Blowback in Syria: Damascus's terrorist past may help define its future
09/06/2012
By James Denselow
London, Asharq Al-Awsat - The month of May saw a double suicide attack in
Damascus that brought a country increasingly defined by an atmosphere of
Civil War to the top of the news as a victim of terrorism. The attack was
eerily similar to the ones that have blighted Iraq over the past ten years.
The first bomber's vehicle attempted to breach the walls of a Syrian
military intelligence building while the second vehicle exploded a few
minutes later decimating the crowd that had gathered killing 55 and wounding
hundreds more. Syria's state-run news agency was quick to publish gruesome
pictures of the victims of the attack which President Bashar al-Assad's
regime pinned on "foreign-backed terrorist groups."
The standard questions speculating who was behind the bombings followed with
Al-Qaeda and its latest offshoot Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) coming out as the
prime suspect, a view confirmed by the United Nations and the United States.
The fact that the regime in Damascus has wanted to define the conflict as
one between the government and terrorists since its inception in March 2011
has led the opposition to quite legitimately challenge this Al Qaeda
narrative. As Stephen Starr, author of "Revolt: Eyewitness to the Syrian
Uprising", explained to Asharq Al-Awsat; "we have always had to second guess
the regime when it talks about terrorism in Syria; because of the broader
propaganda we regularly can't believe their claims. With this is mind, I
don't think we can be sure terrorists are actually responsible for the
recent bombings in Damascus, despite apparent claims of such. It is all too
hazy to declare anything with certainty".
The Syrian regime clearly believes that it can exploit the fog of war and
absence of real media coverage in the country to replicate a much tried and
tested narrative used by Western governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. The
core of such a tactic relies on blaming everything on terrorism and
terrorists and then using it as a justification for a disproportionate harsh
response. Fayssal al-Hamwi, the Syrian representative at the UN Human Rights
Council, highlighted the regime's use of this tactic when he blamed the
Houla massacre on "groups of armed terrorists numbering 600-800". The Syrian
government announced a committee of inquiry to find out what the truth was
with its initial report stating that the main motive of the murderers was
"to ignite sectarian strife". US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice described
al-Hamwi's claims as "another blatant lie".
A Complex Beast
Syria's relationship with terrorism is a far more complex beast with a
history that can be traced back to the start of Assad rule of the country
over 40 years ago. Syria has used its foreign policy and its backing of
proxy groups in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine to champion its self-styled
position as 'leader of the resistance bloc'. The 10 May suicide attack bore
parallels with the famous 1983 Hezbollah suicide attack on a U.S Marine
barracks in Beirut that killed 220 marines and led to the Reagan
administration withdrawing from the country. Car bombs and suicide attacks
were also a common tactic used by Hamas during the 2nd Intifada against
Israel. Both Hamas and Hezbollah are allies of the Syrian regime, with a
complex network of financial, political and historical links. However,
following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria became linked to far more
unpredictable and dangerous terrorist groups who used their country as the
main transit route to fight the Americans. Today the regime has
paradoxically found itself as the target of resistance movements that are
hugely varied in composition and tactics ranging from secular military
defectors, Kurdish fighters to those who would fight under a religious flag
against the Assad regime.
Syria has ridden the lion of supporting terrorist groups in the past and is
now experiencing a deadly blowback as the less controllable elements turn
against them and the more conventional ones abandon them.
The US State Department has had Syria on its list of state sponsors of
terrorism since the list's inception in 1979 "because of its continuing
support and safe haven for terrorist organizations". Arguably its support
can be divided into more traditional groups who've looked to capture or
influence the state (the Hezbollah / Hamas models) and the far more
dangerous extremist groups (Al Qaeda / Jund al-Sham / Al-Nusra Front etc)
who, while providing effective opposition against the US throughout their
occupation of Iraq, increasingly view the conflict in Syria through a
sectarian lens.
Prior to the outbreak of protests in March 2011 Syria was already
experiencing a low level terrorist threat with the group 'Jund al-Sham'
claiming responsibility for attacks on the US Embassy and even the same
intelligence building in Damascus that was hit in May. Following the
outbreak of violence across Syria and the deployment of the military against
the protestors a plethora of groups have tried to exploit the new space
created by the conflict. The regime, unwilling to consider itself to blame
for the protests, has stuck to the rhetoric of blaming others. On the 29th
of May Syrian State media reported President Assad's meeting with Kofi Annan
where he stressed the need "for the countries who are financing, arming and
harbouring the terrorist groups" to commit to Annan's plan. Assad told Annan
that the success of his plan depends on stopping weapon smuggling and
curbing terrorism and those who support it.
Blowback from Iraq
There is no small amount of irony around Assad opposing weapon smuggling
considering his regime's long standing practice of it. The Iraqi-Syrian
border in particular was once a source of transit for fighters to Iraq and
is now seeing the flow is reverse. Chris Doyle, Director of the Council for
Arab-British Understanding (Caabu), explained to Asharq Al-Awsat that "there
is a huge danger that Jihadi groups will be rushing to Syria to exploit the
power vacuum and inter-communal tensions. In the past the regime has allowed
certain groups to operate within its borders, some of these that were
allowed into Iraq to attack the Americans are now returning to attack the
Syrian regime, particularly in the East of the country.
