The 23 May 2013 twin suicide attacks targeting the Agadez army barracks and
an Areva mining site in Arlit, and the 1 June violent prison break in
Niamey, cast a shadow over Niger’s stability. In a deteriorating regional
environment, President Mahamadou Issoufou and his Western allies have
favoured a security strategy that has significant limitations, as elsewhere
in the Sahel. An excessive focus on external threats can overshadow
important internal dynamics, such as communal tensions, a democratic deficit
and the growing marginalisation of poor, rural societies. Security spending
looks likely to increase at the expense of social expenditure, carrying
significant risks for a country that faces serious demographic and economic
challenges. The possibility of a terrorist spillover from its neighbours is
compounded by a fragile socio-economic and political environment.
Niger, a focus of outside interest mainly for its uranium and newfound oil
reserves, has recently received renewed attention. For several years,
Western countries have viewed the Sahel-Sahara region as a particularly
dangerous zone, characterised by the rise of insecurity, political crises
and poorly controlled flows of people, arms and other licit and illicit
goods. The 2011 Libyan civil war, the 2012 Mali crisis and the recent
intensification of military confrontations between government forces and
Boko Haram in northern Nigeria all affect Niger. Ideas, weapons and
combatants circulate across borders. However, surrounded by crisis-ridden
neighbours, Niger appears contradictorily to be fragile and yet an island of
stability. Its Western and regional allies seek to contain perceived growing
threats, in particular from violent Islamist groups such al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in
West Africa (MUJAO).
Since 2011, Nigerien security forces have been on alert with the support of
Western militaries that have been present in the country ever since. They
also contribute to the UN Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), with a
battalion deployed in the Gao region, close to Niger. The country has been
included in security strategies that protect it, but over which it has
little influence. Niger constitutes an important element of the French
military operation in Mali; is pivotal to the European Union’s Strategy for
Security and Development in the Sahel; and also accommodates a growing U.S.
assistance and presence. Encouraged by its allies to upgrade its security
apparatus, the government has also substantially increased its military
expenditure. But such a security focus could lead to a reallocation of
resources at the expense of already weak social sectors.
The security strategy pursued in the Sahel over the last decade has proven
weak in neighbouring Mali. In Niger, it will be of little help to President
Issoufou in establishing a bond of trust between the state and the people.
The current regime, which took over after a transition from military rule in
2011, is still fragile. The president’s “Renaissance” program, a high-level
platform of reforms on which he was elected, raised hopes but has yet to
show tangible results. Social protests are already on the rise. This
situation stirs political ambitions, and tensions surrounding the formation
of the new national unity government in August 2013 revealed a fragile
democracy. Moreover, as in the rest of the Sahel-Sahara region, the state
and security apparatus are suspected of being infiltrated by transnational
criminal networks. The risks are high when deep socio-economic distress is
added to insufficient democratic consolidation.
However, these weaknesses should not obscure a more nuanced reality. In
2009, the attempt by then-President Mamadou Tandja to forcibly remain in
power showed that some institutions and civil society are willing to fight
to protect democracy. The military admittedly intervened in political life
to stop Tandja, but returned to the barracks after a relatively short
transition. These gains are certainly still weak. The historically
influential military could intercede again in the event of an institutional
deadlock. Corruption and impunity remain endemic, and some civil society
representatives have been co-opted by the ruling elites. As in Mali,
frustration over democratic shortcomings feeds the expansion of an Islamic
civil society that is particularly vocal in its criticism; it can represent
either a radical, potentially violent protest movement or a peaceful attempt
to “re-moralise” public life.
Finally, the Tuareg issue has not been fully resolved in Niger, though it
appears better managed than in neighbouring Mali. Far from being homogenous,
Tuareg society is divided along generation, clan and social fault lines;
some elites are well integrated into the administration and have little
reason to turn against the state, while others raise the spectre of a
resurgent conflict, out of conviction or to defend their privileged position
as middlemen. The population has grown tired of rebellions that have failed
to keep their promises, but many youths from the north have few alternatives
to trafficking and armed activities.
Rather than a security state, the people of Niger need a government that
provides services, an economy that creates employment, as well as the rule
of law and a reinforced democratic system. President Issoufou should keep
the initial focus of his agenda on these goals and recognise that national
security and stability depend at least as much on those issues as on narrow
counter-terrorism military responses.
Dakar/Brussels, 19 September 2013
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Received on Sun Sep 22 2013 - 13:56:45 EDT