussels, 3 July 2012
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Received on Tue Jul 03 2012 - 17:22:03 EDT
