U.S., forget about ousting al-Assad
By Kapil Komireddi
January 28, 2014 -- Updated 2315 GMT (0715 HKT)
* He says that proved mistaken; military still backs Bashar al-Assad
* He says the U.S. goal of an al-Assad ouster is unrealistic
* He says U.S. should try to head off al Qaeda gains from Saudi
backing of the opposition
Editor's note: Kapil Komireddi is an Indian journalist who writes on South
Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. <
https://twitter.com/kapskom>
Follow him on Twitter
(CNN) -- "The French, British and Americans have no understanding of what's
happening here," a foreign diplomat posted in Syria told me in the summer of
2012. At the time it was still possible for an outsider like me, having
recently arrived in Syria from London, to imagine Bashar al-Assad's imminent
departure. Even a U.S. State Department official had dismissed his regime as
"a dead man walking."
But non-Westerners who had spent years in Syria were less hopeful. They
rejected reports in the American press prophesying the demise of the
government. Al-Assad, they said, was popular among the minorities. Besides,
the army's loyalty to him was near-absolute.
Today, Bashar al-Assad is more powerful than he was 15 months ago. For all
the predictions of his impending overthrow, his Baathist machine remains the
only stable feature in Syria. Despite the carnage, daily life in Damascus,
al-Assad's bastion, largely continues as before. There have been no major
defections, and most importantly the Syrian Arab Army, despite suffering
more than 30,000 fatalities, continues to pledge its allegiance to al-Assad.
In the past two months, it has reclaimed from the opposition territory
outside Damascus.
Yet, instead of recalibrating its response, Washington remains tethered to
its same narrow policy goal: al-Assad's removal from power. John Kerry
devoted his speech Wednesday in Switzerland, where representatives of the
Syrian government and some opposition groups have assembled to hold peace
talks, to reiterating this demand. This is an unrealistic expectation. Far
from achieving al-Assad's exit, it will prolong the violence. Syrian
government representatives did not go to the negotiating table to throw away
his gains. The so-called Geneva Communiqué that forms the basis of Kerry's
demand
<
http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-syria-talks-20140123,0,992030.story#axzz
2rKSMpxqI> does not in fact call for Assad's removal.
And he is unlikely to budge without a credible threat of force from the
United States.
Kerry claimed this week that
<
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/16/world/la-fg-wn-kerry-syria-talks-20
130916> such a threat was still "on the table." In truth, Washington's
options are severely limited by the embarrassing fact that the opposition
that has come to Switzerland to wrest power from al-Assad does not have a
significant constituency in Syria. Its
<
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/uk-syria-crisis-idUKBREA0J0SX20140
123> members hold little sway over the mujahideen fighting government
forces.
Much of the territory outside the government's control is held by groups
linked to al Qaeda, and al Qaeda is opposed to the peace talks. It is aware
that it could emerge as the unintended beneficiary of any Western attempt to
dislodge al-Assad.
Even the "moderate" elements of the opposition appear to be beyond
Washington's control. The peace talks in Switzerland were deemed crucial by
Washington. Yet members of the opposition repeatedly threatened to derail
them if their demand to exclude Iran from the process was not met. Kerry had
been attempting for weeks to get a seat for Tehran at the talks because he
grasped that,
<
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/world/middleeast/kerry-iran-syria.html?_r
=0> as a regional power that has abetted Syria in its civil war, Iran's
presence was vital to progress. This irked Saudi Arabia, the Sunni theocracy
that is alarmed by the thaw in relations between Tehran and Washington.
Saudi Arabia's intervention in Syria has always been part of its effort to
blunt Iran's influence and cripple what it sees is a Shia corridor of power
in the Middle East. As the principal backer of the opposition, Saudi Arabia
<
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-22/saudi-arabia-said-to-disregard-u-s
-on-aid-to-syria-islamists.html> has played a key role in transforming Syria
into a haven for foreign jihadists cut from the same ideological cloth as
the men who carried out the 9/11 attacks. Iran hurt its own interests by
refusing to adhere to preconditions, which in Tehran's view bound it to an
unfavorable outcome -- a Saudi-backed transitional government -- even before
the talks had begun. But its abrupt exclusion from the peace talks is a
triumph of Saudi policy.
All of this explains why al-Assad, despite having presided over the
slaughter of so many Syrians, was able to ridicule the negotiations
<
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/01/20/Assad-Hariri-tr
ial-tool-to-pressure-Hezbollah-.htm> as a "joke." His decision to dispatch a
delegation to participate in them was in deference to his sponsors in Russia
who, having labored hard to halt the threat of a U.S. military strike
against their client last year, are eager to demonstrate the utility of
diplomacy. Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, was quick to cast
the opening day as a success. "For the first time in three years,"
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/22/us-syria-crisis-idUSBREA0L0H82014
0122> he said, "the sides -- for all their accusations -- agreed to sit
down at the negotiating table."
But the framework for the negotiations already looks obsolete. Hammered out
in 2012 by Kofi Annan, then the U.N. peace envoy to Syria, its terms --
calling for a transitional governing body by mutual consent of all parties,
a national dialogue, free elections, and a comprehensive review of the
constitution -- hark back to a time when al-Assad seemed weak, the
opposition was unified, and the phrase "Arab Spring" could be spoken
hopefully in the West. The major powers that helped forge the Geneva
Communiqué, perhaps anticipating al-Assad's fall, refused to place their
weight behind it when it mattered.
<
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/world/middleeast/annan-resigns-as-syria-p
eace-envoy.html?pagewanted=al> Annan quit his job in frustration.
To ordinary Syrians, the ongoing talks in Switzerland look like a
meaningless sideshow. Al-Assad, feeling triumphant, refuses to go. An
internally riven opposition refuses to temper its demands. The West,
unwilling to intervene militarily and incapable yet of forcing change
diplomatically, watches with impotent rage. Al Qaeda, once enfeebled, looks
on expectantly.
Syria is now a homicidal theater for a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and
Iran -- the Middle East's Sunni and Shia powers. A dialogue between the two
may do more to halt the fighting in Syria than negotiations between Assad
and his Syrian adversaries operating from abroad. Washington's energies are
better spent in nudging the two rivals in that direction.
More immediately, the United States' ambition should be to end the violence.
Rather than push for al-Assad's departure, it should work toward obtaining a
pragmatic power-sharing deal centered on reconciliation rather than regime
change. Finally, it should press its allies in Saudi Arabia and Qatar to
drop their support for radical Islamists. If not, the flames that are now
devouring Syria may soon engulf the West.
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Received on Tue Jan 28 2014 - 17:26:26 EST