Museveni plays peacemaker by day and combatant by night in South Sudan – By
Lesley Anne Warner
Posted on January 31, 2014
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/31/museveni-plays-peacemaker-by-day-and
-combatant-by-night-in-south-sudan-by-lesley-anne-warner/>
Within days of the outbreak of the violence in mid-December, the Uganda
People’s Defence Force (UPDF) deployed to South Sudan at the government’s
invitation. The UPDF’s mission at the outset was ostensibly to evacuate the
<
http://www.irinnews.org/report/99494/doubts-over-uganda-s-military-interven
tion-in-south-sudan> over 200,000 stranded Ugandan nationals and to secure
strategic installations in Juba. However, several weeks into the operation,
President Yoweri Museveni
<
http://www.africareview.com/News/Only-nine-Ugandan-soldiers-killed-in-South
-Sudan/-/979180/2154464/-/anpkxwz/-/index.html> disclosed that the UPDF was
also involved in combat operations alongside government forces.
Indeed, the UPDF’s <
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49582>
helicopter gunships, heavy artillery, tanks, and
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25759650> approximately 1,600
soldiers have been instrumental in helping the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA) retake cities held by anti-government forces affiliated with
former Vice President Riek Machar. In a motion
<
http://m.irinnews.org/Report/99494/Doubts-over-Uganda-s-military-interventi
on-in-South-Sudan> passed in the Ugandan parliament to retroactively approve
UPDF operations, the UPDF’s raison d’être in South Sudan was couched in
terms of protecting the Ugandan expatriate community, ensuring Ugandan
national security, and preventing genocide and other atrocities against
humanity.
Nevertheless, the manner in which Uganda is securing its interests
compromises concurrent efforts on the part of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), of which Uganda is a member, to mediate the
crisis.
Although one of Machar’s ‘
<
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Machar-group-wants-UPDF-out-of-S--Su
dan/-/688334/2136678/-/ur2t3n/-/index.html> red-lines’ prior to signing an
IGAD-brokered Cessation of Hostilities had been the presence of the UPDF in
South Sudan, he quickly
<
http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/How-the-South-Sudan-ceasefire-w
as-signed-/-/979182/2158506/-/10k0kloz/-/index.html> exhausted any
diplomatic or military leverage to strengthen his hand at the negotiating
table. The Cessation of Hostilities signed last week between the Government
of the Republic of South Sudan (represented by the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition
<
http://aidleap.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/south_sudan_coh_signed.pdf>
stipulates that “armed groups and allied forces invited by either side”
should be redeployed and/or progressively withdrawn. Yet, IGAD as a whole is
yet to pressure Uganda to cease playing the diametrically opposed roles of
combatant and peacemaker in South Sudan.
Museveni has long seen the stability of South Sudan as an important element
of Uganda’s national security, and has demonstrated his willingness to
intervene in South Sudan’s internal and external disputes. During a period
of particularly heightened tensions between Sudan and South Sudan in April
2012, Museveni <
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article42330>
announced Uganda’s willingness to intervene on the part of the latter in the
event of full-scale war. In addition, between 2010 and 2011, the late
General George Athor led the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A),
which was one of the strongest anti-government armed groups at the time. In
December 2011, Museveni invited Athor to Uganda to participate in a
confidential discussion of a Ugandan initiative to sponsor peace talks
between the SSDM/A and the Government of South Sudan.
Days later, Athor was <
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16273758>
killed in an ambush with the SPLA in Central Equatoria, allegedly en route
to recruit additional fighters in a part of South Sudan that was well
outside his normal operating area of Jonglei. The SSDM/A and other anti-SPLA
armed groups subsequently
<
http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/press-releases/south-sudans-rebel-
groups-accuse-uganda-president-of-killing-george-athor-vow-new-offensive>
accused Museveni of having Athor assassinated in Kampala and staging his
death by ambush in Equatoria. Coupled with his alleged complicity in Athor’s
death, Museveni’s December 2013
<
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/12/uganda-south-sudan-20131231042
4812733.html> threat that the nations of East Africa had agreed to go after
Machar should he refuse to accept a ceasefire with the Government of South
Sudan, demonstrates that Museveni’s interests are more aligned with
maintaining the pre-crisis status quo than creating the space for a
political settlement.
Museveni’s relationship with the SPLA spans four decades. During the civil
war, Uganda not only provided financial and military assistance to the SPLA
to fight the Government of Sudan, but the UPDF was even involved in direct
combat operations in South Sudan. Museveni’s wartime support for the SPLA
was especially critical between 1991 and 1993 – after the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) toppled the Derg regime, severed
Ethiopian support for the SPLA, and expelled them from their rear bases.
Furthermore, the additional setback posed by Machar’s attempt to unseat the
late John Garang as head of the SPLA just months after the loss of the
SPLA’s primary source of foreign support made Ugandan support during this
time period vital.
In retribution for Uganda’s support for the SPLA, the Government of Sudan
funneled support to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) through Machar and
other anti-SPLA groups to destabilize South Sudan and Uganda. When the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between Sudan and South
Sudan, Machar, who had come back into the SPLA fold, was the lead negotiator
for unsuccessful peace talks with the LRA. Due to the collapse of the peace
talks in 2008 and Machar’s history of shifting loyalties, Museveni may be
concerned that if Machar came to power in South Sudan, he could
<
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/08/south-sudan-peace-talks-falter
> reignite his civil war-era relationships with Khartoum and the LRA to
destabilize Uganda, despite the fact that the LRA is at its weakest point in
years.
Aside from protecting Ugandans in South Sudan and ensuring Ugandan national
security, Uganda also framed its intervention in terms of a need to prevent
“genocidal and other atrocities against humanity.” Minister of Defence
Crispus Kiyonga
<
http://www.irinnews.org/report/99494/doubts-over-uganda-s-military-interven
tion-in-south-sudan> stated, “Africa must learn to defend itself. We saw
what happened in Rwanda. Millions of people were killed as African states
and [the] UN looked on. We must not allow a repeat.” As the international
community prepares to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan
genocide, such overt references seek to cast Uganda’s intervention in a
moral, humanitarian light so as not to reveal Museveni’s actual realpolitik
motivations. Yet, actions speak louder than words. By acting as a
pro-government combatant rather than in a civilian protection capacity,
Uganda has proved that its rationale of preventing genocide in South Sudan
had no real merit.
Considering Uganda’s longstanding linkages to the current Government of
South Sudan and Museveni’s professed anti-Machar sentiments, UPDF operations
should have occurred under the auspices of IGAD, and with an African Union
or United Nations mandate restricted to protecting civilians and strategic
installations once its mission surpassed the evacuation of Ugandan
nationals. Instead, Uganda’s current roles as both combatant and peace
broker run the risk of damaging what is supposed to be a legitimate and
nonpartisan IGAD mediation process.
Lesley Anne Warner is an Africa analyst at CNA’s Center for Strategic
Studies and blogs on African politics and security at
<
http://lesleyannewarner.wordpress.com/> Lesley on Africa. Follow her on
twitter _at_lesley_warner <
https://twitter.com/#%21/lesley_warner>
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Received on Fri Jan 31 2014 - 10:39:35 EST