It's two years after the secession of the South and Sudan remains in a state
of political turmoil. What to do then? According to Princeton Lyman and Jon
Temin, it's high time to pursue a national dialogue that involves all of the
country's warring factions and the international community.
By Princeton N. Lyman and Jon Temin for United States Institute of Peace
(USIP)
17 September 2013
_____
Introduction
Two years after losing a quarter of its people and territory, Sudan remains
in turmoil. The secession of South Sudan in 2011 did nothing to resolve
Sudan's longstanding internal conflicts. Since then, President Omar
al-Bashir's regime has been challenged by an armed rebellion whose
confidence is growing and deepening internal divisions, punctuated by plots
to overthrow him by elements of the army. Now is the time for Sudan to
embark on a genuine internal dialogue and reform process that leads to a
broad-based, democratic government willing to pursue meaningful
reconciliation among Sudanese.
But how to initiate that process remains as difficult as ever.
There is a growing international consensus that efforts to resolve Sudan's
multiple internal conflicts - from the war in Darfur that has raged for more
than a decade to renewed violence in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states
- individually, in a piecemeal fashion, have failed. Instead, there is
increasing recognition, at least among the regime's opponents and some in
the interna-tional community, of the need for a more comprehensive approach
to Sudan's internal conflicts that addresses critical issues of governance,
managing diversity and reconciliation.
While there are ongoing and rather vigorous discussions in different camps
of the Bashir regime about the need for change, these debates have not
extended to include opposition parties or armed groups fighting the regime.
Moreover, the president and his inner circle will be loath to enter into any
process that might end in their demise, especially given the International
Criminal Court indictments of Bashir and some of his top lieutenants, who
face the prospect of trials in The Hague if they leave once. How to convince
the regime to engage in a meaningful dialogue and reform process, while
simultaneously addressing their self-preservation concerns, remains a
central, unsolved riddle.
Implementing National Dialogue and Reform
One place to start is to focus on the principles that should underpin any
national dialogue and reform process. Foremost among them is that any
process must enjoy broad participation, based on the recognition that all
facets of Sudanese society have a right to participate in the process. This
includes Sudan's Islamists, who are part and parcel of Sudan's political
fabric and are legitimate participants in any process. It also includes
elements of the current regime, which retains the support of a segment of
Sudanese society, especially those who have profited economically during its
reign.
Participants also need to include the armed opposition, currently led by the
Sudan Revolution-ary Front (SRF), a union of the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement-North (SPLM-N) and the three main Darfur-based rebel movements. The
SRF's rhetoric espouses a peaceful resolution to Sudan's crises, but their
actions call that commitment into question, as exemplified by their attack
in Northern Kordofan only hours after the conclusion of initial talks with
the government in April. The subsequent breakdown in talks was a setback,
and such maneuvers often politically empower government hardliners
resolutely opposed to negotiations. If the SRF is going to participate in a
political process, they need to develop a stronger political component of
their operations, which have so far been heavily skewed toward military
objectives, and honestly evaluate their unified commitment to peaceful
change. If that commitment is genuine, there should be international
assistance, in the form of training and capacity building, to help the SRF
transition toward being a political participant in Sudan's future. Khartoum
will resent such assistance to their armed oppo-nents, but it is critical
for a peaceful dialogue process.
A consistent failure of past negotiations in Sudan is that they most often
involve only the belligerents: the government and armed rebels. For a
national dialogue process to succeed, both traditional opposition political
parties and civil society have to be involved in a meaningful way. This will
likely make the process slower and more complex, but it will also make any
agreements more durable. Complicating matters are divisions within these
unarmed groups, especially among the opposition political parties, just as
there are divisions within the SRF. This is another area in which external
assistance and facilitated discussions among the opposition may be able to
help smooth the path to national dialogue.
In order to initiate any dialogue process, there will need to be some modest
confidence-building measures among prospective participants, especially
between the regime and SRF. One step could be a cessation of hostilities in
Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile (a goal that many diplomats have
worked for in the past two years, to little avail). The trade-off at the
heart of any cessation could be for SRF elements to suspend their military
efforts and put their weapons beyond use (as the African National Congress
did during negotiations in South Africa) in exchange for being allowed to
operate freely as one or more political parties. This trade-off is more
likely to succeed than simply demanding that the SRF first disarm. Such an
understanding could have important implications on the ground - humanitarian
organizations have not been able to access many desperate groups in Southern
Kordofan and Blue Nile for some time - as well as encourag-ing the SRF to
focus more on its political operations.
