South Sudan: Not Just another War and another Peace in Africa - By Matthew
Le Riche
Posted on
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/28/south-sudan-not-just-another-war-and
-another-peace-in-africa-by-matthew-le-riche/> January 28, 2014
Making sense of the situation unfolding in South Sudan is a daunting task.
There is however, a lot accumulated knowledge that can help us in this
pursuit. Reading journalistic accounts and listening to official engagements
by global leaders and others involved suggests much of this repertoire of
knowledge has been lost or ignored.
Common explanations for the conflict are ethnic or tribal violence; an
opposition confronting an authoritarian government; and/or a humanitarian
crisis. I have felt that most commentary on the situation mirrors most of
that which has come before regarding conflict in Africa more generally.
Let's unpack these approaches to thinking about the current situation in
South Sudan. Although hope for a mediated settlement is positive, real
progress and peace will only come with widespread reconciliation and
political efforts that take the intricate detail of the situation into
account. Peace agreements are more than just pieces of paper; they must be
viable and as the saying goes, the devil is in the detail.
The structure of the conflict is important.
The idea that there are two clearly discernable camps, 1) the government and
2) the opposition is inaccurate. There remain many questions about the
coherence of the so-called opposition group both politically and militarily.
The group of leaders detained and arrested in Juba may have expressed
oppositional views about the President but each individual's role in the
situation remains unclear to the public. The accused and the public deserve
those arrested to be given their day in court.
The political figures involved and those fighting were, up until recently,
members of the same government, or at least the main political party. So the
fight is as much within a political party as it is between those with
alternate political visions for the new nation. Personal political ambitions
are just as important as wider political agendas, and in many cases, the
most important.
Another major issue with this binary description is the question of command
and control of opposition forces. For example, in some interviews Riek
Machar has claimed to be in command of all the 'rebel' forces. On other
occasions he has denied that he controls the White Army (a group of armed
youth that are marauding throughout Jonglei), rather stating they are
directed by a "local spiritual leader". While some clear groups exist in the
field, such as that under the command of General Peter Gadet, (this is the
group that threatened Juba and took control of Bor), the connection between
these forces and political leaders remains unclear. This renders any
agreement inked in Addis Ababa tenuous and difficult to enforce.
Connected to the tendency for polarised 'framing' is that those described as
'opposition' are often understood as being popularly representative of a
minority group. The conclusion tends to be that oppositions are thus
attempting to redress abuses, wrongs and marginalization. In South Sudan
currently, those accused of heading the opposition are from very different
communities and have varied backgrounds. Some were already being targeted on
corruption charges before the fighting erupted, and others had only just
been removed from posts in government. Curiously absent in the group are
some of the long-time opposition to the government such as Lam Akol and
leaders of the SPLM-DC (the only significant opposition political party
outside of the SPLM proper).
Rather than observing an opposition vs. government, the situation we see
unfolding is a tragic case of post-liberation movement bifurcation or
fragmentation. It is very common in states where a liberation movement
becomes the government that the political party then begins to break apart
with the disappearance of the unifying force of common opposition to
colonialism or other marginalization.
This is not an ethnic war. at least not yet.
So why does it look like one to so many? And what element has ethnicity (in
this case tribal affiliation) played in the conflict?
If you consider the chronology of events in detail, the role of tribal
identity in the conflict becomes clear.
All the senior figures involved had/have organized armed bodyguard forces,
the largest being the Presidential Guard (known as 'Tiger'), a sub-unit of
the army, they are based separately from the main body and command of the
army. Tiger also responds to a slightly different chain of command, being
directly under the control of the President.
In South Sudan any leader has a major obligation to his or her community or
tribe. These obligations are often satisfied by including large numbers of
extended family or fellow-tribesmen in offices in government or as drivers,
advisers, guards etc.
Most of the figures involved have bodyguard forces largely from their home
areas and tribes that radiated around them. This nepotistic approach has
created a situation where the main supporters and physical defenders of
individual leaders took on more or less exclusive ethnic constructions.
In early December the South Sudan security services had concluded, rightly
or wrongly, that there was an imminent threat to the President and
government. On orders from President Kiir, Tiger moved to arrest the figures
believed to pose the greatest threat. This included almost all of those
politicians that attended the meeting and rally of discontent with the
government and President in the days preceding the escalation of violence.
Along with these arrests also came the attempt to neutralize the loyalist
guards of each of the accused. The initial and most urgent action was taken
to disarm and put under control those connected or believed to be connected
to the former Vice President Riek Machar. There were also several units in
the military that had major concentrations perceived to be loyal to some of
the accused. Efforts by the security services were taken to prevent these
groups from posing a threat.
The result of this action however, was a focus on individuals from several
communities. Investigations and police actions, along with Military Police,
began to appear as though they were targeting the Nuer community - this was
largely a result of Machar and others surrounding themselves with their own
tribesmen.
Unsurprisingly, many in these groups resisted and then actively took on
units of the Presidential Guard and government security services. They then
took what resources they could muster and fled to the bush to link with
defecting units and others preparing to fight the government. Most of the
accused accepted the arrests and at the same time instructed any associated
armed manpower not to resist. But in the case of the former Vice President
and several others, a very forceful resistance was unleashed.
