Succession And Political Stability In Saudi Arabia - Analysis
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http://www.eurasiareview.com/author/observer-research-foundation/>
Observer Research Foundation
September 22, 2013
By Prabhat Prakash
For the last 60 years, the crown has been passed on to Ibn Saud's many sons
who have continued his family line. So, by extending this principle of
succession it can be argued that if the crown is passed to the next
generation, that branch of the family will dominate the coming successions
and eliminate other family lines.
Succession to the next generation may pose a threat to the Kingdom's
stability as it will create "a complex web of rivalry and political
competition"1 among Saudi princes who wish to secure their family lines.
House argues that historical precedent suggests that the system of brotherly
succession has created family feuds in the past, which have led to the
collapse of previous Saudi states. The second Saudi state, she contends, was
toppled in 1891 due to Al Saud brothers fighting for dominance2 . There were
others like, Saud bin Abdulaziz (son of Ibn Saud), who when in power drained
State resources and left the nation bankrupt.
In Saudi, the King holds the ultimate power and by that token it can be
argued that he is the sole decision maker. But there is historical precedent
that suggests that important decisions are only approved by the King once
consensus has been reached. This was evident when in 1990s, Abdullah bin
Abdulaziz (son of Ibn Saud and the current King) was trying to liaison with
foreign oil companies but the decision was delayed because the step was
being opposed by the members of House of Saud. This form of decision making
has its root in the Bedouin tradition, where decisions are taken by
consulting the heads of different tribes. It can be suggested that the
Bedouin tradition is not for maintaining equality but to guarantee loyalty.
A society which has not embraced western style democracy and is based on a
system of hierarchical superiority where the pace of reform is influenced by
its rigid and conservative political system, it is essential to keep these
isolated tribes content because regional tensions can infect the Kingdom and
trigger instability.
Regression and unpredictability
Al- Rasheed argues that Saudi Arabia can be defined as a kingdom in
regression which is, "plagued by regular reshuffling of princes and lacking
energetic leadership with a serious vision for the future"3 . By extending
this argument of constant instability in the kingdom, it can be suggested
that any succession due to its sheer complexity is open to conflict.
Reshuffling can also be seen as a way of redistributing wealth in Saudi
Arabia, as governmental seniority brings opportunities to make financial
gains. Al-Rasheed calls this a 'balanced and orchestrated game,' which
upholds the principles of the Bedouin tradition. The unpredictability and
ambiguity of the Saudi succession system creates an illusion that all
contenders to the Crown have an equal chance of becoming the King and
therefore reduces the probability of voices being raised against the status
quo. This hinders the possibility of future reforms.
Karasik draws comparisons between Saudi and the Soviet Union by arguing that
"Saudi Arabia right now is looking a lot like the Soviet Union did at the
end of its empire in terms of ageing leadership and switching leaders
quickly because of sudden deaths."4 However, it will be naive to believe
that Saudi will have the same fate as the Soviet Union because both are
distinct in their internal and external policies. Today's challenges are
different from those of the post Cold War era and Saudi's close economic
ties with the US and its strong regional position makes the political
climate of the Kingdom unique. America's vested interest in Saudi Arabia
both in terms of oil and its crucial role in aiding the US to maintain the
regional stability or insatiability are of prime consideration.
Factors affecting succession
There has been a great amount of speculation among diplomats, academics and
the business industry about the internal workings of the House of Saud.
Different factions of the international community have different priorities
and therefore hold a distinct conception as to what the decision making
process entails. It can be argued that if one is well versed with the
internal dynamics of the Royal family, it will aid the process of predicting
decisions taken by the King. However, it would be ignorant to believe that
House of Saud functions in isolation and external factions do not influence
the dynamics within the Kingdom. These external factions tend to include a
wide variety of stakeholders including State and non State actors. In order
to understand the Saudi political system and succession it is pivotal to
consider some of these rational and irrational actors who have the potential
to influence Succession.
