Too Many Players, Too Few Solutions?
The aid and military support that the international community offers to
Central and the Horn of Africa may be stifling 'local solutions to local
problems'.
By Fawzia Sheikh for the ISN
11 June 2012
_____
Both Central and the Horn of Africa secure regular spots in the headlines,
but not for coveted reasons - simmering violence, religious radicalism and
piracy are among the biggest draws. The international community's aid,
advice, military support and diplomacy to the states of the region have
achieved some success, failed in certain instances or are evolving as
strategies. But on the sidelines, ordinary Africans are still clamouring for
a bigger political stake - and a little peace.
Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in Uganda and its environs.
Hiding out in the African bush, the Lord's Resistance Army - a rebel group
guilty of terrorizing the communities of the Great Lakes for decades -
encountered a new wave of notoriety in the spring. A San Diego-based NGO
known as the Invisible Children produced a video in March highlighting the
LRA's longstanding practices of recruiting child soldiers and raping girls.
It was a project which earned widespread internet attention and arguably,
for the first time, propelled the problem of the LRA into the mainstream of
Western consciousness.
The latest interest in the vicious gang underscored that groups with "a
megaphone" can galvanize attention toward an issue with the capacity to
shock policymakers in Washington, D.C., Brussels or at the UN "out of their
complacency," argued Philippe de Pontet, Africa director at the Eurasia
Group in Washington, D.C.
Empowering Great Lakes' Militaries
Even before the video became an online hit, the U.S. government was tackling
the LRA phenomenon following the advocacy community's efforts to raise it as
a human rights issue, de Pontet said. The United States passed legislation
in 2010 aimed at stemming the 20-plus-years' conflict. Previously,
<
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/REVISED_Yamamoto_Testimony.pdf>
Congress has provided millions of dollars in logistical support, training
and equipment to the security forces of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan to counter
the rebels and protect their populations. Last fall, the Obama
administration enhanced its counter-LRA strategy by dispatching
special-forces to the "thick of the jungle to help security partners . . .
close the noose around Kony once and for all," de Pontet told the ISN. The
latest deployment of American military advisers is part of a
<
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/REVISED_Yamamoto_Testimony.pdf>
multi-pronged strategy in the wide territory to support projects boosting
civilian protection, improving early warning capabilities, providing
humanitarian relief and strengthening communities.
While the Pentagon was always engaged with the continent through its special
operations units, it created
<
http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644.> U.S. Africa Command after
realizing that it was not paying heed to Africa's complexity. Washington's
latest regional military headquarters became fully operational in 2008 with
the aim of protecting American national security interests and bolstering
the capacity of Africans.
Today, Special Operations Command-Africa, probably the smallest of the
elite-force outfits, is balancing three major theatres of operation: helping
African forces to contain the ongoing situation in Somalia; supporting
border armies in Uganda, DRC and South Sudan; and lending a hand in Mali and
throughout the Sahel.
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, former U.S. President George W. Bush
was determined to beef up the African military apparatus (previously trimmed
in the march toward democracy) in order to fight al Qaeda in the Central
African and Horn of Africa nations. In doing so, this strategy has arguably
created one particular "beacon" in East Africa -- a more professional
Ugandan army. Over the past few months the Uganda People's Defence Force has
achieved notable success in whittling down the LRA to a few hundred fighters
surrounding Kony. The Uganda military has also made a significant
contribution to the African Union (AU) forces battling the al-Shabaab
terrorist group in Somalia.
Intractable Somalia?
Yet despite concerted efforts to stabilize Somalia, international actors
have been hard-pressed to lessen the despair produced by an intricate blend
of government stagnation, radical Islamism and food insecurity. But
minimizing coastal vulnerabilities appears to have been relatively
successful. Accounts of Somali pirates brazenly attacking ships off the Horn
of Africa and demanding hefty ransoms in a coastal free-for-all emerged
after the 1991 demise of the central government. In recent years,
international naval forces have launched patrols to protect the nearby
waters. Yet this may have resulted in the shifting of problems associated
with piracy to new geographical areas. Foreign intervention has also
relocated previously Europe-bound refugees further inland to African
countries, with Kenya becoming a major destination, adds Thomas Kwasi Tieku
of The Centre for International Governance Innovation. In other cases like
Darfur or the CAR, the tight policing of borders by more powerful African
forces hunting for terrorists have forced many seeking sanctuary to remain
trapped in their homelands.
However, the Atlantic Council's Peter Pham argues that it is up to the
Somalis rather than the international community to rebuild their country
following 20-plus years of 15 transitional governments. "Somalis can get
their act together," he noted, pointing to autonomous regions like
Somaliland and Puntland as evidence. The trouble is that Somalia's official
political leaders remain suspected of stealing most of the country's
bilateral foreign assistance and allowing weapons to be sold to al Shabaab.
