Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2014 00:29:31 +0100
New Threats in Africa Mean New Questions for UN Peacekeeping: Interview with
Major General Patrick Cammaert
By Bianca Selway
16 January 2014
New types of UN peacekeeping brigades could compromise the United Nations'
basic principle of impartiality and put UN personnel, their families, and
other organizations at risk, said Major General Patrick Cammaert, the former
military advisor to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
and former Eastern Division Commander to the UN Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
Mr. Cammaert said that although the UN's first "intervention brigade" helped
the Congolese army defeat the M23 rebel group in early November, "there are
a lot of questions to be raised before we can say this is now the recipe for
the future."
"We first had a transition from traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI of
the [UN] charter to multidimensional peacekeeping under Chapter VII of the
charter. Are we now going one step further where we have a kind of blurring
of one of the principles, the consent of the parties? Or, are we now calling
in first coalitions of the willing multinational forces with a non-consent
attitude sanctioned by the [Security] Council?"
Mr. Cammaert said the first priority should be to develop a political
consensus between the Security Council, DPKO, and the troop-contributing
countries of what "robust" peacekeeping is from a tactical standpoint.
"And maybe with all of this blurring of consent and impartiality, the
principles of peacekeeping, maybe it's time that we have another
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Report_of_the_Panel_on_United_Nations_Peacekee
ping> Brahimi report," he said, referring to the landmark report published
in 2000.
Mr. Cammaert said UN peacekeepers are running up against "a threat that has
never been seen in Africa before." He cited new weaponry such as improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombs, and car bombs that are changing the
game in Africa.
Mr. Cammaert discussed the use of drones, known as unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), in UN peacekeeping, and described three hurdles. One is that UAVs
can only fly with the consent of the parties in that country. The second is
that neighboring countries get very nervous when drones are being used just
across their borders. And the third is the question of who is controlling,
interpreting, consuming, and transforming the data.
"In general terms, the discussion on drones has opened a debate on using
more technology in peacekeeping," he said. "I think there are now
technologies available that should be used by peacekeepers, concepts
developed by UN headquarters, the office of military affairs." He said what
is needed now is not stereotypical peacekeeping units, but tailor-made
forces for each country.
Interview
Bianca Selway: Today, I welcome Major General Patrick Cammaert to the Global
Observatory. He's the former military advisor to the United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and former Eastern Division Commander
to the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
My first question is: Earlier this month, the M23 rebel group in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo surrendered following a military defeat by
the Congolese armed forces and UN troops. What was the role of the UN
intervention brigade in this defeat?
Patrick Cammaert: Before I really give an answer on the role of UN
intervention brigade in the defeat, I would like to mention that the FARDC,
the Congolese army, did play a significant role in this operation, which was
a little bit unexpected because the reputation of the FARDC was not that
good, to say it mildly, and certainly not when we remember November-December
last year when the M23 managed to have the FARDC on the run and have the
United Nations peacekeepers in a very passive role, and then march into
Goma. That was still the perception when the whole thing developed recently.
So, the FARDC did a tremendous role, and the role of the United Nations
mission-and the intervention brigade in particular-was very much a support
of the operations of the FARDC. And support means providing fire support,
providing advice by their force commander, the brigade commanders, providing
logistic support, and working in joint operations quite closely with the
FARDC in all sorts of blocking positions, and, in the end, using the attack
helicopters to further bring the M23 on their retreat and on their
surrender. So, the intervention brigade did a good job, and I also think
that the FARDC did a very, very, very good job.
BS: What do you think is next for the brigade and the broader UN
peacekeeping mission in the Congo, MONUSCO?
PC: Again, let's start with the FARDC. I mean, they have now recovered the
ground that was previously occupied by the M23, so it's very important that
state authority will be restored in the North Kivu province in particular,
and that the ground that has been recovered will be held by the Congolese
authorities, by the army and the police, because MONUSCO has no capacity to
do that because the forces are used and needed somewhere else. And we should
not forget that the mandate of the protections of civilians under imminent
threat of physical violence, including sexual violence, is still a priority
in the mandate of MONUSCO, including the intervention brigade.
So, the intervention brigade and the regular forces of MONUSCO are very much
needed somewhere else because there are still a lot of armed groups left-the
ADF-Nalu, FDLR/Interahamwe, you have the LRA, you have also the various
Mai-Mai groups-there are still a lot of spoilers of the process of
sustainable peace and stability in the Congo, and, in particular, in the
eastern part of the Congo.
