Central Africa: Darkening the DRC - the Long, Deep Shadow of Rwanda
By Simon Allison, 6 June 2012
Analysis
Tiny Rwanda should be inconsequential to the affairs of the DRC, one of
Africa's biggest countries. Yet when Rwanda chooses to exert its malign
influence from the unstable eastern border, the whole country shudders with
the impact. Now is no exception.
In the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, on the border with Rwanda,
a nastly conflict is re-igniting. Information is scarce and loyalties hard
to determine, but it's clear that the fragile peace that has obtained in the
region for three years is unlikely to last much longer, if it hasn't been
irrevocably shattered already.
Looming over the mutinies, skirmishes and propaganda is the dark shadow cast
by a tiny nation: Rwanda, whose malign influence could turn a rebellion into
a continental war. This is not far-fetched.
It's happened once before, in 1998, when Rwandan involvement in eastern
Congo contributed to what's often described as the Great African War, where
eight African countries were involved in a conflict that measured deaths in
the hundreds of thousands.
The tensions this time around began with the defection from the Congolese
army of an infamous warlord called Bosco Ntaganda, who goes by the nom de
guerre of "the Terminator". Ntaganda was upset at plans by the Congolese
government to arrest him, in line with an international warrant issued by
the International Criminal Court which accuses Ntaganda of involvement in
rape, torture and using child soldiers.
Although the warrant was issued years ago, the Kinshasa government's
intention to enforce it is something new, a tool to consolidate the power of
recently re-elected President Joseph Kabila and give his government some
much-needed international legitimacy. In addition to the targeting of
Ntaganda, rumours abounded that the government intended to dismantle, once
and for all, the parallel command structures of Ntaganda's rebel militia,
which remained largely intact despite their incorporation into the army.
Ntaganda and his top lieutenants were having none of this. Mobilising those
parallel structures, his rebel militia defected en masse from the army,
taking cash, weapons and ammunition with them. Since then, there's been
sporadic fighting between Ntaganda's men and the government troops sent to
catch them, with both sides claiming important, and sometimes mutually
exclusive, victories.
The mutineers have rebranded themselves as the M23 movement, referencing the
March 23 date on which the 2009 peace deal was signed, and are accusing the
government of failing to properly implement that agreement.
The real question in all of this is Rwanda's involvement. The M23 movement
has its roots in the CNDP, which in turn emerged from the RCD.
Never mind the acronyms: what's important to know is that each iteration of
the rebel militia claims to speak for the Tutsi population in eastern Congo,
and has historically been strongly supported by the Tutsi-led government in
Rwanda. This support has included arms and personnel, and even cross-border
intervention from Rwandan army units.
There are strong historical reasons for Rwanda's involvement. After the
Rwandan genocide in 1994, many of the eventually-defeated genocidaires (the
people who implemented the genocide) fled into eastern Congo, where they
continued to wage war against the Tutsi-led forces that halted the killings.
They formed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and,
in contrast to the new Rwandan government and Ntaganda's rebels, remain
mostly of Hutu ethnicity. But the Rwandan army has never let an
international border stand between it and chasing its enemies, hence their
frequent incursions into eastern Congo since 1994; and their support of
Ntaganda, and before him CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda (imprisoned in Kigali as
as part of the compromises that led to the 2009 peace deal).
There are also financial concerns. Rwandan businesses have substantial
interests in eastern Congo, as do Rwandan generals. There's the precious
matter of minerals, which are abundant in that part of the country; indeed,
many speculate that it was minerals that fuelled the Great African War as
armies all jostled for their share of the spoils. The more stable the
government in the DRC, the greater the threat to Rwandan interests.
Rwanda is therefore incentivised to destabilise the country, which it does
both directly, on occasion, but usually through their sponsorship of rebels.
And their favourite rebel is Ntaganda. As Ida Sawyer, Human Rights Watch's
field researcher in eastern Congo, told iMaverick: "Bosco Ntaganda has
always been Rwanda's guy in the area."
Last week, an internal report from the under-staffed and under-equipped
United Nations peacekeepers in the area was leaked to the BBC, indicating
that Rwanda has maintained its support through the latest crisis in the
area. Although unable to prove Rwandan involvement unequivocally, the leaked
report cited defectors who claimed they had been trained in Rwanda under the
impression they were joining the army, before being sent over the border to
fight with M23.
On Monday, Human Rights Watch went even further, claiming that the Rwandan
military had sent 200 - 300 men to fight for the rebels, and that they
allowed Ntaganda and his men to cross the border at will. This was allegedly
in addition to supplying them with weapons and ammunition.
Witnesses even told Human Rights Watch that they had seen Ntaganda in a bar
in Rwanda, meeting with a Rwandan military officer.
Yet Rwanda has consistently denied involvement in the latest crisis in
Eastern Congo, dismissing claims to the contrary. Still, the weight of
evidence contradicting this is becoming difficult to ignore. There's no
smoking gun, as yet; but the circumstantial evidence is strong.
While Rwandan involvement has helped to exacerbate the violence in the
region, their involvement could give the international community the
leverage necessary to do something about it.
While international or even African intervention is highly unlikely, the
African Union and the donor countries on which Rwanda relies so heavily can
use their influence to pressure Rwanda into removing its support for the
rebels, or to persuade the rebels to lay down their arms.
Ida Sawyer of HRW also points out that the UN peacekeeping force could play
a greater role in assisting the Congolese army to deal with the rebel
threat.
Yet even these largely diplomatic tactics are unlikely to materialise.
Conflict in the DRC is decidedly unsexy, as it's been going on for decades
and there's little hope of a swift resolution. Chances are, the
international community will leave eastern Congo in the hands of whichever
armed force happens to be controlling all or bits of it at the time, be it
the Congolese army, Ntaganda's rebels, or the former genocidaires (who are
being left largely to their own devices at the moment).
This means that little Rwanda - with a land mass just 1% of the DRC's - will
continue to wield its undue and largely negative influence over the region
for some time to come.
iMaverick is South Africa's first daily tablet newspaper and includes
coverage from the Daily Maverick and Free African Media. To subscribe, go
to: www.imaverick.co.za <
http://www.imaverick.co.za/> .
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Received on Wed Jun 06 2012 - 14:20:51 EDT
