Kenya's 'Economic' Conflict with Al-Shabaab
Kenya's recent incursion into southern Somalia demonstrates that the world's
'most failed state' impacts upon the security dynamics of its neighbors.
By Edoardo Totolo
11 Jun 2012
_____
In October 2011, after the kidnapping of three tourists in Lamu and two aid
workers in the Dadaab refugee camps, Kenya took the unprecedented decision
to send troops to southern Somalia to fight a fundamentalist group with
links to al Qaida. Although there was no proof that Al Shabaab was directly
involved in the kidnappings, the incidents were utilized by the Kenyan
government to justify the intervention. Indeed, Nairobi did not act on its
own and coordinated its activities with the Somali and Ethiopian armies.
Moreover, Kenya's largest military operation since achieving independence
also received <
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15446110> logistical
assistance from France.
The incursion in Somali territory was not - as it initially appeared - an
improvised retaliation against the fundamentalist group. Although the
abductions put pressure on the government to take immediate action, a
<
http://allafrica.com/stories/201112180073.html> leaked US embassy cable
revealed that Kenyan officials met secretly with delegations from Ethiopia
and the United States to discuss the "
<
http://allafrica.com/stories/201112180073.html> Jubaland Initiative" at
least two years earlier. The plan envisages the creation of a separate state
in the <
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jubaland> Jubaland region of southern
Somalia. In doing so, the "Jubaland Initiative" would cut al Shabaab off
from the area bordering Kenya and stem the flow of migrants and illegal arms
thwarting into the country. The plan, however,
<
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Ethiopia+and+Kenya+differ+on+Somalia+
/-/1064/1067050/-/9cpkmez/-/> was opposed by Ethiopia, as the creation of an
autonomous administration in Jubaland could have fueled similar claims in
the Somali-dominated
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch-Archive/Detail/?i
d=110663&lng=en> Ogaden region in Ethiopian territory.
The limited resources and international support given to the operation have
changed the scope of a conflict that is underpinned by economic
considerations. Kenya does not have the capacity to install an autonomous
administration in Jubaland. Yet it is nevertheless determined to safeguard
its growing economic interests in the region. These include a major
infrastructural project with Ethiopia and South Sudan and control of the
port of Kismayu in southern Somalia. The most pressing need in the short
term, however, is the safeguarding of Kenya's lucrative tourism industry.
Economic Interests behind the Intervention
Although Kenya's economy has grown considerably since 2009 the short-term
economic outlook for the country remains fragile. Kenya's current account
deficit - the difference between the country's imports and exports - is one
of the highest in the world and currently accounts for 13% of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). This in turn contributed to the massive depreciation of the
Kenyan currency in 2011 and a parallel rise in inflation. Accordingly, when
the kidnappings in Lamu were perceived as a threat to Kenya's tourism
industry, the government quickly realized that it needed to preserve its
major source of foreign currency. Indeed, safeguarding Kenya's tourism
industry was as much about protecting a valuable source of income as it was
about protecting the whole economy from future shocks.
The strategic importance of Lamu is underscored by the
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17231889> $23bn infrastructural
project for a new port and an oil refinery as well as a pipeline, motorway
and railway linking the Lamu Port to South Sudan and Ethiopia (LAPSSET). The
Lamu port will be at least five times bigger than the one in Mombasa
(currently the largest in Kenya) and it will become the main outlet for
exporting of goods from East Africa and oil from South Sudan. Moreover,
since
<
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/2012326174456726672.html> new
oil deposits were found near Kenya's Lake Turkana - not to mention the
ongoing exploration for oil in the
<
http://en.ethiopianreporter.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2
392&Itemid=26> Ogaden region, the potential for Lamu to become a major oil
hub in East Africa is becoming increasingly apparent. Accordingly, the
presence of al-Shabaab in neighboring Somalia poses a significant threat to
the project.
The Somali port of Kismayo - around 200 kilometers north of the Kenyan
border - is also of geo-economic importance to Kenya. Accoring to the latest
United Nations Monitoring Report on Somalia and Eritrea (
<
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433> pdf) al Shabaab
generates
<
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/1101/Kenya-Somalia-l
ook-for-international-help-to-fight-Al-Shabab> half of its revenues through
this port. The UN estimates, for example, that the group makes between $35
and $50 million a year mostly through taxation at Kismayo. Yet of greater
significance to Kenya is that goods smuggled through the port of Kismayo
have weakened legitimate Kenyan businesses and reduced the capacity of the
government to collect customs revenues. Criminal activities such as the
trafficking of small arms, human beings and drugs have also reinforced
criminal networks and contributed to further destabilization across the
region.
Short-Term Consequences and Long-Term Scenarios
Arguably, the most positive - though unexpected - effect of Kenya's conflict
with al Shabaab has been a sharp reduction of ransom prices demanded by
Somali pirates. According to Kenyan
<
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate+News/Kenya+Somali+incursion+cu
ts+piracy+costs+in+Indian+Ocean/-/539550/1269660/-/ute9l/-/index.html>
shipping experts ransom prices have dropped by at least 50 percent since the
conflict started. It is also thought that ransom demands could drop even
further if al Shabaab loses its grip over southern Somalia. Although al
Shabaab is not directly involved in the business of piracy in the Horn of
Africa, it is believed that the group provides protection to pirates as well
as arms and logistical support.
Yet despite this seemingly unexpected success, the short term effects of
Kenya's incursion into southern Somalia have been far from positive. In
addition to provoking a series of retaliatory attacks in
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18257748> Nairobi and
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/31/us-kenya-explosion-idUSBRE82U0BC2
0120331> Mombasa, there has been an increase in arrivals at the Dadaab
refugee camps. Indeed, prior to the incursion the level of refugees arriving
at the camps was at an historical high. Last year, the region suffered its
worst
<
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/18/east-africa-drought-disaster-re
port> drought in sixty years.
Moreover, it is becoming evident that Kenya has neither a clear exit
strategy nor the financial capacity to continue the operation. In only six
months, the government has created a
<
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Somalia+war+leaves+Kenya+with+Sh12bn+Bud
get+gap+/-/539552/1387784/-/format/xhtml/item/1/-/jasc30z/-/index.html>
budget gap of over $150 millions. The decision of African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) to join the Kenyan forces has brought some fresh hope for
the stability of the mission. However, AMISOM seems intent on
<
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate+News/Kenya+Somali+incursion+cu
ts+piracy+costs+in+Indian+Ocean/-/539550/1269660/-/ute9l/-/index.html>
concluding operations as soon as possible. Indeed, it is uncertain whether
Kenya will be able to maintain its commitment in the run up to next year's
presidential elections.
The presidential elections scheduled for March 2013 are probably the most
important of Kenya's recent history. In 2007, the dispute surrounding the
final result brought the country to the brink of civil war. This prompted
the two candidates - the Orange Democratic Movement's Raila Odinga and the
Party of National Unity's Mwai Kibaki - to create a power-sharing government
in the interest of maintaining peace and addressing the root causes of the
violence. And while the power-sharing government has been moderately
successful in stabilizing Kenya, tension appears to be resurfacing ahead of
the next elections. Accordingly, the social, economic and political future
of Kenya and East Africa may for a time be dependent on the capacity of
Nairobi to ensure a smooth election process and peaceful transfer of power
to the new government. Whoever wins the election will, however, need to
address the impact that Somalia in general - and al Shabaab in particular -
has upon the peace and security of Kenya.
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Received on Mon Jun 11 2012 - 17:20:39 EDT