The violent and often exaggerated response of the Presidential Guard then
resulted in further escalation, and the cycle of attack and retaliation
began. Those linked in any way to Riek Machar, which meant mostly Nuer, were
targeted by the Presidential Guard. Then many began to draw the conclusion
that any Nuer was connected to Riek Machar. The reality however was that
many Nuer remained in the army - including the Chief of Staff.
The guards of the different leaders had all built up heavily armed
protection groups, largely drawn from their respective tribal groups, which
meant that the fighting took on the character of ethnic targeting. No doubt
young male Nuer were being targeted by the security services, but it was not
necessarily by virtue of a specific hatred of Nuer, but because of a
perceived connection to the former Vice President and others who were
believed to be plotting against the President.
The orders and directions were taken too far and abused, with many Nuer
suffering the consequences. This then gave justification to others to
retaliate upon Dinka communities in areas such as Akobo and Bor where the
forces of Peter Gadet and the White Army engaged in operations against the
government.
It is important to understand that the majority of the attacks were not
initially because of ethnicity or a hatred of others due to their ethnicity.
Furthermore, most of the opposition figures detained are Dinka. That said,
the more this dynamic of attack and retribution progresses, and the more it
is framed as 'ethnic fighting' by all involved, including journalists and
international organizations, the more it moves towards tribal or ethnically
defined war.
Consequently, we can see an instrumental manipulation and use of
tribal/ethnic identity and loyalties. The international community and those
observing this situation should work to undermine this dynamic and logic
that is pushing the conflict in the most dangerous of directions.
Peace Deal in Addis Ababa
Several specific issues with the agreements struck in Addis Ababa suggest
that the deal is not likely to hold.
The nature of the focus on the release of the arrested leaders is the first
problem. The combination of granting a pardon and the release of those
detained is confusing. It remains to be seen if there is a justifiable case
against them. Support and pressure for due process should be the more
appropriate demand. Not proposing such a scenario, along with the inclusion
of the requirement of a pardon, is curious - it suggests an acceptance of
guilt and resembles the many amnesties given by the President to various
other individuals and groups that have defected and used violence against
the government.
Sadly the attempt at a process of political inclusion and mediation since
the CPA in 2005 has created a cycle where there are many incentives
associated with rebellion and the threat and/or use of violence.
Some detainees are likely to want some kind of proper judicial process as
they will want to clear their names of wrongdoing. Also, if there was
in-fact a coup or some other violent action being planned, the South
Sudanese government should be supported to implement more appropriate
judicial process and if they express capacity limitations various
international actors would more than likely be willing to provide support.
In some respect the deal as it stands does not allow the government of South
Sudan to implement due process and will likely just prolong the type of
cyclical violence plaguing the young state.
The BBC has reported that despite agreeing to the Addis Ababa deal, the
government of South Sudan has commented that they will not release prisoners
until appropriate legal processes have been carried out. Riek Machar has
also stated that he would not cease his actions until President Kiir leaves
office. Those at the lowest level, such as the youth fighters of the White
Army, have stated that they will not stop until Machar is made President.
Another major problem with the agreement is the practicality of how it would
be implemented. All the peace agreements to date in South Sudan and Sudan
have struggled with implementation. This one, with even more vague
statements and less clear requirements is unlikely to be different. The
requirement for all forces to be redeployed also conflicts with the
requirements to preclude any "actions that could be viewed as
confrontational."
Movements can be interpreted in so many ways, with major confusion amongst
forces, their locations and who is confronting who, particularly in Jonglei,
these clauses do not make practical sense. Further complicating matters, the
ability to monitor and verify this agreement is questionable. With the UN
and international community more generally facing major criticisms and
lacking credibility at the moment, it is doubtful that the terms can be
independently monitored and verified. The monitoring and verification
mechanism offered by IGAD is very limited and lacks the capacity to hold
parties to account for any violations.
Rather than offering a strong chance for peace, this agreement will just
initiate a period of blame and counter blame, morphing the conflict but not
resolving it.
The sad truth is that the recent violence has set South Sudan back in terms
of social and economic development - but this is a political fight that was
in many ways inevitable. Since South Sudan became independent, even before,
it was clear that a struggle was emerging over the future of the SPLM, the
political dispensation in the new nation and over the banner of 'liberator'
itself. No one was willing to give up ownership of the idea of being a
liberator and leader in the party of liberation. The result has been the
internal wrangling that has stalled the political party and government and
spurred internal confrontation. This is why the real political fight has not
been between parties during elections but within the SPLM itself.
The recent conflict has created a major setback to a national
reconciliation, the most critical process for the future of South Sudan.
Many may confuse the current reconciliation of some elites with each other
and the government with a core element of a national reconciliation. If
anything however, the kind of accommodation that is likely to arise from the
current situation could set back the wider and deeper national
reconciliation agenda required for South Sudan to move forward and for
people to come together as one nation and a united people.
Matthew LeRiche is Visiting Assistant Professor, Memorial University of
Newfoundland.
------------[ Sent via the dehai-wn mailing list by dehai.org]--------------
Received on Tue Jan 28 2014 - 16:52:28 EST