Religion and politics
Understanding the Saudi-Wahhabi relationship is pivotal to analyse the
operations of the State. Yamani argues that the region can be defined in
terms of struggle for mastery of the Muslim world. It can be suggested that
this struggle includes two major regional players, Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Both can be perceived as expansionists and promoting their sect of Islam 5
.This is evident from the lengths the Saudi-Wahhabi regime has gone to
promote their politico-religious ideology. Bronson elaborates on this and
contends that King Fahd spent over $75 billion to build religious schools
and Mosques 6.
The importance of religious organisations is well established in Saudi
Arabia. When in 1963, King Saud refused to give up the Crown, the Ulema
intervened and appointed Crown prince Faisal as the new King. This proves
the kind of power the Ulema holds in Saudi society. This can be seen as a
classic example of a symbiotic relationship between religion and politics.
In Saudi, the leadership has often used religious organisations to
legitimise their rule, as this provides the decisions taken by the
government a religious backing which in turn gives the religious authorities
a position of respect in civil society. Marines agrees with this and
suggests that the relationship between the Ulema and the Government can be
viewed as one which is exemplified by interdependence7 .
The Ulema in Saudi can also be compared with the Iranian Supreme leader in
that it is seen as a institution of high importance, but the Ulema, unlike
the Supreme leader, does not enjoy an official status and is mainly used as
a tool of political and social legitimisation. Therefore, it can be
suggested that due to the Kingdom's history and the role religion played in
its formation, the State cannot function without a body that upholds its
religion. Salame posits that the Saudi political system can be defined in
terms of theocracy. But by viewing the political system in such narrow
terms, the importance of local identities and societal values are ignored8 .
These regional differences provide Saudi's with a sense of identity which
plays a crucial part in Saudi politics that is based on regional inclusion.
In March 2013, a prominent cleric denounced the harsh sentencing of two
human rights activists through an 'open letter', in which he argued that,
"There is smoke and dust on the horizon. We are justified in worrying about
what lies beyond. If the security agencies tighten their grip, it will only
worsen the quagmire we are in and cut off all hope of reform," 9 this is an
example of the discord between the administration and the religious
authorities that has shaped Saudi politics. Now the call for reform is not
only wanted and argued by the minorities or the underrepresented liberals
but also other sections of the society. It will only be logical to contend
that maintaining Saudi-Wahhabi relationship is essential for Kingdom's
stability.
Royal women
Henderson argues that the Royal women play an important part in Saudi
politics and hence succession. It can be suggested that due to the
prominence of intermarriages within the House of Saud, the women represent
important families in the Kingdom and can therefore build alliances between
different branches. Henderson employs the example of how King Fahd used to
summon the women of al-Saud and discuss his views. This can be seen as an
extension of the Bedouin tradition and importance placed on building
consensus.
American influence
The U.S.-Saudi relationship is defined by necessity rather than choice. US
have vested interests in the region and Saudi's strategic position aids US
in tackling regional dilemmas. Saudi Arabia also plays a 'leadership' role
in promotion and conservation of Islam, both as a religion and an ideology.
It is often argued that the relationship between the two nations makes Saudi
Arabia seem like Americas de facto colony. Sampson suggested that from early
20th century when US oil companies invaded Saudi, the State has learned to
survive through international necessity rather than internal legitimacy10 .
US also controlled Saudi Arabia through being its 'international protector'.
Throughout the 20th century, US aided Saudi in its military operations and
remained its prime supplier of weapons. However, Yamani argues that this has
hindered Saudi from developing its own military capabilities. Saudi has also
used US to maintain its role as the regional power. A stronghold in the
Kingdom has aided US to take and often dictate decisions to other regional
players. Therefore, US will 'want' a leader that is sympathetic to the US
cause and wishes to build a relationship based on consensus and help
maintain US's position in the region.
Henderson argues that nature of this symbiotic relationship has often been
determined by the personality of the King11 . King Fahd was considered
sympathetic to the US and his decision to allow US military during the 1991
Gulf war alerted the region but reaffirmed his alliance with the US.
Blanchard argues that the Obama Administration has cooperated with Saudi
authorities on both regional and internal issues12 . King Abdullah has
continued this interdependent relationship but has taken a more cautious
approach.