The long desert border, which was largely un-demarcated until the 2003 US
invasion, is very difficult to regulate during the day and virtually
impossible without aerial surveillance and night-vision equipment,
capacities that the Syrian military generally lacks. On the 27th of May
Iraqi security forces went on high alert for several hours until Sunday
morning following clashes between the Syrian army and rebel forces near the
border. The village of Abu Kamal, at the Euphrates Iraq-Syria border
crossing, used to be a safe haven for those fleeing the violence in Iraq.
Today those on the Iraq side of the border are the ones who feel safer.
Writing in the 'Combating Terrorism Center' (CTC) journal Brian Fishman
explained that "in contrast to the situation in other Arab Spring
revolutions, in Syria militants linked to Al Qaeda seem to have a militarily
relevant capability on the ground". Analysts monitoring the internet chatter
on extremist websites have also noted "level of excitement, which has not
been seen in these circles since the height of the Iraq war".
What makes an understanding of the extremist groups crossing from Iraq to
Syria more complex is the rumoured relationship between them and Iran. On
the 9th of May, Anbar tribal leader and Awakening Movement leader Azzam
al-Tamimi, told the press that "there are clear links between Al Qaeda in
Iraq and the Iranian regime....Tehran is providing training camps for their
members." Syria, like Iran, also had links to these groups, as Andrew
Tabler, author of 'In the Lion's Den' who spent seven years working in
Damascus, explained: "looked at historically, the Assad regime may be
secular, but it has extensive relations with jihadi groups, whether allowing
them to transit Syria to fight the US in Iraq or in Lebanon to carry out its
foreign policy objectives." A senior Lebanese security official said
recently that at least 150 foreign militants have gained a foothold inside
Syria. Whilst this number may not seem particularly large, the tactics that
such groups are willing to deploy makes them dangerous force multipliers.
For evidence of this reality we can look again to Iraq, a country that
suffers from a chronic terrorism problem. Despite significant advances
against Al Qaeda in the western Anbar region, the US military estimates that
850 militants are still operational and are linked to coordinated,
simultaneous attacks across the country. Likewise JN and future offshoots
should be seen as an accelerant to the conflict rather than a defining
element, although as occurred in Iraq any spectacular sectarian attack
against an iconic individual or location may create unforeseen consequences.
Blowback from Lebanon
The regime is also trying to secure its western border with Lebanon, another
border that historically was criss-crossed with smuggling routes. The
200-mile long border, dismissed in the past by Syrian leaders as a colonial
imposition dividing al-Sham (Greater Syria), has suddenly become a contested
zone. In November of last year, concerned by reports of the nascent 'Free
Syria Army' (FSA) transiting the border and arms smuggling, the Syrian army
took the drastic step to start demarcating the border with security forces
and landmines. According to Human Rights Watch many people fleeing the
violence have been seriously wounded.
A particular concern for the regime in Damascus comes from the Palestinian
refugee camps in Lebanon, another location where Syria has held historical
influence. Media reports have emerged of Palestinians from Ein el-Helweh
camp writing their wills and heading into Syria via Tripoli. Tripoli
meanwhile is increasingly divided. On 13 May, the arrest of Shadi Al Mawlawi
in Tripoli for alleged links with terrorist organizations was followed by
protests in the city. Four days of violence ensued between gunmen from
various factions, during which time 10 people were killed and many more
injured. The situation remains tense. On Sunday 20 May, a Sheikh and his
companion were shot dead at an army checkpoint. The killing sparked a
violent response in the north of Lebanon with protesters blocking roads and
demanding that the army withdraw from some areas. While Tripoli remained
relatively calm, the event led to fighting between rival groups in Beirut,
resulting in the deaths of two people and 18 others being injured. Lebanon
remains both a source of danger to the regime in Damascus and the country
most likely to be destabilised by Syria descending deeper into civil war.
The Ghost Militia
While outside observers may increasingly view the situation in Syria as a
civil war, the regime is still operating as if it is fighting a
foreign-backed insurgency. What makes Syria's counter-insurgency strategy
particularly savage is its use of state backed militia groups such as the
'Shabiha' or 'Ghost Militia'. Chris Doyle pointed out that "one of the
lessons from the massacre in Houla is that it is much easier for people who
aren't in uniforms to conduct this kind of crime. The massacre could have
been conducted by people from neighbouring Allawite villages who wanted to
deliver a message with the support of the Syrian military." The Shabiha are
essential state sponsored terror groups that appear to have their own
leadership and command structure. Slitting the throats of women and
children, firing upon funeral processions and increasingly repeated mass
executions are actions based upon trying to reassert a fear of the regime on
those protesting against it.
At the start of June former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard
Myers says the possible use of force in Syria would be "a lot more complex"
than it was Libya. The huge network of Syria's connections with groups in
Lebanon and since 2003 Iraq does mean that to truly understand events in
Syria you must look beyond its borders. The fundamental challenge for the
survival of the Assad regime is to manage to contradiction between the
rhetoric of being the vanguard of regional resistance to being the prime
target of it. That the regime is willing to unleash the Shabiha on its own
population is a reflection of desperation, not of strength. Speaking to his
new Parliament at the start of June Assad said that "whoever did this in
Houla could not be a human being but a monster. And even a monster could not
carry out such an act." The problem for Assad is that the Shabiha and many
of the extremist groups crossing into the country are monsters of his own
regime's making.
------------[ Sent via the dehai-wn mailing list by dehai.org]--------------
Received on Sat Jun 09 2012 - 19:55:34 EDT