So, there is still a lot of work to be done, and, as I understand it from
the force commander, General Carlos Santos-Cruz-who did an outstanding job
in bringing all the military noses, but also the civilian noses, pointing in
the same direction and saying we have one mandate, we are one mission, we
are one force-it's now looking at how and when to point the attention to the
other armed groups, and working again closely with the FARDC, because the
FARDC in principle are the ones who have the first responsibility to protect
their own civilians of imminent threat. So, that is now in the planning
phase, and there is a consolidating phase in where and how to position
troops, FARDC and MONUSCO troops, on the ground that had been recovered from
the M23.
BS: Given that the military defeat of the M23 has largely been hailed as a
success, are we likely to see this kind of more aggressive intervention
brigade used in other UN peace operations?
PC: Well, that's a very interesting question, because this intervention
brigade was mandated and invented by the Security Council because of sheer
frustration of the passivity of MONUSCO in November-December, and the
Council said, well, this should stop, we should restore the reputation of
MONUSCO, we should restore the credibility of MONUSCO in the eyes of the
international community and the local population.
So, with that, on an exceptional basis, this intervention brigade was
mandated. And the mandate as such was only adjusted to give an extra line
for the intervention brigade to neutralize and target armed groups. The rest
of the mandate and the rules of engagement were unchanged.
So, we have here an interesting situation that the regular forces-i.e.,
everybody minus the intervention brigade-still have a protection of civilian
mandate, are still authorized to use force beyond self defense. And how are
they now-when they were passive in November and December of last year-are
they now going to be active-proactive in particular-to prevent atrocities
from happening? That has to be seen.
And this exceptional basis that the Council brought in their mandate-it has
a little bit of a resemblance to 2011. If I'm not mistaken, Security Council
resolution 1975 in Cote d'Ivoire, where the Council was also frustrated by a
sort of passivity of the UN forces in Cote d'Ivoire and said in the mandate
that was launched then to prevent heavy weapons to be used by armed groups,
which was also inviting or underlining a more proactive posture than before.
So, it has to be seen if this is a kind of a pattern, and it has to be seen
what is required in the future. Because we are seeing now something coming
over the horizon like the Central African Republic, we have seen things in
Mali-which are extraordinary situations with a threat of spoilers of a
process, if I may say it mildly, using weaponry like IEDs-improvised
explosive devices, suicide bombs, car bombs, you name it. A threat that has
never been seen in Africa before.
So, are we now in a transition? We had first a transition from traditional
peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the [UN] charter to multidimensional
peacekeeping under Chapter VII of the charter. Are we now going one step
further where we have a kind of blurring of the principles of peacekeeping
such as the consent of the parties, or impartiality? Or, are we now calling
in first coalitions of the willing multinational forces with a non-consent
attitude sanctioned by the Council? There are a lot of questions to be
raised before we can say this is now the recipe for the future.
Because we should not forget that, yes, we had in this case a handful of
countries who were willing to provide troops for this intervention
brigade-South Africa, Tanzania, Mali-but what about all the others? And if
every mission, when faced with a serious security problem, people said,
well, that's not my problem, we should call in an intervention brigade? We
have to be proactive. We don't want to go that track. Well, you will
probably not find the troops to do that, you see? So, in my view, the first
priority to look at is that political consensus should be obtained between
the Security Council, DPKO, and the troop-contributing countries of what is
robust peacekeeping. And robust peacekeeping is the use of force under
Chapter VII of the charter at the tactical level.
On the tactical level-not on the strategic level, the strategic level is in
the Council-there should be clarity. Because if we don't have that political
consensus, you stumble from one problem to the other, forcing the Council to
act out of frustration and coming up with these kind of new concepts, which
have a lot of dangers as well. You have a risk of being drawn into the
conflict as one of parties of the conflict-your impartiality is at stake.
Humanitarian colleagues, UN family, and NGOs are not very happy with that
because they could be seen as part of the United Nations intervention
brigade. There are a number of risks there that have to be addressed.
And maybe with all of this blurring of consent and impartiality, the
principles of peacekeeping, maybe it's time that we consider to update the
Brahimi report. Maybe you have somebody who might be the right person to
lead a group of people who conceptually, doctrinally look at this: How and
in which direction are we going with peacekeeping? Because the United
Nations headquarters is not a multinational force headquarters or a
coalition of the willing headquarters-is not an operational headquarters, as
NATO has in Afghanistan. The UN headquarters is a strategic, political
headquarters. And the authority is invested and delegated to the force
commander and the SRSG [Special Representative of the Secretary-General].