Equally important will be detailed preparations for the dialogue process and
reaching a broad con-sensus on the agenda, scope and authority of the
process before it starts. This will take time, possibly a year or more, but
is essential. Quiet shuttle diplomacy between participants can help to
narrow the gaps between them, as can informal "Track II" dialogues led by
NGOs, some of which are already underway and can help smooth the transition
to a more formal "Track I" process. During this pre-dialogue period, central
questions will need to be addressed: Does the dialogue establish principles
on which a follow-on political process proceeds? Or does the process itself
draft a new constitution? Is an interim authority needed to administer and
govern during part or all of the dialogue processes? How are the results
integrated into law and policy and ultimately implemented? What mechanisms
can be put in place to ensure transparency and to build trust that leaders
are making decisions for Sudan, not just for their own self-interest? How
will citizens be informed of and consulted on dialogue topics and decisions
that are made? Outsiders can o.er suggestions for addressing these
questions, and there are multiple examples of dialogue processes elsewhere
that can be used as models, but ultimately these questions need to be
grappled with and answered by Sudanese.
If all the necessary groups engage in a dialogue process, it's unlikely they
will reach a full con-sensus given the long history and deep divisions
between them. If this is the case, Sudan should borrow the concept of
"sufficient consensus" from the prolonged negotiations to end apartheid in
South Africa. Those negotiations also involved many participants and various
interest groups, who were unlikely to reach broad agreements, but it was
understood that "sufficient consensus" would be achieved if the two dominant
negotiating parties - the African National Congress and National Party -
were in agreement. Sudanese will need to agree what combination of parties
may constitute "sufficient consensus" in their context.
Sudan's political calendar presents another complication, as nationwide
elections are scheduled for 2015. While it is possible that a dialogue
process could be completed within two years, this seems unlikely given the
many obstacles to such a process and breadth of issues to be discussed,
combined with the fact that successful dialogue processes elsewhere have
taken several years, if not more, to yield meaningful results. Elections in
2015 should not be viewed as an immovable end point in the process, nor
should the regime be allowed to use them to legitimize their rule through
flawed elections, as was the case in 2010. Instead, if there is a genuine
national dialogue process underway, one that is participatory and gaining
momentum, then a delay in elections for a maximum of two years should be
considered.
External Assistance for Internal Change
It is unlikely that the Sudanese parties will be able to initiate and
sustain a national dialogue process on their own. The necessary external
oversight and support should come primarily from the African Union High
Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), an ad-hoc body established by the
African Union in 2010 and chaired by former South African president Thabo
Mbeki. The AUHIP has focused most of its efforts on mediating negotiations
between Sudan and South Sudan on difficult post-secession is-sues, with some
notable successes. The AUHIP's mandate was recently extended until January
2014, but it should refocus its attention toward Sudan's deep internal
divisions, which President Mbeki has expressed an interest in working to
address (in his most recent interim report, Mbeki writes "the AUHIP proposes
to engage with each government [of Sudan and South Sudan] on its agenda of
democratization and constitutional reform.") The AUHIP should serve as a
guide and advocate for a dialogue process, with the full backing of the
African Union Peace and Security Council, whose members should be eager to
stem the tide of never-ending Sudan crises on their agenda. President Mbeki
and the AUHIP can be particularly helpful to the detailed preparations and
"pre-dialogue" needed prior to the start of the process, especially given
his close involvement with the dialogue and reform process in South Africa
in the 1990s. To allow President Mbeki and other AUHIP personnel to focus on
dialogue and reform in Sudan, the AUHIP team will need to be expanded and a
subsidiary mechanism to the AUHIP should be established to oversee
implementation of agreements reached by Sudan and South Sudan, which should
not be subject to constant renegotiation.
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Received on Wed Sep 18 2013 - 13:14:28 EDT