Succession and regional influences
Since the region has been defined through a history of conflicts and
intervention from the time of the Ottoman Empire, it can be suggested that
its borders and people are not immune to change initiated by violent
conflicts. Until now, Saudi has not been affected by the dramatic
geopolitical changes in the region but to ensure this stability it will have
to take calculated steps. Saudi plays an important role in the region but
this can also prove problematic for its succession plans. Its constant
discord with Iran over its internal politics and its role as an aggressor in
the region has made the two countries regional rivals. It has been argued
that in order to contain Iran's power, Saudi should appoint a more dynamic
leader. It is contended that currently Saudi is "politically incapacitated"
and America and the Gulf countries should push forward for reform in the
Kingdom13 . It can be suggested that the US can play an indirect role by
encouraging GCC countries to engage in dialogue with the Royal family and
establish a basis for developing a multilateral dialogue to strengthen the
plans for succession into the next generation. Saud bin Faisal (son of Ibn
Saud), has advocated a dialogue with GCC countries regarding Iran, but its
prospects were halted due to the alleged assassination plot against the
Saudi Ambassador in Washington14 .
The Emir of Qatar has passed the Crown to his son, Tamin Bin Hamad Al
Thani15 . If Saudi follows the Qatari precedent, there is hope for internal
reforms in the Kingdom as a younger leadership can bring a fresh outlook in
liaison with the religious authorities to lighten the conservative mood in
the country. Qatar in the last 30 years has been transformed into a major
regional player which has formulated a highly assertive foreign policy.
However, it will be inaccurate to compare Saudi and Qatar, as both countries
have distinct demographics. Qatar is not plagued with many of Saudi's social
problems like youth unemployment and income inequality. Qatar, owing to its
disproportionately small size and the wealth generated from its natural gas
reserves, give it a per capita rate four times that of Saudi. Cunningham
argues that the Qatari succession should not be seen as a shake-up but a
mere shuffle, the main purpose of which is to send a signal to its regional
rivals and the international community of its modernising nature16 . There
are commonalities between the two Gulf States, such as their aggressive
stand towards Iran. In that sense, an alliance between the younger
generations over geopolitical issues can prove beneficial.
Orderly succession, political reforms through consensus and regular
consultation to promote regional harmony will contribute to stability within
Saudi Arabia and in the West Asian region as a whole; stability vital for
peace and harmony in the world at large.
(The author was a Research Intern at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)
1. "The Political Outlook of Saudi Arabia", Chatham House Reports. May
2011
2. House, Karen. On Saudi Arabia. Alfred A. Knope (2012)
3. Al-Rasheed,The unpredictable succession plan of Saudi Arabia. April 23
2013
4. Katy Watson, "Saudi succession raises Economic Challenges." BBC News
26 June 2012
5. May Yamani. (2009). From fragility to stability: a survival strategy
for the Saudi monarchy. Contempory Arab Affairs . 2 (2), 90-105.
6. Bronson, R., 2006. Thicker than oil: America's uneasy partnership with
Saudi Arabia. New York: Oxford University Press.
7. Marines, Alejandra Galindo (2001) The relationship between the ulama
and the government in the contemporary Saudi Arabian Kingdom: an
interdependent relationship?, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at
Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3989/
8. Salame, Ghassan (1987). "Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia" in Arab
Studies Quaterly 9, (3): 306-325.
9. Editorial. (2013). House of Saud: built on sand. Available:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/02/saudi-arabia-editorial
10. Sampson, A., 1975. The Seven Sisters: the great oil companies and the
world they shaped. New York; Viking Press.
11. Simon Henderson, "The Saudi Way." Wall Street journal, August 2012
12. Blanchard, C. (2012) "Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S relations".
Congressional research service.
13. Simon Hendreson . (2013). To stop Iraa, get a new Saudi King .
Available:
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/to-stop-iran-get-a-
new-saudi-king/267013/.
14. Blanchard, C. (2012) "Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S relations".
Congressional research service.
15. "Qatari emir Sheikh Hamad hands power to son Tamim". BBC. 25 June
2013
16. Finian Cunningham. (2013). Qatar power transfer simply PR exercise
triggered by Saudi rivalry. Available:
http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/06/27/311025/saudi-rivalry-behind-qatari-
pr-shuffle/.
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Received on Sun Sep 22 2013 - 13:43:54 EDT