Accordingly, Somalia's official leaders lack legitimacy among their citizens
"and the international community.can't make people be virtuous," adds Pham.
Ironically, Somalia's pirates may offer a 'local' solution to the country's
well-documented problems. A
<
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/1201
12summary.pdf> Chatham House report released in January indicated that
pirates do indeed contribute to urban development, with a considerable
portion of the stolen funds reaching the poorer inland areas. This has led
to the creation of small businesses, mosques and community centres, in
addition to covering salaries for local guards, drivers, caterers and
construction workers. Yet, enthusiasm for this 'solution' needs to be
tempered by arguments that most ordinary Somalis never enjoy the bulk of the
prize. According to Pham, the vast majority of the bounty flows to
financiers living abroad or who invest their money overseas.
Refugees' Greatest Hope
Amidst the large players operating in this swath of Africa have been
interstate NGOs supplementing four UN missions in Sudan and DRC. Over the
past six years, aid groups have intensified their presence on the ground,
with the smart ones delegating some responsibilities to local counterparts,
says Tieku. Uganda and Kenya have become hotbeds of NGO activity partly
because of a refugee influx from neighbouring countries, while dysfunctional
Somalia has transformed into "more or less an NGO state," he explained.
"Without the NGOs occupying the local space, the set of conflicts in Africa
would have been really horrible."
The involvement of global aid workers in Africa has had its drawbacks,
though. Describing the "CNN effect," Tieku explained how the development
community has converged on conflicts dominating the media such as
genocide-plagued Darfur. This has often resulted in the mobilization of
significant funds to a particular region that nevertheless lack coordination
with respective national governments. He criticized the myopic approach to
aid delivery for sidelining less-captivating humanitarian crises until they
reach a breaking point.
Miles to Go
No doubt there are sparks of hope across this immense territory: security
forces targeting Kony, activists embracing the power of social media to
enlighten broader audiences and Western NGOs shoring up African counterparts
to directly mend their unravelling countries. But there are still problems.
For one, the international practice of putting out long-smouldering fires
instead of proactively offering concrete solutions seems likely to linger.
The Institute for Security Studies' Paul-Simon Handy in particular
criticized international actors' preference for "quick fixes" to contend
with Africa's refugee flows, piracy, ethnic tensions and radical Islamism.
He also lamented their lack of attention to state-building and poverty
alleviation on which African organizations tend to focus.
Another problem is that many Westerners have favored a top-down approach
involving local governments. For instance, American bilateral support to
certain "proxy" countries like Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda to tackle
regional security challenges is premised on bolstering states even though
they lack strong democratic traditions, Tieku said. However, this approach
is unlikely to work in Somalia, where international stakeholders' alienation
of local entities has inadvertently prolonged the crisis in the Horn.
According to Pham, the only plausible path to peace in Somalia is a
"building-block process" embracing many grassroots groups like spiritual
leaders who actually have authority and are capable of delivering something.
One proposal that continues to receive consideration is the decentralization
of Somalia's political system into a loose patchwork of clans thereby
diminishing the relevance of Sudan, which local experts believe is the only
way to achieve "minimal governance and start to get basic services to
communities." According to de Pontet, this approach may lead to the
empowerment of local leaders in Puntland - the piracy heartland - to take
aim at the activity. However, it is likely that the valuable source of money
from steep ransoms will influence their decision.
Wrestling for Control
Given Africa's entrenched regimes and persistent conflicts, it is difficult
to imagine a dramatic power shift from militaries and elites to civil
society and ordinary citizens. On a continent in which
<
http://www.uspolicy.be/headline/state%E2%80%99s-carson-entrenched-african-l
eadership> nine leaders have been at the helm for more than two decades ,
instituting lasting, positive change seems doubtful for now. Yet there have
been some attempts. Most notably, Kampala was the scene of massive protests
attracting professionals, students and the middle class for several months
leading up to last year's re-election of President Yoweri Museveni, a
26-year leader. Unlike in the past, Ugandan citizens are demanding change in
"more insistent, sophisticated ways" such as strikes, large protests and
social media movements mirroring other corners of the globe, adds de Pontet.
The downside of the nearby uprisings in the Arab world, though, has been a
cascade of weapons from the Libyan conflict to places like Niger and Mali,
the scene of a coup in March. "We're in for a long haul in terms of pockets
of wars across East Africa, Central Africa, the Horn of Africa or the Sahel
belt," warns Tieku, a prediction that does not bode well for indigenous-led
solutions to regional problems.
_____
Fawzia Sheikh has reported from East Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.
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Received on Mon Jun 11 2012 - 17:16:26 EDT
