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[Dehai-WN] Le Monde diplomatique: The Fractious Pair of Sudans

From: Berhane Habtemariam <Berhane.Habtemariam_at_gmx.de_at_dehai.org>
Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 23:17:53 +0200

The Fractious Pair of Sudans

Western countries and China hope that a bilateral agreement on oil transit
rights will defuse the situation and prevent a new North-South war; but the
major powers have been unable to impose a compromise, stresses Jean-Baptiste
Gallopin.

 10-06-2012

The South Sudanese president Salva Kiir told parliament back in January that
the government had "unanimously decided that all oil operations in South
Sudan should be halted with immediate effect and no crude oil belonging to
South Sudan shall flow through the pipelines on the territory of the
Republic of Sudan." This was a response to Khartoum's seizure of South
Sudanese oil, and brought the conflict between the states over oil revenue
distribution to a head.

Oil is vital to the young republic, which has been independent since July
last year: It provides 98% of the government's income. A prolonged stoppage
in production would threaten the state's already fragile infrastructure, and
end hopes of stability in the region after decades of civil war.

The Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir was among the international leaders
who attended South Sudan's independence celebrations last year in the new
state's capital, Juba. His presence signified that Khartoum finally
recognised partition, after much prevarication. But there were still
disagreements over the distribution of oil revenue and public debt, and the
final boundary between the states. The organisation of regional security was
also not finalised.

Oil in common

Oil is a vital source of currency and fiscal revenue for both Sudans; they
are dependent on each other, since one controls the reserves, the other the
export infrastructure. If Khartoum does not agree on oil transit and
refining rights, they both face potential economic disaster.

From August 2010 negotiators met regularly in the Ethiopian capital Addis
Ababa for long, unsuccessful talks. Relations steadily worsened because of
internal divisions among the ruling elites, who were competing with each
other and unable to deal with local conflicts in their border areas.

The crisis began with the Sudanese army's invasion of the disputed Abyei
region in May 2011, two months before the south's official independence. The
status of this border region (of minimal strategic importance) was meant to
have been agreed to by a local referendum, and organised in parallel with
the referendum on independence. But Khartoum prevented the referendum and
seized the entire territory. The fighting between the armies was the worst
since the 2005 peace agreement. The message is clear: The north is ready to
use its military superiority to dominate the negotiations.

A new civil war

The Sudanese army turned against any members of the SPLM/A (Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army), the former rebel movement in power in the south)
on its territory -- 6,000 in the northern state of South Kordofan and 4,100
in Blue Nile, both bordering South Sudan. Their populations, black African
rather than Arab, are culturally and politically closer to the south.

The Sudanese army and its allied militias launched a massive offensive
against armed and unarmed members of the SPLM/A in South Kordofan on 5 June
2011 and on 1 September the fighting spread to Blue Nile. The leader of
SPLM/A North (SPLM/A-N), Malik Agar, went underground after his home was
raided, and called for the overthrow of the regime in Khartoum: on 8
September he announced that his movement was splitting from the SPLM/A in
power in Juba. A new civil war had begun.

Khartoum and Juba have continued to negotiate, while also beginning an
economic war. Since May last year, Sudan has imposed restrictions on cross
border trade with the south, where business relies heavily on imports from
the north. Last July both governments circulated new currencies without
consulting each other. Uncertainty provoked by the fiscal crisis and tension
has caused the exchange rate to fluctuate, forcing the central banks of both
states to draw on their already weak foreign exchange reserves to avoid
massive devaluation.

Each side is using force, direct or indirect, to try to make the other give
way. The north gives logistical and military support to rebel groups
fighting against the South Sudanese government, and has bombed its territory
several times since November 2011.

The government in Juba has difficulty maintaining the fiction that it is not
connected to SPLM/A-N rebels. They use South Sudan as a support base, as do
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), some of whose forces have now left
Darfur for South Kordofan. This March, the southern army, the JEM and the
SPLM/A-N launched a joint offensive against Heglig, an oil field on the
border, revealing an unprecedented level of coordination.

Khartoum ouster?

The SPLM/A-N and the Darfur rebel groups, now allied in the Sudan
Revolutionary Front (SRF), want a change of regime in Khartoum. South
Sudan's growing involvement with the SRF and the intransigence of southern
negotiators, particularly Pagan Amum (who is close to SPLM/A-N leaders),
suggest that part of the political elite in Juba has been won over to this
objective.

Western countries and China hope that a bilateral agreement on oil transit
rights will defuse the situation and prevent a new North-South war; but the
major powers have been unable to impose a compromise. Washington has limited
room for manoeuvre because of its historic support for the South and
antagonism towards the North, and US public hostility towards Khartoum. The
focus by the Congress and the US media on human rights violations by the
Sudanese army in South Kordofan has made it impossible for President Barack
Obama's administration to offer Sudan even partial lifting of US sanctions
in exchange for peace with the South. These sanctions were imposed in 1997
and 2006 in response to Sudan's support for terrorism, and the repression in
Darfur. So after years of being lenient with the South, Washington is now
striving to put pressure on Juba. On 2 May it got the UN Security Council to
pass a resolution threatening sanctions on both Sudans.

China's balancing act

It is not clear how much influence China has, despite its close links with
all the protagonists: It is a major player in Sudan's oil sector, which it
helped Khartoum develop during the civil war, and has also managed to get
closer to Juba since 2008. But its obvious efforts at mediation have not got
anywhere. Chinese diplomats complain about their powerlessness, to their
western counterparts. As relations get more embittered between the two
Sudans, Beijing's balancing act gets more difficult. On the other hand, Juba
knows it can count on Israel, which supported the southern rebellion from
1955.

There are still many local obstacles to an agreement. Two partial
compromises -- one on integrating the SPLM/A-N into Sudanese politics, put
forward in June 2011, and the other on the status of Sudanese and South
Sudanese citizens on each other's territory, in February 2012 -- are long
dead. The first, negotiated between Nafi Ali Nafi, al-Bashir's right hand
man, and Agar of SPLM/A-N, was denounced by the Sudanese president three
days after it was signed. The second was made obsolete by clashes on the
border that many suspect were orchestrated jointly by SPLM/A-N and a faction
of South Sudan's army, to prevent rapprochement between the north and south.

There is no guarantee that an agreement on oil rights will be enough to calm
the situation. It would probably not end the violence in South Kordofan and
Blue Nile, the causes of which are local. The border will stay unstable.

Timeline

1 January 1956: Sudan gains independence after a rebellion in the south in
August 1955.

October 1964: Popular insurrection ends the military regime established in
1958.

25 May 1969: Coup led by Gaafar al-Nimeiry.

March 1972: Agreements on autonomy for the south signed in Addis Ababa with
the rebels.

1983: Al-Nimeiry's regime decides to apply sharia law. A new rebellion
starts in the south, led by John Garang and his Sudan People's Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

April 1985: Popular revolt and end of the military dictatorship.

30 June 1989: Islamist army officers led by Omar al-Bashir seize power. The
war with the south intensifies.

9 January 2005: Peace agreement signed with the SPLM/A, making provision for
a referendum on self-determination for the south in five years.

2011: In January, the population of the south vote overwhelmingly in favour
of independence, which is proclaimed on 9 July.

Jean-Baptiste Gallopin is a specialist on the Sudans with an international
human rights organisation; he writes here in a personal capacity.

Translated by Stephanie Irvin

Copyright C 2012 Le Monde diplomatique - distributed by Agence Globa

 




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