Now, if you go steps further in using force, that command-and-control
arrangement might change as well. Is the United Nations ready for that? Are
the member states ready for that? I don't know, but it is something that has
to be addressed and has to be addressed soon, before we have another problem
on our doorstep, like the Central African Republic, or another one coming in
Syria or Somalia. One can also see also a change from multidimensional
peacekeeping to transnational organized crime. How are we going to deal with
that in peacekeeping operations? All these things have to be addressed in a
new way of thinking or an updated/adjusted Brahimi.
BS: The Congo mission has also been the first to mandate the use of unarmed
drones. What are some of the challenges that peacekeeping missions are
likely to face in using drones?
PC: It's very interesting. We live now in 2013. I just looked it up, when I
was military advisor in 2003 and one of the missions established in, if I'm
not mistaken, August 2003, was Liberia. I went there as a military advisor
to help set up the mission. And to cut a very long story short, we came up
with a plan to use aerial surveillance and unarmed vehicle drones.
When I left, that was put into plans, and when I left to go to the eastern
part of the Congo as a division commander, the mission managed at that time
to get six million dollars in the budget to get this kind of equipment. And
all the specifications in terms of reference, all the plans and requirements
were written, but in UN headquarters, I think the time was not ripe. Now,
ten years later, 2013, the first UAVs are drawn in and brought to the Congo.
There are positive and negative sides to this. And, as I said, we were
already studying that in 2003. UAVs can only fly with the consent of the
parties in that country, because if the United Nations is not controlling
the air space and the host country says you will not fly those UAVs. If you
want to use them in Sudan or Darfur, there's a great possibility that they
will never enter the country, let alone that you can use them, because the
government is already making life very difficult for helicopters to fly, let
alone UAVs. So, that is a precondition. You must have a host government who
is willing to fly them or let them fly and let them be used by the United
Nations.
Two, the neighbors of the area where you are going to use them might feel
uncomfortable. That is something that you cannot totally ignore. Let me put
it this way: there are sensitivities there which you have to take into
account.
Another thing that plays here is who is controlling, interpreting,
consuming, transforming the data. You must have analysts who are skilled to
do that. Are those civilians who come with the equipment that they are
using? I don't know. Or are they from a member state that's providing those
people because they are skilled to do that, are they civilian, are they
military? I don't know. That is something that has to be looked at.
In general terms, the discussion on drones has opened a debate on using more
technology in peacekeeping. I think there are now technologies available
that should be used by peacekeepers, concepts developed by UN headquarters,
the office of military affairs. We need, in my view, not stereotypical
units-so many vehicles, so many of this, so many of that. You need
tailor-made forces. You need tailor-made forces for Mali. You need
tailor-made forces for Sudan. You need tailor-made forces for the Congo.
For instance, in the Congo, you have huge lakes. In my time, there was a
smuggling of weapons and ammunition from the neighbors over the lakes into
the eastern part of the Congo. We used our naval forces, riverine units, to
patrol the lakes and to intercept those kinds of smugglers. Sometimes we
were successful, sometimes we were not.
But you have technology in the form of radar that could very easily point
out where people are sailing and where their courses are, etc. Member states
might be willing to provide the UN with this kind of equipment. You have
nowadays ground radar that you can put on certain routes, you have infrared
sensors. You have RAVEN systems-those are small drones; you throw them in
the air, a little plane, you control them with your iPad, and you can see
over the horizon of what's going on, and you can adjust your plans and your
tactics and all the rest. It is a very technical piece of equipment
So, there are a lot of technologies nowadays available with member states in
particular with the armed forces of developed countries. Maybe it provides
an opening for those countries to come back in UN peacekeeping. When you
talk about tailor-made forces, that is something in the force requirements
that the mission of the office of military affairs should ask member states
to provide, and equip a mission with, so that the force commander and the
senior management team can use that in their effort to have the joint
mission analysis cell, the JMAC, to provide them with better documents,
policy papers assessments for decisions to be made and strategic planning to
be made.
And finally, you have also what we call the infusion cells. It has to do
with the consuming of the data, etc. So you need specialists who can put the
whole thing together and together with the JMAC provide an intel picture of
the battlefield of the area of the operations.
BS: Thank you so much for your time. It's been an absolute pleasure meeting
with you this morning.
<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kitgum_IDP_camp_from_the_air,_Uganda
.jpg> Kitgum IDP camp from the air, Uganda
A camp of internally displaced persons (IDP) in Kitgum, Uganda.
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