It was hoped that the Arab Spring would bring freedom and democracy to the
Middle East and North Africa. However, continued unrest in Libya and Syria
points to a potentially bleaker future for the region.
By Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou for the ISN
13 June 2012
_____
The first phase of what has come to be known as the Arab Spring was, for all
intents and purposes, over by the summer of 2011. Six months after an
accelerated chain of events was set in motion from the Tunisian countryside,
state-society relations and political dynamics across the Middle East and
North African (MENA) region have been profoundly reordered. In quick
succession, well-established and solid political institutions were deposed
in Tunisia and Egypt followed a few months later by the overthrow of Libya's
Muammar Gaddafi and Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh. After years of political
repression and state brutality, fear had seemingly changed sides. Many
authoritarian states across the MENA region were now on the defensive and
looking for ways to avoid being the next regime to collapse under pressure
from popular uprisings.
While the opening months of the Arab Spring culminated in the overthrow of
leaders (who had collectively been in power for 125 years), what followed in
all countries was a period of political uncertainty. Widespread enthusiasm
for the democratic future of the MENA region was gradually replaced by
skepticism towards projects aimed at transforming societies and implementing
unprecedented political change. Yet hasty assessments of the political
future of a number of states often overlooked the complexity and
unpredictability of the transition from authoritarian regime to
fully-fledged democracy. Accordingly, as the revolution moment dissipated -
whether successfully in Tunisia, ambiguously in Egypt, violently in Libya,
or painstakingly in Yemen - the longer-term nature of the transformations
began taking shape.
As the hopeful Arab Spring gave way to the uncertain Arab Autumn, the
political dynamics of the MENA region were made increasingly complicated
after the stalled revolutions in Bahrain and Syria. The cycle of mass
uprisings leading to new power configurations that began in Tunisia began to
lose steam. In its place came the emergence of ad hoc opposition movements
that provided opportunities for increasingly lengthy regime push-back, most
notably in Syria. In doing so, the final outcome of the political unrest
that that continues to engulf two of the most volatile regions in the world
may have similarities with the Middle East's not-too-distant past.
Specifically, the Arab Spring is on its way to producing two power
transformations of lasting consequence: the Lebanonization of Syria and the
Iraqization of Libya.
Division and Disorder for Libya
Muammar Gaddafi's seven-month resistance against the National Transitional
Council and other actors sent an important message to the leaders of the
MENA countries. Whereas regimes leaderships witnessed the downfall of
Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak with a palpable
sense of political paralysis, Gaddafi demonstrated that resistance to
political change was an option. True to his self-style autocratic rule,
Gaddafi engaged in a violent and suicidal fight-to-the-finish which pitted
him against the vast majority of Libyans. As Gaddafi inevitably became a
figure of national hate, he provided Libya's opposition movement with a
center of gravity that propelled it forward in spite of poor organization
and external dependence. After his eventual downfall, he also stripped it of
a tangible common purpose. As a result, post-Gaddafi Libya continues to lack
a coherent project for societal and political rejuvenation.
Instead, Libya has entered a cycle akin in many ways to what Iraq has
experienced since the United States invaded the country in 2003 and the
subsequent death of Saddam Hussein - prolonged periods of social and ethnic
division and disorder. Even before the fall of Tripoli, the Libyan
opposition rested upon shaky foundations that were at best supported by the
overarching objective of removing Gaddafi from power. However, upon losing
the one element that provided the opposition with a sense of cohesiveness,
the various factions reverted to their atomized identities. Ironically, this
resulted in the perpetuation of a dynamic that Gaddafi had cultivated over
his four decades of rule - namely, the prevention of state-society
symbiosis.
Currently Libya is engulfed in a naked struggle for political power. Yet in
sharp contrast to Tunisia and (perhaps to a lesser extent) Egypt, the fight
for power in Libya is not being expressed through political parties or
structured civic movements. Instead, Libya is being divided along a complex
mixture of ethnic and regional lines. In addition to the reaffirmation of
tribal affinities, these include urban center affiliations (with at least
four key hubs: Misrata, Zentan, Benghazi, Tripoli), and wider regional
perspectives (Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania). When combined with the
influence of Islamist militants such as Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), Libya's political landscape emerges as having much in common with
the factions that dominated Iraq in the mid-2000s. Similarly, insecurity has
been on the rise in Libya due to the large number of weapons in circulation
throughout the country, the frustrated expectations of many revolutionaries
and the absence of a strong government. Accordingly, leadership was a
problem for Libya prior to the Arab Spring and remains so in the aftermath.
Syria's Violent Future
As Iraq's recent (and as-of-yet unresolved) period of political unrest is
being replayed in Libya, the violence and instability that plagued Lebanon
for most of the 1970s and 80s may come to pass as the future of Syria.
Misreading Gaddafi's - and indeed Ali Abdallah Saleh's - resistance as a
potential game changer Bashar Al Assad embarked upon fully-fledged conflict
with large segments of Syrian society. Integral to his attempts to safeguard
the Ba'athi regime he inherited from his father has been the full use of
Syria's well-organized internal security apparatus. And while it remains to
be seen whether Al Assad will survive the political upheaval, Syria is now a
state that needs to take into account that large sections of society have
been violently pitted against each other.
Accordingly, Syria is today beginning to experience a similar process of
societal fragmentation that was typically associated Lebanon for so many
years. Indeed, just as Lebanon had - in the aftermath of Syria's 1975
intervention - lapsed into state collapse, outside interference by regional
powers and intervention by international actors, Syria is currently
following a similar trajectory. Al Assad's full use of the instruments of
state power seems set to continue for the foreseeable future. As a result,
the ongoing political unrest is likely to engulf even greater numbers of the
Syrian population. Moreover, the Syrian crisis continues to impact upon the
geopolitical calculations of external actors as diverse as the United States
and the Arab League and overspills into neighboring states such as Turkey
and Lebanon.
An Uncertain Future
The social, economic and political problems that Libya and Syria continue to
face demonstrates that jury is still out on what shall be the final and
enduring legacy of the Arab Spring. It is encouraging that political
transformation is forging ahead peacefully and positively in the likes of
Tunisia and Morocco. However, it remains to be seen whether Egypt or Yemen
will make a similarly peaceful transition to democracy. By contrast, Libya
and Syria may offer an altogether different - and perhaps unexpected -
outcome of the Arab Spring. Transformation in both countries may result in
political and societal fragmentation associated with events from the Middle
East's not-so-distant past. If so, the Arab Spring's original promise of
better governance and political freedom may become a dim and distant memory.
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Received on Wed Jun 13 2012 - 11:00:54 EDT
