Moving Towards Weak and Failed States
4 June 2012
From de-colonization to the end of the Cold War and beyond, Central and the
Horn of Africa have been blighted by political violence and state failure.
Today we trace the regions’ march towards fragility.
Prepared by: <
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/About-Us/Staff> ISN staff
_____
In recent years, many of the countries of Central and the Horn of Africa
have become bywords for state failure and intra-state conflict. A host of
international actors and organizations have in turn attempted to resolve the
regions’ disputes through a combination of mediation, economic assistance
and humanitarian aid. Yet the social, economic and political development of
both regions continues to be compromised by ethnic tensions, geopolitical
rivalries and fragile state institutions. In order to better understand the
causes of conflict and state failure across Central and the Horn of Africa
we today consider some of the long-standing social and economic problems
that continue to plague both regions. In doing so, we find that past
historical experience and control of natural resources make a solid
contribution to the fragility of both regions’.
Lines in the Sand
The borders of many African states remain a legacy of the colonial powers
that dominated the continent from the late 19th century until as late as the
1970s. In many cases the European ‘scramble for Africa’ cut through ethnic
affinities and tribal identities that had existed long before colonialism.
According to our partners at Chatham House, prevailing diplomatic convention
argues that these boundaries should nevertheless remain in place. In doing
so, the colonial boundaries would prevent the opening up of a Pandora’s Box
of competing territorial claims. Yet in parts of Central Africa this often
resulted in the continued wielding of colonial power by post-colonial
states.
Accordingly, key Central African states saw the process of democratization
subverted by the interests of either distinct political classes or tribal
affiliations. The emergence of ‘strongman rule’ in states like Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda not only led to the marginalization of
society along ethnic lines, but also widespread corruption and economic
development that benefitted the few. Indeed, where natural resources were
exploited for wealth generation, such forms of governance inevitably led to
the emergence of powerful cliques with a vested interest in maintaining the
political status quo. As a result, rulers such as Uganda’s Idi Amin or the
Central African Republic’s Jean-Bèdel Bokassa used colonial instruments of
power to rule their countries with an iron fist.
Indeed, many regimes and ruling elites also employed norms inherited from
the colonial period to ‘divide and rule’ along ethnic lines. The political
fallout from Kenya’s disputed elections in 2007, for example, resulted in an
upsurge of ethnic violence and the deaths of 1,200 Kenyans. To further
complicate matters, when previously marginalized ethnic groups assume power,
they also take on the same characteristics as their predecessors. As part of
a phenomenon labeled by the Oxford Research Group as ‘our turn to eat’, the
new ruling class assumes the colonial instruments of power and rules in a
similar fashion to the previous regime.
However, it could be argued that the ‘lines drawn in the sand’ by the
colonial powers do not adequately explain the Horn of Africa’s descent into
violence and chaos. With the exception of a brief period of occupation by
Mussolini’s Italy, Ethiopia has never been effectively colonized. Moreover,
South Sudan’s secession from the North in 2011 also demonstrates that the
colonial borders drawn here are perhaps less durable than in other parts of
the African continent. Yet the formation of new states such as Eritrea and
the de facto separation of Somaliland from Somalia nevertheless cut through
the communities of the region just as much as the colonial borders.
As a result, social, linguistic and ethnic ties continue to be divided by
borderlines in the modern Horn of Africa. The case of the region’s
Somali-speaking community amply demonstrates this point. Beyond the borders
of Somalia, ethnic Somalis also live in parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and
Djibouti. Accordingly, the overlap of ethnic communities - particularly in
the border regions - may provide opportunities for grievances and political
unrest to sporadically occur. Some of the most porous borders in the world
potentially allow ethnic minorities to supply rebels with arms and money to
fight insurgencies in other states. Yet providing moral and material support
to rebellions in other countries does not necessarily have to be based on
ethnic ties. During Eritrea’s war of independence with Ethiopia, Sudan
provided support to Eritrean rebels, despite have little in the way of close
ethnic affiliations with them.
A Continent Awash with Weapons
Khartoum’s support for Eritrea not only demonstrates that geopolitics
impacts upon armed conflict in both regions, it also reflects that many
regional paramilitary struggles have access to an ample supply of small arms
and light weapons. Many arms in circulation throughout Central and the Horn
of Africa were originally supplied by the rival Cold War blocs to countries
such as Ethiopia in the name of ideology, and also to fight proxy wars. But
instead of the Cold War ending the steady supply of weapons, arms dealers
began to flood Africa with surplus stock from the former Soviet bloc. And
despite better regulations, the world’s leading arms exporters - including
the United States - often accounted for over 50% of all arms sales across
the continent.
When combined with an undercurrent of ethnic tension, the abundance of small
arms have the potential to make the political conditions of Central and the
Horn of Africa increasingly fragile. Further exacerbating the situation are
the undemocratic and neo-patrimonial regimes that favor bribery and
corruption over effective governance. While states such as DRC and have in
the past agreed with a host of conflict resolution proposals, governments
have often failed to effectively reintegrate rebel fighters back into
society. Ineffective demobilization strategies and relatively easy access to
weapons have, therefore, done little to address some of the root causes of
conflict across these regions.
Resource Curses
Relatively easy access to weapons also goes a long way to determining who
controls access to the regions’ natural resources. Control of mineral
resources in turn fuels the development of ‘war economies’, whereby warring
factions not only benefit from the misappropriation of funds generated by
sales, but also from opportunities to continue financing intra-state
conflict. In the case of the DRC, for example, conflict has often been
sustained by the sales of copper, zinc and timber to the clients from the
developed world and, increasingly, China. And in the case of both Central
and the Horn of Africa whoever controls access to natural resources often
holds the reins of power.
Accordingly, revenues generated by natural resources are subject to
mismanagement and the personal enrichment projects of the region’s corrupt
and undemocratic regimes. Such ‘projects’ in turn overlook the social and
economic needs of the majority of the population and reinforce instruments
of colonial power. This inevitably creates a situation where the majority of
the population of Central and the Horn of Africa live in abject poverty,
despite an abundance of natural resources that continue to enhance the
economic development of ruling cliques. In doing so, Africa’s natural
resources combine with past history to make the continent seem like it is
constantly locked in a cycle of conflict.
The Way Forward
Over the course of this week, we will outline how a host of international
actors are trying to resolve the myriad problems confronting Central and the
Horn of Africa. Based purely on our analysis, it seems apparent that the
international system is dealing with a set of long-standing and complex
problems. And while international actors have had some success in
ameliorating some of the most pernicious aspects of state failure, they
clearly still have more to do. For that reason, we will also be considering
the impact that ‘local solutions’ are having upon seemingly ‘local
problems’. Indeed, given that these solutions are likely to be made
difficult by borders that often overlook ethnic affinities, it remains to be
seen how much impact they are likely to have on the problems confronting
Central and South Africa.
Editor's note:
For more content on the Central and Horn of Africa region, please see our
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Editorial-Plan/Dossiers/> dossier on the topic.
A tank and two men in the Somali desert
<
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en> Creative Commons -
Attribution 2.0 Generic
<
http://www.flickr.com/photos/carlmontgomery/1709694176/> Creative Commons -
Attribution 2.0 Generic
Left over from the war
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Received on Mon Jun 04 2012 - 18:49:11 EDT
