Why do we continually misunderstand conflict in Africa?
– By Lucy Hovil
Posted on
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/10/why-do-we-continually-misunderstand-
conflict-in-africa-by-lucy-hovil/> February 10, 2014
Violence in Africa seems particularly prone to the scourge of
one-dimensional descriptions. Often described as ethnic or tribal, and
sometimes as sectarian, the media prescribes an adjective that quickly
becomes accepted as gospel and this explanation is then hard to shift. Thus
we are told that the recent outbreak of violence in South Sudan is ethnic
(Nuer against Dinka); and fighting in the Central African Republic (CAR) is
sectarian (Christians against Muslims). It is seldom described in political
terms.
The problem here is not just semantics or the irritation caused by
inadequate descriptions of complex issues. The real problem lies in the fact
that misdiagnosis is a dangerous business. Once a label is fixed to a
conflict it can become an exclusive explanation for that conflict (normally
expounded by some form of argument that animosities derive from a primordial
source), and can dictate resolution to that conflict. As the logic usually
goes, if the two ‘groups’ or warring factions can sign a ceasefire followed
by a peace agreement then the conflict is resolved. Yet time and time again,
ceasefires, peace agreements and externally enforced power sharing
arrangements based on reductive understandings of the causes of conflict
prove to be quick fixes, little more than holding exercises until conflict
breaks out again.
For decades the war in Sudan was portrayed as being between the Muslim north
and the Christian/animist south, which became accepted as an accurate
analysis of what was taking place. Yet there is little in this binary
representation of conflict that allows for an accurate understanding of the
multiple complex factors driving a war that was, in fact, between a
centralised state and multiple sites of marginalisation across the country.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) that was signed in 2005 was eventually whittled down to only one of
its elements – the referendum on the independence of the south. The
referendum neither resolved conflict in the reduced state of Sudan (as
evidenced by renewed conflict in Darfur and, more recently, in South
Kordofan and Blue Nile), nor led to consolidated peace in the newly-created
state of South Sudan (now graduated to the label of ‘ethnic’ conflict). The
misdiagnosis of the problem enabled those with short term political agendas
to scrap the democratic transformation agenda that had been included in the
CPA, and consequently the secession of the South has failed to generate
peace in either Sudan or the new South Sudan.
In the same way, the prevalent interpretation of past violence in Rwanda –
and, therefore, the response to that violence – has been reduced to ethnic
genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in 1994. There is seldom mention of the broader
context of violence in which the genocide took place – and, therefore, of
the need to engage with broader issues of post-conflict (as opposed to
exclusively post-genocide) recovery. This oversimplification has enabled the
post-genocide government to avoid scrutiny for its own actions. Once again,
therefore, it is unsurprising that individuals continue to flee Rwanda in
fear for their lives as a repressive state feeds off its genocide credit;
and that the lack of honest appraisal of what took place during and after
the genocide continues to haunt the region not least in the form of cornered
militias in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo trying to fight their way
out of an alleged ‘génocidaire’ cul-de-sac.
Yet we never seem to learn the lesson. Right now, the potential impact of
these oversimplifications can be seen clearly in South Sudan, one of the
most recent outbreaks of violence on the continent. Although there is much
rhetoric about the need for a comprehensive national process, there has been
little talk about how and when this will happen. Most energy so far has gone
into persuading two small groups of powerful individuals who allegedly
represent two ethnic constituencies to sign a ceasefire. This energy is now
going into discussions on monitoring of that ceasefire. A ceasefire is an
important first step, but unless regional and international actors insist
unequivocally on the need for a broader national process, little will
change.
By reducing conflict to ethnic antagonism, (with its dangerous bedfellow,
genocide, lurking just around the corner) there is an assumption that people
position themselves in one-dimensional categories. This approach ignores
local realities in which people create and maintain multiple forms of
belonging not least in order to ensure multiple forms of legitimacy and
access to resources. While not denying that people might identify themselves
along ethnic and/or sectarian lines – just as they identify themselves, for
instance, along gender or economic lines – in a context of multiple forms
and expressions of belonging, the reduction of conflict to simple binaries
inevitably falls wide of the mark.
Ultimately, therefore, this continual cycle of misdiagnosis fails to engage
with broader issues, not least the key areas of poor governance that leave a
small minority perched in their feathered nests, ignoring the needs and
demands of the majority of people whose lives are impacted by violence and
who so desperately want peace. For as long as those holding the weapons are
the only ones heard, any resolution of conflict is going to fail:
negotiations simply re-define and reallocate power within the circles of
this increasingly unattractive minority. Instead we need to be far more
nuanced in the way in which we talk about conflict, resisting the temptation
to distil complexity into formulae that history has proved fail to work. We
need to ask different questions in order to prioritise an understanding of
the broader context of the social fabric in which conflicts take place so
that in the midst of conflict, when the situation is raw and quick fixes are
undeniably attractive, we force ourselves to be multidimensional in our
thinking.
Dr Lucy Hovil is senior researcher, International Refugee Rights Initiative.
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Received on Mon Feb 10 2014 - 17:59:09 EST